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This research is concerned with the moral philosophical and epistemological positions 
underlying economics and the examination of its claims. Specifically, two questions are 
asked with the intention of investigating the issue of the commensurability of what have 
been referred to as ‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’ values. Firstly, do environmental citizen 
values possess objective validity? Secondly, are moral norms motivated by individual 
well-being?
Part II of the thesis considers the objective validity of environmental norms. Arguments 
concerning the objectivity of scientific knowledge within the philosophy of science 
literature are reviewed, and the existence of necessity in knowledge posited as a 
requirement for objective knowledge. One possible source of necessity is identified in 
the form of the adoption of Piaget’s ‘genetic epistemology’ in explaining environmental 
preferences. However, attempts to empirically identify such necessity prove 
inconclusive.
Concerns within the literature over the objectivity of the naturalistic project in the social 
sciences threaten to undermine attempts to identify necessity in knowledge. It is 
suggested that these problems can be overcome through the adoption of a scientific 
realist perspective. This is in turn paralleled with the ‘direct perception’ approach to 
explaining conceptions of nature. However, attempts to identify cross-cultural 
commonalities in the conceptions of nature in support of the direct perception approach 
prove inconclusive.
Part HI then explores the question of whether moral norms are motivated by individual 
well-being. Following a review of attempts to incorporate moral norms within 
economists’ conception of ‘rationality’, the question is redefined as whether moral 
norms share the teleological structure of economic preferences. The results of a 
Contingent Valuation survey suggest that moral norms and economic preferences are 
commensurable, and that morality possesses a teleological structure. However, it is 
suggested that this conclusion requires that assumptions be made regarding respondents’
14
beliefs, a limitation experienced generally when investigating causal laws in the social 
sciences.
Thus the answers to both the questions posed are inconclusive. Instead the outcome of 
the research points to the epistemological problems in establishing causal relationships 
within the social sciences. It is suggested not only that further research is required, but 




Moral norms, the market, and environmental policy.
This thesis started life as an investigation into the sustainability of indigenous forest use 
norms in northern Thailand. Having identified the expansion of the market into the 
previously relatively isolated upland areas of Thailand as an important factor in the 
effectiveness of traditional norms, attention was turned to the nature of the sanction 
system underlying communal resource regulation, considered important in determining 
the impact of market forces on traditional resource use practices. A review of the 
collective action literature concerned with this question identified two lines of argument 
divided according to utilitarian and deontological conceptions of morality.
An interest in non-market valuation techniques revealed a debate between mainstream 
environmental economists and their detractors concerning the incorporation of moral 
values into market prices that also divided along the lines of utilitarian and 
deontological conceptions of morality. Moreover, this literature defined the debate 
according to the commensurability of what are referred to as ‘citizen values’ and 
‘consumer values’, and outlined the assumptions required for value forms to be 
considered commensurable, namely, that consumption decisions are based primarily on 
individual well-being, and that individuals are the best judges of their own well-being.
Combining these two debates, Part I of the thesis establishes the importance of the 
commensurability of citizen and consumer values in determining the appropriate role of 
both traditional communal resource use norms and economic valuation in environmental 
policy. It then proposes the determination of the commensurability of citizen and 
consumer values through an investigation of the assumptions underlying claims of 
commensurability as a research question for the remainder of the thesis. In this way the 
research hopes to contribute to resolving the utilitarian-deontological moral 
philosophical debate and thus the debates concerning the appropriate form of economic 
valuations of the environment and the impact of market forces on traditional resource 
use norms.
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Chapter 1 concentrates on the problem of deforestation and the related policy debate in 
Thailand. Having identified the erosion of traditional resource use norms by the 
expanding market as a problem of concern in establishing a policy of community 
management of forest resources, it is suggested that the nature of the sanctioning 
systems underlying community norms is important in regulating the impact of the 
market. The issues underlying the debate over the nature of the sanctioning system 
required for communal action parallel those underlying debate over the efficacy of the 
economic valuation of environmental resources. The latter is the subject matter of 
chapter 2. Specifically, it is suggested that the commensurability of ‘citizen’ and 
‘consumer’ values not only underlies the appropriateness of incorporating social norms 
into economic valuation, but will also determine the impact of market forces on 
traditional social norms. Moreover, attempts by economists to defend the 
commensurability of citizen and consumer values can be used to identify research 
questions, the answer to which will contribute to both the community forestry and 
economic valuation debates.
18
1. Solutions to Thai deforestation: The Community Forest Bill and the 
extension of the market.
1.1 Deforestation and traditional communal forest use in Thailand
Deforestation is currently an issue of major international concern. Depending on the 
definition of deforestation used, estimates measured the exact scale of the problem at 
between 14 and 17 million hectares per annum (1.8 -  2.2% of total forest areas) by the 
end of the 1980s, an increase on the 0.6% per annum at the end of the 1970s (Pearce, 
1990). The situation in Thailand is no different. In 1938 forest cover was estimated at 
72% (England, 1996). As late as 1961 forest cover was estimated at 53% of the national 
area, comfortably within the target of maintaining 40% of the area of the country 
forested set by the government in 1960 (Hirsch, 1987). However, by 1986 estimates 
ranged from a high of 29% of the country forested to a low of 15%, depending on the 
definition of forest areas (Hirsch, 1987). Significantly, only 30% of the forest in the 
hills above 800m -  the main source of watershed for the entire country -  remain 
(Anderson, 1993). The rate of deforestation in Thailand is shown in table 1.1.
Table 1.1 Comparison o f existing forest and changes in Thailand\ 1961 -  1985 
(England, 1996)
YEAR AREA OF FORESTED 
LAND (ha)









Thus, by any estimate of forest area, deforestation in Thailand can be seen to have been 
proceeding at an alarming rate over the last 50 years, bringing with it various adverse 
effects. First, soil erosion affects over 170,000 square km of Thailand. Soil loss in areas 
of deforestation is estimated at between 50 and 350 times that for undisturbed forest 
(Hurst, 1990). Soil loss in turn impacts agricultural yields. Between 1960 and 1982 
yields fell by 15% in Thailand despite the use of increasing quantities of fertilisers 
(Hurst, 1990). Erosion also reduces the effective life span of waterways, irrigation 
channels, and dams. Second, deforestation is also thought to result in the break down of 
the water cycle. In 1984 serious flooding occurred in 60 of Thailand’s 72 provinces, 
destroying an estimated 640,000 ha of crops (Hurst, 1990). Changes in the water cycle 
in turn impacts weather patterns. Although the exact impact is unknown, it is thought 
that deforestation is causing declines in rainfall through the fall in evapo-transpiration 
from trees (Hurst, 1990). Thirdly, deforestation is thought to have resulted in the loss of 
numerous species in an area of unique levels of biodiversity. Although the exact loss of 
species is unknown, declines in the numbers of high profile species help to indicate the 
scale of the problem, with the tiger, elephant, crocodile, mouse, deer, kouprey and 
Sumatran rhino all considered to be under threat.
Traditionally, two explanations for the rate of deforestation have been put forward. 
Firstly, excessive logging and the subsequent encroachment it encourages, as access to 
forested areas is opened up. Identifying this as a primary cause of deforestation, and 
following the connection of deforestation in upland areas to flash floods in November 
1988 in southern Thailand in which 350 people died, the Thai Government responded 
by suspending logging activities in the southern region and subsequently banning 
logging throughout Thailand in 1989 (England, 1996). While official figures suggest 
that, after the logging ban, the rate of forest encroachment dropped by 83.59% 
(England, 1996), the logging ban does not represent a comprehensive solution to the 
problems of deforestation. It is suggested that illegal logging persists and has simply 
taken on more surreptitious forms, while state development projects have provided 
opportunities for occasional logging licences to be granted (England, 1996).
The other cause of deforestation that is pointed to is swidden agriculture, in particular 
the agricultural techniques of the hill tribe population. An estimated 2000 communities 
of hill tribe people, including groups of Lua, Karen, Lisu, Hmong, Akha, and Lahu,
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practice swidden agriculture over an area of 5,000 km2 of the forest areas of northern 
Thailand (Anderson, 1993). However, to label swidden agriculture as detrimental to the 
forest environment is misleading, as it ignores the variety of forms that swidden 
agriculture takes in the region. On the one hand, the Hmong, Yao, Akha, and Lahu 
practice a version of swidden agriculture known as shifting cultivation: the felling and 
burning of forest areas, and growing crops in the cleared area as long as fertility is 
maintained -  approximately 4 to 5 years -  before moving on to clear another area. On 
the other hand, the Karen, and Lua practice a form of swidden agriculture known as 
cyclical swiddening. It is the environmental degradation produced by the former of 
these methods that earns swidden agriculture its poor reputation. However, the cyclical 
swidden of the Karen is generally considered environmentally benign1.
Support for the environmentally benign nature of cyclical swiddening is reconciled with 
the notion that tribal cultivation techniques have detrimental effects on the forest 
environment through what has been referred to as the ‘Karen consensus’. This argues 
that traditional Karen communal forest use regulation provides a sustainable way to 
manage forest resources, but that external social forces undermine the efficacy of these 
institutions (Chalardchai, 1989). Firstly, migration into Karen areas places traditional 
use systems under pressure, reducing the land available to operate rotation farming, and 
causing the overuse of the forest (Chalardchai, 1989; Anderson, 1993). Increased 
population levels, and improved access to forested areas have seen migrants from 
lowland areas clearing forests for agricultural land. Moreover, other hill tribes from 
higher elevations, whose land use techniques are not so benign, and who have 
increasingly exhausted their land, are migrating to the lower elevations inhabited by the 
Karen.
The encroachment by migrants into hill tribe land is exacerbated by government road 
building and cash crop promotion policies. Concerns over national security in the era of 
Prime Minister Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat (1958 -  63) resulted in a programme of 
road building into areas considered vulnerable to the influence and armed insurgence of 
the Communist Party of Thailand (Lohmann, 1995). Construction of roads in Thailand, 
under the authority of the Office of Accelerated Rural Development, has absorbed the
1 See s. 6.9 for a discussion of the benign nature of Karen forest use norms and the cultural system
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largest single portion of the development budget in Thailand since 1950 (Hirsch, 1987). 
With access to remote areas of Thailand improved by the building of new roads, 
migrants were then drawn to these areas by the promise of the cash crop boom, and the 
Government’s promotion of agricultural exports under the guidance of the World Bank 
(Bello et al. 1998; Charit, 1989), as well as problems of tenancy and high rents in their 
home regions. The result was an estimated 3 million lowlanders migrating to the forests 
of the north. Migration and forest clearance thus served the dual purpose of improving 
the balance of trade and removing potential cover for the Communist Party (Lohmann,
1995).
The effect of the encroachment by migrants on traditional lands is exacerbated by the 
hill tribes’ lack of citizenship and thus land rights. The fact that the hill tribe populations 
don’t enjoy full Thai citizenship status means that their land entitlements are limited. 
Moreover, this is a situation aggravated by the fact that the traditional Karen tenure 
system is a mixture of individual, household, and community based rights, while the 
Thai legal system recognises only private land rights (Vandergeest, 1996). Thus, the 
Karen are faced with the choice of either accepting the Thai legal categorisation and 
applying for rights to their traditional land, in which case the vital communal aspects of 
their resource use system is undermined, or maintaining their communal system and 
risking encroachment into their land by migrants. In each case, the efficacy of 
traditional use systems is damaged.
A second factor that undermines the ability of the Karen to implement their traditional 
use system, one related to the property right issue raised above, is the forest reservation 
policy. While forestry policy in the early part of the century followed the philosophy 
and practice of the British in India and Burma, adopting a “scientific” approach to 
forestry and the creation of logging concessions (Chalardchai, 1989; Vandergeest,
1996), since the 1960s the Thai Government, backed by a 1939 law empowering it to 
declare protected forest reserves, has specified targets for the proportion of the country 
that should remain under forest cover. 1960 saw the codifying of the Conservation and 
Protection Act, followed closely by the National Park Act of 1961. In 1964 the National 
Reserve Forest Act introduced a rather ambitious target of maintaining 50% of
underlying them.
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Thailand’s total area under forest. This target has since been lowered on a number of 
occasions. The Fourth National Plan of 1977-81 set the target at 37%, though based on 
the above estimates even this seems too ambitious.
The establishment of protected areas progressed only slowly in the 1960s, with only 1% 
of national territory protected by 1967 (Vandergeest, 1996). Increased government 
concern with conservation in the 1970s resulted in the acceleration of the rate of 
demarcation of protected areas, and 9.4% of national territory was designated either 
national park or wildlife sanctuary by 1986 (Vandergeest, 1996). The role of national 
parks and wildlife sanctuaries received a boost in 1989 when the government banned all 
logging activities in Thailand, and the mandate of the Royal Forestry Department 
shifted from one of organising timber extraction to one of forest conservation. The 
policy of protecting forests has seen the Thai Government create 52 parks, 28 wildlife 
sanctuaries, and 41 non-hunting areas, many of which are in the north (Anderson, 
1993), and 28% of the total land area of Thailand being declared protected by 1992 
(Bello etal. 1998).
The impact of the creation of protected areas has been to undermine Karen resource use 
systems. For those villagers that find themselves within protected areas the result is 
conflicting land rights systems. The co-existence of Royal Forestry Department 
regulations concerning forest use and traditional land rights produces an insecurity of 
tenure and an effective open access regime. The inability of communities to develop a 
sense of attachment to land creates a mentality of exploiting the land as quickly as 
possible before rights to that land are removed altogether. In Thailand, the northern 
region provides the majority of recorded cases of conflict over forest rights related 
issues. Lack of respect for state property rights by tribal people has resulted in little 
adherence to forestry legislation. This is well illustrated by the highly organised Karen 
army calling for self-rule. Attempts by the state to reduce opium production, a vital 
source of funding for the army, meant that the Karen had to resort to illegal logging 
practices for income. In 1985 the authorities imprisoned over 5,000 log poachers in 
northern Thailand (Hurst, 1990). Resistance by locals to the suppression of their 
traditional rights through the creation of protected areas has manifest itself in the 
formation of the Northern Farmers Network, which attempts to influence policy makers
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with demonstrations and marches, including the recently well publicised march in 
Chiang Mai in May 1999 that was broken up by the authorities.
Thirdly, the extension and intensification of the role of the market in Thai society is 
thought to influence the effectiveness of traditional resources use systems. Beginning 
with the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1826, and the Bowring Treaty of 1855, and 
continuing through US influence during the fight against communism in the Cold War 
and the adoption of market based development policy under the guidance of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Thailand has gradually been opened to the 
forces of global capitalism and a dependence upon external demand (Chalardchai, 1989; 
Hirsch, 1990; Lohmann, 1995). Until recently the relative abundance of land within 
Thailand insulated rural communities from the influence of capitalism. However, 
following a period of land use extensification the last fifteen years has seen an increased 
problem of land scarcity, and with it an increase in the impact of capitalism on rural 
communities. The result has been the increased differentiation of, and conflict within 
communities, and the decline of the traditional community (Lohmann, 1995).
A final pressure on the working of traditional resource use systems is the access to 
alternative worldviews that improved communication and transportation permit. For 
instance, the schooling of hill tribe children within the Thai education system, while 
providing the tools for tribal people to better themselves within Thai society, represents 
a severe challenge to the perpetuation of tribal cultures (Anderson, 1993). Moreover, the 
missionary activity of various religions has resulted in tribal people abandoning their 
traditional beliefs with the resultant changes in social structure and ethnic identity 
(Chumpol, 1997). Conversion to Christianity in particular is thought to have brought 
major changes in Karen culture (Chumpol, 1997)2. The more subtle effect of alternative 
worldviews propagated, for instance, through the media are more difficult to identify3.
2 This effect is mediated by the fact that only 17% of the Karen population in Thailand have converted to 
Christianity, while 55% are thought to have adopted a form of Buddhism that allows the maintenance of 
traditional animistic beliefs (Chumpol, 1997).
3 See s. 9.3 for a further discussion of the influence of the media and education system on traditional 
resource use norms.
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1.2 The Karen Consensus, Participation, and the Community Forest Bill
1.2.1 The Karen Consensus.
The result of the above forces is the gradual assimilation of the hill tribes into Thai 
society and the global market economy, the loss of indigenous knowledge, institutions, 
and values, and the undermining of environmentally benign traditional resource use 
systems (Kempe, 1997a, 1997b; McCaskill, 1997). It is the claim of what is referred to 
as the ‘Karen Consensus’ that these externally imposed forces of modernisation have 
subverted traditional resource management regimes resulting in natural resource 
depletion. Moreover, it is suggested that participation of Karen communities in forest 
resource management, once protected from such external forces, in particular once 
traditional communal rights are legally recognised, presents the possibility of 
sustainable forest use and a solution to the problem of deforestation.
The history of the debate concerning the concept of development and the role 
participation should play in development in Thailand has tended to follow that in the 
more general development debate. In the immediate post-war period development was 
conceived as bringing productivity and consumption levels into line with those of 
developed countries (Hirsch, 1990). Consequently, it was to the history of the developed 
world that those concerned with development turned in search of models of this process: 
state formation, national integration, growth, capitalist transformation, urbanisation, 
industrialisation etc. Following this trend, and under the guidance of the World Bank 
(Chalardchai, 1989) Thailand adopted a development ideology based on the promotion 
of individual accumulation of wealth, monetized production relations, and the 
nationalist ideology of nation-religion-monarchy, and initiated national economic 
planning in the early 1960s (Hirsch, 1990). From this perspective, participation was 
limited to people’s roles as consumers and producers, and forest areas were opened up 
to clearing for cash crop production.
It was soon realised that unequal distributions of income or the failure to recognise the 
benefits of accumulation via the capitalist economy were inhibiting development under 
such an approach (Panayotou, 1983; Hirsch, 1990). Thus, there emerged in Thailand a 
development ethos concerned with ensuring the trickle-down of the fruits of growth to
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the rural population (Hirsch, 1990). The World Bank produced a report entitled 
“Thailand: Towards a strategy of full participation”, arguing that the problem was not 
the promotion of capitalist penetration into the economy but that such penetration had 
not gone far enough. The answer was ‘modernisation’, with non-capitalist elements 
ironed out through the construction of roads, the extension of credit, and the 
improvement of marketing. In forestry, the commercial forestry approach, in particular 
the National Forest Policy partly adopted in 1987, was indicative of this attitude to 
participation. The aim of the National Forest Policy was to expand forests to 40% of the 
total land area. One third of this would be achieved through protected areas, the 
remaining two thirds through the establishment of commercial forest. The success of 
such plantation forest was limited by illegal logging and degradation by farmers. 
Replanting thus covered less than 8% of the forest lost annually (Hurst, 1990).
It is suggested that the failure of reforestation programmes was the result of the lack of 
control given to communities, therefore not overcoming the causes of deforestation (s. 
1.1). The rights that were given to farmers, including the Forest Village Program of 
1956 and the National Forest Land Allotment Programme (STK) launched in 1982, 
tended to emphasise private tenure and suffered from problems of tenure insecurity 
(Lohmann, 1995). The result was the concentration of land rights in the hands of the 
well-connected few, and little to talk about in terms of environmental gains4 (Hurst, 
1990). The failure of commercial reforestation programmes to improve participation in 
development was illustrated by the displacement of people, which eventually led to 
protests by thousands of dissatisfied peasants in Nakhon Ratchasima City and Pak 
Chong district in June 1993, forcing the government to suspend commercial 
reforestation.
In an attempt to overcome the failure of previous policies, and in response to changes in 
popular thinking within development circles regarding participation issues, a new 
approach to participation was manifest in the forestry sector through a number of 
initiatives, such as the Thai Forest Sector Master Plan (TFSMP), and the Forest 
Conservation and Development Project. The TFSMP divided Thailand’s forests into
4 Plantations were dominated by eucalyptus, as it is very fast growing. However, eucalyptus consumes 
large quantities of water, provides poor shade and is thus not suitable for inter-planting with crops, and 
produces too many toxins in its leaf litter to allow other plants to grow beneath them (Lohmann, 1995).
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‘Conservation Forest’ and ‘Multipurpose Forest’, which defined the possible use of 
forest areas and included a community forestry element. However, while the plan 
adopted the language of community forestry, Bello et al (1998) argued that the basis of 
the plan was a strong argument for commercial forestry. Thus, the plan effectively 
paved the way for the reintroduction of the commercial reforestation practices that had 
been banned only a few years before. In fact the ban on commercial reforestation was 
lifted in 1993.
The notion behind the Forest Conservation and Development Project, co-funded by the 
World Bank administered Global Environmental Facility, was to create protected 
conservation areas, with minimal human presence, surrounded by a ‘Conservation 
Buffer Zone’ five kilometres deep where communities would partake in ecologically 
sustainable economic activities. The arguments against the buffer zone policy suggest 
that it is simply an adaptation, or an add-on to the national parks philosophy. That is, the 
solution to conservation is seen as keeping people away from the forest, while 
perceiving the encroachment problem as simply one of poverty (Bello et a l 1998). 
Instead, it is argued the problem is one of community control over resources and 
villagers’ claims to land within protected areas. The solution is thus viewing the 
relationship between people and the forest as a dynamic process based on co- 
evolutionary development, and recognising the compatibility of traditional activities and 
conservation, as reflected in the Karen Consensus.
The perceived compatibility of traditional activities and conservation is manifest in Thai 
forestry policy in attempts to implement the Community Forestry Bill (CFB), which 
seeks to give more control over forests to communities, allowing communities to 
manage resources in their forest, replacing the Royal Forestry Department officials’ 
mandate to do so, and allowing the creation of community forests within conservation 
areas. Disagreement between NGOs over whether communities could co-exist with and 
be trusted to conserve the forest delayed the introduction of the CFB. However, the 
Royal Forestry Department eventually approved a draft bill, and in September 1997 the 
Committee of Public Hearings presented the CFB to the Cabinet. However, after the 
public hearing had approved the bill, changes were made to the bill without any input 
from the NGOs that had helped write it. For instance, one such change concerns the 
process of creating community forests within conservation areas. With the changes,
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communities would have to prove that they can manage forests for five years before 
community forest status will be conferred. Even then, community forests would be 
subjected to inspections by four different government organisations.
The NGOs involved in the development of the bill challenged these changes, and in July 
2001 six competing drafts of the CFB were submitted to the House of Representatives: 
five submitted by the government, the sixth being proposed by citizens following the 
collection of 50,000 signatures by NGOs, academics, and community representatives. 
The main difference between the proposed draft bills is that, while the government’s 
versions give authority for granting and monitoring of community forest rights to the 
forest chief and agriculture minister, the people’s version suggests authority should be 
locally administered. In November 2001, the House approved the notion of allowing 
Community Forest in protected areas providing a forest management plan is submitted 
and the community can show that it has successfully managed the forest for the last 5 
years (Bangkok Post, November 1, 2001). Later the same month, the Senate accepted 
the bills for deliberation despite their concerns that community management would 
harm forests in protected areas (Bangkok Post, November 2, 2001).
1.2.2 The market and traditional use rights
To some extent the motivating forces underlying the difference between the two forms 
of draft bill are political. In support of this position, Vandergeest (1996) argues that the 
nature of bureaucratic politics in Bangkok is to blame for opposition to permitting 
livelihood activities inside protected forest areas. The motivation of government 
departments to maintain budgets and the associated status of its officials is thought to lie 
behind the Royal Forest Department’s (RFD) attempt to maintain exclusive control over 
protected areas. The RFD’s legitimacy, and therefore budget, was initially based on its 
control over the extraction and export of timber from Thailand’s forests. The creation of 
protected areas, especially following the banning of logging in 1989, meant that the 
RFD could no longer legitimise its control over territory by appealing to the need to 
promote economic development through scientific forestry. The problems this change in 
emphasis on forest issues created for the RFD are highlighted by its declining budget 
during the 1980s (Vandergeest, 1996). However, through redefining its role as a
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conservationist organisation required to regulate protected areas, the RFD relegitimised 
itself, and once again its budget began to rise (Vandergeest, 1996).
Beyond political issues, underlying the debate in the Senate as to where authority for 
regulating community forests should lie sits the contentious and very real issue of 
whether communities are able to interact sustainably with the forest. Even accepting the 
validity of claims that the traditional forest use practices of the Karen are 
environmentally benign, there is still the issue of the various external forces that have 
undermined the efficacy of such institutions (s. 1.1). Arguments that community 
regulation provides a strategy for sustainability would seem to be based upon the notion 
that traditional systems can be protected from the adverse effects of modem social 
dynamics. However, one has to ask whether this is possible.
Considering the issues discussed above, it might be argued that establishing a legal 
system that recognises and enforces the communal property rights of tribal groups 
would go some way to overcoming the problems of migration and national park policy. 
Moreover, though perhaps more difficult, it is possible to imagine measures that would 
help to mitigate the impact on traditional culture of alternative world views. For 
instance, the education system could be reformed to pay special attention to the needs of 
minority cultures. However, perhaps the largest obstacle to protecting traditional 
cultural systems is the apparent inexorable extension of the market and its undermining 
of communal institutions.
The likely impact of the extension of market forces on tradition resource use norms 
depends on our perception of the source of and factors maintaining communal practices. 
This is an issue that has received significant attention within the literature on the success 
of collective action mechanisms. Within this literature, there exists a consensus on a 
broad range of conditions thought important for the success of co-operative institutions: 
small user groups, living close to resources, free to establish their own management 
regimes, a high dependence on the resource being managed, clearly defined common 
property rights, simple and fair rules, a well established punishment mechanism, low 
costs of monitoring, public resolution of crucial issues, and an available conflict 
resolution mechanism (Baland and Platteau, 1996). However, beyond this consensus
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there exist a number of issues upon which commentators disagree. One such issue is the 
form of sanction system required for collective action5.
Positions within the debate over the nature of the appropriate sanctioning mechanism 
within communal arrangements can be organised according to the moral economy- 
political economy debate of James Scott and Samuel Popkin. While Scott (1976) 
suggested that village communal organisations are regulated by reciprocity norms that 
keep villagers in moral debt and place the subsistence of community members before 
individual maximisation, Popkin (1979) rejected the moral economy, arguing that 
individual maximisation strategies precede village level strategies. These positions are 
represented within the collective action literature by the work of Wade and Olson. On 
the one hand, Olson (1971) suggested that collective action is made possible through the 
implementation of punishments and inducements that impact the individual’s benefit 
function. On the other hand, from his studies of collective action in India, Wade (1987) 
argues that where successful collective action regimes were found the main explanatory 
variable was the existence of a net collective benefit, which in turn was reflected in the 
existence of “morality, power, loyalty, and other forms of social interaction”, while 
elective punishments and other forms of inducement were found to be lacking. The 
difference between these two positions is that one emphasises the role of social values, 
codes of honour and responsibilities, while the other emphasises values based upon 
individual preferences.
It is proposed that whether sanction systems are based upon moral commitment or 
individual maximisation will determine the impact of the market on the efficacy of 
social norms in the regulation of forest use, and thus the potential role of community 
regulation of such resources in a sustainable management strategy. That is, if communal 
resource use is regulated by a mechanism that calls on the individual maximisation of 
members, then the extension of the market, through changes in the payoffs facing 
members, has the potential to undermine community regulation regardless of social 
structure. On the other hand, the regulation of community activities through moral
5 Others include the role of economic incentives for participation in co-operative enterprises, the potential 
for larger groups to co-operate successfully, and the role of past experience of successful collective action 
(Baland and Platteau, 1996).
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norms provides the possibility that protecting traditional social institutions can ensure 
the maintenance of traditional use norms even in the face of market expansion.
Moreover, if communal resource use is based upon a system of regulation that works 
through the manipulation of the individual maximisation of community members, then 
there is reason to think that appropriate market valuation, also influencing individual 
maximisation might also produce similar forest use regulation. On the other hand, if 
resource regulation requires communal norms, the chances of the market simulating 
such management regimes is limited. It is exactly this issue that underlies debate over 
the efficacy of economic valuation of environmental resources. Furthermore, this debate 
provides further insight into the relationship between market values and social norms, 
and can be used to elaborate avenues for further research that will enable us to 
contribute to determining the impact of market forces on traditional social norms. Thus, 
before elaborating on the relationship between sanctioning systems and the durability of 
traditional social norms, the next chapter considers perspectives on the economic 
valuation of environmental resources.
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2. Economic valuation of environmental resources and the 
commensurability of citizen and consumer values.
2.1 Introduction
This chapter briefly outlines what might be economists’ solution to the problem of 
deforestation: overcoming market failure and bringing total economic values to the 
decision-making process (s. 2.2). The efficacy of this approach is then discussed by 
distinguishing between the utilitarian and deontological moral frameworks and, in 
particular, what are referred to as ‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’ values (s. 2.3). It is suggested 
that, for everything economists claim to hold true, citizen and consumer values must be 
considered commensurable. The notion of the commensurability of citizen and 
consumer values is then extended to the problem of the impact of market forces on 
traditional social norms presented in chapter 1, and it is explained how the resolution of 
the commensurability debate can contribute to this problem (s. 2.4).
Having located the commensurability debate in the history of economic discourse with a 
review of the socialist calculation debate (s. 2.5), attempts by economists to defend the 
commensurability of citizen and consumer values and thus the neo-classical paradigm 
against the critique that it fails to appropriately consider ethical values are discussed (s. 
2.6). In particular, two such defences are focused upon: that agents are primarily 
concerned with their own well-being, and that individuals are the best judges of their 
own well-being. It is proposed that these two issues be investigated in the remainder of 
the thesis in order to contribute to the commensurability debate and thus both the 
market impact and economic valuation debates. Section 2.7 then provides an extensive 
summary of how this thesis goes about undertaking this investigation.
2.2 Economic valuation and the sustainable use o f natural resources.
2.2.1 Estimating total economic value.
The issue of deforestation can be reffamed in the language of economics providing an 
alternative solution. Economists point to a number of reasons why individuals might
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rationally deplete valuable tropical forest resources. For instance, Swanson (1995) 
shows that it is in the interests of investors to convert a resource with a growth rate less 
than the discount rate into an alternative form of capital. That is, the discount rate 
determines the rate of return required from natural resources and therefore the level of 
conversion to higher return assets. It can be shown that extraction of assets will take 
place to the point where the growth rate of an asset equals the rate of discount 
(Swanson, 1995). However, discount rates may also have output effects that work in the 
opposite direction to such substitution effects.
Lower discount rates will result in higher values being applied to the future, and 
therefore higher levels of investment today. It is argued that the application of shadow 
prices to reflect the true economic value of tropical forests will have a two-fold effect 
(Swanson, 1995). Firstly, the discount rate applied will be lowered. Secondly, as the 
emphasis is moved from higher growth to higher value assets in the calculation of 
returns, the possibility that tropical forests are chosen in asset portfolios will increase. 
From this perspective, deforestation becomes a change in land use due to the 
replacement of low return with higher return uses in the process of economic decision 
making. The determination of the optimal use of forest land therefore requires an 
analytical framework for the social evaluation of tropical forests in order that its true 
return can be considered in decision making.
Various attempts have been made to estimate the total economic value (TEV) of tropical 
forests through the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Pearce (1990) demonstrates that 
there exists an anti-conservationist bias within economic incentives. That is, the TEV of 
the conservation of tropical forests actually exceeds the development values derived 
from destroying forests. It is suggested that a major difficulty contributing to the extent 
of deforestation is that many components of the TEV of forests have no market, 
especially underdeveloped non-timber products, indirect uses, and option and existence 
values (Pearce, 1990). Thus, the choice of land use is biased in favour of marketable 
uses such as ranching, timber exploitation, and agriculture, and therefore excessive 
conversion of forest.
Swanson (1995) has identified further biases towards the conversion of tropical forests 
resulting from network externalities due to prior development in temperate parts of the
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world. In particular, Swanson (1995) argues that the perceived values of tropical forests 
are predetermined by the conversion decisions of initial development paths. The 
societies taking such decisions -  in this case the countries of the West -  select a number 
of locally available assets to develop. Investment in these assets produced network 
externalities that resulted in subsequent development efforts tending to take the form of 
‘catch-up’ and the transposing of these selections to their own territories; a bias that 
tends to favour investment in the same set of assets across the globe. This is particularly 
important from the point of view of the conversion of tropical forests, as these initial 
development decisions were taken in the context of temperate ecosystems. However, 
tropical and temperate ecosystems differ in fundamental enough ways as to reduce the 
effectiveness of management techniques developed in one when applied to the other.
The bias towards conversion of tropical forests is exacerbated by attempts by 
government to promote the development processes that are perceived as having been so 
successful elsewhere, resulting in programmes of agricultural subsidies, and land grants 
that encourage conversion (Swanson, 1995). A specific consequence of this is the 
allocation of forestlands to solve the problems of population pressure and poverty 
elsewhere in the economy. Moreover, governments tend to perceive timber harvests as 
the only benefit of forest resources (Hartwick and Olewiler, 1998). This is reflected in, 
for instance, the depletion of forest resources in order to raise revenue and reduce levels 
of indebtedness (Reid, 1995)6. Such policies contribute to the encroachment into 
traditional, indigenous lands and the subsequent erosion of traditional forms of forest 
use regulation.
Hence, it is argued that non-market valuation techniques can ensure that the TEV of 
forest resources are accounted for in decision-making, reducing deforestation rates. That 
is, there are economic arguments in favour of the conservation of tropical forests. 
Indeed, Barbier (1991) estimates that the maximum potential TEV of tropical forest 
resources would be obtainable through a sustainable management regime. Pearce (1990) 
even argues that, while efficiency would require the ‘true’ value of resources be
6 Such incentives are thought to exist within Thai forestry policy. While commercial logging was 
officially outlawed in 1989, it is suggested that state development projects have provided opportunities 
for occasional logging licences to be granted (England, 1996). Moreover, the Thai Forest Master Plan, 
while presented under the guise of community forest policy, paved the way for the reintroduction of 
commercial forestry, the ban on which was lifted in 1993 (s. 1.2.1).
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considered, there is evidence to indicate that consideration of only marketable direct use 
values alone would be sufficient to favour tropical forest conservation, the observed 
clearing of forest lands being the result of subsidies offered for such activities, and the 
insecure tenure of many users. Thus, economic arguments are alone sufficient to justify 
a dramatic reduction in deforestation rates around the world.
2.2.2 Consumer values: economic valuation o f the environment.
The valuation of the environment is an issue that invokes particularly deep felt, 
fundamental divisions between the different academic disciplines. On one side of the 
social science debate reside the economists who, conceiving of environmental ‘use- 
values’ as articles capable of satisfying given, subjective preferences, argue for the 
efficacy of the application of the economic framework and the market mechanism to the 
valuation of natural resources (Perman et al. 1996). From this perspective, 
environmental problems are classified as externalities: the exclusion of environmental 
preferences from expression within the market due to the nature of the environmental 
resources in question (Perman et al. 1996; Keat, 1997). Hence the solution to such 
problems consists in removing such externalities through, for instance, the use of cost- 
benefit analysis (CBA) and the attachment of ‘shadow’ or ‘surrogate market’ prices to 
environmental goods and services. Once this exclusion is overcome, through the 
institution of property rights or use of economic valuation techniques, environmental 
resources are thought to be allocated optimally through the interaction of supply and 
demand within the market.
This modem conception of economic value within the market dates back to Alfred 
Marshall’s reconciliation of the two theories of values which Adam Smith had initially 
presented economics but had difficulty reconciling: a labour cost theory of value, stating 
that the value of a commodity was determined by the amount of labour it took to 
produce it; and a labour command theory of value, stating that the value of a commodity 
was equivalent to the amount of labour it could be exchanged for in the market. Smith’s 
inability to reconcile these two value concepts established what would become the split 
between the “production cost theories of value” and the “subjective preference theory of 
value”.
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Current economic theory is the result of Marshall’s reconciliation of these two theories 
into one coherent theory with the construction of his “Marshallian Scissors”. According 
to this conventional theory, the value of a good is given by the equilibrium market price 
found where the supply curve, representing the production cost theory of value, 
intersects the demand curve, representing the subjective preference theory of value. 
However, the notion that the incorporation of both “production cost” and “subjective 
value” theories of value in some way overcame the subjective nature of economic 
valuation is misconceived. The valuation of production costs in determination of the 
supply curve, while taking account of the physical aspects of production, is itself 
ultimately determined by choices relating to work, saving, risk, and so on, and so also 
represents the expression of subjective preferences7.
The extension of this subjective preference based valuation process to environmental 
resources becomes problematic when it is asked: what costs and benefits should be 
regarded as relevant within the valuation process? Initially, a relatively narrow view of 
values relevant to economic valuation was taken, restricted to goods which were already 
subject to market pricing. However, in reaction to criticisms that this approach failed to 
take into account significant aspects of the value people attributed to the environment, 
the concept of externalities was broadened to incorporate ‘intangible’ values involved in 
the aesthetic appreciation of nature, and ethical objections to environmental damage 
(Keat, 1997). In order for such a move to be justified -  that is, in order for consistency 
with the utilitarian moral foundations of neo-classical analysis to be maintained -  all 
evaluations and moral commitments have to be considered commensurable, or reducible 
to subjective utility. As Hodgson (1997: 52) puts it:
In sum then, moral values and norms appear in the neo-classical 
analysis, but either they are rendered commensurate with everything else 
via the utilitarian calculus of satisfaction seeking individuals, or they are 
simply disregarded. [...] The neo-classical economist is thus like the 
cynic in Oscar Wilde’s play Lady Windermere's Fan -  a person who 
‘knows the price of everything and the value of nothing’.
7 This is a perspective fully developed by the Austrian School. A brief review of subjectivism in the work
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2.3 Citizen values: the non-commensurability o f environmental values.
Arguments against the economic valuation of natural resources can be summarised by 
an expansion of “possibly the most venerable -  and surely the most familiar -  
distinction in political theory” (Sagoff, 1998: 214): that between utilitarian and 
deontological (or Kantian) conceptions of rational choice. The utilitarian approach 
states that decisions should be made “by evaluating their consequences in terms of prior 
preferences” (March, 1994). Adopting the deontological framework, decision makers 
“pursue a logic of appropriateness, fulfilling identities or roles by recognising situations 
and following rules that match appropriate behaviour to the situations they encounter” 
(March, 1994).
Neo-classical economics takes as its foundation a utilitarian moral philosophy, the 
fundamentals of which are thus extended to arguments within environmental 
economics. Utilitarianism is a consequentialist moral philosophy, judging the moral 
rightness of an action by the utility that is generated by it, or its contribution to the 
greatest good of the greatest number. Classical utilitarianism, as developed by Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, possess three main components: an assertion that 
outcomes be assessed on their impact on the ‘social good’; a criterion as to what 
constitutes social good; and the principle that individual good is cardinally measurable 
and comparable over persons and time (Perman et a l , 1996). However, difficulties were 
encountered in measuring utility cardinally. Neo-classical utilitarianism overcame this 
by dropping the strong cardinal measurement requirement. The resulting weaker 
utilitarianism defines ‘good’ as the utility generated, and utility as the satisfaction of 
individual preferences. Different packages of goods and services are ordinally ranked in 
terms of a preference ordering.
The concern of neo-classical economics is directed toward the achievement of utility 
maximisation through maximisation over individual preference orderings. The concept 
of Pareto efficiency is invoked to provide a more substantial description of the 
requirements for maximising utility, including the eradication of externalities that 
motivates the application of non-market techniques to the valuation of natural resources.
of Hayek can be found in chapter 10.
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However, optimality is not a unique solution, but dependent on the rights of individuals 
within the decision making process (Perman et al., 1996), a situation recognised within 
the fundamental theorems of welfare economics.
The fundamental theorems of welfare economics recognise the relationship between 
initial endowments and welfare maximising outcome, stating that, for a given initial 
distribution of wealth, individual welfare maximising behaviour results in a welfare 
maximum for society through the satisfaction of individual preference. As property 
rights determine the structure of costs and benefits, each initial distribution results in a 
different welfare maximising position. Choosing between these different outcomes 
requires that a Social Welfare Function (SWF) is adopted, and different welfare 
positions ranked. However, rejection of the strong cardinal assumption of classical 
utilitarianism means that these different welfare positions cannot be ranked (Perman et 
al., 1996). Neo-classical economics overcomes this limitation by assuming that income 
is distributed in such a way that the marginal utility of income is equated for all 
individuals, thus allowing a simple equally weighted aggregation of individual 
valuations.
In reality conflict between individual preferences requires that distributional judgements 
be made through the choice of a SWF. This is the basis for Arrow’s (1951) 
Impossibility Theorem, which states that conflict between individuals means that no 
social welfare function can satisfy all. There is no meaning to total output independent 
of distributional and ethical judgements, and the supposed separation of efficiency and 
equity is misleading. The analytical simplicity of efficiency has led economists to adopt 
it with such devotion that it is scarcely thought of as normative. However, 
acknowledgement of the normative nature of economic techniques has led 
commentators, such as Page (1988), to argue that economists should embrace normative 
concepts to improve their analysis.
Another instance of the endowments relative nature of efficient solutions can be found 
in discussion of the Coase theorem. The Coase theorem states that, in the face of 
externalities, bargaining to a position of efficient allocation of resources can be 
achieved through the allocation of property rights to all resources. Individuals would be 
aware of their own cost and benefit structures, and the owner of the resource would be
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able to charge for changes in the allocation of the resource should others consider it 
welfare enhancing. The strong version of the Coase theorem considers voluntary 
exchange with completely specified property rights to eliminate all Pareto relevant 
externalities, and produce the same efficient allocation of resources irrespective of 
where property rights are allocated. However, this requires that income effects are zero, 
markets are frictionless, and property rights can be costlessly established and enforced 
(Perman et a l, 1996). The weak and more analytically useful version is derived through 
the relaxation of these assumptions.
Acceptance of income effects or the existence of transaction costs will result in the 
allocation of property rights impacting on the Pareto allocation of resources. Property 
rights determine the level of transaction costs and income effects, and therefore the level 
of externality that is Pareto relevant (Perman et a l, 1996). Some economists, such as 
Demsetz (1967), consider such levels of externality to be optimal. However, this 
approach considers bargaining to take place within a given institutional structure. In 
fact, the transaction costs, as well as the externalities themselves are a function of the 
institutional setting (Perman et a l, 1996). It would be analytically convenient to be able 
to simply calculate costs and benefits and consequently determine the rights structures 
that maximise welfare, but this ignores the fact that costs and benefits are themselves a 
function of the rights structure. Consequently, rights cannot be justified by reference to 
costs and benefits.
The lack of attention to distributional issues is the main point of divergence between 
utilitarian and deontological moral frameworks. The deontological perspective criticises 
the narrow definition of human behaviour espoused by utilitarianism, distinguishing 
between utility based on goods and services consumed and well-being defined as a 
broader motivation. Sen (1987) regards well-being as including attributes that people 
enjoy as citizens. For instance, freedoms such as democracy, free speech, and tolerance. 
While utilitarianism would regard these attributes as having only instrumental value as 
they contribute to the generation of utility, Sen considers such freedoms as having 
intrinsic value, and thereby directly impacting well-being. Sen extends his criticism of 
utilitarianism further arguing that individuals have objectives beyond self-interest that
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they wish to see achieved8. These may include the elimination of poverty or the 
conservation of nature.
Expanding the notion of human behaviour beyond the narrow definition employed by 
utilitarianism, deontology is a duty or rights based definition of individual well-being 
(Perman et a l, 1996). That is, it assigns morality to actions and their confirmation with 
rules and procedures encapsulating human rights to fundamental freedoms, rather than 
according to their consequences. The key message is one of free action. Distributions 
are only just if they result from free choices. The consequences of actions only become 
relevant once freedom of choice is observed.
Deontology’s emphasis on the ‘ethical rationality’ of norms or rights represents the 
currency of Schumacher’s meta-economics. In 1974 Schumacher wrote:
Economics operates legitimately and usefully within a given framework 
which lies altogether outside the economic calculus. We might say that 
economics does not stand on its own two feet, or that it is a derived body 
of thought -  derived from meta-economics (1974: 38).
Thus, meta-economics describes the context of economic activity, such as morals and 
the environment. Rather than being incorporated into economic valuations, moral values 
reflect a different level of analysis. Thus, there are many standards of value, as well as 
some ordering principle for determining which takes precedence over the others. 
Typical are Rawlsian rules introducing a lexical ordering amongst values, such that one 
value only comes into play once another has been satisfied (O’Neill, 1998). For 
instance, rights win against any other values.
The utilitarian and deontological alternatives in political theory introduce the distinction 
between consumer and citizen values. As Sagoff (1998: 2 1 4 -  15) distinguishes between 
them, “consumer preferences, for example, to buy Pepsi rather than Coke, reflect what 
the individual thinks is good for her or him. Citizen values, in contrast, reflect principles 
the individual believes are implicit in the character, commitments, or identity of the
8 For a further discussion of Sen’s work in this area see chapter 8.
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community as a whole”. Consumer values are the given, subjective preferences assumed 
by economists, while citizen values are a “richer register of human aspirations”, 
included in which is concern for the state of the natural world (Holland, 2001). 
Opposition to the application of economic valuation techniques to natural resources thus 
rests upon the commensurability of the citizen and consumer value attached to 
resources.
The role of this “richer register of human aspirations” has been applied to the allocation 
of environmental resources by a number of authors, most notably Mark Sagoff (1988, 
1998). Sagoff (1988) argues that it is a serious error to regard ethical or aesthetic 
objections to environmental damage as external costs that can be entered into the market 
mechanism, as this illicitly transforms ethical values into individual preferences. That 
is, citizen and consumer values are non-commensurable; they are based upon different 
objective functions, the costs and benefits of which cannot be balanced in arriving at 
decisions. There is a ‘category’ mistake involved in attempting to incorporate moral 
values concerned with fundamental human rights into economic valuations concerned 
with consequences for utility judged according to individuals’ preferences.
The criticism of the incorporation of environmental citizen values into economic 
valuation is based on the idea that the market (and other forms of monetary valuation) is 
blind to the reasons underlying judgements. That is, rather than evaluating whether or 
not judgements are true or false, economics evaluates judgements according to their 
holders willingness to pay. What counts is how much individuals will pay to satisfy 
their wants. This is tantamount to assessing the credibility or validity of these 
judgements by their proponents’ willingness to pay for their being accepted or acted 
upon. Sagoff (1988) suggests that to arrive at environmental decisions in this way is 
equivalent to trying to decide whether a person on trial is guilty by discovering, before 
any evidence has been heard, what the preferences of the jury are in this regard, and 
then calculating the net benefit of the two possible verdicts, or deciding the outcome of 
a football game according to the aggregation of the preferences of the spectators9.
9 Though there might be a case for the argument that this is how football matches held at Old Trafford 
the home of Manchester United, are actually decided
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Keat (1997) agrees with Sagoff that there are category errors involved in incorporating 
moral norms into economic valuations, but disagrees with his characterisation of citizen 
and consumer values. While Sagoff (1988) distinguishes between ‘judgements’ and 
‘preferences’, Keat (1997) argues that one can talk of the reasons behind people’s 
preferences or desires, thus not confining the concept of judgement to citizen values. 
However, Keat acknowledges that although preferences are normally based on 
judgements, it is a “highly significant failure of the market [...] that such questions have 
no role or function in how it operates” (1997: 36). Market transactions take place 
without reference to the reasons for which consumers prefer what they prefer. Thus, if 
individuals can be accepted as the best judge of what is in their interest, an assumption 
often criticised, then the market’s blindness to reason is inconsequential (Keat, 1997). 
That is, the reasons behind values are the domain of the individual, and the neo-classical 
approach holds. However, it is argued that the reasons behind citizen values do not 
relate to the determinants of individual well-being, but instead to ethical judgements 
with regard the attainment of aggregate well-being. Preferences are seen as the product 
of social processes, rather than exogenously given, developing throughout a person’s 
lifetime, and it is the process of social interaction and deliberation giving rise to 
preferences that imbues preferences with what Sagoff (1988) refers to as “ethical 
rationality”. In this case, it is argued that it would be a conceptual error to treat ethical 
judgements as if they were judgements about individual well-being, and to incorporate 
them into the market:
[Ethical claims] state what a person believes is right or best for the 
community or group as a whole. These opinions may be true or false, 
and we may meaningfully ask that person for the reasons that he or she 
holds them. But an analyst who asks how much citizens would pay to 
satisfy opinions that they advocate through political association commits 
a category mistake. The analyst asks of beliefs about objective facts a 
question that is appropriate only to subjective interests and desires 
(Sagoff, 1988: 94).
Keat (1997) identifies two forms of ethical judgement: those concerned with the 
expected contribution of the proposed course of action to the well-being of all or some 
of those affected by it; and those which do not. The most obvious cases of the latter
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kind are ethical judgements involving the ascription of rights, as those espoused by the 
deontological perspective outlined above. Keat then argues that both forms of ethical 
judgement should be excluded from economic valuations. The former as they are 
attempts to perform the same role as the market: to arrive at calculations of aggregate 
well-being. To do otherwise would run into problems o f ‘double counting’. The latter as 
their rationale implies that the utilitarian framework upon which the market is based is 
not the ethically correct way of making decisions. Attributing rights places limits on 
what would otherwise be the implications of aggregate welfare calculations.
Thus, the assumption of commensurability should be rejected. If I care about something, 
then one way of expressing that care is to refuse to put a price on it:
When Darius was king of the Persian empire, he summoned the Greeks 
who were at his court and asked them how much money it would take 
for them to eat the corpses of their fathers. They responded they would 
not do it for any price. Afterwards, Darius summoned some Indians 
called Kallatiai who do eat their parents and asked in the presence of the 
Greeks [...] for what price they would agree to cremate their dead 
fathers. They cried out loudly and told him to keep still (Herodotus, 
Histories; quoted in O’Neill, 1997: 79).
2.4 Commensurability and the impact o f market expansion on traditional resource 
use norms.
The notion of the commensurability of citizen and consumer values can be applied to 
the discussion concerning the impact of market expansion on the efficacy of traditional 
Karen resource use norms that we left back in chapter 1. That is, the debate concerning 
the distinction between moral commitment (Wade, Scott) and individual maximisation 
(Olsen, Popkin) parallels that concerning the commensurability of citizen and consumer 
values. If citizen and consumer values are commensurable it would suggest that the 
norms underlying community resource regulation are of a qualitatively similar form as 
the consumer values prevalent in the market, and norms based sanctioning systems 
operate through the manipulation of individual benefits and calculations based on self- 
interested rationality. In this case, the benefits provided by the market have the potential
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to undermine commitments to social norms, and a situation in which market expansion 
can erode social norms can be envisioned. If, however, citizen and consumer values are 
non-commensurable this would likely be the result of moral norms being of a 
qualitatively different form to consumer values, and norms based sanctioning systems 
can be said to operate through the construction of ‘ethical rationality’. In this case, the 
benefits brought by the market will not be expected to undermine community 
regulations, and traditional use systems based upon such norms can be said to continue 
to regulate the forest in the face of market expansion.
It is a small step from acknowledging the possible contribution of the commensurability 
debate to the determination of the effects of market forces on traditional communal 
norms to paralleling the debates within each discussion and recognising that they are 
based upon the same issue. That is, the debate concerning the nature of the sanctioning 
system underlying collective action can also be defined as that between the utilitarian 
and deontological conceptions of rational choice. On the one hand, Olson and Popkin 
adopt a utilitarian perspective, arguing that communal institutions are maintained 
through the manipulation of individual maximisation strategies. On the other hand, 
Wade and Scott accept a more deontological line of thinking, suggesting that collective 
action succeeds through the existence of reciprocity norms and the keeping of 


















Hence, it is suggested that determination of the commensurability of citizen and 
consumer values can contribute not just to the determination of the efficacy of applying 
economic techniques to the valuation of natural resources, but also to determining the 
possible impact of market expansion on traditional Karen resource use norms, thus 
contributing to the debate concerning the appropriate form of the Community Forest 
Bill in Thailand.
2.5 Commensurability: The socialist calculation debate revisited.
The major source of the assumption of the commensurability identified within 
environmental economics lies in the supposition that the rational resolution of practical 
conflicts requires a common measure through which different options can be compared. 
A classical statement of this utilitarian position can be found in J. S. Mill:
There must be some standard to determine the goodness and badness, 
absolute and comparative, of ends, or objects of desires. And whatever 
that standard is, there can be but one; for if there were several ultimate 
principles of conduct, the same conduct might be approved of by one of 
those principles and condemned by another; and there would be needed 
some more general principle, as umpire between them (quoted in 
O’Neill, 1998: 122).
The dispute concerning the issue of commensurability and the nature of rational 
decision making in environmental economics is part of what O’Neill (1998: 121) refers 
to as “a long footnote to the calculation debates”. The ‘socialist calculation debate’ was 
offered by the Austrian economists of the 1920s and 1930s as a defence of the market 
economy. Its central concern was to question the possibility of rational economic 
planning in certain forms of socialist economy. In particular, it asked whether rational 
action was possible in the absence of commensurability. Although they were preceded 
in the debate by the likes of Barone, Pierson and Weber, and the debate was later taken 
up by Hayek, Lange and Taylor, the following review of the calculation debate will
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focus on the contributions of Ludwig von Mises and Otto Neurath, as it is here that the 
issue of commensurability is addressed most clearly10.
Mises’ (1935) argument in Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth is 
aimed against the possibility of a socialist economy. Part of the argument is targeted 
against Neurath (1973), who denied that rational economic choice required the existence 
of a single unit of calculation and advocated a ‘natural economy’ founded on calculation 
in kind. Mises’ arguments against Neurath turn on assumptions about the nature of 
practical rationality and its dependence on commensurability. For Mises any rational 
decision requires the commensurability of different values (O’Neill, 1998). There needs 
to be a single common unit which reduces the choice between different options to a 
matter of calculation:
The practical man [...] must know whether what he wants to achieve 
will be an improvement when compared with the present state of affairs 
and with the advantages to be expected from the execution of other 
technically realisable projects which cannot be put into execution if the 
project he has in mind absorbs the available means. Such comparisons 
can only be made by the use of money prices (Mises, 1949; quoted in 
O’Neill, 1998: 115).
Neurath’s position is founded upon a rejection of just this account of rational choice. 
Neurath (1983) criticises the assumption made by Mises that values are commensurable. 
He rejects the possibility of units of pleasure upon which calculations could be made, 
suggesting that there is no possibility of a purely technical ordering of states of affairs, 
as pleasures are themselves incommensurable. In support of his argument, and the 
argument made by Sagoff and Keat above, Neurath points to the ineliminability of non­
technical ethical judgements. Thus, rather than involving a single unit of measure that 
reduced decision making to a purely technical procedure, rational choice requires ethical 
and political judgement.
10 A brief summary of the others’ contributions to the socialist calculation debate can be found in O.Neill 
(1998).
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The strength of Neurath’s position becomes apparent in a problem that Mises raises 
with his own position, and one that makes very clear the relationship between the 
position of Mises and that of environmental economics (s. 2.2). Mises recognises that, 
even in a market economy, there exist ‘non-economic goods’. For instance, 
environmental public goods. His response to this problem is to suggest that we cannot 
avoid making hard choices between non-economic and economic goods, and in doing so 
we are implicitly making economic evaluations of the non-economic (O’Neill, 1998). 
Rational decision making requires monetary units and, whether we like it or not, we are 
implicitly accountants, putting a price on unpriced goods. The economist is merely 
making this explicit.
Mises’ position is implausible, accepting that there are economic decisions that involve 
non-economic, or non-market goods while at the same time suggesting that the only 
way such decisions can be made is through the market valuation of such non-market 
goods. His response begs the question (O’Neill, 1998). Mises simply offers a position 
which is plausible only if it assumes what it is supposed to prove -  that all rational 
choices involve units of comparison to which rules of calculation can be applied. 
Neurath’s account of what is going on here is stronger, allowing that comparability need 
not assume commensurability, that there is no rule that can be mechanically applied to 
produce a determinate decision, and that there is an ineliminable role for judgement 
(O’Neill, 1998). ‘Tor this reason, the continued dominance within economics of the 
[...] Mises assumptions about practical reason is one of economics’ enduring 
foundational problems” (O’Neill, 1998: 121).
2.6 Defending utilitarianism: the commensurability o f citizen and consumer values.
Much of the argument in defence of market economies can be stated as a response to the 
worry that, because, in market economies, economic decisions are not constrained 
directly by ethical considerations, that these economies are ethically indefensible. 
O’Neill (1998) distinguishes five arguments made to defend market economies from 
precisely this concern:
(i) Recognising that we live in a pluralistic society, it is precisely a virtue of market 
economies that decisions and outcomes are not determined by any ethical goal.
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That is, it is not the job of economic institutes to promote the ‘good’ under some 
particular conception of it. Perfectionist accounts of public institutions should be 
rejected in favour of institutional arrangements which are neutral between 
different conceptions of good, and the market offers an institutional arrangement 
which realises this liberal principle of neutrality.
(ii) The market best realises the human good as an unintended consequence of the 
pursuit of other ends. The strategy at the centre of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible 
hand’ defence of market economies is a version of this strategy. Other versions 
are offered by Jevons and Menger.
(iii)Through markets, a central or the central good of human life, individual 
autonomy, is best realised. In a narrow sense, the autonomy argument can be 
understood as a version of the neutrality argument. However, understood more 
substantially as a desirable state of character, the autonomy argument is 
perfectionist in form. J. S. Mill provides arguments of this kind.
(iv)The market facilitates rational decision making not possible in non-market 
economies, as it introduces a universal unit of comparison in making choices. 
This claim can be found in much work within the Austrian tradition, including 
that of Mises and Hayek, culminating in a set of arguments concerning the 
epistemic qualities of the market in discovering and distributing the information 
required for the coordination of their efforts11.
(v) Markets are institutions that work because they reflect the “grain of human 
nature”. That is, humans are self-interested or at best beings of limited altruism. 
However, through markets the activities of self-interested agents can produce 
outcomes which, from the perspective of the altruist, would be best.
This thesis will concentrate its effort on just two of these defences: (i) that we live in a 
plural society and the market realises the liberal principle of neutrality appropriate to 
this, and (v) that individuals are self-interested. These are the two reactions of 
economists identified by Keat (1997) in response to his criticism of them. That is, 
economists return to the assumptions required for the efficient working of the market 
with the intention of ensuring citizen values remain within the utilitarian definition of 
human good as given, self-interested, subjective preferences:
11 For further discussion of Hayek’s epistemic defence of the market see s. 10.7.
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(a) In making decisions consumers are primarily concerned with their own well­
being. That is, they are self-interested.
(b) Individuals are the best judges of their own well-being, and what may be 
expected to contribute to it. That is, preferences are subjectively determined.
The only way to defend the incorporation of citizen values into the market as not being 
a category mistake is to accept these assumptions (Keat, 1997). If they are accepted, the 
market can be said to be efficient in the sense of maximising aggregate well-being, and 
the use of Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) as a guide to intervention in order to correct 
market failings is justified. Let us take each of these assumptions in turn.
If we accept assumption (a), that decisions are based on concern for one’s own well­
being, then it seems quite reasonable to regard willingness to pay as a measure of the 
expected contribution of a good to one’s well-being. That is, being prepared to pay 
more for one item rather than another would reasonably suggest that a greater benefit is 
expected from that item. Economists support the incorporation of citizen values into the 
extended CBA by attaching a more abstract meaning to preferences, one’s utility is 
based on other people’s consumption or utility (Becker, 1976a). Agents are said to 
prefer something in the sense that they would choose it in preference to other things. 
That is, the above criticisms are equated with the motivations underlying preferences. It 
is, therefore, argued that the axiomatic development of economic utility does not 
exclude any particular preference. From this perspective, rather than a fundamental 
break from the utilitarian tradition, citizen values represent anomalies within that 
system (Hanley and Spash, 1995).
However, even if this argument is entirely legitimate, and citizen values represent a 
form of preferences, the problem remains the ability of economic valuation to capture 
the motivations underlying preferences. That is, while it might be possible to 
incorporate citizen values within an extended CBA without stumbling upon conceptual 
anomalies, doing so misses the information present in the reason behind such 
preferences. In the words of Keat (1997: 43), this employment of the concept of 
preference in justifying the incorporation of citizen values into CBA “denudes the 
related concept of efficiency of any prima-facie ethical significance: it is no longer at all
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clear why the achievement of efficiency [...] should be seen as ethically desirable”. 
Thus, irrespective of the mechanism by which value forms impact upon individuals, it is 
suggested that the role of community based resource regulation goes further and ensures 
that the ‘true’ value of resources is appreciated, a value that would be missed by the 
TEV.
It is in response to this criticism that economists point to assumption (b), that 
individuals are the best judge of their own well-being. If we accept this, then the fact 
that the market fails to respond to consumer preferences by evaluating them does not 
matter, as no such evaluation could be expected to improve on the judgements which 
consumers have made themselves. That is, defending their framework against the 
criticism of committing a category mistake, economists argue that Keat and Sagoff have 
assumed the ability to evaluate ethical judgements, that to criticise the market for 
“missing the reason behind such preferences” is to assume citizen values reflect a 
reasoning superior to that of consumer preferences. That is to say, Keat and Sagoff are 
cognitivist about value. They believe that beliefs about values can be resolved 
rationally. It is suggested that citizen and consumer values are non-commensurable as 
citizen values possess greater ‘validity’.
Returning to a quote of Sagoff used earlier, we can see the belief that citizen values 
possess objective validity quite clearly:
[Ethical claims] state what a person believes is right or best for the 
community or group as a whole. These opinions may be true or false , and 
we may meaningfully ask that person for the reasons that he or she holds 
them. But an analyst who asks how much citizens would pay to satisfy 
opinions that they advocate through political association commits a 
category mistake. The analyst asks of beliefs about objective facts a 
question that is appropriate only to subjective interests and desires (Sagoff,
1988: 94; emphasis added).
And,
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If pleasure or satisfaction itself were the goal, a good biochemist or 
hypnotist could provide it at little cost and the Big Lie would be better 
than the hard truth (1998: 219; emphasis added).
Indeed, Sagoff only refers to the non-commensurability of values as a manifestation of a 
more fundamental criticism of economic valuation, the “blindness of the market to 
reason”. It is not only argued that citizen values reflect an “ethical rationality”, distinct 
from the self-interested rationality perceived as underlying neo-classical economics, but 
that such ethical rationality reflects the ‘truth’ of values that the market, by combining 
all values within a single measure, is consequently blind to. In response to this, neo­
classical economists return to their assumption that values are thoroughly subjective and 
do no more than express the preferences of the individual12. From this perspective, all 
ethical judgements are equally valid, as none have any legitimacy beyond the opinion of 
the individual. That is, the market’s blindness to reason is inconsequential, as the ethical 
principles upholding values can have no objective validity.
Economists, as “meta-ethical sceptics”, deny the possibility that there are any rational 
justification for ethical judgements. They argue that “there is no way of supporting one 
judgement against another: all are ‘equally valid’, [...] though only because none have 
any such ‘validity’ at all. More specifically, as subjectivists they claim that saying ‘X is 
right’ is the equivalent of saying ‘I like or prefer X’” (Keat, 1997: 44).
Another way to describe the same point is to suggest that modem society is 
characterised by a pluralism -  a diversity of equally valid concepts -  of the good that 
the appropriate institutions in this context are necessarily neutral with regard the good, 
and that the market and the liberal state provide this role. O’Neill (1998: 16) describes 
this position:
Recent liberalism has been characterised in opposition to perfectionism, 
as the view that public decisions and institutions are to be neutral 
between conceptions of the good. Such neutrality is required it is argued 
in virtue of the pluralism characteristics of modem society. [...] Given
12 See Keat (1997) for a brief summary of this argument.
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the pluralism characteristic of modem society, perfectionism entails a 
political practice which is at best authoritarian, at worst totalitarian. It 
necessarily involves the imposition of a contested conception of the 
good life by coercive means. Hence, modem pluralistic societies require 
economic and political institutions, the market economy and liberal state, 
that are themselves neutral between different conceptions of the good.
The most explicit and developed formulation of this position is to be found in Austrian 
economics. Hayek presents the market order of the ‘Great Society’ as a response to 
pluralism:
The Great Society arose through the discovery that men can live together 
in peace and mutually benefiting each other without agreeing on the 
particular aims that they severally pursue. The discovery that by 
substituting abstract rules of conduct for obligatory concrete ends made 
it possible to extend the order of peace beyond the small groups pursuing 
the same ends, because it enabled each individual to gain from the skill 
and knowledge of others whom he need not even know and whose aims 
could be wholly different from his own (Hayek, quoted in O’Neill, 1998:
19).
The market allows individuals with different ends and beliefs about the good to 
cooperate with each other, as it is “in principle unprincipled” or amoral. The alternative 
to the market is either continual enmity and social discord or the resolution of difference 
by forcible imposition of one set of ends by the state. Hence, the case for the market is 
not that it realises some specific end or good, but rather that it is neutral between 
different conceptions of the good. Indeed through market exchanges actors might 
contribute to the realisation of ends to which they might be opposed.
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2.7 Objectives and summary
In summary, the commensurability of value forms would seem to be divisible into two 
issues: whether norms are based on self-interested benefit functions; and whether norms 
are determined subjectively. Each is addressed by one of the core assumptions 
underlying neo-classical economics and utilitarian moral philosophy. It is the objective 
of the remainder of this thesis to explore these two assumptions, thus contributing to the 
debate concerning the commensurability of value forms and clarifying the conceptual 
issues underlying the moral philosophical presuppositions of different social scientific 
approaches.
Resolution of these two issues will contribute to the determination of, first, whether 
economic valuation should attempt to incorporate citizen values and, secondly, whether 
community based resource regulation is likely to ensure the conservation of forest 
resources as implied within the Community Forest Bill in Thailand. Firstly, if norms are 
based upon self-interested individual benefit functions, it might be expected that they 
can be incorporated into economic valuation without agents experiencing ambivalence 
and that traditional norms face being undermined by the alternative incentives prevalent 
in the market. Secondly, if norms are found to be subjectively determined, possessing 
no more validity than any other norms, both the claim that traditional norms possess 
some privileged position regarding the functions of the forest and the argument that 
their incorporation into the market results in the loss of such information are 
undermined.
Thus, having begun with the standard, practical questions of the appropriate role of 
communities in forest policy in Thailand and the efficacy of employing market 
valuation techniques in allocating natural resources, the identification of more 
fundamental issues underlying both of these questions causes us to turn to debates and 
issues rarely considered in addressing these questions.
2.7.1 The development o f the thesis.
The approach adopted within this thesis is somewhat unconventional (see s. 2.7.2 for a 
summary of the thesis structure). While this is partly the result of the breadth of scope
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and complexity of the issues involved, on its own this is insufficient explanation of the 
specific shape of the argument. Indeed, that the potential breadth of the argument 
extends beyond the discussion undertaken, and that alternative arguments may have 
been employed in addressing the questions raised, means that the specific theoretical 
debates reviewed, empirical investigations undertaken, and the relationship between 
these aspects of the thesis requires further justification. Perhaps the best way to provide 
such a justification is through a description of how the thinking developed in the course 
of researching this thesis to finally arrive at the approach described above.
2.7.1.1 The relationship between metatheoretical discussions and empirical studies.
On initially arriving in Thailand to undertaken the fieldwork for this thesis, the intention 
was to investigate the anomalies identified in responses to Contingent Valuation (CV) 
surveys in order to examine the impact of moral norms on the efficacy of the economic 
valuation of natural resources. In particular, literature reviews had revealed interesting 
parallels between market failure in allocating public goods, the problems applying 
economic valuation techniques to such goods, CV anomalies, the role of moral norms in 
communal action, and the efficacy of communal action in allocating public and 
communal goods. That is, it was suggested that the link identified between common 
property rights and moral norms, and between common property rights and public 
goods, could be used to investigate the impact of moral norms on CV responses through 
attempts to value common property resources with a CV survey.
It was resolved that an empirical study should follow a number of angles if these 
parallels, and the cause of CV anomalies were to be investigated. Firstly, an instance of 
common property had to be identified. The forest management regime of the Karen 
provides a good example of such institutions. Secondly, the moral beliefs of the Karen 
underlying these property rights had to be elicited. Surveys were thus designed to 
topographically map the spirit beliefs of the Karen with regard the forest, as well as 
their common property management regime, as discussed chapter 7. Thirdly, the 
relationship between these moral norms and the public nature of the resources had to be 
identified. It was intended that the public nature of the services provided by the forest 
resources of the Karen be identified through consideration of the ecological 
characteristics of the resources. In turn, this required a pre-existing ecological survey be
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identified. Finally, the possibility of allocating such communal property resources 
through the market mechanism would be investigated through the monetary valuation of 
such resources within a CV survey. An analysis would be undertaken of people’s 
motivations in responding to the CV survey in the way they did in order to determine 
whether the moral norms underlying the allocation of the resources were the cause of 
anomalies experienced in the application of CV surveys to such resources.
Thus, it was intended that an area of northern Thailand that had been subject to an 
ecological survey be identified, an appropriate indigenous village be located within that 
area, the common property rights and spirit beliefs of that village be mapped, and then a 
CV survey attempting to monetarily value the forest resources regulated communally be 
performed.
However, whilst waiting for permission to research in Thailand from the relevant 
authorities, and whilst searching for research sites and assistants, further reviews of the 
literature revealed the fundamental conceptual issues underlying the commensurability 
debate with which the CV anomalies discussion was concerned. In particular, the two 
question with which this thesis is concerned: the objectivity of moral norms, and the 
relationship between moral norms and individual benefit functions. Further reading 
revealed the philosophical debates underlying the objectivity-subjectivity issue, and the 
parallel between the direction perception approach to explaining conceptions of nature 
and the scientific realist perspective, both of which maintain the possibility of 
objectivity in knowledge. Furthermore, an interest in evolutionary psychology 
suggested that evolutionary explanations of environmental preferences might provide a 
source of the necessity in knowledge required for objectivity (see s. 2.7.2.1 for further 
discussion of these issues).
Digesting these issues, and reflecting how the planned research might be used to 
contribute to the questions raised, it was realised that the intended investigation into the 
anomalies in CV survey responses could be used to address the question of the 
relationship between moral norms and individual benefit functions, as described in Part 
III of the thesis (see s. 2.7.2.2). Moreover, it was realised that a comparison of the 
ecological survey and the mapping of Karen spirit beliefs might be able to reflect upon
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the commonalities in conceptions of nature predicted by direct perception, and thus the 
claim to objectivity in knowledge (see s. 2.7.2.1).
The use of a CV survey is not perhaps the most obvious method of going about 
investigating the teleological structure of moral norms. If this question had driven the 
design of the fieldwork from the start, it might be expected that a more conventional 
ethnographic investigation might suffice to explore this issue. However, having initially 
entered the field with the intention of investigating the anomalies in CV survey 
responses, and subsequently realising the relationship between these anomalies and the 
debate concerning the respective structure of economic preferences and moral norms, 
the potential for using the CV survey that had already been designed in investigating 
this issue became evident.
Recognising the potential use of the intended research in addressing these more 
fundamental conceptual issues, it was resolved to change the emphasis of the research. 
This was partly motivated by the realisation that, in order to determine the 
commensurability of citizen and consumer values, and therefore decide whether 
economic valuation of natural resources is appropriate, or whether traditional communal 
management systems might contribute to a sustainable resource management regime, 
both conceptual questions require answering. That is, commensurability requires that 
both citizen and consumer values are subjective and can be reflected in an individual 
benefit function. If the practical question that initially drove the research -  the 
appropriateness of economic valuation of natural resources -  is to be resolved, both 
questions require addressing.
With this in mind, while the permission was obtained, and the other surveys 
implemented, a third survey was designed to examine the source and structure of 
people’s environmental preferences in an attempt to investigate the potential of evolved 
environmental preferences as a source of objectivity. It is this survey that is described in 
chapter 4 (see s. 2.7.2.1).
Consequently, the objectives of the research were altered to address the conceptual, and 
more fundamental issues underlying the economic valuation of natural resources. Such 
a change in emphasis brought with it a range of moral philosophical and
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epistemological arguments that were not only relatively new to the author, but which 
also had previously had little place in debates concerning the economic valuation of 
resources. It is with this in mind that it was decided to dedicate large parts of the 
following thesis to reviewing these arguments. That is, the emphasis given to reviewing 
philosophical arguments is justified with an audience of economists or other social 
scientists in mind. Thus, while the arguments may be somewhat caricatured from the 
perspective of the philosopher, they are written for the social scientists to whom they 
may not be quite as familiar.
2.7.1.2 The choice o f research location.
As noted above, the fieldwork described within this thesis was initially undertaken with 
the intention of researching just among the Karen of northern Thailand. However, 
during the period in which research permission was being sought, an extra source of 
funding became available that allowed the sample population to be extended. It was 
initially intended that this extension should be restricted to other Karen villages. 
However, logistical problems, as well as difficulties in attaining the trust of particular 
villages in the politically driven context of Thai forestry, meant that criteria had to be 
dropped.
One instance illustrates the difficulties involved in gaining the trust of participants 
particularly well. Having trekked through the forests of the Doi Chiang Dao Wildlife 
Sanctuary to an isolated Karen village, a few days were spent on introductions and the 
piloting of surveys. After the pilot of the landscape preference survey described in 
chapter 4, the headman announced with a concerned expression that a village meeting 
had been called and that my presence was requested. Come the time for the meeting, the 
village elders were gathered in the dark, smoky atmosphere of the headman’s kitchen, 
while the reminder of the village crowded around the door to listen in.
When everybody was gathered, a number of questions were asked regarding my 
background, my interests in undertaking the research, and my intended use of the results 
of the research. Particular attention being paid to my relationship with the Royal Forest 
Department. Further questions followed concerning my intentions for eliciting the 
villagers’ preferences for various landscape pictures and the locations of the landscapes
in the pictures. Finally, everybody’s curiosity seemed to have been satisfied, and 
everybody became more relaxed.
It was then that the concern of the villagers was explained. They had previously been 
visited by an American researcher who had surveyed the village’s use of the local forest 
resources. The research was undertaken on behalf of the Royal Forest Department and 
concluded that the villagers were incapable of conserving the local forest and should be 
removed from their traditional lands to an alternative site outside the wildlife sanctuary. 
The villagers were thus unsurprisingly concerned by my questions concerning their 
management of the wildlife sanctuary, and had been particularly interested in my 
landscape preference survey, as they had thought that by stating their preference for a 
particular picture that they were selecting the location to which the village would be 
moved.
Such problems in locating appropriate Karen sites meant that the increase in the 
population size had to be facilitated through incorporating alternative, non-Karen 
research sites. It is this sequence of events that lead to the inclusion of a Thai sample 
population on top of the original Karen sample population. As is described in the thesis, 
the social norm of forest conservation that also existed within the Thai population made 
this extension consistent with the objectives of the research.
2.7.2 Structure o f the thesis.
In order that the objectives outlined above are met, this thesis adopts a somewhat 
unconventional structure. The two questions underlying the issue of commensurability 
- the objectivity of moral norms, and whether they can be incorporated into individual 
benefit functions -  are related in that the answers given to them both contribute to the 
conception of human action within the social sciences, and, in particular, whether the 
definition of economic man might be considered accurate. However, these questions are 
very different in nature. On the one hand, whether people are able to value norms 
monetarily without stumbling upon conceptual anomalies - whether such norms can be 
incorporated into individual benefit functions -  is very much a positive, psychological 
issue. On the other hand, whether norms possess any objective validity is very much a
58
normative philosophical question. Thus, in the following exploration they will be dealt 
with separately.
The necessity of this somewhat unconventional approach can be illustrated through 
consideration of the complexity and interdisciplinary nature of the issues involved. A 
more conventional approach would review a particular literature, from which a specific 
hypothesis would be identified for investigation. Having described a methodology for 
investigating this hypothesis, empirical results would be presented and analysed, and 
conclusions drawn. However, the following thesis is based upon the objective of 
clarifying the conceptual issues underlying the commensurability issue, rather than the 
resolution of a single hypothesis. Within the scope of this objective, it is difficult to 
identify a single hypothesis that is able in any significant way to contribute to its 
achievement. The above discussion has already identified two questions important to 
achieving the objective of determining the commensurability of citizen and consumer 
values. Furthermore, within just one of these questions - whether moral norms possess 
objective validity -  a number of pertinent hypotheses can be identified for investigation 
form the wealth and breadth of contributory disciplines. For instance, whether Piaget’s 
genetic epistemology can explain environmental preferences, and whether there are 
commonalities between scientific and indigenous conceptions of nature. Hence, a 
number of implicit hypotheses are proposed in the course of this thesis, and the possible 
contributions to this complex objective are better served through a more discursive 
approach. To this end, the thesis is divided into four sections. Part I has identified the 
problem that it is the objective of the thesis to address, Part II and Part III attempt to 
clarify the issues underlying the commensurability of citizen and consumer values, and 
Part IV concludes.
2.7.2.1 Part II: The objective validity o f moral norms.
Part II addresses the hypothesis that moral norms possess objective validity. The issue 
of the objective nature of knowledge is approached in chapter 3 through a review of the 
philosophy of science literature, as it is through addressing the objective nature of 
science that this issue seems most accessible. Following a summary of attempts to 
overcome the problem of induction in testing covering laws -  the distinction between 
analytical and synthetic statements made by logical positivists, and Popper’s suggestion
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that the aim of science is refutation rather than confirmation of the deduced events -  the 
Duhem-Quine underdetermination hypothesis and Kuhn’s social explanation of theory 
choice are reviewed to suggest that knowledge is relative and subjective.
A similar epistemological position is identified within the social sciences in the work of 
Gadamer and Foucault, and more generally in anthropology’s cultural relativism. 
However, a review of the foundational texts of this cultural relative perspective, and 
attempts within anthropology to deal with apparent human universals is used to suggest 
one possible form of objectivity: the existence of necessity in knowledge. Identifying 
such human universals, or necessity in knowledge as corresponding with a definition of 
objectivity that accepts epistemology as basic, the search for such necessity in 
knowledge is presented as the aim for the remainder of Part II.
Chapter 4 initiates this search by identifying one possible source of necessity in the 
evolution of environmental preferences proposed within the evolutionary psychology 
literature. However, problems for the acceptance of this evolutionary explanation of 
environmental preferences are identified in the fact that the debate concerning the 
explanation of such preferences is characterised by a culture-nature dichotomy. 
Following various commentators on this debate, the thesis mirrors the call for an 
interactionist perspective -  the explanation of environmental preferences through a 
combination of universal/natural and local/cultural factors. Failing to find such a 
perspective in the literature, the interactionist approach found within Piaget’s genetic 
epistemology is proposed; a perspective that maintains the possibility of necessity in 
conception.
Piaget’s proposal that concepts are developed through the application of the principles 
of ‘assimilation’ and ‘accommodation’ to experience of the environment -  an 
experience ensured by a set of primitive schema -  is elaborated upon. The expected 
form of environmental preferences emerging from these insights is hypothesised, and an 
investigation of the ability of Piaget’s approach to explain environmental preferences is 
designed through the investigation of landscape preferences. Eliciting respondents’ 
preference between pairs of pictures in northern Thailand -  thus attempting to address 
the criticism that such approaches tend to be focused in western societies -  the possible 
existence of necessity in environmental preferences, though expressed in a locally
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determined context, is identified. However, this investigation proves inconclusive, as 
the approach adopted is one of proving a universal from a universal. That is, Piaget’s 
concept of developmental necessity is only one possible universal that could be used to 
explain such preference universals. The existence of universal aspects of environmental 
preferences cannot on its own be used to conclude that a process of rational necessity 
underlies the development of preferences, as suggested by Piaget’s genetic 
epistemology. Instead, such a result would be consistent with, for instance, the learning 
of an ecological universal.
Chapter 5 outlines a number of problems with the naturalistic epistemology approach 
adopted in chapter 4 -  that of applying psychological investigation to the resolution of 
epistemological questions. In particular, the claims of psychology to provide objective 
knowledge of the nature environmental preferences is burdened with the same 
epistemological problems facing science in general, outlined in chapter 3. Furthermore, 
the application of folk psychology -  the explanation of human behaviour through 
beliefs and desires -  within the human sciences opens the objectivity of psychology to 
further criticism. That is, the holistic nature of beliefs and desires means that an infinite 
number of belief/desire combinations can be thought to underlie an action, and beliefs 
and desires cannot be measured independently of the theory by which they are related to 
actions. Hence, the human sciences are unable to establish causal laws. The naturalistic 
project in the human sciences is undermined.
A number of alternatives are proposed in response to the failure of the naturalistic 
project based upon folk psychology. The behaviourist approach is reviewed and rejected 
as suffering from the same problems as folk psychology. The interpretative rejection of 
the naturalistic project -  its replacement with folk psychology based upon 
understanding, rather than causally explaining actions -  and the corresponding 
acceptance of relativism in knowledge of human subjects is summarised.
This decline into subjectivism and the corresponding abandonment of the possibility of 
objectivity in knowledge is challenged by a scientific realist definition of science. 
Rejecting the ontology that implicitly underlies the positivist description of science, 
scientific realism describes the ontological context of science as one in which events are 
not invariant. Instead, reality is structured and scientific laws are tendencies. Moreover,
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while the fallibility of knowledge is recognised as resulting from our interests and the 
cultural context that cause us to focus on particular aspects of the structure of reality, 
there are still rational grounds for theory choice, and the possibility of objectivity is 
maintained. Furthermore, the possibility of necessity in knowledge is extended to social 
meaning.
The chronology of the development of scientific realism lends itself to the interpretation 
that it provides a defence of the epistemic status of science against the relativist critique 
concerning the relationship between theory and evidence. That is, scientific realism’s 
rejection of relativism, as well as the timing of its emergence at the height of the 
relativist critique, could easily be interpreted as an attempt to answer the questions 
posed by this critique -  questions posed against positivist science. However, this is not 
how scientific realism is presented in this thesis. Rather than maintaining positivism’s 
strong claim to objectivity in knowledge, scientific realism is interpreted as an 
alternative conception of science. Indeed, if anything, the nature of the objectivity of 
knowledge that emerges from scientific realism could be said to be epistemologically 
inferior to that proposed by positivism. That is, scientific realism acknowledges of the 
fallibility of knowledge and the role of interests in the development of knowledge. 
However, at the same time it maintains the possibility of necessity in knowledge, even 
if this possibility is epistemologically inferior to that of positivism.
Chapter 6 identifies a parallel between the approach of scientific realism and that 
adopted by what is referred to as the ‘direct perception’ approach to explaining 
conceptions of nature. Recognising the inability of mainstream anthropology to explain 
what is known as the ‘indigenous perspective’ -  the apparent ‘oneness’ with nature of 
indigenous peoples -  due to its implicit adoption of Cartesian dualism within cultural 
relativism, the direct perception approach provides a way of overcoming the resulting 
disengagement of man and nature by explaining the development of conceptions of 
nature through direct engagement with the environment. Moreover, the direct perception 
approach mirrors key aspects of scientific realism: namely the notion of affordances 
used to explain our understanding of nature parallels scientific realism’s notion of 
scientific laws as tendencies. Direct perception mirrors scientific realism in its 
maintenance of the possibility of necessity in knowledge, as well as the fallibility of 
knowledge.
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Chapter 7 attempts to put the claims of scientific realism and direct perception to the 
test. Firstly, the emphasis on dislocation from resources in explanations of deforestation 
is identified as supporting the claim of direct perception that an appreciation of the 
value of resources requires engagement with those resources. Furthermore, 
commonalities in tree symbolism, and the fact that such symbolism tends to reflect the 
nature of the trees themselves, rather than being entirely socially constructed, also 
supports the claims of direct perception.
The claim that commonalities in conceptions of nature might be expected to result from 
the development of conceptions of nature based on direct engagement with the 
environment is then put the test through a comparison of the conception of the 
functionality of forest ecosystems within ecological science and Karen beliefs. A survey 
of the non-linear ecology literature suggested that the extent of biodiversity could be 
used as an approximation of the functionality of ecosystems from the perspective of 
ecological science. A survey of Karen belief systems revealed that the topographical 
distribution of resource spirit owners could be used as the corresponding indicator of 
Karen conceptions of the functionality of the local forest ecosystem.
A biodiversity survey of a wildlife sanctuary in northern Thailand was obtained, from 
which a topographical description of indicators of biodiversity was derived. Locating a 
Karen village within the area of the same wildlife sanctuary, a survey of the spirit 
beliefs of the village was undertaken. A topographical comparison of Karen spirit 
beliefs and indicators of biodiversity suggest that there are no commonalities in 
conceptions of nature.
However, rather than concluding that the direct perception and scientific realist 
approaches to understanding knowledge should be rejected, it is pointed out that direct 
perception merely allows for the possibility of commonalities. There is no suggestion 
that commonalities must occur. Moreover, the emphasis of both direct perception and 
scientific realism on knowledge as tendencies, as well as their acknowledgement of the 
fallibility of knowledge, can be used to explain the non-existence of commonalities. 
With this in mind, it is suggested that the non-existence of commonalities might be 
expected for the case of knowledge of the functionality of ecosystems. Not only are
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ecosystems very complex, but the time periods over which their processes are through 
to be expressed extend well beyond those over which direct knowledge might be 
expected to be achieved. Moreover, the diverse interests of the Karen and ecologists 
would be expected to cause their respective investigations to focus on very different 
aspects of ecosystems, and thus produce different knowledges.
Part II concludes that, while there is both theoretical and empirical support for the 
existence of objectivity in knowledge, this is far from a closed debate, and further 
research is required if we are to get closer to its resolution.
2.7.2.2 Part III: Can moral norms be incorporated into individual benefit functions?
Part IE then turns to the question of whether moral norms can be incorporated into 
individual benefit functions. Chapter 8 begins to answer this question with a review of 
the theoretical debate concerning the relationship between moral norms and the notion 
of economic man. Criticism of the notion of economic man is identified as focusing 
upon two issues: imprudence and altruism. In the context of the investigation of the 
respective structures of moral norms and economic preferences, the chapter focuses on 
the problems faced in incorporating instances of moral behaviour within the notion of 
economic man.
However, it is suggested that, while criticism of the notion of economic man tends to 
revolve around its equation with the notion of self-interestedness, this requirement 
emerges from attempts by economists to reconcile utilitarian and economic definitions 
of utility -  the notions of utility as the tendency to produce ‘good’ and utility as 
preference satisfaction respectively. However, the economic definition of utility as 
preference satisfaction does not require that agents be self-interested. That is, rather than 
specifying the content of preferences, economics merely makes a claim regarding the 
structure of preferences: that they are teleological. It is thus suggested that consistency 
between the existence of moral norms and the concept of economic man require that 
moral norms have a teleological structure.
Chapter 9 then attempts to empirically investigate the structure of moral norms, and 
whether they are teleological, as consistency with the concept of economic man would
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require. Identifying the association of anomalies (protest responses) in responses to 
Contingent Valuation (CV) surveys with the non-commensurability of citizen and 
consumer values (moral norms and economic preferences), it is hypothesised that such 
anomalies are a manifestation of the non-teleological nature of moral norms. Thus, it is 
suggested that the structure of moral norms can be tested by determining whether 
protest responses result when people are asked in a CV survey to monetarily value 
resources whose use and allocation is regulated by moral norms. Hence, having 
identified strong moral norms prescribing the conservation of forest resources among a 
number of groups in the northern Thailand region, a CV survey for the valuation of 
these resources is designed and implemented amongst these groups.
Although there exist social norms specifying the protection of the forest resources 
valued within the CV survey, it is concluded that the majority of responses are 
consistent with those expected of economic man. That is, while protest responses are 
observed, the motivations elicited as underlying the majority of these protests are 
consistent with consumer values.
However, problems with concluding the commensurability of moral norms and 
economic preferences from this evidence, and thus the teleological structure of moral 
norms, emerge from the fact that assumptions have to be made concerning the activation 
of such moral norms by the survey employed. That is, there is no way of knowing 
whether the survey performed activated the moral norms that were identified as relating 
to the resources being valued, and thus whether the results obtained contribute to our 
knowledge of the structure of such norms. This possibility is emphasised by the concern 
that the Contingent Valuation Mechanism presupposes economic values and is therefore 
flawed in its investigation of moral norms. While it is suggested that this concern 
ignores the argument that anomalies in CV survey responses are themselves a 
manifestation of such norms, the problem remains of knowing for certain whether or not 
norms are activated by a specific survey.
Moreover, this problem is exacerbated by the employment of a willingness to pay 
(WTP) response format within the above CV survey. That is, it is suggested that the 
admittance of willingness to pay could seem consistent, potentially, with a commitment 
to deontological values. A deontological value that supports the hypothetical scenario
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presented in the CV survey -  in this case the conservation of local forest resources -  
may well manifest itself in a large WTP. It is suggested that this shortcoming of the 
investigation might be overcome through the employment of a willingness to accept 
compensation (WTA) question format, as such deontological values would be manifest 
in significant protest responses to such WTA questions.
Chapter 10 identifies a similar problem underlying the source of knowledge in 
economics in general. That is, as economics employs a folk psychological description of 
behaviour, it suffers from an inability to measure the beliefs or desires underlying action 
other than through rational choice theory itself. Attempts at describing knowledge 
within economics as causal laws thus suffer from the inability to measure initial 
conditions separate from the theories to which they are applied. It is suggested that this 
epistemological problem underlies the lack of predictive success in economics that 
some commentators have identified.
Attempts at applying such causal theories in the generation of knowledge are identified 
as the epistemological approach underlying economics. Furthermore, arguments 
proposed by economists in support of this epistemological approach are shown to fail -  
in particular, Friedman’s evocation of instrumental logical positivism. Finally, the 
adoption of alternative epistemological positions by some economists -  Hayek’s 
subjectivism, and Lawson’s realism -  is pointed to as further evidence of the 
epistemological problems of the naturalistic project in economics.
Part III then concludes that, while attempts at empirically testing the structure of moral 
norms suggest that they are consistent with the conception of economic man, the 
epistemological problems faced by the naturalistic project adopted within economics 
undermine this conclusion.
2.7.2.3 Part IV: Conclusion.
It is argued that the investigation undertaken proves unable to conclude whether citizen 
and consumer values are commensurable or not, and thus whether the utilitarian or 
deontological moral philosophy best describes human motivations. Instead, in reflecting 
upon the failure of the empirical investigations undertaken, and drawing on some of the
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philosophical arguments outlined within the thesis, it is suggested that the main 
contribution of the thesis is to outline the epistemological issues underlying the 
development of knowledge in attempting to answer these questions, and how alternative 
epistemological positions can be used to derive different knowledge, which in turn 
perpetuates debate.
In particular, it is suggested that the naturalistic project within the social sciences 
suffers from a number of problems. Namely, the inability to measure beliefs and desires 
-  the initial conditions within folk psychological causal laws -  means that the social 
sciences fail in their attempt to develop accurate and improvable causal explanation. 
The caveats to the conclusions drawn in chapter 4 and chapter 9 are pointed to as 
evidence of this failing. In each of these cases, assumptions have to be made with 
regards the nature of the beliefs and desires that participants bring to the research 
situation; assumptions whose veracity cannot be evaluated except through the 
application of theory.
For instance, in chapter 9, the conclusion that moral norms are commensurable with 
economic preferences, and thus that moral norms are teleological in structure, can only 
be maintained if we assume that moral norms are activated by the survey performed and 
brought to the valuation problem. However, as actions can be the outcome of a large 
number of belief-desire combinations, and there is no way of actually measuring beliefs 
or desires, there is no way of knowing whether this is indeed the case other than through 
the application of the theory being tested. That is, the only way that we can know 
whether moral norms are activated is through the application of the hypothesis that 
anomalies in CV responses are a manifestation of the non-commensurability of moral 
norms.
Moreover, the debate concerning the structure of moral norms is used to demonstrate 
the possible contradictory knowledge available from the adoption of alternative 
epistemological principles. That is, while the positive epistemology adopted within the 
empirical investigation of chapter 9 suggests that moral norms and economic 
preferences are commensurable, the hermeneutic epistemology that underlies the more 




The objective validity of environmental norms.
This part of the thesis addresses the question of whether values can possess objective 
validity. That is, can we evaluate ethical judgements, or do they merely express the 
preference of their holders? Can we know something objectively, or is all knowledge 
subjectively determined? In particular, can environmental norms be thought of as 
possessing objective validity? However, designating such a broad philosophical issue as 
the subject matter of a thesis, and only part of a thesis at that, precludes a 
comprehensive survey of the relevant issues. Thus, before we continue, the choice of 
subject matter requires justifying, and the breadth of subject matter requires qualifying.
The choice of subject matter does not simply reflect an attempt to resolve an important 
aspect of the commensurability debate, though that is certainly a powerful argument for 
undertaking such research and is how it is presented within this thesis. Attempting to 
research such an interdisciplinary issue as the value and conception of nature inevitably 
requires that contributions from a range of subject areas be considered and related, in 
this case economics, psychology, and anthropology. Such an approach raises concern 
for the philosophical issues that define the different approaches within the social and 
behavioural sciences and the differences and relationship between them -  issues that 
often goes unmentioned within such debates. The aim of the research is thus extended to 
incorporate these issues so as to portray the contributions of the different disciplines 
appropriately and to outline some of the limitations of the principles they accept. This 
topic is taken up once again in the conclusion.
The aim here is limited to an introduction of some of the debates of relevance from the 
perspective of the non-philosopher. That is, it is hoped that, rather than providing a new 
perspective on the issues discussed, the thesis provides a starting point for a social or 
behavioural scientist interested in the philosophical underpinnings of their subject. 
Thus, from a philosophical standpoint, the debate raised will be to some extent 
caricatured. The issues of concern have occupied philosophers for millennia and are far
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too broad and detailed for justice to be done here to the minds that have contributed to 
their debate. Hence, the positions presented should not be thought to represent a 
comprehensive review of the philosophical debate, as the intricacies of the arguments 
are inevitably overlooked. Instead, they should be considered a sample of relevant 
philosophical arguments, a first step into a larger debate.
Considering the restrictions on the extent and scope of the discussion undertaken here, it 
is important that the reasoning behind the selection of specific philosophical issues be 
explained in the context of the subject matter chosen. The structure of this part of the 
thesis is very much informed by a two-way interaction between the identification of 
relevant theoretical debates and empirical investigations designed to inform them. 
Although the basis for this research are issues of concern within economics, the 
theoretical issues presented in Chapter 3 tend to focus upon debate concerning the 
objectivity of empirical observation in science as represented by the philosophy of 
science literature. While of relevance to the social sciences as well as the natural 
sciences, focusing on such issues overlooks the particular approach to subjectivism 
employed within economics, for instance that of the Austrian tradition associated with 
Menger, Mises and Hayek1. However, it was decided to concentrate on the philosophy 
of science literature because it is here that the objectivity/subjectivity debate is most 
accessible.
Based upon the findings from this theoretical review, two pieces of empirical work are 
undertaken, attempting to explore the possible existence of objectivity in environmental 
knowledge and values. Having identified the existence of ‘necessity’ in understanding 
as being required if citizen values are to be ‘objective’, Chapter 4 identifies the debate 
in psychology concerning the existence of innate aspects of environmental preference as 
potentially providing such necessity in the context of environmental values. The 
organisation of this debate according to the culture-nature dichotomy is used to suggest 
that environment preferences might best be explained using an interactionist 
perspective. In particular, Piaget’s genetic epistemology is used to define such an 
interactionist perspective that also maintains the possibility of necessity in the 
development of concepts. Although an empirical investigation fails to prove
1 For a brief introduction to subjectivism in economic theory see section 10.7, as well as O’Neill (1998).
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conclusively that the Piagetian model explains environmental preferences, the 
possibility of necessity in the development of environmental preferences remains.
The employment of psychology to resolve epistemic debate raises a host of 
philosophical issues. Chapter 5 concentrates on the difficulties raised for investigations 
within the social and human sciences by doubts concerning the epistemic status of folk 
psychology, and identifies scientific realism as a potential solution to the problems of 
folk psychology and related claims of relativism. The debate within anthropology 
concerning the role of direct perception in the conception of nature, in particular the 
“indigenous perspective”, is highlighted in chapter 6 as containing exactly this scientific 
realism verses relativism argument, and presented as basis for further empirical 
investigation.
Thus, having ventured once again into the territory of philosophical theory, the direction 
of the debate in Chapter 7 turns back towards the empirical. The prediction of 
commonalities in conceptions of nature emerging from the scientific realist and direct 
perception approaches is identified for investigation. A comparison of conceptions of 
environmental functionality within ecological science and Karen spirit beliefs is 
undertaken to contribute to this debate. Thus, the structure of the ensuing argument very 
much evolves through the interaction of empirical and philosophical debate.
In summary, it is suggested that, although recent trends within the philosophy of science 
literature would tend to favour the subjectivity or relativism of knowledge, there 
remains room within the debate for the possibility that knowledge possesses at least an 
element of necessity or objectivity. However, empirical attempts to identify such 
necessity within knowledge of the environment or the way the environment is valued 
prove inconclusive.
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3. The objectivity of knowledge: Contributions from the philosophy of 
science and from anthropology.
3.1 Introduction
In an attempt to outline a theoretical basis for our discussion of the ontological status of 
environmental citizen values, this chapter briefly reviews recent debates within the 
philosophy of science concerning the problems faced by scientists defending the 
objectivity of their empirical observations, as it is here that the issue of the objectivity 
of knowledge is most accessible. Once the definition of objectivity and subjectivity has 
been elaborated (s. 3.2), the epistemic subjectivist argument is developed through the 
consideration of the underdetermination of theory by observation (s. 3.4), Kuhn’s 
historical description of science as paradigms (s. 3.5), and Quine’s holistic empiricism 
(s. 3 .6). A shortcoming of epistemic relativism is identified in the form of mainstream 
anthropology’s difficulties dealing with the apparent existence of human universals (s. 
3.8). Finally, a possible approach to saving the objectivity of science, and thus a 
potential source of objectivity in environmental citizen values, in the form of ‘necessity’ 
in the development of knowledge is suggested for exploration in later chapters (s. 3.9).
3.2 Epistemological frameworks and the objectivity o f knowledge.
The notions of subjectivity and objectivity have long been an interest for philosophers, 
particularly those engaged in epistemological and ontological investigations. Hence, it 
is to these philosophical concerns that we turn in an attempt to determine the nature of 
citizen values. In particular, in order to limit the scope of the discussion, we will pursue 
this investigation by considering the question, how reasonable is the claim that 
knowledge can be objective? In turn, it becomes important to define what it is we mean 
by ‘objective’. Firstly, the distinction between epistemological and ontological 
objectivity should be made (Audi, 2000). Ontological objectivity is that which is not 
mind-dependent. Epistemological objectivity takes method as fundamental, and makes 
the distinction between intra- and inter-personal, between matters that depend on the 
psychology of the individual, and those that don’t. Thus an epistemological objective 
question would be one answerable by a method used by any competent investigator,
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while a subjective question would be one answerable only from the questioner’s 
perspective.
From the epistemic perspective, objectivity is a grade of cognitive achievement, a 
property of the contents of mental acts and states (Audi, 2000). In this sense, only things 
such as judgements, beliefs, theories, concepts, and perceptions can be significantly be 
said to be objective or subjective. Bell (2000) identifies one notion of epistemic 
objectivity as that which entails ‘presumptive universality’: for a judgement to be 
objective it must possess a content that may be presupposed to be valid for all men.
Once the form of objectivity has been determined, we then have to decide whether we 
will take epistemic or ontological objectivity as basic. Either ontological or epistemic 
notions of objectivity can be taken as basic (Audi, 2000). Hence, if the epistemic notion 
is taken as basic, then objectivity in an ontological sense is derived from considerations 
of justification. That is, mind-dependence is a matter amenable to method. Conversely, 
if the ontological notion is taken as basic, the criterion for the interpersonal method and 
its objective use is a matter of its mind-independence. On the one hand, a realist 
position requires that ontological objectivity is taken as basic, as the epistemic 
objectivity of a belief is to be explained by appeal to the independent existence of the 
entities it concerns, independent of the cognitive access we have to them (Bell, 2000). 
On the other hand, a non-realist position does not require that beliefs be explained by 
appeal to independent reality, and epistemic objectivity can be taken as basic.
The remainder of discussion in Part II considers debate concerning the objectivity of 
scientific and social scientific knowledge. As various arguments are presented in favour, 
as well as against the possibility of objective knowledge, various definitions of 
objectivity are encountered. For instance, having reviewed arguments concerning the 
objectivity of scientific investigation, this chapter suggests that, if scientific objectivity 
is to be upheld, then some form of necessity in knowledge must be accepted. That is, 
while alternative definitions exist, including the coherence, justifiability, 
communicability and intelligibility of beliefs, it is the universal validity that underlies 
epistemic objectivity that is adopted. Furthermore, in chapter 5, a scientific realist 
perspective is presented that maintains this epistemic definition of objectivity, based on 
the universality of knowledge, but also maintains a realist position, and thus takes
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ontological objectivity as basic. It is the possibility and nature of objective knowledge 
to which we now turn.
3.3 Deductivism, logical positivism and the problem o f induction.
Emerging from the Reformation and the Enlightenment, scientific philosophy rooted 
knowledge in human rather than divine capabilities. The resulting “new science” of 
Copernicus and Galileo needed a philosophical defence against the dogmatism of the 
Church and Aristotle. It found its defender in Francis Bacon (1561 -  1626), who is 
generally recognised as the founder of the modem scientific tradition. Bacon theorised 
about science, and about knowledge in general, distinguishing two ways of discovering 
truth: experience as the moment of tmth when hypotheses are tested and knowledge 
developed, and rational intuition guaranteeing the basic truth of axioms.
Out of this epistemology emerged what is referred to as the deductivist conception of 
science: a conception of laws as formulated in terms of constant conjunctions of events 
or states of affairs (Lawson, 1997). On this view, laws, which are referred to as 
‘covering laws’, express regularities of the form ‘whenever event x then event y \  Thus, 
according to deductivist explanation, some event, thing, or phenomena must be deduced 
from a set of initial and boundary conditions plus universal laws of the form ‘whenever 
event x then event y \ This theory of explanation is also variously known as the 
covering law model, the Popper-Hempel theory of explanation, and the deductivist- 
nomological model, or D-N model for short.
Historically, encourgement for the deductivist conception of science and explanation 
stems from a version of positivism rooted in Locke’s and Hume’s analysis of causality. 
The first of Bacon’s ways of discovering tmth was adopted by John Locke in his An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), a move that represented the origins of 
empiricism: “nothing is in the mind that is not first in the sense”. It is empiricism and 
the notion that observation and evidence enable us to choose between theories that 
science takes for granted as the source of objective knowledge. However, how such 
knowledge is generated has yet to be fully explained.
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Science does not accept knowledge that cannot somehow be subject to the test of 
experience. A traditional approach is the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method. Given a 
hypothesis H that is to be tested, one deduces from H (in conjunction with initial 
conditions) an observational prediction O. If O turns out to be true, the hypothesis is 
said to be confirmed to some extent.
From the outset, however, science has explained by appeal to a realm of untestable 
entities, processes, things, events, and properties (Rosenberg, 2000a). It is the 
discomfort about the fact that such things seem both necessary -  without appeal to them 
theory cannot effect the unification of observation and explanation -  and unknowable -  
unobservable -  on the part of philosophers that forms the basis for epistemological 
discussion concerning the subjectivity/objectivity of knowledge.
The problem with the inductive methodology of empiricism was first officially 
formulated by David Hume. In his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
(1748), Hume’s pursuit of empiricism led him to face the problem of induction: how 
can we justify inferences from sensory experience (current and past) to the future and 
the sort of scientific laws and theories we seek. There are only two ways to justify a 
conclusion, those identified by Bacon: deductive argument (conclusion follows 
logically from the premises), and inductive argument (premises support the conclusion 
but do not guarantee it). Hence, in justifying induction, we are required to employ either 
a deductive or an inductive argument. However, doing so requires that we suppose the 
reliability of inductive argument. Rosenberg (2000a) illustrates this notion with the 
following argument in favour of the inductive method:
1. If a practice has been reliable in the past, it will be reliable in the future.
2. In the past inductive arguments have been reliable.
Therefore,
3. Inductive arguments will be reliable in the future.
While the argument is deductively valid, for it to hold the first premise requires 
justification, and the only satisfactory justification for the premise would be the 
reliability of induction, which is the argument that is supposed to be being established. 
That is, inductive arguments are left to justify induction, and empiricism struggles with
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the epistemic requirement of basing induction and scientific investigation in a system of 
general principles or a system of derivative knowledge (Hollis, 1995). It is this problem 
with induction that produces scepticism about the empirical sciences: while we can 
observe “constant conjunctures of events”, for science to conclude causation from this is 
sensible but not logically warranted.
A number of attempts have been made within empiricism to resolve this problem. One 
such attempt, associated with logical positivism, was to view scientific theories as 
instruments, heuristic devices, tools we employ for organising our experience, but not 
literal claims about it that are either true or false (Rosenberg, 2000a). On this view, 
theoretical claims are not abbreviations for observable claims, they are more like 
mnemonic devices, acronyms, uninterpreted symbols without empirical or literal 
meaning.
One of the proponents of the logical positivist defence of scientific theory was A. J. 
Ayer. Ayer (1936) argued that inferential propositions are necessarily true not by force 
of necessary fact, but just by the way we speak. It is their form, rather than what they 
say about the world that makes them true. In support of this argument, Ayer 
distinguished between the analytic and synthetic constituents of theory. Analytic 
statements represent theory’s role as language, and have no substantive content. The 
resulting propositions, argued Ayer, are reducible upon definition of their terms to 
tautologies, whose denial is self-contradictory. That is, these analytic facts arise from 
the conventions of language. They are true by convention, relying on rules that have 
been constructed by humans. In this form, theory performs the role of a filing system, 
and cannot increase our knowledge of the world (Hollis, 1995). They may be supported 
by experience, but only because they never allow experience to refute them, as they 
state relations of ideas rather than matters of fact. That is, theoretical statements should 
not be thought of as true or false, as their role is to provide rules by which proper 
inferences can be made. As it is these relations/inferences that induction is considered 
responsible for, it is suggested that truth based upon induction does not rely on general 
principles. The validity of theory is based in its success in prediction, not in its appeal to 
axioms (Hollis, 1995). It is this predictive role of theory that is provided by its synthetic 
statements.
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Thus, the inferences made by the inductive method in generating theories are justified as 
being necessarily true tautologies. Criticism of the inferences made in the application of 
the inductive method as only being justifiable through the application of the inductive 
method is mistaken, as such inferences reflect analytical statements, theory’s role as 
language, rather than its substantive predictions. The metaphor of theory as a filing 
cabinet, as a heuristic device for organising experience, changes the aim of science from 
merely discovering facts to organising these facts into a coherent system, a role 
performed by theory. The analytic statements of theory are translatable into a set of 
factual, substantive statements, but theoretical terms themselves do not refer to 
unobservable entities, this is the role of synthetic statements (Boylan and O’Gorman, 
1995).
Thus, logical positivism attempted to defend empiricism by distinguishing between the 
observational and non-observational terms in which scientific laws and theories are 
expressed, and by arguing that it is our knowledge of the behaviour of observable things 
and their properties which confirms and disconfirms a theory (Rosenberg, 2000a). The 
court of last epistemological resort is maintained as observation.
3.4 The underdetermination o f theories.
The problem of induction states that, as theories infer beyond the data available, they 
cannot be conclusively confirmed, as experience can only provide evidence of a small 
part of the instances the theory applies to. Thus, as first pointed out by Hempel (1945) 
in his Paradox of the Ravens, while empirical evidence supports a hypothesis to some 
degree, it may also support many other hypotheses to an equal degree14. That is, in the 
foregoing H-D schema, if H is confirmed, so is H&X, where X is any arbitrary 
statement. Following Karl Popper (1963), some philosophers have thus exploited the 
asymmetry in empirical matters between proof and disproof, arguing that while no 
universal empirical theory can be proved, owing to our ignorance of the totality of 
phenomena, a universal theory can be disproved by only one counter-instance to it. That 
is, scientists never seek evidence to confirm hypotheses, but only to falsify them 
through the method of ‘conjecture and refutations’. That is, once again in the foregoing
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H-D schema, if O turns out to be false, one can immediately conclude that at least one 
of the premises is false. If one has sufficient confidence in the truth of the initial 
conditions, one can conclude that H has been refuted. Science progresses by subjecting 
hypotheses to increasingly more stringent tests until the hypotheses is falsified and its 
limits established, and its accuracy and predictive power improved.
However, the claim that hypotheses are falsified is also argued to be incorrect, as 
nothing follows from a general law alone. Pierre Duhem (1954) pointed out that, in 
addition to the hypothesis being tested and statements of initial conditions under which 
the test is conducted, we also need auxiliary hypotheses to carry out the deduction of 
observational consequences in the H-D schema.
Rosenberg (2000a) illustrates this notion through consideration of the statement “all 
swans are white”. He tells us that it does not follow from this statement that there are 
any swans, still less that there are white ones. That is, testing this hypothesis requires 
auxiliary hypotheses, further statements about the conditions under which the 
hypothesis is tested. For instance, testing the hypothesis “all swans are white” first 
requires that certain objects be established as swans, and doing so requires that we 
assume the truth of other generalisations about swans besides their colour. Moreover, no 
single falsifying test will tell us whether the fault lies with the hypothesis under test or 
the auxiliary hypotheses -  what if the grey bird thought to falsify the hypothesis “all 
swans are white” is actually a goose? Thus, Rosenberg argues, the logical possibility 
that any auxiliary hypotheses might be wrong, a possibility that cannot be denied, 
means that any hypothesis that is tested can be preserved from falsification by giving up 
and attributing falsity to the auxiliary assumptions.
Hence, as a matter of logic, scientific law cannot be completely established by available 
evidence, nor conclusively falsified by a finite body of evidence. No single scientific 
claim meets the test of experience by itself. It does so only in the company of other 
hypotheses needed to effect the derivation of some observational prediction. It is the 
complicated nature of the testing of hypotheses that provides us with the Duhem-Quine 
“underdetermination” thesis (Rosenberg, 2000a). That two or more hypotheses are
14 For a summary of this argument against confirmation as a source of evidence in favour of a hypothesis
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always required in any scientific test means that when a test-prediction is falsified there 
will always be two or more ways to “correct” the hypothesis under test. When theories 
become more complex, involving numerous hypotheses, it is open to the theorist to 
make one or more changes in the theory in light of a falsifying test, any one of which 
will reconcile the theory to the data. The large number of possible changes introduces a 
degree of arbitrariness foreign to our picture of science, as slack is introduced into the 
relationship between theory and observation (Rosenberg, 2000a). In short, theory is 
underdetermined by observation.
However, science does not show the proliferation of theory and the kind of theoretical 
disputes that the possibility of underdetermination might lead us to expect (Rosenberg, 
2000a), something that demands explanation. If, owing to the ever-present possibility of 
underdetermination, theoretical consensus is not achieved through the “official” method 
of testing through observation and experiment, how is it achieved? Rosenberg (2000a) 
suggests two alternative responses to this question: that observation really does govern 
theory choice, but as yet we have not figured out how; or that observation does 
underdetermine theory, but that theory is fixed through some other process. It is this 
second alternative to which Thomas Kuhn turned his attention.
3.5 Kuhn’s history o f science.
In his The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions (1970), Kuhn was among the first to 
explore the history of science for non-observable factors in theory-choice. Kuhn 
considered periods of scientific changes, suggesting that periods of revolutionary 
change in science alternated with periods of “normal science”. He suggested that the 
term “theory” did not describe the intellectual core of a programme of normal science. 
Instead, he coined the term “paradigm”. Paradigms drive normal science, and differ 
from the account of science advocated by logical positivists. Instead of following where 
data, observation and experiment lead, normal science dictates the direction of scientific 
progress by determining what counts as an experiment that provides data we should 
treat as relevant, and when observations needs to be corrected to count as data.
see Dancy and Sosa (2000) or Rosenberg (2000a).
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The logical positivists hold that theories succeed one another by reduction, which 
preserves what is correct in an earlier theory and so illuminates the history of science as 
progress. However, Kuhn challenges this position, suggesting that, under the auspice of 
normal science, three sorts of empirical inquiries flourish: redetermination of previously 
established observational claims to greater degrees of precision; the establishment of 
facts without significance or importance for themselves but which vindicate the 
paradigm; and experiments undertaken to solve problems to which the paradigm draws 
our attention. Moreover, failure to accomplish any of these aims reflects on the 
scientists rather than the paradigm. That is, during normal science research focuses on 
applying the paradigm to the explanation and prediction of data. What cannot be 
explained is outside its intended domain, and within its domain what cannot be 
predicted is experimental error.
Kuhn insists that paradigms do not triumph according to anything like the experimental 
method suggested by empiricists: observational terms are used to describe the data 
which epistemically controls theory; theory and observation are distinct. In doing so 
Kuhn makes the epistemologically radical claim, denying that there exists a vocabulary 
that describes observation and that is neutral between competing theories. That is, 
paradigms not only extend their influence to theory, but they also dictate observation. 
Terms by which we describe observations presuppose a division of the world of 
experience into categories that reflect prior theories. In other words, the categories we 
use to classify things are shot through with interpretation.
Paradigm change, then, occurs when radical solutions are sought to the anomalies and 
puzzles that are incompatible with the paradigm. Revolutions occur when these 
anomalies resist solution long enough. As more and more scientists attach importance to 
the problem, radical solutions are sought that become potentially paradigm wrecking. 
Moreover, during these periods of competition between old and new paradigms, nothing 
between the paradigms can be settled by observation or experimentation, as 
observational data are already theoretically charged. Instead, the most significant factors 
in choosing between paradigms are social factors.15 The lack of a role for observation in
15 Specifically, Kuhn points to two principles that influence the composition of a paradigm: the 
intellectual and the institutional. Intellectually, a paradigm consists of a set of guiding axioms which can 
shift in the course of reasoned debate, despite the fact that the framework actually sets the canon of
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choosing between paradigms means that paradigms become incommensurable: though a 
new paradigm may have solved the anomaly of its predecessor, it may leave 
unexplained phenomena that its predecessor successfully dealt with. That is, there exists 
explanatory loss.
However, there is more to incommensurability than explanatory loss. Kuhn seems to 
argue that paradigms are incommensurable in the sense of not being translatable one 
into the other. This makes explanatory loss immeasurable and underwrites the further 
claim that paradigms do not improve on one another, and therefore that science does not 
cumulate in the direction of successive approximations to the truth. Scientific 
“progress” seems more a matter of replacement than reduction. According to Kuhn, we 
must take seriously the notion that scientific revolutions really are changes in world­
view. That is we should view succession in paradigms the way we view changes in 
fashion, literature, music, art and culture (Rosenberg, 2000a). Hence, science can make 
no claims to epistemic superiority, or to be more objectively progressive.
3.6 Quine’s Holistic Empiricism.
The conceptual underpinning of Kuhn’s historical description of scientific change lies in 
the work of W. V. O. Quine, who attacked logical positivism from ‘^ within” (Rosenberg, 
2000a). Quine (1953, 1981) denied the analytic-synthetic distinction, a move that gave 
rise to a holism in thinking about how theory confronts experience, and the 
underdetermination which spawns Kuhn’s approach to the nature of science.
Quine (1981) demonstrates how factual beliefs do not stand in isolation but occur as 
part of a system of beliefs. Starting with logical positivism’s assumption that sentences 
can exist in isolation from one another, Quine describes how the supposedly factual 
ideas expressed in these sentences are dependent upon the meaning of the words used to 
construct them; how the meaning of these words are, in turn, dependent upon their 
context of proposition, the sentences within which they are contained; and how the 
meaning of sentences depends upon the system of sentences to which they belong. In
reasoned debate. Institutionally, science is kept on track by social mechanisms: organised activity, the 
hierarchy of power, academic apprenticeships, and structures established to organise funding support. 
Paradigm shifts are, therefore, more likely to occur with deep shifts in the structure of power.
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doing so, he demonstrates that there is no purely factual language independent of 
theory, and thus adequate for scientific descriptive purposes (Boylan and O’Gorman, 
1995). Factual beliefs do not stand in isolation, they occur in a holistic system of 
beliefs: “the totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs [...] is a man-made fabric 
which impinges on experience only along the edges” (Quine, 1953: 42).
Given this holistic dimension of language, theory becomes indispensable for factual 
description. Thus, as description is theory-laden, the analytic-synthetic distinction 
underlying logical positivism’s support for the empirical method (s. 2.3) is rejected. It 
follows that no observation taken in isolation can correspond to an identifiable portion 
of the external world, as neither experience nor theory is “pure”. Instead, our factual 
statements come before the bar of experience holistically, and the unit of empirical 
support is the entire holistic theory (Boylan and O’Gorman, 1995; Rosenberg, 2000a). 
Statements can be preserved as true by simply revising some other part of our system of 
belief, and there is no guarantee of harmony between observation and belief: the 
Duhem-Quine underdetermination thesis.
Quine’s holism of meaning is similar to and mutually supportive of the epistemological 
thesis of holism in the way data tests theory (s. 3.4). However, if theory meets data as a 
whole, and the meaning of a theory’s terms are given by their place or role in the theory, 
then we have more than a philosophical explanation of underdetermination. In this case, 
there are no meanings, or truths of meaning distinct from theories about the world, and 
we also have a philosophical foundation for incommensurability (Rosenberg, 2000a): 
our holistic epistemological concepts give us no guarantee of the same world across 
theoretical divides, and truth becomes relative to the specific paradigm.
3.7 From philosophy to history to relativism.
Kuhn’s doctrine has generally been interpreted so as to give rise to relativism: the 
notion that there are no truths, and that disagreements between positions are 
irreconcilable. That is, the incommensurability of paradigms -  explanatory loss and the 
inability to translate between paradigms -  deprives epistemology of a paradigms-neutral
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position from which to access competing paradigms, and provides an invitation to 
epistemic subjectivism (Rosenberg, 2000a). Kuhn himself was ambivalent about 
whether to plead guilty to the charge of epistemic relativism about paradigms, but other 
philosophers are keen to transform his work to this end (Rosenberg, 2000a). Most 
influential among these is Paul A. Feyerabend (1975). Starting with Quine’s holism of 
meaning and the notion that empirical observation meets hypotheses at the level of 
entire holistic theories, Feyerabend developed a “methodological anarchy”, which stated 
that there was no cognitive basis to choose between theories. In the hands of post­
modernists, Quine’s holism of meaning becomes the claim that the world external to 
scientific theory is itself a construction without existence independent of scientists. That 
is, science is seen as the dominant beliefs system of our culture rather than the source of 
objective belief (Hollis, 1995).
The epistemic relativist position has a tradition in the social sciences dating back to 
Weber’s concept of verstehen. It was made popular in the social sciences in the 1960s 
by Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics (1976). Hermeneutics traditionally was a 
theory of the interpretation of meaning principally concerned with biblical exegesis. 
Gadamer’s project was to develop a more generalised philosophical hermeneutics which 
can give an account of the conditions of all interpretation. To do so, he adopted a form 
of hermeneutics derived from Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) and Wittgenstein’s 
conception of language games, in which understanding is seen as governed by three 
dimensions: the author, the text itself, and the interpreter (Boylan and O’Gorman, 
1995). Rather than constructing the mind of the author, as previous, narrower versions 
of hermeneutics had espoused16, Gadamer conceived of hermeneutic understanding as a 
question of the mediation or fusion of public horizons. That is, interpreters bring their 
own cultural context to the processes of understanding and fuse these with those of the 
text, creating imaginative, original interpretation.
Applying this conception of understanding, Gadamer considered the social sciences to 
stand in a peculiarly tense relationship to their object, a relation that requires 
hermeneutic reflection (Outhwaite, 1987). He notes that the social sciences do not so 
much aim to understand as incorporate linguistic truisms in their attempt to capture the
16 A hermeneutic tradition commonly associated with Schleiermacher (1959) and Dilthey (1967).
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real structure of society. Concerned with our encounter with a participant in a cultural 
tradition other than our own, Gadamer suggested the process of coming to an 
‘understanding’ in the social sciences is a ‘fusion’ of one’s own ‘horizon’ of meanings 
with that of the other person/culture. In this post-modern hermeneutic perspective, each 
culture creates and renovates its own understanding. Knowledge is relative. Truth 
emerges in dialogic encounters between specific elements, each of which has a horizon 
that contributes to its formation (Gadamer, 1975). We are caught in a hermeneutic 
circle: we grasp the world in terms of its components, but we can grasp things within 
the world only in terms of our prior mastery of the web of significance of the world as a 
whole. Moreover, as ‘insiders’ initiated into the practices of a historical culture, the 
world is already intelligible to us. As a result, the questions of traditional epistemology 
are topics for specialised ‘regional’ inquiries.
Another contemporary manifestation of relativist epistemology within the social 
sciences is the project of genealogy, especially the work of Michel Foucault17. Foucault 
attempts to answer the question: If knowledge is the product of historically-specific, 
contingent modes of inquiry, what effect has this had on our knowledges? In order to 
answer this, he developed a ‘genealogical’ method to describe what he called 
‘power/knowledge’. He formed the dyad power/knowledge to indicate that each is 
always implicated in the other, in the sense that the negotiations and strategic 
movements of power create the open spaces where discourses can emerge, but that 
power is exercised through knowledge (Dancy and Sosa, 2000). Genealogy, an 
approach borrowed from Nietzsche, is the examination of the relationship between 
power and specific knowledges.
Foucault’s project was political in that it was motivated towards dislodging our 
dogmatic attachments to present categories and concepts, by revealing their genesis in 
the mire of contingent conceptual transformations, historical conflict, and political 
struggle. Given such contingencies, the operations of power are necessary to explain the 
emergences of all knowledge systems. Foucault’s primary influence on epistemology
1' Both Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Foucault’s genealogy are part of the broader ‘continental 
epistemeology’, which originated from the work of Hegel, is reflected in the work of Marx and Nietzsche, 
and developed in the twentieth century into five major orientations to epistemology: phenomenology, 
critical theory, hermeneutics, post-structuralism, and feminism. For a brief description of the development
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will most likely be in this introduction of power as a salient ingredient in understanding 
knowledge.
Corresponding with the relativist conception of understanding found in Gadamer and 
Foucault, Peter Winch (1958) asserts that understanding social phenomena is much 
more like learning a language than giving an explanation of the workings of a machine. 
He argues that the judgement of a system of thought can only be performed from the 
perspective of ‘immanent criteria’. That is, they can only be judged from within the 
context of their own systems of thought, as rationality is itself culturally relative, and 
there is no understanding other cultures. In support of this relativism, Winch presents 
evidence of the magic and spirit beliefs of the Azande, which he concludes, while 
strange to Western eyes, are “perfectly sensible” within their system of belief.
Such cultural relativism has, however, raised questions for social scientists. Perhaps 
most importantly, if rationality is relative, how can the apparent instances of intra- 
cultural communication and understanding be explained? Winch found doubts in the 
conclusion of his own epistemic relativism that we could never come to understand 
another culture, which seemed to contradict evidence of our learning other languages or 
coming to understand other cultures (Potter, 2000). These concerns caused Winch 
(1958) to argue that the inherently meaningful nature of universals in the human 
condition provided the basis for intra-cultural understanding. He identified four 
categories that define such universal human condition: the fact that all societies had to 
come to terms with birth, marriage (some social mechanism for reproduction), and 
death, and must interact with nature in order to provide the necessities of life. In support 
of this argument, Winch describes the Azande as interacting with the natural world in 
what was recognisable as a practical way, despite their “strange” belief system. For 
instance, crops were still planted at what, from the Western agro-biological perspective, 
would be considered the right time of year. That is, evidently there is some link between 
their belief system and ours with regards aspects of interaction with the natural world. 
We come to similar conclusions, but couch them within the terms of different beliefs 
systems: meteorology and agro-biology versus the supernatural.
of ‘continental epistemology’, and the relationship between its different branches see Dancy and Sosa,
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3.8 The middle ground: challenging cultural relativism.
There is an uninvited guest which has been seated [...] beside us and 
which is the human mind.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1953: 4, quoted in Brown, 1991).
Levi-Strauss made this statement in the context of concerns over the existence of 
commonalities in cultural phenomena and its apparent undermining of the cultural 
relativism underlying mainstream anthropology. As Donald Brown concludes a 
summary of literature from mainstream anthropology:
What we know about universals places clear limits on the cultural 
relativism that anthropologists have developed and disseminated 
widely. Furthermore, what we know about universals suggests the 
need to revise a conception of human nature that anthropologists have 
helped to shape (Brown, 1991: vii).
3.8.1 Challenging the foundational texts o f cultural determinism.
The foundational texts upon which cultural relativism in anthropology is generally 
considered to rest have, to some extent, since been refuted, and the veracity of cultural 
relativism consequently called into doubt. Donald Brown (1991) identifies four 
examples of such texts:
(a) In Coming o f Age in Samoa (1928), Margaret Mead argued that adolescence 
among Samoans was not the stress that it was considered in the West, and, 
hence, that Western conceptions of adolescence were strictly cultural. Mead’s 
book, published in the midst of a debate over the relative importance of 
biological and cultural determinants of behaviour, was hailed as a definitive 
demonstration of the importance of culture. However, Derek Freeman (1983) in 
his Margaret M ead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking o f an
2000).
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Anthropological Myth shows that adolescence was just as stressful in Samoa as 
in the West and that Samoa was not as different from Western societies as Mead 
had led us to believe.
(b) Bronislaw Malinowski in his Sex and Repression in Savage Society (1927) 
suggested that the Oedipus complex was peculiar to “patriarchal” societies. The 
matriarchal Trobriand Islanders, among whom Malinowski conducted his 
research, developed, he argued, a different complex -  one in which a boy felt 
hostility towards his mother’s brother rather than his father. Again this purported 
to show that what Westerns considered natural or universal wasn’t. Yet Melford 
Spiro’s Oedipus in the Trobriands (1982), reanalysing Malinowski’s own data, 
argues persuasively that the Trobrianders did have an Oedipus complex.
(c) Benjamin Lee Whorf argued that the Hopi had no sense of time or that their 
sense of time was very different from ours (Carroll, 1956). The problem of Hopi 
time is intimately linked to what has become known as the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis: that categories of language shape perceptions of the world, and that, 
insofar as different societies have their own languages, the worlds in which 
societies live are distinct worlds. Therefore, since the Hopi language, Whorf 
said, included no conception of time, the Hopi perceive the world in a very 
different way than we do. This represented an extreme form of cultural 
relativism. However, Malotki (1983) has since documented the richness of Hopi 
conceptions of time and their essential similarities to ours. Indeed, Whorf 
himself argued that “my own studies suggest, to me, that language, for all its 
kingly role, is in some sense a superficial embroidery upon deeper processes of 
consciousness which are necessary before any communication, signalling, or 
symbolism whatsoever can occur” (Carroll, 1956: 239).
(d) Another of Mead’s anthropological classics was her Sex and Temperament in 
Three Primitive Societies (1935), in which she argued that the Tchambuli, a 
group of people from New Guinea, had male and female temperaments that were 
the opposite of what we in the West consider normal. However, Deborah 
Gewertz (1981) restudied the Tchambuli and found that Mead had
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misinterpreted the situation among them; “thus effectively smashing another of 
the icons of relativism” (Brown, 1991: 10).
Moreover, not only have the foundational texts of cultural determinism been challenged, 
but the work of the more prominent advocates of the relativist approach is littered with 
doubt regarding the non-existence of universals.
3.8.2 The acknowledgement o f universals.
We tend to be blase about our mental lives. We open our eyes and familiar 
articles present themselves; we will our limbs to move, and objects and 
bodies float into place; we awaken from a dream and return to a 
comfortably predictable world; Cupid draws back his bow, and lets the 
arrow fly. But think what it takes for a hunk of matter to accomplish these 
improbable outcomes, and you begin to see the illusion [of relativism].
Steven Pinker (1997: 18-19).
Brown (1991) records a long history of ambiguity within mainstream anthropology with 
regard the existence of universals. He notes that, in a history of anthropological thought 
that has fluctuated in its support of the role of universals in the human condition, there 
has always lingered a doubt regarding the complete exclusion of universals at the heart 
of mainstream anthropology.
Franz Boas, the “single most important figure in American anthropology”, transformed 
the concept of culture in ways that were to have important implications for the study of 
universals. Boas saw cultures as plural; each culture should be judged on its own terms, 
rather than from our ethnocentric perspective (Brown, 1991), a move that would 
establish the relativism of American anthropology and would inform the work of the 
likes of Kroeber, Benedict and Mead. However, this move away from generalisations 
and towards cultural relativism, and the detailed studies of particular cultures, did not 
cause Boas to dismiss universals. He utilised the conceptual unity of mankind to assert 
that this unity produced universals. In his The M ind o f Primitive Man (1963), he noted:
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The appalling monotony of the fundamental ideas of mankind all over 
the globe. [...] We find not only emotion, intellect and will power of 
man alike everywhere, but also similarities in thought and action among 
the most diverse peoples. These similarities are [...] detailed, [...] far 
reaching, [...] vast, [...] and related to many subjects (1963: 154).
A. L. Kroeber, one of Boas’s students, is generally credited with perfecting the 
argument that culture is a level of phenomena that cannot be reduced to lower levels. In 
particular one cannot explain culture traits in psychological or biological terms. 
Kroeber’s 1915 paper, Eighteen Professions, draws a sharp boundary between 
biological science and cultural anthropology. This approach was emphasised in his 1917 
paper, The Superorganic, which was an anti-reductionist proclamation of the freedom 
from the influence of biological explanation of social phenomena.
However, despite Kroeber’s anti-reductionist contributions, he was in fact not such an 
extremist. In the same Eighteen Professions, Kroeber said that the relation between 
biological and social factors was a special province of anthropological study. Indeed, 
his later papers (1949, 1960) were decidedly reductionist, stressing that there is no 
alternative to considering flesh-and-blood human beings as the efficient causes of 
culture, while concluding that culture had only a “degree of autonomy” from the organic 
realm on which it rested. In one of his earliest papers, he spoke of the “tendencies” at 
the root of all anthropological phenomena, which are “inherent in the mind” (1901).
In 1935 Kroeber stated his views more clearly. His view of the current methods in 
anthropology involved putting the “protean X of the mind to the rear,” but this did “not 
abolish the X”:
The X, or its relation to the Y of culture, does remain our ultimate 
problem. This fact [...] we tend to forget; and, probably more than we 
know, we are bringing up our students and successors in an ultra­
behaviourist attitude [...]. [I]f there is a human mind, it has a structure 
and constitution, and these must enter into its phenomenal products [...].
[I]t is well to remember that we are making a deliberate omission for 
practical purposes for the time being; and above all we have not yet
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proved that X equals 0 (Kroeber, 1935: 565 -  566; quoted in Brown,
1991).
While American anthropology established for itself a relativistic tradition, not all 
anthropologists were swept along with this tide. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw 
Malinowski, the co-founders of British social anthropology, formulated a framework for 
analysing culture that used as its fixed points of reference certain universal givens of 
human life. While he rejected the universality of the Oedipus complex (s. 3.12.1), 
Malinowski also suggested that innate dispositions shape human behaviour in many 
ways (Brown, 1991). For instance, while he denied the universality of the Oedipus 
complex, he did so by affirming the universality of family complexes in general.
Malinowski’s A scientific theory o f culture (1960) presented a list o f universal 
institutional types, each the response to a universal principle/problem of humanity. He 
stated that “any theory of culture has to start with the organic needs of man” (1960: 72). 
These needs provide the framework for a scientific theory of culture. In addition to 
basic needs (metabolism, reproduction, bodily comforts, safety, movement, growth, and 
health), Malinowski also posited “imperative needs” or “derived needs”. They include 
the production and reproduction of the means of production (economics), the 
codification and regulation of human behaviour (social control), the renewal of the 
human material of each institution (education), and an organisation of authority and 
power (political organisation).
The analysis of culture, according to Malinowski, consisted of showing the way the 
institutions peculiar to each society discharged the function of meeting each of the basic 
and derived needs (Brown, 1991). That is, from Malinowski we get not so much a list of 
universals as a list of universal conditions for the existence of society and culture. 
However, a further aspect of Malinowski’s universalism is the notion that human 
impulses are everywhere much the same and that culture is rooted in “innate or natural 
tendencies of the human mind”. However this thought is not followed up in his work.
The list of anthropologists acknowledging the existence of universals and the problems 
they cause for cultural relativism can be extended to include Murdock (1945), 
Kluckhohn (1953), Hallowell (1963), Berlin and Kay (1969), Goodenough (1970),
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Tiger and Fox (1971), Rohner (1975), and Bloch (1977). More recently, work within the 
biological sciences, including Hamilton (1964), Maynard Smith (1964), Trivers (1971, 
1972), and Wilson (1975), has also inspired consideration of the role of human nature in 
culture. However, the argument already present should be sufficient as evidence of the 
concern over the veracity of the cultural relativist program.
3.8.3 The call fo r  the *middle ground\
While the above arguments would point towards the rejection of the cultural relativist 
perspective, this in no way implies the veracity of a biological determinist perspective. 
Indeed, while rejecting Mead’s Coming o f Age in Samoa, Freeman (1983) suggests that 
human behaviour is a combination of biology and culture, and that both elements 
require consideration in understanding human behaviour. Such a call for a ‘middle 
ground’ -  ‘interactionism’ -  is increasingly mirrored on both the biological and cultural 
sides of the debate.
The success of cultural anthropology in the first decades of the last century created a 
dilemma: “universals existed and were likely to rest upon psychobiological factors, yet 
human behaviour was fundamentally shaped by culture, and culture was an autonomous 
phenomenal realm that was not determined by psychobiological factors” (Brown, 1991: 
62). From this perspective, cultural universals are highly improbable. That is, unless 
they occur through sheer coincidence they could only result from having existed in the 
very infancy of humanity and thus have descended by uninterrupted cultural 
transmission to all its branches. Any other explanation would involve something other 
than culture causing culture and hence would deny its autonomy. The identification of 
cultural universals, therefore caused problems for anthropology. As Brown (1991: 64) 
tells us:
A cultural universal confounds the traits of the cultural and the 
biological: it is neither fish nor fowl... Lying in anthropological limbo 
... universals were not literally or consciously tabooed, but they weren’t 
embraced with much enthusiasm either.
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Pinker (1997: 57) argues that the “dichotomy between ‘in nature’ and ‘socially 
constructed’ shows a poverty of imagination, because it omits a third alternative: that 
some categories are products of a complex mind designed to mesh with what is in 
nature”. The same dichotomy forms the subject matter of C. P. Snow’s The Two 
Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (1959), and evoked his comment: “this 
polarisation is sheer loss to us all” (quoted in Wilson, 1998: 138). Also in support of a 
middle ground, Stephen J. Gould (1991) reminds us that Goethe realised that some 
dichotomies must interpenetrate, and do not struggle to death on one side, because each 
of their opposite poles captures an essential property of any intelligible world. However, 
the potential for the development of a coherent ‘middle ground’ is limited by the 
incompatible philosophical frameworks upon which the positivist and hermeneutic 
approaches are built. It would therefore seem that, before a middle ground can be 
reached, the dichotomous epistemology that stands in its way must first be overcome.
3.9 Saving science: overcoming subjectivism..
3.9.1 Lakatos's methodology o f scientific research programmes.
Although thinking within the philosophy of science has become increasingly sceptical 
concerning the possibility of objective truth within science, the possibility has not been 
abandoned altogether. Perhaps the most prominent figure in the defence of science 
against the relativism of knowledge is Imre Lakatos. Lakatos (1970) argued that the 
philosophy of science should be concerned with rules for modifying and comparing 
theories, not rules for assessing theories. That is, philosophers should be less concerned 
with the question “Is theory T well or poorly supported by the data?” than with the 
questions “Is this version of theory T an improvement over the last?” and “Are the 
proponents of theory T making as much progress improving it as are the proponents of 
alternative theories?” (Hausman, 1994).
In his Falsification and the Methodology o f Scientific Research Programmes (1970), 
Lakatos attempts to show that rejection of the ideals of proven knowledge (s. 3.3 -  3.6) 
need not force one to accept either Kuhnian social psychology or scepticism. Instead, 
Lakatos argues that the Popperian falsificationist perspective remains open. Classifying 
Popper’s work as ‘sophisticated falsificationism’, Lakatos’s positive contribution is to
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complete the programme begun by Popper by proposing a methodology of scientific 
research programs that enables a rational reconstruction of methodology and of the 
growth of scientific knowledge (Caldwell, 1994a).
Lakatos’s ‘Sophisticated Methodological Falsificationism’ recognises that theories do 
not exist in isolation, but as part of a larger and dynamic system. Thus, it does not make 
sense to talk of a theory. Instead the point of reference of methodological discussion 
should be a series of theories. The role of the methodologist is to evaluate how research 
traditions change through time in order to discover whether its modification is 
progressive or degenerative.
Lakatos argues that science is and should be dominated by “scientific research 
programmes” -  series of related theories that possesses a certain “hard core, ” which 
must be preserved through all modifications of particular theories. Moreover, the 
research programme contains rules and suggestions (“a positive heuristic”) that directs 
scientists in making modifications. Thus, argued Lakatos, competing research 
programmes should be compared by examining their overall progressiveness. In turn, 
Lakatos described a progressive modification of a theory as being one that is not ad hoc 
(Hausman, 1994):
(a) A modification to a theory may have no new testable implications at all. 
Modifications that are not ad hoc in this sense are “theoretically progressive”.
(b) A modification may present testable implications, but these implications are not 
confirmed. That is, modifications are not “empirically progressive”.
(c) Modifications of theories must be made in the “right” way. That is, they must 
represent some element of continuity, rather than being arbitrary.
Any such evaluation of the progressiveness of a research programme is a long-range 
affair: there is no instant rationality by which to evaluate the success or failure of a 
research programme (Caldwell, 1994a). The most important implication of Lakatos’s 
work is that theory evaluation cannot be instantaneous, since a whole system of theories 
in its historical evolution must be evaluated. However, despite this long term approach, 
Lakatos believes that his methodology of scientific research programmes retains a
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prescriptive role for methodology and avoids the subjective quagmire of the work of 
Kuhn or Feyerabend. That is,
Lakatos provided an alluring compromise which provided both a 
prescriptive methodology that simultaneously provided methodological 
criteria of evaluation, while allowing for the testing of the methodology 
against the history of the discipline (Boylan and O’Gorman, 1995: 24).
There remain problems with Lakatos’s defence of falsificationism. However, rather than 
concerning ourselves with these here, we will take Lakatos’s lead and consider further 
the possibility of objectivity in knowledge18.
3.9.2 The search fo r  necessity in knowledge.
In response to relativism’s attempted undermining of science’s claim to objectivity, 
Rosenberg (2000a: 165) points out that neither Kuhn nor Quine19 intended to cast 
science down from such claims, arguing that:
For all Kuhn’s insights into the history of science, something has gone 
seriously wrong in the development of the social studies of science since 
his time. [...] Much of the motivation for the attempt to understand natural 
science stems from an appreciation of its predictive power and explanatory 
depth, from the desire to identify its methodological secrets so that they 
can be applied elsewhere [...] with the same theoretical insights and 
technological results. When an inquiry so motivated concludes that science 
is just another religion, just one of a wide variety of ways of looking at the 
world, none of which can claim greater objectivity than the others, then 
sometime, somewhere, we have taken a wrong turn in our inquiry.
On Kuhn’s view, mature science is the best example of objective knowledge we have. 
He argued that to understand what objective knowledge consists in we should not lay
18 For a discussion of the problems with Lakatos’s methodology see Caldwell (1994a), Hausman (1994), 
and Boylan and O’Gorman (1995).
19 See section 5.2 for a review of Quine’s defence of the epistemic status of science.
down formal criteria a priori, but rather, we should examine the methodology of 
physical science (Dancy and Sosa, 2000).
The remainder of this part of the thesis will be dedicated to elaborating the possibility of 
overcoming scepticism through demonstrating how changes in theory that new data 
provoke is not of the arbitrary nature described by the epistemic relativists. That is, 
attempts to avoid the ‘slippery slope’ from theory-dependence into relativism will be 
made through the discovery and positing of some elements of necessity. Necessity in 
belief concerning the environment is identified as the condition for the validity of any 
particular belief system and a requirement for the argument that communities’ belief 
systems ensure the appropriate use of resources. Such necessity is a sufficient condition 
for epistemic objectivity -  for a judgement to be objective it must possess a content that 
may be presupposed to be valid for all men (s. 3.2). It is also the issues that has caused 
problems for cultural relativism in anthropology (s. 3.8): the existence of human 
universals.
Rosenberg (2000a) tells us that to do this, the philosopher must either become a 
historian and extract from the historical record the principles of reasoning, inference and 
argument that participants in paradigm shifts and theory changes actually employ, or 
turn to the reasoning processes characteristic of humans and the adaptive significance of 
reasoning for our ability to survive and thrive. It is the second of these that will form the 
approach adopted in the remainder of this part of the thesis in order to investigate the 
possibility of necessity in conception of the environment. The next chapter begins this 
search within the field of environmental psychology.
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4. Environmental preferences and Piaget’s theory of knowledge: 
Searching for necessity in environmental preference in northern 
Thailand.
4.1 Introduction
The possibility of necessity in environmental valuation, and thus objectivity in 
environmental citizen values, is identified in the form of evolved environmental 
preferences within the environmental psychology literature (s. 4.2.1). In turn, this is 
recognised as corresponding with the modularity thesis of cognitive development (s.
4.2.2), a framework that has been separately related in the anthropology literature to the 
notion that there exist commonalities in biological classification (s. 4.2.3). However, the 
veracity of the modularity thesis is doubted in general, as well as in explanation of 
biological classification (s. 4.3.1). Moreover, other contributions to the environmental 
psychology literature reject the notion that environmental preferences are the product of 
evolution, arguing that local, cultural factors are more important in their explanation (s.
4.3.2).
The organisation of the explanation of environmental preference according to the 
culture-nature dichotomy has led to calls for an interactionist perspective incorporating 
both universal and local aspects (s. 4.4). Failing to find any such framework within the 
environmental psychology literature, Piaget’s ‘genetic epistemology’ is identified as 
providing the potential for an interactionist explanation of environmental preference (s. 
4.5). Moreover, Piaget’s interactionist perspective maintains the possibility of necessity 
in the development of concepts. A survey is then designed to elicit people’s landscape 
preference through the comparison and ranking of landscape photographs in order to 
analyse the structure of environmental preference (s. 4.6).
Although the result of this survey would suggest that an interactionist perspective, such 
as that represented by the epistemological position of Piaget, provides a better 
explanation of environmental preference than the ‘culture’ or ‘nature’ approaches on 
their own, the data collected fails to show that Piaget’s epistemological framework is 
the only explanation of preference. Specifically, the learning of ecological universals is
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proposed as an alternative explanation. Although this explanation undermines the 
explanation of environmental preferences based on Piaget’s framework, the possibility 
of necessity in the development of environmental preference still remains.
While the analysis performed is used to comment upon the structure of environmental 
preference, it is important to point out that such preferences are only investigated at the 
level of cognitive/information processing. That is, the role of affective aspects of 
environmental preference thought to result through the development of, for example, a 
sense of place are ignored in the analysis undertaken. This approach is facilitated 
through the separation of the person and the landscape being evaluated through the use 
of photographs, as well as ensuring the landscape photographs used did not represent 
environments directly familiar to the participants. Hence, the discussion undertaken here 
is not intended to represent or explain environmental preference in its entirety, but to 
highlight an aspect of environmental preference with which to investigate the possibility 
of necessity in valuation.
4.2 The possibility o f innate environmental preferences.
4.2.1 Biophilia: innate environmental preferences.
One potential source of natural necessity identified within the environmental valuation 
literature is the notion that environmental preferences are innate. The environmental 
psychology literature on the source of environmental preference is dominated by what is 
referred to as the culture-nature dichotomy. On one side of the debate reside those who 
support the notion that environmental preferences are influenced by evolved tendencies 
to prefer certain landscape forms; a phenomenon E. O. Wilson has dubbed biophilia 
(1984). What Wilson presents as intuitive with the support of circumstantial evidence in 
his Biophilia (1984) has also been the subject of more rigorous scientific investigation 
of environmental aesthetics as affective, evolved, functional based ways of responding 
to the informational patterns of our environment.
Research on the biological mode of biophilia could be considered to have begun with 
Appleton’s (1975) The Experience o f Landscape. Appleton’s basic thesis is that a 
landscape that appears to facilitate survival is one that will also provide aesthetic
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satisfaction. The basic proposition is that certain rewards or advantages associated with 
natural settings during evolution were so critical for survival as to favour the selection 
of individuals with a disposition to acquire and then retain various adaptive positive 
responses to unthreatening natural configurations and elements.
Support for explaining landscape preferences as a function of evolved values suggests 
that biology may play a role in at least three positive, biophilic responses to 
unthreatening natural landscapes: “liking/approach” responses; restoration or stress 
recovery responses; and enhanced high-order cognitive functioning when a person is 
engaged in a non-urgent task (Ulrich, 1993). Over the last twenty years, a considerable 
research literature relating to the first type of positive responsiveness, 
“liking/approach”, has been amassed20, and it is this response that will form the basis 
for the following discussion of universal factors in environmental preference 
determination.
While a number of survival problems have been considered in the application of 
evolutionary principles to the determination of “liking/approach” responses, including 
way-finding and habitat selection (Appleton, 1992, 1996; Kaplan, 1992; Orians and 
Heerwagen, 1992), each approach focuses on the information processing abilities of the 
human mind in surviving an environment, and the characteristics of the landscape 
identified as being significant in preference determination have remained remarkably 
consistent between the different approaches.
The rationale behind the application of evolutionary principles to explaining 
environmental preferences is that humans, as information seeking animals, were much 
more likely to survive in an environment which provided the necessary resources, and 
accessible, comprehensible information (Barkow et al, 1992; Kaplan, 1992; Orians and 
Heerwagen, 1992). Natural selection would, then, tend to favour individuals who 
preferred landscapes which provided the information necessary to survival.
20 For reviews or collections of articles see Zube, Brush and Fabos 1975; Daniel and Vining, 1983; 
Ulrich, 1983, 1986; Smardon, 1988; Kaplan and Kaplan, 1989; Nasar, 1988; Ribe, 1989.
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The landscape characteristics which receive most consistent support in the evolution of
O l  OA.landscape preference are the complexity , coherence , legibility and mystery of the 
landscape, and the existence of water within the landscape. Although the proposed 
combination of these factors in the determination of preference varies with author and 
between studies25, their presence remains consistently significant.
4.2.2 Domain specificity and innate cognitive functions.
Perhaps the best known manifestation of the notion that there exist innate cognitive 
functions currently available within cognitive science is the modularity or domain- 
specificity thesis. Derived from the argument advanced by Fodor’s The Modularity o f 
M ind (1983), and reflected in Noam Chomsky’s (1988) influential theory of language, 
broadly speaking a module is a relatively autonomous component of the mind, one 
which, while it interacts with, receives input from, and sends output to other cognitive 
processes or structures, performs its own internal information processing unperturbed 
by external systems (Garfield, 1995). Fodor (1983) distinguishes between ‘input 
systems’, which are domain-specific modules, operating independently of other 
modules, and with a fixed neural architecture and a fixed timetable of development; and 
‘central systems’, which are domain-general and global, specifying no limit on the form 
or timetable of development. The first are reflexes, the second thoughts. The innately 
determined nature of these reflexes provides the possibility of necessity in knowledge.
Just as it is our problem here to discover necessity in understanding, the modular 
approach can be seen as motivated as a response to the problem of attending to ‘inputs’ 
in a way that that supports the development of concepts shared among people
21 Complexity is an assessment of the scene in terms of its potential for exploration, involving the 
richness or number of different objects in the scene. A scene low in variability is unlikely to provide 
much to look at. and not likely to be worth exploration.
22 Coherence refers to the ease which one can grasp/understand the organisation of the scene. Repeating 
elements provide rapid assessment of how the scene hangs together. Fewer different regions, relatively 
uniform within themselves and clearly different from one another also enhance coherence.
23 Legibility is an assessment of how well one can find one’s way in the depicted scene, the inference that 
one will be able to maintain one’s orientation. A scene that is open and offers visual access, but with 
distinct and varied objects to provide landmarks is high in legibility.
24 Mystery represents the promise of more information. The inference that one could learn more about the 
scene if one could explore its third dimension. This is enhanced by characteristics such as screening in the 
foreground, or a winding path, features that suggest the presence of more information while at the same 
time partially obscuring it.
25 Compare Kaplan [1992] with Orians and Heerwagen [1992] for an appreciation of such variation.
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(Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994; Keil, 1994; Sperber, 1995). It is argued that experience 
alone is inadequate, as many of the critical concepts children need to learn never appear, 
and are open to many alternative construals. In response to this puzzle, Keil (1995: 241) 
tells us that ‘"there must [...] be belief-like structures that narrow down an indefinitely 
large number of features and feature relations to a manageable number”. These 
represent restrictions on the kinds of knowledge structures that the learner typically 
uses. They represent the framework upon which developing knowledge depends and 
grows: natural necessities. Learning is thus simplified, as the learner need not consider 
every possible reading of the input.
Amongst those who accept the application of modules to the development of 
conceptions of nature, there seems to be general agreement as to the manner in which 
such modules relate inputs to knowledge output. That is, from the start, children are 
endowed with a collection of independent subsystems designed to perform 
circumscribed tasks (Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994), each of which is endowed with 
causal-explanatory biases constraining concept growth (Keil, 1995).
4.2.3 Concepts o f nature as the product o f modular cognitive faculties.
Though still an issue of some debate, in support of the application of modularity to the 
understanding of conceptions of nature there is evidence within the anthropological 
literature of cross-cultural commonalities in the conception of nature in the form of 
empirical regularities within the classification of biological kinds. Indeed, such 
regularities caused Atran (1990: 265) to conclude that “in practice, the field biologist 
who is initially unfamiliar with a terrain can usually rely on local folk to provide a fairly 
accurate first approximation of the scientific distribution of the local flora and fauna,” as 
the groupings used by people to classify animals and plants are obvious to all cultural 
groups.
Berlin (1972, 1978) and his associates (Berlin Breedlove and Raven 1966, 1973, 1974) 
show that in spite of significant variation in the plants and animals that any local 
population encounters, and in spite of the fact that many of those plants and animals 
lack any cultural salience for any given local population, there is striking consistency in 
the way humans everywhere classify the world of living things. The basic principles of
99
classification of biological kinds are extremely stable over significant differences in 
learning environment and exposure.
Atran (1990, 1995) suggests that all cultures divide the living world into two kingdoms 
(animal and plant), that each of these is taxonomically subdivided into major life forms 
(e.g. fish, bird, mammal), and that these are further subdivided into (sometimes 
unnamed) subcategories (e.g. ungulates, rodents). Finally, the taxonomy bottoms out in 
all cultures at the level of primary taxa (species/genus e.g. mouse, dog, wolf, deer). 
Atran also claims that humans presume each primary taxon to uniquely possess an 
inherent physical nature or underlying essence, which determines the kind’s teleological 
growth, its characteristics behaviour, morphology and ecological proclivity.
Quoting studies of the Delaware Indians, the Tzoltzil of Mexico, the Brou of Cambodia, 
the Rangi of Tanzania, the ancient Hebrews, Greeks and Romans, Atran (1985) argues 
that the first botanical life form to appear in any language is ‘Tree,” usually defined as a 
plant taller than a human adult and usually ligneous, which in turn implies the 
recognition of another life form, namely “herb,” or a plant usually smaller than a human 
adult and herbaceous. That is, “size” and “woodiness” are a universal distinction. 
Equally, the combination of the criteria of size and woodiness may lead to a fiirther 
partitioning of the plant world into four life forms: tall and woody trees, woody bushes 
or ligneous shrubs of small or medium height, small or medium undershrubs whose 
stems are ligneous but whose branching patterns are herbaceous, and small, herbaceous 
herbs and grasses. It would seem that folk-botanical life forms are recognised on the 
basis of numerous gross morphological characters. “In brief, virtually all humans, at all 
times and in all places, categorise the animals and plants that they readily perceive in a 
very similar way” (Atran, 1995: 211).
Atran (1990, 1995) and Sperber (1994) not only identify universal biological 
classificatory systems but also interpret them as reflecting competencies implicating 
numerous perceptual modalities. That is, folk biology is a core domain of human 
cognition, innately determined, and developed without exploratory theory building. 
Thus, biological classification is pre-theoretical and constraining, and in turn makes 
possible explicit biological theory. “It is suggested that an innate living-kind module 
privileges as input all the perceptual information pertaining to the identification of
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organisms as those things that can be readily assigned a taxonomic description” (Atran, 
1995: 208). That is, a natural necessity in knowledge about the environment can be 
located in the innate modules of the mind.
The idea is that innate principles lead children to believe that the visible morpho-typical 
patterns of each readily identifiable biological species are causally produced by an 
underlying essence. The nature of this essence is initially unknown, but presumed. The 
child must discover how essences govern the teleological relations between visible 
parts, and how they causally link initially ill-perceived inheritable parts to morpho- 
typical parts through irreversible patterns of growth. Virtually all people, in all cultures, 
cannot help but follow through this innately driven ‘research program’ (Atran, 1995).
4.3 Local influences on landscape preferences.
4.3.1 Environmental conceptions and values as candidates fo r  domain-specificity?
There remains debate as to exactly what mental functions represent candidates for 
modularity. Typically, input and output functions, such as perception and motor control, 
are considered candidates for modularity (Garfield, 1995). However, it is less plausible 
that central processes are subserved by modules (Garfield, 1995). For one thing, such 
processes demand access to a large amount of knowledge. For another, it would be 
bizarre to suggest that evolution would issue into existence special neural structures 
devoted to these tasks. Critics of modularity argue that the processes to which 
modularists refer are in fact instances of more general cognitive processes that are 
recruited across domains (Garfield, 1995).
This line of argument gains support from the observation that skill acquisition, for 
instance chess, results in performance having exactly the characteristics Fodor (1983) 
ascribes to modules: speed , mandatory operation , information encapsulation , and
26 Module process are very fast, something that it is thought derives partly from the manditoriness of 
modules -  the fact that there is no need to decide whether to bring a modular process into play eliminates 
planning time (Garfield, 1995).
27 We don’t have a choice in whether we bring domain-specific cognitive mechanisms to bear. For 
instance, whether we bring scene recognition mechanisms to bear on visual data (Garfield, 1995).
28 Having no access to information from elsewhere in the cognitive system. All the information available 
to a module comes directly from its own subsystems or from their dedicated input devices.
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perhaps even localisation29. Critics also point out that central processes seem to be 
mandatory; while we have a great deal of voluntary control over what we think about, 
we often find that thinking is forced upon us; and that we have a lack of introspective 
awareness of even our central cognitive processes (Garfield, 1995).
Evidence of the modularity of biological classification is also problematic. Carey (1995) 
suggests the hypothesis that folk biology has an innate basis suffers from the following 
problems: those aspects of folk biology that emerge early in childhood are most 
probably not domain-specific; and those aspects of folk biology that are domain-specific 
are probably not innate, nor are they theory neutral. While most theorists acknowledge 
the need for constraints on learning of some kind (Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994), 
disagreement remains as to the importance and source of these constraints. Debate 
remains on issues such as whether constraints are innate or acquired, and internal or 
external to the learner (Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994).
Equally, while there is some support for the notion that apparently associative concepts 
have cores of explanatory beliefs underlying them (Keil, 1994), these are open to 
alternative interpretation. Indeed, theory-building capacities applied to a world that 
provides massive consistent evidence across cultures, or domain-general concept- 
formation capabilities could well provide similar results (Carey, 1995). That is, 
empirical regularities have an alternative interpretation: “that a close correspondence 
between commonsense and science reflected regularities in the world external to 
cognition, rather than indicating a set of shared cognitive dispositions” (Hirschfeld and 
Gelman, 1994: 26).
Moreover, while studies of the construal of biological kinds argue against the notion 
that young children blindly follow tabulation of feature frequency and correlations 
(Keil, 1989; Gelman and Coley, 1991; Wellman and Gelman, 1988), they do not prove 
that domain-general tabulation procedures cannot work. There is still the possibility that 
the proposed innate dispositions are themselves learned through more general learning 
procedures. That is,
29 Lack of access to other processes of intermediate representation. That is, the modules only interact with 
central processes at their proper interfaces. This would accord with naive intuition and the lack of
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Modes of construal may be exploratory entities that are constantly trying to 
find resonances with aspects of real world structure. [That is], it may be part 
of their nature to be constantly seeking out new resonances with other sets of 
phenomena [...], as having a very different role in the growth of concepts.
[...] It may be that these fundamental modes of construal are the only 
explanatory systems ever available to us and that we learn about new 
patterns by discovering which of these modes [...] best provide insight into 
a set of phenomena (Keil, 1994: 252).
The modular account of conceptual development presents us with a dilemma: for 
instance, knowing innately that there are, say, nouns still leaves the learner with the 
problem of determining what words are nouns (Karmiloff-Smith and Russell, 1995). A 
‘bootstrap’ is needed from innate formal knowledge to particular knowledge: without 
first-hand experience of an object, how could one recruit an innate representation of the 
object?
4.3.2 Local influences on landscape preferences.
In support of the domain-general approach to cognitive development, on the culture side 
of the culture-nature dichotomy in explaining environmental preference dissatisfaction 
with the evolutionary approach suggests that the application of such results is limited to 
the population from which participants were selected and the specific landscapes 
presented, and that variations in culture, environment, sex, personality, age, occupation 
and race produce local variations in landscape aesthetics. Lyons (1983: 505) documents 
significant variations in the results of environmental preference studies that “suggest 
that the development of landscape preference is a cumulative process that reflects the 
action, through the life cycle, of socially differentiating attributes such as age, gender, 
place of residence, and environmental experience” . Moreover, “each of these works 
marshals evidence that social and demographic factors act differentially on populations 
to produce a range of environmental tendencies” (Lyons, 1983: 489). Studies support a 
range of contextual elements that influence landscape preferences:
introspective awareness of cognitive processes: such processes occur inside modules and our central
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- Duncan (1973) found patterns of landscape taste that correlated with social class.
- Zube et al (1974) found that the factors that most consistently explained 
variation in preference were landscape exposure as a child, occupation, and 
place of residence.
- Hecht (1975) found patterns of landscape taste that correlated with social class.
- Daniel and Boster (1976) found evidence for preferences based on the subject’s 
place of residence.
- Macia (1979) found significant preference differences between male and female 
university students.
- Miller and Rutz (1980) suggest that different adult preferences are due to 
increased content discrimination as a result of learned cultural values.
- Balling and Falk (1982) demonstrated different preference patterns for adults 
with varying occupations, as well as that preferences change with age.
- Zube et al (1984) report significant variations in environmental preference as a 
function of age.
Greenbie (1992) documented how lifestyle and life experience influence 
landscape values and choices.
- Zuckerman et al (1993) report variations in preference with ethnicity and the 
sensation seeking personality trait.
An observation that supports the local influence on landscape preferences is that studies 
suggesting apparently universal aspects of human environmental preferences have 
tended to concentrate their research effort within Western countries, particularly North 
America and Europe (Lyons, 1983; Ulrich, 1993). While this is understandable, as it is 
in these locations that environmental concern can be observed most strongly, it has led 
to doubts as to the universality of the environmental values observed. To investigate this 
claim requires a study of environmental preference among individuals from societies 
other than the modem Western ones in which the landscape preference is typically 
studied. In response to such criticism, a study of the environmental preferences of the 
residents of northern Thailand will form the basis for this investigation.
processes only have access to the outputs of modules (Garfield, 1995).
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4.4 The call for an interactionist perspective.
The organisation of the debate concerning the nature of environmental preference 
according to the culture-nature dichotomy has been criticised as too simplistic. 
Commenting on this dichotomy, Bourassa (1990: 788) states that:
Among those who have investigated the matter, there is a clear 
consensus that theory has been neglected in landscape or environmental 
aesthetics [...]. There has been vast amounts of research in the field, but 
that research has not been unified or informed by any comprehensive 
theory of landscape aesthetics. Instead, the various research efforts either 
are atheoretical or reflect fragmented and apparently incompatible 
theoretical foundations. The work that has been done on theory tends to 
focus exclusively on either biological or cultural bases for aesthetic 
behaviour, without any attempt to reconcile those apparently 
incompatible sets of explanations.
The call for an interactionist approach to the understanding of behaviour can be heard in 
a number of behavioural based disciplines. Brown (1991: 88), concludes a 
comprehensive review of the classic anthropological texts:
A great many universals do require explanation, at least in part, in biological 
terms. Many seem to require explanation in “interactionist” frameworks -
i.e. in terms of combinations of biological and cultural factors. If we want to 
understand universals in the context of particular societies, the necessity of 
the interactionist framework is all the greater.
Explanation of environmental preferences through an interactionist framework requires 
that the roles of innate and cultural factors, as well as their interaction be specified. 
Each side of the dichotomous culture-nature debate displays problems that enable the 
issues faced in constructing an interactionist perspective to be identified:
- The ‘nature’ approach can be seen as motivated in response to the problem of 
attending to ‘inputs’ in a way that supports the development of concepts shared
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among people (Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994; Keil, 1994; Sperber, 1995). It is 
argued that experience alone is inadequate, as many of the critical concepts 
children need to learn never appear, and are open to many alternative construals. 
The ‘nature’ argument that there exist innate concepts is thus used to narrow the 
possible readings of inputs and simplify learning. That is, learning by its nature 
presupposes the application of some concepts (Hundert, 1995).
- The ‘nature’ account of conceptual development presents us with a dilemma: for 
instance, knowing innately that there are, say, nouns still leaves the learner with 
the problem of determining what words are nouns (Karmiloff-Smith and Russell, 
1995). A ‘bootstrap’ is needed from innate formal knowledge to particular 
knowledge: without first-hand experience of an object, how could one recruit an 
innate representation of the object?
Resolving these two problems presents the interactionist perspective with a challenge: 
to understand how the “learning” of concepts is consistent with the pre-requisite 
existence of concepts.
4.5 Piaget’s stages theory of knowledge.
One such interactionist description is Piaget’s stage theory (1929, 1932). Although 
Piaget’s work is not without its critics, Piaget himself is extremely important in the 
history of thought in psychology and this work still holds some important 
epistemological lessons. While it is his theory of cognitive development in the context 
of child psychology for which Piaget is best known, he himself claims to be addressing 
epistemological issues, in particular genetic epistemology: “the study of the 
development processes that underlie the mental functions studied in general 
psychology” (Piaget and Inhelder, 1966: viii). It is to the elaboration of Piaget’s genetic 
epistemology and its implications for the format of an interactionist perspective on 
environmental preference that this section is dedicated. The lack of any such 
interactionist perspective identified by the author in the environmental psychology 
literature requires that a starting point for the development of such a perspective be 
found. It is for this epistemological purpose that Piaget’s work is selected. However, 
during the following discussion it should be kept in mind that Piaget’s conclusions are 
far from universally accepted.
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Piaget’s answer to the interactionist question of how learning of concepts is consistent 
with the pre-requisite existence of concepts was to suggest that nature gives rise to 
instinctive behaviours (primitive schemas) that ensure our environment will be 
experienced, a notion that formed part of his “stage theory” of cognitive development 
(1952). Piaget believed that knowledge requires a prior cognitive framework, that one 
cannot know without prior categories of thought, and thus focused in his research on the 
development of this framework (Kitchener, 1986).
4.5.1 The stage theory o f cognitive development.
Although there is some ambiguity as to what is actually meant by genetic epistemology 
and how it is to be distinguished from the related fields of evolutionary epistemology, 
developmental epistemology, and historical epistemology, it can perhaps best be 
described as concerning the notion that changing epistemic states abide by certain 
rational constraints, limiting the logical form any epistemic trajectory can take 
(Kitchener, 2000). Its concern is the theory of development, evolution, genesis or 
history of knowledge from less adequate to more advanced states, and it was with this 
concern in mind that Piaget posed his theory of cognitive development.
Piaget’s stage theory of cognitive development, as its name suggests, states that 
concepts develop in stages, each of which builds upon the previous (Piaget, 1952). He 
found that two year olds apply concepts such as object, space, time and causation. 
However, when he turned to the investigation of the prevalence of these concepts in 
babies, he discovered that, in all likelihood, we come into the world with none of these 
concepts (Hundert, 1995). In order to explain such conceptual development, Piaget 
proposed a series of four stages, each with an underlying cognitive-logical structure, in 
which conceptual schema, such as space, time and object, develop from more primitive 
schema, such as sucking, grasping and seeing (Kitchener, 1986):
(i) The sensorimotor stage ( 0 - 2  years).
Purely action based sensorimotor schema (sucking, grasping, pulling, turning)
progressively develop via repetition, differentiation, generalisation and integration
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into simple habits, which in turn develop into complex, creative kinds of 
instrumental behaviour in similar or analogous circumstances. These actions are 
thus pure behavioural dispositions and practical concepts into which objects are 
assimilated. The child knows the world exclusively by means of its actions. As yet 
there are no internal ideas, abstract thought, or prepositional logic.
This is the stage of egocentrism, in which the child cannot distinguish the self from 
the world because he/she does not yet have a sense of the self or the world. 
Overcoming egocentrism requires the child to become aware of him/herself as one 
“constructed” object among others, related to others in space and time. This process 
of decentration thus presupposes the development and construction of certain 
categories -  object permanence, space, time, causality -  and their elaboration into a 
framework of reality.
(ii) Preconcrete operational or intuitive stage ( 2 - 7  years).
This stage sees the development of the ability to represent or symbolise by means of 
initiation, play, signs, and symbols: what Piaget refers to as the semiotic function. 
The child is no longer limited to action, but can begin to symbolise and represent 
actions and thus to reason about them. This is a move towards the internal sphere of 
thought. However, the child is still largely egocentric, and its thought is limited to 
the external sphere of motor behaviour, and thus remains pre-logical.
The child’s thinking is intuitive/preconceptual, relying exclusively on the immediate 
perceptual appearances of things. Thoughts are not supported by reasons, since the 
child trusts as valid his/her immediate perceptual experience. However, this is 
superior to motor intelligence, since it permits the representation of non-present 
situations and some reasoning about them.
(iii) Concrete operational stage ( 7 - 1 2  years).
The beginning of true logical operations of symbolic thought. The internal mental 
representations of the second stage now possess logical properties/operations: an
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action which has been internalised, made reversible30, and integrated into a larger 
holistic structure. The operations at this stage are only applicable to concrete, 
manipulable objects. Hence, the child is tied to content and has not yet attained the 
level of thinking characteristic of purely formal thought.
(iv) Formal operational stage (1 2 -1 5  years).
Peak of cognitive development: reversibility pursued on purely a logical plane, and 
able to perform purely mental operations on non-concrete objects and hence to 
reason about them, to engage in abstract, formal, hypothetical reasoning about 
propositional objects.
Although the details of Piaget’s timetable have been doubted by certain authors, for 
instance Spelke (1990), the basis of Piaget’s theory still holds some important 
epistemological lessons. At each of the above stages, the child is equipped with a set of 
cognitive structures -  schemata, concepts, and categories. Piaget describes the manner 
in which these structures develop between the stages using the notions of ‘assimilation’ 
and ‘accommodation’ (Kitchener, 1986):
- An object is assimilated into cognitive structures as the subject acts towards it in 
a certain way, just as the child who sucks its thumb assimilates it into a sucking 
schema. In acting towards an object, it is judged, interpreted, or brought under a 
certain category. Hence, assimilation is equivalent to a judgement: to assimilate 
a thumb to a sucking schema is to judge a thumb as something to be sucked.
- Accommodation is a process in which the epistemic subject and its structures are 
modified to match more closely the properties of the external object. Cognitive 
structures are brought into line with the external world.
Assimilation and accommodation should not be conceived as two separate processes 
working one after the other; instead they function reciprocally and simultaneously. 
Accommodation is the process of adjusting structures to the object as assimilated, and
30 An operation is reversible when, starting from its result, a symmetrically corresponding operation can 
be found which will lead back to the data of the first operation without these having been altered in the 
process (Kitchener, 1986).
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assimilation is the incorporation of an object into accommodated structures (Kitchener, 
1986). If we had pure assimilation with no accommodation, we would have the 
epistemological counterpart of naive idealism: pure assimilation would be pure fantasy, 
comprising only the creative role of the subject, and theories would be produced 
irrespective of facts. Conversely, if we had pure accommodation without assimilation, 
we would have the epistemological counterpart of naive realism: the non-creative 
imitation of external objects or objective facts in which the subject would play no active 
role. Each of these extremes Piaget rejected.
Cognitive stages can be seen as being a state of ‘equilibrium’ with the surrounding 
world. Since there is evolution in these stages, there is an increase in equilibrium over 
the course of development. However, no epistemic subject is ever in perfect equilibrium 
with its environment. Kitchener (1986) describes Piaget’s model of equilibrium as 
functionalist or pragmatist, in that cognitive activity begins only when a cognitive 
need/motive arises -  a puzzle, question, contradiction, the need to defend oneself 
rationally or to pursue a cognitive goal. This need constitutes a state of disequilibrium, 
and when it is satisfied, equilibrium is restored, and the new equilibrium is more stable.
4.5.2 P iaget’s theory o f knowledge.
Piaget rejects empiricism as categorically wrong (Kitchener, 1986). He argues that 
empiricism is wrong in its claim that the mind passively acquires knowledge and that 
experience comes with a ready-made structure. According to Piaget’s stages of 
cognitive development mediated through both assimilation and accommodation, 
whatever structure knowledge has is at least in part due to the subject’s creative activity 
of constructing it. That is, observation is not free from conceptual elements, as 
empiricism would have us believe. However, Piaget does not deny the empirical 
method, arguing instead that empiricism has interpreted empirical and experience in the 
wrong manner: knowledge as the passive ‘reading off/recording of sense data, free 
from interpretation or judgement. Thus, Piaget is critical of the logical positivist claim 
that there are pure observational data, that there is a sharp distinction between theory 
and observation, positing that the knower is active in the process of knowing.
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Kitchener (1986) goes on to argue that Piaget is, in a certain sense, a rationalist. The 
epistemological rationalism of Descartes and Leibniz introduced the notion of innate 
ideas to explain knowledge of the external world; a priori faculties that provide the 
general axioms upon which experience must be written. The notion of innate ideas led 
to the concept of a pre-established harmony between the subject and object. Knowledge 
is organised into a deductive system, in which all truths are derived from a relatively 
small number of axioms and definitions, whose truth is guaranteed by their self­
evidence through the use of the faculty of intuition, which allows us to see that general 
axioms capture essential properties about the world (Curley, 2000). The problem with 
rationalism lies in its transcendence of the limits of observation by theoretical reflection, 
and then claiming that such reflection carries with it knowledge of reality. As Hollis 
(1995) expresses it, it is “ spiders making cobwebs out of their own substance”. The 
result is an immutable law of thought, whose necessity cannot be proved, as all proofs 
presuppose them, and presents an epistemological problem: how can we know the 
existence of such a theory of thoughts if it is hidden from our everyday ways of 
knowing experience? Piaget thought that this was inadequate, criticising the use of 
innate concepts to explain how thoughts are able to correspond with reality (Kitchener, 
1986).
However, despite Piaget’s rejection of the rationalist’s nativism, which he described as 
“structure without genesis” it is suggested that in important aspects, he is clearly a 
rationalist (Kitchener, 1986). For instance, he believed that knowledge is organised and 
structured in a complex way, and that the source of this organisation lies in the 
epistemic subject. That is, assimilation is equivalent to the rationalist’s judgement. The 
basic epistemological unit is a judgement involving rules, categories, schemas and 
principles. The difference between Piaget and the rationalist is the source of these 
judgements. In other words, the key issue is the meaning of a priori. Piaget’s schema 
can be seen as being applied a priori, and used to assimilate or judge the world, just as 
the rationalist’s faculties (Hundert, 1995). However, where the rationalist believes the 
structure of the mind to be fixed at birth, Piaget admits that the functioning of the mind 
is fixed at birth, but denies that its structure is (Kitchener, 1986).
Piaget can thus be classified as accepting important aspects of both empiricism and 
rationalism. On the one hand, Piaget maintains the active role of the epistemic subject in
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interpreting, categorising, and structuring experience, as is expressed in the notion of 
assimilation. That is, the subject constructs the epistemic object and in doing so 
synthesises incoming data via certain operations and structures (Kitchener, 1986). On 
the other hand, Piaget maintains not only that knowledge is constructed by the subject 
but also that the epistemic categories themselves are constructed: the notion of 
accommodation.
Piaget accepts that certain concepts or categories are necessary for us to have 
knowledge, though his list of concepts “necessary for thought” varied somewhat over 
time -  including formal laws of logic, the notions of time and space, the ideas of cause, 
quantity, classification, as well as concepts of objects, number, chance, reality, and 
motivation, and emotional, moral and social categories (Kitchener, 1986). However, in 
positing the necessity of knowledge, Piaget differs significantly from the necessity that 
emerges from the modularity thesis (s. 4.2.2). While Piaget accepts the necessity of 
certain concepts for experience, he rejects the idea that a certain interpretation of these 
concepts is necessary. Kitchener (1986) illustrates this difference with reference to the 
notion of the a priori. Piaget rejects the notion of a priori categories as being fixed at 
birth, what Kitchener refers to as ‘temporal priority’, though accepts the notion that 
categories are universal and necessary, what Kitchener refers to as ‘logical priority’. 
That is, Piaget accepts that change in these necessary categories would not be 
accidental, but in some sense rationally necessary (Kitchener, 1986). It is thus suggested 
that Piaget accepts a “looser version of transcendental knowledge”: if there is a logic to 
development, the historical necessity of concepts have an underlying developmental 
necessity (Kitchener, 1986). That is, a dialectical construction of categories follows a 
certain stage sequence that universally and necessarily lead to the construction of the 
cognitive structures characteristic of adults who experience the world in the same 
manner -  for instance, mathematics and logic.
Piaget provided a way to understand how the “learning” of concepts a posteriori is 
consistent with the pre-requisite existence of concepts a priori through his stages of 
cognitive development (Hundert, 1995). That is, through the proposal of primitive 
schema and the processes of assimilation and accommodation Piaget provided the 
means to incorporate both the a priori and the a posteriori, as well as the notion of 
innate structures into the development of concepts. Thus, Piaget sits between, and
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accepts aspects of both empiricism and rationalism. He accepts both the empiricist 
notion that concepts are learned, and the rationalist notion that learning is organised by 
the subject through the application of pre-existing concepts. Concepts are both a priori 
and a posteriori.
It is important to distinguish this interpretation of Piaget’s genetic epistemology from 
what has been termed the “phylogenic fallacy”: the notion that the development of the 
individual somehow parallels the evolution of the species. That is, what is not being 
argued here is that the process or outcome of the development of environmental 
preferences in the context of interaction with the local environment parallels the picture 
of the evolution of environmental preference described in section 4.2. Instead, in 
Piaget’s framework, the outcome of this evolutionary process would determine the form 
of any primitive schema inherited by the child. Such schema may work to shape 
subsequent interaction with the environment, and thus the development of necessary 
categories. However, it is important to note that these necessary categories are not fixed 
at birth. Any historical necessity in preferences or concepts is the result of a 
developmental necessity based upon the application of primitive schema in determining 
the interaction with the environment that results in the construction of cognitive 
structures characteristic of adults who experience the world in the same way. In no way 
do such primitive schema imply the development of the individual in a manner 
paralleling the evolution of the species. However, it can help to explain historical 
necessity in the context of development in the local environment.
4.5.3 Piaget’s genetic epistemology and environmental preference.
Piaget’s suggestion that the functioning of the mind provides the basis for the learning 
of universal concepts allows both the universalities of the ‘nature’ approach and the 
learning aspects of the ‘culture’ approach to be incorporated into one framework. 
Piaget’s description of a process of cognitive development that maintains within it both 
a role for local environmental factors as well as the notion of necessity in conception 
allows both the argument that environmental preferences are locally determined and the 
argument that there are universal aspects of environmental preference to be incorporated 
within one framework.
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Specifically, the notion that there might exist some form of logical necessity in the way 
features of the local environment are assimilated and accommodated into environmental 
preferences might be expected to result in a preference structure whereby learned 
preferences reflect universal principles expressed within the local context. Thus, the 
following characteristics of environmental preference might be predicted:
1. The existence of underlying universalities in preference, due to logical necessity 
in preference development.
2. The contribution of local factors to preference determination, due to the logical 
necessity in preference development being expressed in the local context.
3. The dominance of local factors over universal factors in determining preference, 
as these reflect the context specific expression of any universal principles in 
preference development. That is, any local aspects of environmental preference 
identified would be expected to encompass universal factors, and thus represent 
the environmental preferences predicted by the logical necessity of preference 
development in the local context, as learned preferences are expansions of 
universal tendencies in the context of the specific local environment.
4. Some relationship between local and universal factors in 
determination, as local factors encompass universal principles.
The possibility that Piaget’s genetic epistemology might provide a way to 
culture-biology dichotomy in explaining environmental preference provides 
for the remainder of this chapter.
4.6 Method,
4.6.1 Subjects.
A sample of 220 people were selected from a range of social and cultural contexts 
within the northern Thailand region. The sample was split evenly between Thais from 
Chicmg Mai (the second largest city in Thailand), Chiang Dao (a small town about 
75km north of Chiang M ai) and Baan Tham (a village in the countryside outside 
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hills above Chiang Dao (see Maps 4.1 and 4.2). All subjects were over 18 years of age 
and had been resident in the location for the whole of their life, thereby ensuring the 
influence of local environmental norms.
4.6.2 Stimulus and response form at
Because landscapes do not lend themselves to easy evaluation by large numbers of 
people, this study, like many others, employed photographs of landscapes31. Each 
participant was presented with 10 pairs of landscape photographs (appendix 2), 
composed from 11 different photographs (appendix 1), for a period of approximately 10 
seconds, and asked to indicate, where possible, which one was preferred.
In order to guard against the effects of familiarity/un-familiarity, all the landscapes 
chosen reflected different local, northern Thai landscape forms, ensuring that all the 
participants were as equally familiar with landscape forms as possible. While 
incorporation of this criterion into the choice of pictures limited the extent which the 
landscapes could be varied, this is offset against the fact that, as a result, each landscape 
could be expansive and thereby representative of conditions true to real life landscape 
preference formation. Whether the consequent limited range of the features within the 
environment impacted the results will require further investigation.
The photographs were all colour and the same size. They were chosen to reflect various 
of the landscapes available in the Northern Thai region, ranging from cultivated fields to 
plantations to natural forest. They were paired so as to ensure participants faced a 
choice between as many combinations of different landscape forms as was possible 
from the photographs. No scenes were used that included people or roads, and the 
presence of animals, fences, and buildings was kept to a minimum. None of the pictures 
showed evidence of fire, predators or prey.
31 Several studies have suggested that people rate landscapes that they visited in much the same way that 




From the brief summary of the literature concerning the possible universal aspects of 
landscape preference (s. 4.2.1) the complexity, coherence, legibility, mystery, and 
existence of water were identified as contributing to preference. From a discussion of 
relevant social norms in the northern Thailand region (see s. 9.3, as well as s. 7.5), local 
aspects of landscape preference were approximated by ‘the extent of forestation’ and the 
‘lushness of the vegetation’. Individual pictures were ranked by an independent panel 
according to each of these characteristics32. A scale of 0 (being weak in the particular 
characteristic) to 5 (being strong in the particular characteristic) was used.
For each pairing of pictures, the score for the second picture was subtracted from the 
score of the first for each of the characteristics. This provided an indicator of the 
difference between the picture combinations for each of the characteristics (a score 
ranging from -5 to 5) that was then compared with the number of participants choosing 
the first picture from each pairing as preferred in order to determine the contribution of 
the different landscape characteristics to people’s preference33. Firstly, as tests showed 
the data to be normal and to display homoscedasticity, Pearson and Partial correlations 
were performed to determine the relationship between individual landscape 
characteristics and preference. Secondly, a number of multiple regression models were 
constructed in order to determine the relative importance of landscape characteristics in 
predicting preference. Thirdly, collinearity tests were performed to identify any 
correlation between the landscape characteristics used in the above tests. Finally, a 
factor analysis was run to identify any common factors underlying the landscape 
characteristics identified.
32 A total of four people ranked the landscape pictures: two people who had lived in Thailand their whole 
lives and two people who had lived in England their whole lives. These rankings were averaged to 
provide the ranking used in the analysis.
33 Tests were also performed using landscape characteristic ranking scales of 20 to -20 and 50 to -50 in 
order to assess the sensitivity of the analysis to the scales used In each case, the scale used had no 




4.7.1 Determinants o f preference.
The application of Piaget’s genetic epistemology to environmental preference predicts a 
role for both local and universal factors in determining preference. As the data is 
parametric (s. 4.6.3) and a positive correlation is predicted between the landscape 
characteristics and preferences, a one-tailed Pearson correlation was performed for each 
of the seven landscape characteristics and the preferences of the sample population 
(table 4.1); the higher the correlation coefficient, the more consistently people in that 
sample group react to that particular characteristic of the landscape in arriving at their 
preference.





Coherence Complexity Mystery Legibility Water Forest Lushness
Picture 1 0.642* -0.306 0.041 -0.811** 0.201 0.807** 0.711*
significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
Of the seven characteristics highlighted, the extent of forestation, coherence, and 
lushness were most highly positively and significantly related to preference. The other 
characteristic highly correlated with preference was legibility, though negatively so, 
thereby contradicting the literature. Neither complexity, mystery, nor the existence of 
water showed much correlation with preference, but the results for these factors were 
not significant at the 5% level.
The fact that the landscape characteristics measured are not mutually exclusive 
categories, and may in fact be correlated with each other means that the above Pearson 
correlations cannot be interpreted as the pure relationship between each characteristic 
and preference. The measurement of the pure, unique relationship between 
characteristics and preference require that the influence of other characteristics be held
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constant and can be determined through the performance of a partial correlation (table 
4.2).
Table 4.2 Partial correlation coefficients fo r  landscape preferences and landscape 




Coherence Complexity Mystery Legibility Water Lushness Forest
Picture 1 0.9851** 0.9744* -0.9689* -0.8446 0.9558* -0.9655* 0.9177*
significant at 5% level; ** significant at % level.
Once the effects of other characteristics has been taken account of, the correlations 
between characteristics and preference display a form more in accordance with that 
predicted in the literature. Complexity, coherence, the extent of forestation, and the 
existence of water now display a highly positive and significant relationship with 
preference. Of the other characteristics, mystery and the lushness of the vegetation also 
display a strong significant relationship with preference, but negatively so, contradicting 
the literature. Legibility also seems negatively related to preference, though the result 
obtained is not significant at the 5% level.
The non-correspondence of the results for the landscape characteristics mystery and 
legibility could be explained through proposing stages in the application of universal 
aspects of preference determination. For instance, Kaplan (1992) proposed a two stage 
model of preference determination in which the presence of landscape characteristics 
coherence and complexity are inquired of first. Only if preference decisions cannot be 
made at this stage do mystery and legibility enter into preference determination. In the 
case where preferences are decided at the first stage, it may well be the case the mystery 
and legibility display a poor correlation with preference.
The above results provide little evidence to distinguish the influence of learned and 
universal factors in landscape preference. Although the results obtained do not wholly 
correspond with all the determinants of preference derived from the literature review, 
both universal and learned elements of landscape preference seem to be present. Further
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tests, however, are required if the appropriate combination and relative contribution of 
these factors in preference formation is to be determined.
4.7.2 Predictors o f preference.
The model of preference developed from Piaget’s genetic epistemology suggests that 
local factors will dominate the prediction of preference. However, correlations tell us 
nothing about the predictive power of variables. One method of determining a complex 
model of predictors when the relative importance of contributory factors is uncertain is 
to perform a multiple regression (Field, 2000).
For situations in which the output data is dichotomous, as is the case here, where 
people’s responses are a choice between picture 1 and picture 2, a Probit analysis is 
appropriate. This determines model parameters for the influence of independent 
variables over the frequency of response to the variable. A Probit analysis was run on 
the frequency of participants choosing picture 1 and extent to which picture 1 varied 
from picture 2 for the landscape characteristics. The regression equation obtained is 
shown in equation 4.1.
p  = _0.40 + 0.62W+ 0.2IF  + I.lOCoh + 0.79Com Eq. 4.1
- 0 .8 3 M -0 . l lL - 0 .3 2 L u
P = number of people preferring picture 1.
W = the difference in the existence of water between pictures 1 and 2.
F = difference in extent of forestation between pictures 1 and 2.
Coh = the difference in coherence between pictures 1 and 2.
Com = the difference in complexity between pictures 1 and 2.
M = the difference in mystery between pictures 1 and 2.
L = the difference in legibility between pictures 1 and 2.
Lu = the different in lushness between pictures 1 and 2.
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The chi-square statistic for equation 4.1 is greater than 0.005 (0.189) suggesting that 
there is no reason why the model should be doubted. In terms of the direction of the 
parameters obtain, the results of the regression model match those of the partial 
correlation (table 4.2). Moreover, the magnitude of the parameters also suggest a 
contribution of individual characteristics the same as that suggested by the partial 
correlation: of those characteristics positively related to preference, coherence has the 
largest parameter, followed by complexity, water, and forestation; and of the 
characteristics negatively related to preference, mystery has the largest parameter, 
followed by lushness and legibility.
However, the order in which predictors are entered into the multiple regression model 
can have significant impacts on the results obtained. As a general rule, predictors should 
be entered into the model in the order of their importance in predicting the outcome 
(Field, 2000). However, it is this order of importance that motivates our undertaking the 
multiple regression model in the first place, so an alternative method must be sought. 
Stepwise methods, in which predictors are entered in an order determined by 
mathematical criteria, are used. Based upon the results obtained in the partial 
correlation, the predictors to be tested in the determination of preference were narrowed 
down to the three ‘universal’ characteristics, complexity, coherence, and existence of 
water, and the local factor, the extent the landscape is forested, which all displayed a 
positive correlation with preferences. These predictors were then combined in multiple 
regressions employing forward34, stepwise35 and backward36 methods of selecting 
predictors. The results of the forward and stepwise methods are shown in equation 4.2.
34 Forward selection of predictors consists of searching for the best predictor based upon the highest 
simple correlation with the dependent variable. If the chosen predictor significantly improves the ability 
of the model to predict the outcome it is retained. The next predictor selected is that with the largest semi- 
partial correlation with the outcome. That is, the correlation with the proportion of the outcome not 
already accounted for by the predictor already selected Again this predictor is added to the model if its 
contribution to the improvement of the prediction of the model is significant.
35 The selection of predictors in the multiple regression is the same as that for the forward selection 
method (footnote 34), except that the removal criteria of the least useful predictor is employed as each 
predictor is added. As such the regression equation is constantly being reassessed to see whether any 
redundant predictors can be removed.
36 The backward method is the opposite to the forward method (footnote 34) in that all predictors are 
placed in the model to begin with and the contribution if each one calculated. The significant value of the 
t-test is used to assess the contribution of each predictor. This significance value is then compared against 
the removal criteria of either an absolute or probability value of the test statistic. If a predictor meets the 
removal criteria (is not making a statistically significant contribution to how well the model predicts the 
outcome variable) it is removed and the model is re-estimated for the remaining predictors.
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P =  77.71 + 21.27F Eq. 4.2
(t = 4.67) (t = 3.66)
(p = 0.002) (p = 0.006)
P = number of people preferring picture 1.
F = difference in extent of forestation between picture 1 and picture 2.
In both the forward and stepwise selection cases, the only significant contributor to the 
prediction of preference outcomes was deemed to be the extent the landscape was 
forested. For every increase in the difference in the ranking of the extent of forestation 
between picture 1 and picture 2 of 1.0 (scale -5  to 5) another 21 more people prefer the 
landscape (from a sample of 220). Moreover, this model was found to predict 63% of 
the variability in preference for picture 1 (R2 = 0.626), and significantly improved our 
ability to predict preference (see t-statistics; and the change in F-statistic = 13.377, with 
a significance value of p = 0.006).
The results from the backward method for selection of predictors tells a similar story 
(equation 4.3). Starting with all characteristics as factors in the model, as the multiple 
regression model is developed, complexity and coherence are removed as being 
insignificant contributors to the model, in each case with insignificant change in the 
ability of the model to predict preference outcomes (the significance of the change in 
the F-statistic being 0.859 and 0.495 respectively).
P =  59.89 + 23.09F + 13.24W Eq. 4.3
(t = 3.69) (t = 4.69) (t = 2.12)
(p = 0.008) (t = 0.002) (p = 0.072)
P = number of people preferring picture 1.
F = the difference in extent of forestation between pictures 1 and 2.
W = the difference in the existence of water between pictures 1 and 2.
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The multiple regression models developed would seem to indicate that iocaF factors, 
specifically the extent to which the landscape is forested, contribute most significantly 
to the prediction of environmental preference. With the exception of the contribution of 
the existence of water in the model developed with the backward selection method, 
universal characteristics were found to be insignificant in their contribution to 
preference.
4.7.3 The relationship between local and universal predictors.
Our model of environmental preference also suggests that there will be a relationship 
between local and universal factors in preference determination. One way of exploring 
this possibility is through indicators of multicollinearity. Although not exceeding the 
correlation coefficient generally taken as indicating possible multicollinearity problems, 
0.9 (Field, 2000), coherence shows a relatively strong relationship with both 
complexity, and the extent of forestation, and each of these relationships is significant 
(table 4.3). That is, a landscape that is coherent is likely to be display large areas of 
forest, and little complexity.
Table 4.3 R-matrix: correlations between landscape characteristics.
Coherence Complexity Water Forest
Pearson Correlation Coherence 1.000
Complexity -0.788 1.000
Existence of water -0.201 0.535 1.000
Extent of forestation 0.775 -0.536 -0.174 1.000
Sig. (1-tailed) Coherence
Complexity 0.003
Existence of water 0.289 0.055
Extent of forestation 0.004 0.055 0.316
The average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the those predictors excluded from both 
multiple regression models developed with stepwise and forward predictor selection 
methods is greater than 1 (table 4.4), indicating that multicollinearity may be biasing the 
regression model (Field, 2000). However, none of the tolerance statistics calculated for
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the excluded variables is below 0.1 (table 4.4), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a 
problem (Field, 2000). Hence, while the existence of collinearity would imply the 
unreliability of the multiple regression model (Field, 2000), its existence is uncertain.
Table 4.4 Collinearity' statistics fo r  the excluded variables fo r  multiple regressions 
performed with both stepwise and forward selection methods.
Equation Excluded predictors Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance VIF
4.2 Coherence 0.399 2.508
Complexity 0.713 1.402
Existence of water 0.970 1.031
Equation 4 .2: predictors: (constant), extent of forestation.
The relationship between predictor variables identified in the R-matrix (table 4.3) and 
the collinearity diagnostics (table 4.4) suggests that the predictor variables could be 
measuring aspects of the same underlying dimension, latent variable or factor. If this is 
the case, the ‘innate’ and ‘learned’ aspects of preference identified could be said to 
reflect an entirely separate, more fundamental dimension of landscape preference. One 
possible way to investigate this is to perform a factor analysis on the predictor 
characteristics.
A principal component analysis was performed (table 4.5) in an attempt to determine 
the extent to which variation in the characteristics used in the above investigation could 
be related to common underlying factors. Based upon the partial correlations between 
characteristics and preference (table 4.2), the universal variables coherence and 
complexity, and the local variable the extent of forestation were compared, as they 
display the strongest relationship with preference. A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling of 0.604 was obtained, exceeding the 0.5 score required for factor analysis to 
be appropriate, but still too low to ensure factor analysis provides clear and distinct 
results (Field, 2000). The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity showed a significance score of 
0.003, confirming the notion that there is some relationship between the variables being 
compared (Field, 2000).
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Table 4.5 Factors identified underlying the coherence, complexity and the extent o f 
forestation in landscapes.
initial Eigenvalues
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 2.405 80.181 80.181
2 0.464 15.483 95.663
3 0.130 4.337 100.000
Three factors/components were identified underlying the coherence, complexity and 
extent of forestation variables (table 4.5). Of these, component 1 explained 80% of the 
variance in the three variables. Of the individual variables, the factor identified accounts 
for 92% of the variance in coherence, 74% of the variance in the extent of forestation, 
and 75% of the variance in complexity.
Knowing that the three characteristics selected could to some extent be measured by the 
same underlying dimension causes one to ask the question: How much of our recorded 
environmental preferences does this underlying factor explain? Using factors scores 
obtained with the regression method (see Field, 2000), a Pearson correlation was 
performed between these and the preference scores. However, a correlation of only
0.662 (significant at the 5% level) was obtained. Similarly, when a regression model 
was run for the factor scores and preferences, it was found that the factor scores only 
accounted for 44% (R2 = 0.438) of the variance in preference. This would suggest that 
the landscape characteristics identified are not reflective of some underlying common 
determinant of preference.
4.8 Discussion.
4.8.1 Distinguishing between local and universal preference determinants.
Concern has been raised over the use of ‘the extent of forestation’ as representing local 
factors in preference development because of the emphasis within the literature upon the
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seemingly universal character of the preference for ‘naturalness’37. If ‘forestation’ can 
be equated with ‘naturalness’, and ‘naturalness’ is a universal aspect of landscape 
preference, then the investigation performed is not necessarily comparing local and 
universal aspects of preference. Support for this argument is derived from the work of 
Kaplan and Kaplan (1982) who present evidence in support of the conclusion that 
natural environments are consistently preferred to human-made environments. 
Moreover, natural environments that contain trees and other vegetation are rated more 
positively than similar environments that lack trees or other vegetation (Ulrich, 1983).
In response to this argument it should be pointed out that, while more ‘naturalness’ is 
preferred to less, it is wrong to equate ‘naturalness’ solely with the extent of forestation. 
In the work of Kaplan and Kaplan (1982) ‘naturalness’ is defined as contrasting with 
the built environment, while Ulrich (1983) includes vegetation other than trees in 
defining preferred natural environments. Thus, each of the pictures used in the above 
investigation (appendix 1) can be classified as ‘natural’, as they exclude man-made 
elements, and the variation between these pictures in terms of the extent of forestation 
does not necessarily equate with variation in ‘naturalness’, as the other vegetation 
within the pictures also classifies them as natural. Hence, to claim that the extent of 
forestation of a landscape merely reflects the ‘naturalness’ of the landscape and thus 
universally preferred aspects of the environment is to adopt a narrow and perhaps 
misleading definition o f ‘naturalness’.
That the extent of forestation does not reflect a universal feature of landscape preference 
is also supported by, for instance, Orians’ (1980, 1986) savannah hypothesis: the notion 
that ‘savannah-like’ environments are preferred over others. This is particularly 
interesting in the present context, as savannahs are contrasted with forests: savannahs 
possess more open space and more scattered trees, affording distant views and low 
grassy ground cover. In support of the savannah hypothesis, Balling and Falk (1982) 
studied the biome preference of different age groups (8, 11, 15, 18, 35 and over 70), 
asking subjects to rate how much they would like to “live-in” or “visit” five natural 
biomes: tropical forest, deciduous forest, coniferous forest, East African savannah, and 
desert. It was found that 8-year old children would rather live in and visit savannah than
37 Brad Jorgenson, personal communication, International Centre for Environment, University of Bath,
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the other four biomes. From age 15 on, the savannah, deciduous forest, and coniferous 
forest were liked equally well, and all three biomes were preferred over tropical forest 
and desert. The preference for deciduous and coniferous forest over tropical forest 
within the study is likely explained by the fact that none of the participants had ever 
visited a tropical forest, instead being more familiar with the deciduous forest that 
comprised their experiences. The conclusion is that savannah type environments reflect 
innately programmed responses that are subsequently modified by experience. Hence, it 
might be expected that tropical forests might become a preferred environment for those 
living in the regions possessing such forests, the lesson being that preferences for 
tropical forests (such as those used in the above survey) are learned rather than innate.
In response to this argument it could be suggested that ‘naturalness’ is a universal 
aspect of preference but that its exact definition is socially constructed (Greider and 
Garkovich, 1994; Macnaughten et al, 1992). Thus, local aspects of the environment are 
preferred to the extent that they are symbolic of the ‘naturalness’ category. If this is the 
case, the extent of forestation may be preferred as it reflects the ‘naturalness’ category, 
and is thus reflective of an underlying universal. However, this is not to deny ‘the extent 
of forestation’ its locally determined categorisation. That the local determination of 
preference is reflective of underlying universal preference categories does not constitute 
an inconsistency in the analysis. Rather, the analysis predicted that local factors in 
environmental preference would encompass universal factors, or that universal factors 
would be expressed in the specific context in arriving at local factors.
Thus, while distinguishing between local and universal predictors is required for the 
analysis, this is not to suggest that the predictors identified represent mutually exclusive 
categories, as the model itself suggests that universal predictors are themselves an 
underlying determinant of local predictors through the process of developmental 
necessity.
2 0 . 1 1 . 2 0 0 1 .
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4.8.2 Piaget ’s theory o f knowledge and necessity in environmental preference.
The model of environmental preference developed from Piaget’s genetic epistemology 
makes three predictions:
1. A role for both local and universal factors in determining preference.
The Pearson and Partial correlations performed (tables 4.1 and 4.2) suggest that 
both universal and local factors contribute to the determination of environmental 
preference, supporting both the role of necessity in the development of 
environmental preference and the assimilation and accommodation of the local 
environment found within Piaget’s model.
2. Local factors will dominate the prediction of preference.
The regression models produced (equations 4.2 and 4.3) suggest that local 
factors contribute most to the prediction of environmental preference. The 
identification of universal features in preference is consistent within Piaget’s 
framework with the observed dominance of local features in the determination 
of preference. Any universality in concepts is developed in the context of the 
assimilation and accommodation of the local environment. Thus, in the local 
context, ‘learned’ aspects of preference would be expected to predict preference 
more strongly, as learned preferences are expansions of universal tendencies in 
the context of the specific local environment. Hence, as the landscape pictures 
used in the investigation were taken from the local environment, this pattern 
would be expected amongst the data.
3. There will be a relationship between local and universal factors in preference 
determination.
Collinearity tests (tables 4.3 and 4.4) suggest the possible correlation between 
local and universal factors in preference determination. In particular, a strong 
relationship is identified between the local factor ‘the extent of forestation’ and 
the universal factor ‘coherence’. Moreover, component analysis (table 4.5)
128
identified a latent factor that explains 80% of the variation in the predictors 
‘extent of forestation’, ‘coherence’, and ‘complexity’. While this factor 
explained only little of the variation in overall environmental preference, it 
supports the notion that there is a relationship between universal and local 
factors in preference determination.
Thus, the results presented would tend to support the ability of the model to explain 
environmental preferences. However, support for Piaget’s model also requires that the 
universal pattern of locally determined preference be derived ‘internally’ within the 
subject, based on primitive schema. Consideration of alternative sources of this pattern 
reveals problems in concluding this from the data collected. For instance, an alternative 
explanation of cognitive development “universally and necessarily lead[ing] to the 
construction of the cognitive structures characteristic of adults who experience the 
world in the same manner” would be the assimilation and accommodation of 
environmental universals. In this case, the restraining factor in cognitive development 
would be external commonalities rather than an internal logical necessity.
The possibility that external commonalities might be the source of universal aspects of 
preference can be illustrated through consideration of the parallel between the notions of 
biodiversity and complexity. While a comprehensive survey of the ecology literature 
will not be attempted in this chapter, an interesting parallel has been noted between one 
of the proposed universal aspects of preference -  complexity -  and the ecological 
principle that biodiversity plays an important role in ecosystem stability (Holling et al, 
1995); the closest the author could find to a universal ecological principle38. The 
definition of biodiversity commonly agreed upon by biologists and conservationists is:
The totality of hereditary variations in life forms, across all levels of 
biological organisation, from genes and chromosomes within individual 
species to the array of species themselves and finally, at the highest 
level, the living communities of ecosystems such as forests and lakes 
(Wilson, 1994: 359).
38 The principle that biodiversity is an important factor in ecosystem resilience has been contended by a 
number of contributors to the ecological science literature. A further discussion of the role of biodiversity 
in ecosystem functioning is elaborated in s. 7.4.
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At a local level, this could certainly be considered comparable with the definition of 
complexity as it is incorporated into models of evolutionary environmental aesthetics: 
the richness or number of different objects in the scene. Thus a parallel can be observed 
between the general ecological principle concerning the role of biodiversity and the 
preference for complexity in environments. While this does not prove that universality 
in preference is externally derived, the existence of such a possibility remains open and 
consistent with the data.
Distinguishing between these alternative sources of universality in preference is beyond 
the analysis performed, as the method adopted throughout consists of deriving a 
universal from a universal: universal preference from either a developmental or an 
ecological universal. There is no reason to believe that the line of causation between 
these universals runs in any particular direction. Uncertainty as to the line of causation 
is summarised by Brown (1991: 89) when he states that “every universal is equally a 
correlate of every other, so the degree of correlation between any of them ceases to be a 
criterion forjudging arguments that posit connections between them”.
Such confusion as to the line of causation between correlated universals introduces an 
element of circularity into the argument; a circularity well illustrated by the possible 
interpretations of preference forms even when confined to possible interpretations of 
Piaget’s “stage theory”. Indeed, Brown (1991), in perhaps the most comprehensive 
study of human universals currently available, identifies various modes for explaining 
universals: explaining a universal from a universal; cultural reflection upon or 
recognition of biological facts; logical extension from (usually biological) givens; 
diffusionist explanations that rest upon the great age of the trait and, usually, its great 
utility; archoses; conservation of energy; the nature of the human organism, with 
emphasis on the brain; evolutionary theory; interspecific comparison; ontogeny; and 
partial explanations. That there exist such a variety of explanations for universals points 
to another limitation of the analysis performed: while the results tend to be consistent 
with an interpretation of Piaget’s stage theory, they are also likely to be consistent with 
any of the other explanations of universality that haven’t been considered.
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Thus, although it can be concluded that Piaget’s work holds the possibility of explaining 
environmental preference formation, as well as demonstrating necessity in preference, 
further research is required if this is to be demonstrated conclusively. Appealing to 
observed universals and consistencies in preference as a method for the analysis of the 
nature of the development of preference seems to fail to approach the problem at the 
appropriate level. It is a similar argument that causes Ulrich (1993) to conclude that the 
innate nature of environmental preferences cannot be derived from their commonality39. 
However, irrespective of their ability to explain the source, appealing to and identifying 
universals and consistencies in preferences does serve to maintain the possibility of 
necessity in the development of environmental preference.
39 Ulrich doubts the validity of the argument that such similarities in preference are genetic in origin, due 
to the insufficiency of the method involved. He suggests that to determine the exact nature of the genetic 
influence behind conceptions of nature requires “behaviour-genetic methods”. For instance, the use of 
twin registers, laboratory based experiments, the use of physiological techniques such as facial 
electromyography (EMG), the response of young children to natural stimuli, and the use of a high- 
resolution PET (positron emission tomography) scanner to locate the position of brain activity during the 
processing of natural verses modem stimuli. It is suggested that such methods are required if the form of 
environmental preference is to be resolved.
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5. Overcoming the unfalsifiability of folk psychology: scientific realism 
and necessity in the development of concepts.
5.1 Introduction
Concerns within the literature over the objectivity of the naturalistic project in the social 
sciences threaten to undermine attempts to identify necessity in knowledge. The 
psychological investigation undertaken in the previous chapter attempted to determine 
whether there exists universal necessity in environment preference, and thus contribute 
to the resolution of the epistemological debate outlined in chapter 3. However, returning 
to the philosophical literature, we find a number of epistemological problems with the 
application of findings in human science to the resolution of epistemological issues. If 
we are to continue to empirically investigate the necessity of knowledge, the 
epistemological issues particular to the human sciences require further elaboration. That 
is, if we are to contribute to the question of whether there can be necessity in 
knowledge, and thus objectivity, we are required to ask whether we can have objective 
knowledge of people’s beliefs and desires.
First, the approach adopted in chapter 4 represents naturalised epistemology: the 
scientific study of how we come to know what we know (Stroud, 1985), or more 
generally the relevance of science to the solution of philosophical problems (Rosenberg, 
2000a). However, the validity of the naturalistic project is vigorously debated. It is 
argued that adopting a scientific methodology in investigating objectivity is simply 
question begging, as the objectivity of science is itself called into question; an argument 
summarised in chapter 3. Section 5.2 briefly outlines the problems of naturalised 
epistemology through the elaboration of Quine’s arguments in favour of naturalised 
epistemology.
Second, the psychological method adopted involves the employment of a folk 
psychological level of explanation of human action in attempting to naturalise social 
science: the explanation of actions by reference to beliefs or desires (s. 5.3). That is, 
having defined objectivity in chapter 3 as the universal validity of knowledge, the 
investigation in chapter 4 was required to ask questions about the nature and
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relationship of people’s actions and beliefs. Thus, the epistemological issues particular 
to the human sciences are invoked once humans become the subject of investigation.
It is suggested that folk psychology fails to satisfy the criteria for a scientific, causal 
theory. Hence, addressing scepticism regarding the objectivity of knowledge using a 
theory that itself fails to meet the standards of objectivity is again merely question 
begging. Thus, the notion that there might be objectivity in understanding human action 
is called into question, undermining the search for necessity in knowledge. Both these 
issues require further consideration before we can proceed with our investigation of 
necessity in knowledge.
The behaviourist “law of effect” is thought to represent a solution to the problems of 
folk psychology in producing a naturalistic social science (s. 5.4). However, a closer 
look at the details of behaviourism reveals that it either relies on circularity in the proof 
of the “law of effect” or suffers from the same problems of folk psychology.
An alternative response to the problems of attempting to naturalise social science 
resulting from folk psychology is presented in the form of the interpretative approach: 
rejecting both that science represents truth and that its causal laws provide the aims of 
social science (s. 5.5). The interpretative approach’s call for the end of the naturalistic 
project and the replacement of causal explanation with the subjective understanding of 
meaning as the aim of the social sciences is challenged in the form of scientific realism 
(s. 5.6). Moreover, scientific realism maintains the possibility of investigating the 
existence of necessity in environmental preference.
5.2 Naturalistic epistemology and scientific objectivity.
The application of psychological investigation to the resolution of epistemological 
debate, as in chapter 4, is challenged by classical epistemology, as psychology is itself 
burdened with the epistemological problems faced by the scientific method it adopts. 
Sceptical epistemology, as presented in chapter 3, is concerned with the legitimacy of 
the claim that science produces objective knowledge. A classical epistemologist would 
argue that to make use of science in consideration of scepticism would simply beg the 
question against the sceptic by making use of the very knowledge he/she calls into
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question (Komblith, 2000). It is circular to use science (psychology) in order to ground 
the legitimacy/objectivity of science, and to do so would be to commit the naturalistic 
fallacy: epistemology is concerned with understanding the normative standards that 
guide our inquiry, but psychology can only tell us how we actually defend our beliefs 
(Hookway, 2000).
Perhaps the best known defence of the use of psychology in the resolution of 
epistemological issues is that of Quine, and it is a brief summary of Quine’s work that 
we shall use to outline the main arguments in favour of naturalising epistemology. 
Despite his rejection of the empiricist theories of meaning and evidence (s. 3.6), Quine 
did not surrender his commitment to an observational language with a special role in 
adjudicating competing scientific theories: the notion that we can rationally choose 
between theories on the basis of their all-round power to systematise and predict 
observations. That is, Quine and his followers proposed a form of naturalism that 
retained for science its claim to objectivity (Rosenberg, 2000a). Having previously 
undermined foundationalist40 attempts to defend the empirical science, and still 
maintaining the veracity of the scientific project, Quine sought to replace epistemology 
with empirical psychology (Giere, 2000). That is, though he holds that science should 
aim at empirical adequacy, he does so because this is the criterion of adequacy that 
science has set itself, not because of the superiority of empiricism itself (Rosenberg, 
2000a).
Quine recommends an investigation into the source of our general knowledge of the 
ways of physical objects, and sees the problem arising from the fact that physical things 
become known to us through the effects they help to induce on our sensory surfaces 
(Stroud, 1985). The problem then becomes, given the evidence of our senses, how do 
we arrive at our theory of the world? Traditional philosophy, the classical 
foundationalist approach, attempts to answer this question through reference to first 
philosophy, an epistemological theory developed independently of, and prior to, any 
scientific theorising (Dancy and Sosa, 2000). Quine, by contrast, argued that there is no 
such first philosophy (Stroud, 1985). Holding that the stimulation of sensory receptors
40 The foundationalist program encompasses a number of epistemological frameworks. However, they all 
share a commitment to the existence of a class of beliefs about our own sensory experience about which it 
is impossible to be wrong, and that these beliefs are sufficient to justify the rest of our beliefs.
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is all that we have to go on in constructing and defending theories, Quine asks how it is 
that humans can arrive at beliefs about the world around them on the basis of such 
sensory stimulation (Komblith, 2000). In answering this question, epistemology in 
Quine’s view is a branch of science: epistemology “falls into place as a chapter of 
psychology, and hence natural science” (1969: 82). It studies the relationship between 
human beings and their environment.
Quine’s conception of human knowledge and therefore his epistemological project 
shares with earlier philosophers the idea of human knowledge as a combination of two 
factors: the contribution of the world and the contribution of the perceiving subject. 
Using these to investigate human knowledge, he suggested that we could subtract man’s 
cues from the physical world from his world view to arrive at the contribution he makes 
himself (1960). Performing this subtraction, Quine argued that the subjective 
contribution of the knowing subject will appear as the dominant influence on the present 
state of our general knowledge. That is, the physical objects we believe in are “posits”; 
statements of their existence are far in excess of any available data (1960). From the 
“meagre inputs” of sensory stimulation, we somehow arrive at the “torrential output” of 
the complex totality of our views about the world. Our belief about the world is 
therefore a “hypothesis” (Stroud, 1985).
In this sense, Quine would seem to agree with classical epistemology that naturalistic 
epistemology does not amount to an answer to the traditional problem of our knowledge 
of the external world. That naturalistic epistemology will never solve Hume’s problem 
of induction based on sensory stimulation is reflected in Quine’s statement, “The 
Humean predicament is the human predicament” (1969: 72). That is, naturalistic 
epistemology is the empirical scientific study of human knowledge, and Quine seems to 
concede a circularity in any naturalistic attempt to ‘Validate” our knowledge of the 
world (Stroud, 1985).
Moreover, by his own arguments, Quine has shown that the employment of theories in 
psychology in an attempt to explain understanding is itself to adopt a non-observational 
and therefore, from an empiricist perspective, a non-objective basis from which to 
criticise opposition to objectivity, as observation is theory laden (s. 3.6). That is, 
attempts to underwrite the claims of science are themselves paradigm bound, and
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undermined by the very philosophical standards of argument and the substantive 
philosophical doctrines that defenders of objectivity embrace (Rosenberg, 2000a). 
Hence, Quine’s description of the epistemological project as “a chapter of psychology” 
encouraged many to interpret his view as a rejection of the normative dimension of 
epistemological thinking.
However, later Quine (1974) seems to change his mind and regard something very like 
the traditional problem of ‘Validation” as a problem answerable by naturalistic 
epistemology: the replacement thesis. He goes on to say,
For me normative epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the 
technology of truth seeking [...] There is no question here of ultimate 
value, as in morals; it is a matter of efficacy for an ulterior end, truth or 
prediction. The normative here, as elsewhere in engineering, becomes 
descriptive when the terminal parameter is expressed (1986: 664 -  5).
This argument he bases on the notion that the sceptical challenge arises within science 
itself. That is, it is exactly our success in understanding the world, and thus in seeing 
that appearance and reality may differ that raises the sceptical question in the first place 
(Komblith, 2000), and unless we have good reason for doubting science, we are 
warranted in standing firm on our scientific view of the world in order to understand its 
undoubted legitimacy (Hookway, 2000). Hence, Quine challenges the desire to ground 
science as a whole, and, in doing so, argues that normative epistemology becomes 
applied science. The question about how knowledge is possible should thus be 
construed as an empirical question.
Another attempt to justify the replacement thesis, one employed by Quine himself, is to 
point to Darwinian evolution for encouragement in answering epistemological questions 
through explanation of why it is that we should be well adapted to getting ‘true’ beliefs 
about the environment (Komblith, 1985). That is, believing truths has survival value: 
the survival of the fittest guarantees that our innate intellectual endowment gives us a 
predisposition for believing truths. It is not necessarily held that beliefs themselves are 
innate, only that the mental mechanisms which guide the acquisition of beliefs are 
innate, the result of biological evolution. Examples include the “evolution of cognitive
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mechanism program” (Bradie, 1986) and the ‘Darwinian approach to epistemology” 
(Ruse, 1986). These provide a normative element to naturalistic epistemology: if we 
arrive at our beliefs just the way we ought, then the normative question of how we 
ought to arrive at knowledge and the positive question of how we do arrive at 
knowledge are equated, and both can be considered through the replacement thesis 
(Komblith, 1985). However, if psychology is to replace normative epistemology, there 
must be a perfect match between the ‘how we do’ and ‘how we ought to’ acquire 
knowledge. This cannot be guaranteed by evolution (Komblith, 1985; Stein, 2000). The 
Darwinian argument can thus motivate a version of naturalistic epistemology, but it 
cannot justify the replacement thesis.
An alternative argument in favour of the replacement thesis is to assume that there are 
basic principles of rationality that apply to all human beings (Komblith, 1985). That is, 
it is not that we all arrive at our beliefs in the same way but rather that rational belief 
acquisition consists of arriving at beliefs in the way we all do. Rationality is defined as 
arriving at beliefs in the same way we do. To do otherwise would be unintelligible to us. 
Once again, this allows the normative and positive questions of knowledge acquisition 
to be equated and the replacement of epistemology with psychology (Komblith, 1985).
A number of attempts to fill in the naturalistic account draw a close connection between 
how people actually reason and how they should reason, thereby attempting to 
illuminate the relation between the normative and the descriptive. As Komblith (2000: 
299) tells us,
One view is that the two are identical [...]. Some have argued that the two 
are, at least, far harder to distinguish than is commonly thought [...].
Others hold that while the two are distinct, any attempt to understand how 
we ought to reason must proceed in part by examination of how we do 
reason [...]. Finally, there are thoroughgoing pragmatic accounts, which 
prescribe processes of belief acquisition solely on the basis of their 
conduciveness to whatever we might value [...]. In each of these views, 
the alliance between epistemological theorising and empirical 
considerations, especially by way of psychology, is far closer than it is on 
more traditional views.
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Detractors of the naturalistic approach maintain that it simply bypasses the very 
questions which philosophers have long dealt with. That is, far from answering sceptical 
questions, the naturalistic approach merely changes the problem (Giere, 2000). Thus, 
disagreement within philosophy over the normative status of naturalistic epistemology 
remains unresolved. Although the above review is in no way comprehensive41, it serves 
to outline the issues involved. Moreover, in the context of the epistemic definition of 
objectivity (s. 3.2), and our search for necessity in knowledge, our concern with the 
naturalistic epistemology debate would tend to focus on its positive aspects. That is, we 
define objectivity as possessing “a content that may be presupposed to be valid for all 
men”. Whether or not such principles have implications for the normative status of 
naturalistic epistemology, as is discussed above, takes the debate a step further than is 
necessary for present purposes. Thus, the normative status of naturalistic epistemology 
shall detain us no longer.
5.3 Folk Psychology and Causal Explanation.
A second problem associated with the psychological investigation of environmental 
preferences emerges when we turn to the epistemological issues specific to the 
naturalistic project in the social and behavioural sciences, and the employment of a folk 
psychological level of explanation of human action: the explanation of actions by 
reference to beliefs or desires. It is suggested that folk psychology fails in its claim to 
represent scientific explanation and thus ‘objective’ knowledge. Hence, its use, as in 
chapter 4, in the investigation of the objectivity of knowledge is merely begging the 
question, and produces doubt over any conclusions with regard human beliefs and 
knowledge.
5.3.1 The unfalsifiability of folk psychology.
In implementing the naturalistic project, we are required to ask, can human action be 
explained in the way the natural sciences explain phenomena in its domain? An answer 
to this question must first consider how it is that the natural sciences explain
41 For a more comprehensive review of the issues and the literature see Kitcher (1992).
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phenomena, and then ask whether this method is appropriate to the study of human 
action.
Since scientific explanation uncovers causal mechanisms, it must involve laws. 
Scientists advance the “deductive-nomological”, or “covering-law” theory in order to 
describe how science explains laws (Rosenberg, 2000a). This states that to explain a 
particular event, one deduces its occurrence from a set of one or more laws of nature 
together with a description of the “initial conditions” that the laws require for 
occurrence of the event to be explained. Scientists hold that laws are explained by 
derivation from other, more general laws (Rosenberg, 1995). A scientific theory is just a 
set of very general laws, which jointly enable us to derive a large number of empirical 
phenomena: predictions about observations. If observations corroborate predictions, the 
theory is confirmed to some degree. While this empirical description of science is 
fallible42, positivists held that the history of science is a history of progress, a history of 
increasingly powerful predictions and increasingly precise explanations. The history of 
science is a history of narrower theories being “reduced” to broader theories 
(Rosenberg, 1995). One theory is reduced to another when the fundamental assumptions 
of the first theory can be derived as theorems from the fundamental assumptions of a 
broader theory.
With this definition of scientific progress in mind, the vindication of the naturalistic 
project turns on its ability to produce causal laws of human behaviour, and 
consideration of the veracity of the naturalistic project requires us to ask, Why have the 
social sciences not provided increasing amounts of cumulative scientific knowledge?43 
In order to answer this question, we must consider the form of explanation employed 
within the social sciences, what is referred to as “folk psychology”, and the problems of 
treating folk psychology as scientific theory (Rosenberg, 1995).
The form of explanation of human actions most commonly found within the social and 
behavioural sciences is the identification of the beliefs and desires that lead to action. 
This folk psychology tends to be of the form (Rosenberg, 1995):
42 See chapter 3 for a review of the arguments against the claims to objectivity by empirical science.
43 For elaboration of social science’s failure to uncover laws of even empirical generalisations that could 
be improved in the direction of real laws about human behaviour see Hollis (1995) and Rosenberg (1995).
139
[L] If any agent, x, wants d, and x  believes that a  is a means to attain d  under 
the circumstances, then x  does a.
The validity of the naturalistic project relies on beliefs, desires, and actions behaving in 
the way that causes and effects behave: the occurrence of an event should be derivable 
from one or more general laws and a statement of “initial” conditions, each of which 
must be logically independent of one another (Rosenberg, 2000b). That is, in 
accordance with scientific “progress”, in order to improve [L] we need to find cases 
where [L] has gone wrong, measure the values of the initial conditions and the actual 
behaviour that it failed to predict correctly, and revise it in order to accommodate the 
observed action from the inferred package of beliefs and desires.
However, attempting to determine the initial conditions required for a causal social 
science -  people’s beliefs and desires -  uncovers methodological problems for the 
naturalist (Rosenberg, 1995). Firstly, in order to identify desires and beliefs with any 
precision, we need to know more about further beliefs and desires, and so on. That is, by 
itself, an action never identifies a single belief or desire. It only does so against the 
background of a large number of other beliefs and desires. This problem of regress has 
led some philosophers to argue that mental states are “holistic”44. Accordingly, our 
explanations of action cannot help being sketchy and vague.
The ability to measure people’s beliefs and desires with greater precision would enable 
this problem to be overcome. However, a second methodological problem of a 
naturalistic social science is that, in too many cases, the only available measuring 
instrument for beliefs and desires is [L] itself. As Rosenberg (1995: 40) states:
If we know what someone’s beliefs and desires are, then [L] will tell us 
what actions she will undertake. If we know what actions a person has 
performed, and we know what her beliefs were, then [L] will tell us what 
her wants were. And if we know what she wanted and what actions she
44 More detail on the “holism” of mental states is given in s. 3.6: Quine’s identification of holistic 
empiricism in the context of the development of scientific theory -  a particular form of mental state.
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performed, then [L] will tell us what she believed. But without at least two 
of the three, belief, desire, and action, the others are not determinable.
That is, in order to measure initial conditions, we must use [L], Thus, as long as what is 
to be explained is an action, nothing could ever conceivably lead us to surrender [L]. [L] 
is unfalsifiable, and the impossibility of disconfirming [L] casts doubt on its claims to 
be a causal law, as it cannot provide empirical, scientific knowledge.
5.3.2 Folk psychology and intentionality.
It is suggested that the inability to falsify [L] derives from the fact that [L] itself defines 
what it is to be an action or interdefines the notions of desire, belief, and action: the 
logical-connection argument (Rosenberg, 2000b). The interpretation of [L] as a 
definition, one useful for rendering action intelligible, recasts desires, beliefs, and 
actions as logically rather than contingently connected. Thus, desires, beliefs, and 
actions are not causally connected by [L] or any single causal law. This logical 
connection between beliefs, desires, and actions is, in turn, thought to be the result of 
their teleological, “intentional” status.
The “intentionality” of beliefs, desires, and actions refers to their “purposefulness”, their 
possessing “propositional content”45, or their psychological attitudes towards statements 
(Heil, 2000). The notion of intentionality derives from the puzzle about how the brain 
can represent the way the world is, or in the case of desire, the way someone wants it to 
be. The standard approach to the solution of this problem is to suggest that 
representation involves things ‘standing for’, ‘being about’, ‘referring or denoting’ 
something else (Schwartz, 1995); that is, to exhibit intentionality, to stand in a special 
relation of direct apprehension to a proposition.
It is argued that no alternative means of improving [L] will ever be found (Rosenberg, 
1995). What is required is some way of measuring a person’s beliefs by some distinct 
effect of belief. However, using behaviour to measure belief or desire suffers from the
45 The propositional approach to representation is generally associated with Gottlob Frege. From this 
perspective, beliefs consist in the mind standing in a special relation of direct apprehension to a
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problem of “extensionality”. That is, such a description fails to achieve 
“intensionality”46, as they will be susceptible to substitution by other intentional states, 
or equivalent descriptions without risking a change in the truth/falsity of the statement. 
While we can assert that every intentional state is identical to some behaviour or other, 
this does not provide the possibility of causal explanation, as it does not enable us to 
identify beliefs and desires in terms of behaviour independent of their effects: actions 
(Rosenberg, 1995).
5.4 Behaviourism and the explanation o f action.
Behaviourism rejects teleological folk psychology. Taking the problem of other minds 
seriously, behaviourism is sceptical about hypotheses, such as folk psychology, that 
involve attributing undetectable mechanisms -  especially mental ones -  to people, as 
there seems no way to test such claims directly and independently (Rosenberg, 1995). In 
response it is suggested that the problem of other minds does not need solving, as the 
social and behavioural sciences are the study of behaviour, and does not require the 
hypothesis that people have minds/mental states. Thus, the behaviourist argues that 
explanations containing the terms ‘belief, ‘desire’, and ‘action’ have little predictive 
power, as they do not name natural kinds (Rosenberg, 1995). They do not “carve nature 
at the joints”.
This approach corresponds with the shrinking of the domain of the teleological 
explanatory strategy throughout the history of science. Indeed, it is suggested that 
science achieved its ‘success’ by eliminating meaning, purpose, or significance from 
nature, rather than reducing it to more fundamental theories47. Science discovered that 
more accurate and powerful non-teleological explanations could be provided, and the 
appeal to intentions was ruthlessly removed. Rosenberg tells us that:
proposition. An alternative approach is the sentential approach of Jerry Fodor in which the objects of 
belief are sentences (Tye, 1995).
46 Intensionality is used to describe an intentional state that cannot be substituted by other intentional 
states without risking the possibility of changing a truth to a falsity. On the other hand, extensionality 
refers to an intentional state which can maintain its truth/falsity even when substituted by another 
intentional state. The application of which can be used to demonstrate that causal approaches to human 
action are impossible, as there is no way of providing a description of the beliefs and desires that cause 
action which are independent of one another and independent of the action they are said to cause: which 
are intensional.
47 For a brief description of the elimination of meaning from nature by science see s. 6.4.1.
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After Galileo, the stars and planets were deprived of the goals 
Aristotelian science attributed them; Newton showed that force, 
acceleration, and gravitational attraction were enough to explain motion.
Then Darwin showed that the fitness of flora and fauna to their 
environments was to be explained without attributing purpose to them or 
intentions to their creator. [...] Now the only arena in which explanations 
appeal to purposes, goals, intentions, and meaning is their “home base”, 
human action (1995: 25).
One way to overcome the propositional representations conventionally employed within 
the human sciences is through the adoption of the conception of connectionist models 
associated with neuroscience. However, behaviourists reject the use of neurological 
data. They do so on tactical rather than philosophical grounds (Rosenberg, 1995). That 
is, it is suggested that, even if descriptions of the neurological causes of actions could be 
provided, the fine structure of the brain differs so much among people that the details of 
our neurological explanations in the case of one person would probably not be 
applicable to anyone else doing exactly the same thing. The natural-kind vocabulary of 
neuroscience includes synapse firing and acetylcholine production, but it won’t include 
“deciding to vote Conservative”, or “preferring coffee ice cream over vanilla” 
(Rosenberg, 1995).
Behaviourists also reject neuroscientific explanations due to their notion that behaviour 
is a function of environmental factors alone (Rosenberg, 1995). Thus, we can ignore 
intervening neural details and still explain almost all human behaviour. That is, there are 
predictively powerful explanatory generalisations about human behaviour that link it 
directly with observable environmental variables; the “law of effect” (Rosenberg, 
1995):
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[LE] If emitted behaviour is reinforced, it will be repeated with greater 
frequency, intensity, and duration. If it is punished, it will be repeated with 
lower frequency, intensity, and duration48.
Behaviourists thus suggest that the intentional categories of desires, beliefs, and actions 
be replaced with new ones, attributes of things that are conditional in form: patterns of 
behaviour, tendencies, dispositions, affordances (Guttenplan, 1995; Rosenberg, 1995). 
That is, the conventional conception of belief as representations (s. 5.3.2) is replaced 
with one of tendencies to say and do various things depending on the circumstances 
(Heil, 2000). That is to say, if certain conditions obtain, then that thing/substance will 
behave in a certain way. The two approaches differ in one important respect. The 
conventional view depicts the connection between belief and behaviour to be causal. 
The behaviourist, in contrast, argues that mental states like belief are not causes of 
behaviour. Beliefs are dispositional states triggered causally, but because these states 
are characterised by reference to behaviour, their connection with behaviour is 
conceptual, not causal (Heil, 2000).
In proposing [LE] behaviourism sought to provide the criterion for good social and 
behavioural sciences as the “predictively successful unification of observable 
behaviour”. However, while [LE] has been an outstanding success in the laboratory (for 
instance, B. F. Skinner, 1953), in its application to humans it has been far less 
successful (Rosenberg, 1995).
Moreover, in response to behaviourism’s attempt to maintain the scientific status of the 
study of human action it is suggested that it may turn out to be nothing more than folk 
psychology translated into new jargon (Rosenberg, 1995). That is, behaviourist theories 
are just as teleological, and indeed turn out to be intentional theories themselves. The 
basis for this argument is that the emission of a certain behaviour results as agents want 
to be reinforced for it and believe that they will be. Moreover, the behaviour that results 
is learned behaviour: learning something about the world, something that can be 
expressed as a proposition. Such propositions must be presented as an intentional state 
of some kind. Thus, [LE] faces the same problems as [L] (s. 5.3.2).
48 The law of effect represents the leading principles in Skinner’s “operant behaviourism” (Rosenberg,
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For [LE] to be predictively superior to [L], it is required that descriptions of reinforcers 
and stimuli independent of the behaviour they control be identified. The environmental 
stimulus is the observable feature of the environment leading to an operant response that 
can be reinforced. Those features of the environment that cannot be made to reinforce 
behaviour are thought not to be stimuli. However, this is to use [LE] to test [LE], That 
is, [LE] works with stimuli and reinforcers to cause behaviour, but in order to determine 
what range of environmental features can be discriminated as stimuli and reinforcers we 
appeal to [LE], The alternative means of identifying stimuli and reinforcers is to refer to 
them as being perceivable (Rosenberg, 1995). However, to do so requires that the notion 
of concepts be evoked, and thus a return to intentionality. The behaviourist defence of 
good social science is therefore faced with the choice between circularity and 
intentionality.
5.5 Interpretation: rejecting predictions in favour o f intelligibility.
Opponents of the “scientific” approach to the social sciences reject attempts to 
naturalise the social sciences as causal theories. Instead, it is suggested that the social 
sciences are justified on alternative non-naturalistic foundations, and that attempts to 
treat beliefs and desires as the causes of action are the result of conceptual confusion. 
The naturalistic approach to the relation between folk psychology and a science of 
human action has long been associated with the views of Max Weber. However, as 
Weber recognised, beliefs and desires cannot just be interpreted as the causes for action, 
but also the reasons for action: they justify it, show it to be rational, render it intelligible 
-  a notion captured in Weber’s concept of verstehen (s. 3.7). Interpreting beliefs and 
desires as reasons for actions changes the role of [L] from that of scientific model or law 
to the identification of the reasons that justify an action. The explanatory strategy of the 
social sciences is no longer revealing causes and effects but making action intelligible 
or meaningful, or showing them to be reasonable in the light of beliefs and desires 
(Rosenberg, 1995). In support of this argument, Wittgenstein (1953: 232) tells us:
1995).
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The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by 
calling it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that of 
physics, for instance, in its beginnings. For in psychology there are 
experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case 
conceptual confusion and methods of proof).
The existence of experimental methods makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method 
pass one another by.
d’Agostino (2000) suggests that there are three reasons for wondering whether 
naturalism can be maintained within the social sciences:
(a) The reflexivity of the social sciences in relation to the objects of their scrutiny. 
That is, human beings, as the subject of the social sciences, take up points of 
view with regard their own activities which are influenced by the results of 
social scientific investigation, and which therefore retrospectively invalidate 
these investigations.
(b) The complexity of social phenomena, and their imperviousness to controlled 
experimental manipulation (see Mill’s argument in defence of the predictive 
record of economics, s. 10.5).
(c) The contestability of the theoretical concepts of the social sciences due to the 
importance of ‘value judgements’ in applying or refusing many such concepts. 
This results from the fact that such judgements are themselves partly evaluative 
rather than descriptive.
Such concerns have persuaded many to reject the naturalist project in the social sciences 
-  the idea that the social sciences should aim at developing abstract general theories 
which provide the basis for fine-grained predictions of concrete social phenomena -  in 
favour of making the aim of the social sciences understanding or interpretation.
The interpretative approach rejects the notion that natural science has progressed more 
than the social sciences on two grounds:
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(a) The notion that the natural sciences themselves have made the progress that 
others have attributed to them. That is, the truth of science itself is rejected. (See 
s. 3.4, s. 3.5, s. 3.6 for a summary of the arguments underlying this claim).
(b) Causal explanation is rejected as the aim of the social sciences. Instead, the 
social sciences are thought to explain behaviour by rendering it intelligible 
(Hollis, 1995). They uncover the meaning or significance of action by 
interpreting what people do. Beliefs and desires are logically linked to actions as 
their reasons, and that linkage is established by rules.
Folk psychology is a theory in which we repose such confidence that nothing in 
ordinary life would make us give it up (Rosenberg, 1995). Folk psychology has often 
been identified as the defining mark of rationality: an agent is rational to the extent that 
he undertakes the actions that are best justified, given his desires and beliefs. That is, far 
from being a contingent law, folk psychology turns out to be the definition of what it 
means to be rational. A notion supported by the logical-connection argument (s. 5.3.2). 
It is folk psychology that enables us to interpret the behaviour of others. If we fail to 
understand the actions of others, then by and large it is the fault not of our ‘"theory” but 
our application of it, as it is probably true by definition that people act in ways they 
believe will attain their desires (Rosenberg, 1995).
Thus it is suggested that the problems of folk psychology (s. 5.3) disappear if we find 
the correct way to understand the theory. It is a mistake to interpret intentional 
explanations as causal theory to be improved upon by the employment of experimental 
methods. By substituting causal inquiry for understanding the meaning of human action, 
the scientific approach to human behaviour misunderstands the nature and aims of the 
social sciences and produces the problems faced by folk psychology. While the natural 
sciences aim at predictive power and technological progress, the social sciences aim at 
improving the human condition, something that requires we identify the true meaning of 
social institutions. Meanings are embodied in rules. Problems explaining behaviour thus 
emerge for the social scientist in the confusion of regularities and rules.
Hermeneutics takes this appeal to meaning quite literally; finding the meaning of an 
action is equivalent to the deciphering of a text (s. 3.7). From this perspective, the 
anthropologist thus attempts to understand the behaviour of a foreign people/culture
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through trying to learn the language governing speech acts. To do so requires the 
assumption that the noises that people emit are actions, and that they follow the rule 
expressed by [L]. That is, if we set out to learn a foreign language, we must attribute [L] 
to them, and the only evidence that would lead us to deny [L] as a rule for these people 
is to conclude that their noises do not have meaning, but nothing would make us 
surrender the assumption that they do (Rosenberg, 1995). Since social science commits 
us to treating actions as meaningful, it commits us to the truth of [L] for all people. 
Anthropology brings us to the point of knowing the folk psychology of our subjects. 
Beyond this point, however, it is thought that improvement is not possible, as 
understanding is subjective and there is no necessity in meaning.
However, as previously argued, the possible existence of human cultural universals has 
caused people to stand back from committing completely to the relativist/interpretativist 
framework (s. 3.7, s. 3.8). In response to this possible flaw, the scientific realist 
framework adopts a behaviourist conception of belief while rejecting both contemporary 
relativism and the scientific notion of causal explanation that underlies conventional 
approaches to the naturalistic project.
5.6 Scientific realism and natural necessity.
5.6.1 Realism, explanation and science.
Boylan and O’Gorman (1995: 86) tell us that scientific realism, sometimes referred to as 
transcendental realism, “deconstructs the tapestry of contemporary relativism while it 
simultaneously vindicates the objectivity of the scientific endeavour”. It is thought to 
give a more cogent account of scientific explanation than that provided by the positivist 
tradition (s. 3.3), as well as overcoming the pitfalls of relativism. That is, it is argued 
that post-modernism is “inadequate as an intellectual response to the times we live in”, 
while positivism is a misguided definition of the scientific endeavour (Potter and Lopex, 
2001). In response, it is suggested that scientific realism offers “a more reasonable and 
useful framework from which to engage the philosophical, scientific, and social 
scientific challenges of this new century” (Potter and Lopez, 2001).
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Scientific realism argues that relativism’s rejection of the objectivity of science (s. 3.4, 
s. 3.5, s. 3.6), as well as the application of science to the study of society (s. 5.5) is 
based upon the scientific method described by deductivism and positivism: causal 
explanation. In response scientific realism demonstrates the fundamental flaw in the 
positivist account of science, and hence transforms the entire ‘naturalism’ debate in 
social science (Potter and Lopez, 2001). Thus, what the scientific realist takes as 
scientific is not what the positivist or hermeneuticist take as science.
From a realist perspective, the discussion undertaken so far is wrong to begin with 
epistemology, as epistemological questions are dependent upon ontological answers to 
questions about the nature of existence (Potter and Lopez, 2001). That is, we have so far 
committed two related errors: reduced ontology to epistemology, and in doing so 
retained an implicit ontology of the ‘empirical world’. Fleetwood (1999) refers to this as 
the “epistemological fallacy”. Thus, while the above discussion investigated objectivity 
as defined by taking epistemology to be basic, the realist perspective adopts a definition 
of objectivity in which ontology is taken as basic.
The most ambitious argument in support of realism is that developed by Roy Bhaskar 
(1978). Given that scientific theories on the whole seem to work remarkably well as an 
explanation of the world, Bhaskar starts with the ontological question: what must the 
nature of reality be like in order to make scientific explanation an intelligible activity? 
Bhaskar’s answer is that a realist ontology is presupposed by the social activity of 
science. That is, if science is to be taken as the combination of sense perception and 
experimental activity, the independent existence of objects must be assumed
(Outhwaite, 1987). From this perspective, the first problem of positivism and
empiricism is that they answer this question only implicitly. Their second problem is 
more serious: that their answer to this question, their implied ontology is
philosophically incoherent (Potter and Lopez, 2001). They commit the fallacy of 
actualism, which causes them to be sceptical about philosophical claims about reality.
If we divide reality into the domains of the real (things: structures, entities,
mechanisms), the actual (events) and the empirical (experiences), from the perspective 
of actualism “the real is collapsed onto the actual which is then anthropocentrically 
identified with, or in terms of, human experience, measurement, or some other human
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attribute” (Lawson, 1997: 62). That is, the real and the actual are conflated, and the 
empirical is considered a subset of the real and the basis for all knowledge (Outhwaite, 
1987; Potter and Lopez, 2001). Scientific experiment consists of ‘artificially’ setting up 
constant conjunctions of events through human intervention. It is from the invariance of 
such events that causality is understood. Thus, actualism is an event-based ontology of 
invariance, with the empirical being interpreted as a subset of the real.
The relativist critique is not just anchored on the social constructedness of knowledge, 
but also on the simplification of the world by the causal laws produced by positivism. It 
sees reality as more nuanced, more complex, but is unable to explain why science 
continues to produce useful knowledge (Potter and Lopez, 2001). Realism also anchors 
its argument on a more complex undertstanding of reality, but it gives a richer and fuller 
description of such complexity. It begins by examining the relationship between 
experiments and the structure of the world, arguing that the domains of the actual and 
the real should not be ontologically conflated as in positivism, but that the three 
domains of the real, the actual, and the empirical should be ontologically distinct. The 
very purpose of experiment is to create conditions that do not occur naturally. For 
instance, events can occur without being experiences, and, more importantly, causal 
mechanisms can neutralise one another in such a way that no event takes place. The 
experimental situation is designed to exclude such variables that would naturally occur 
in reality. Thus, the universal invariance of constant conjunctions of events from which 
scientific explanations of causality are generalised does not necessarily occur in reality 
(Potter and Lopez, 2001).
Realist ontology is ‘thing’ rather than event centred, allowing the inclusion of a 
dimension of reality into the scientific equation that is ignored by actualism (Potter, 
2000). Unlike the constant conjunction analysis of empiricism, which assumes that a 
system within which causal relations are observed is isolated from extraneous 
influences, a realist analysis of causality can account for the interaction of various 
causal tendencies within the complex and open system amongst which we live 
(Outhewaite, 1987). That is, contrary to the conflating of the real and the actual by 
positivism, the realist ontology suggests that actually occurring events are not 
exhaustive of the real. The world is composed not only of events and states of affairs 
and our experiences, but also of underlying structures, powers, mechanisms and
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tendencies that exist, whether or not detected, and govern or facilitate actual events 
(Lawson, 1997).
Potentiality -  unexercised or unrealised causal mechanisms -  is also a crucial aspect of 
reality. Realism conceives of reality as consisting in things that have characteristics, and 
that exist independently of us and our investigation of them, and in sets of relations to 
each other. ‘Things’ may be powers, forces, mechanisms, characteristics, or sets of 
relations (Potter and Lopez, 2001). Things possess characteristics which have 
tendencies to interact in a particular way with other things. The ‘transcendental realist’ 
answer to the question ‘what must the nature of reality be like in order for science to be 
intelligible?’ is thus that reality must be ordered and structured; not that events must be 
invariant (Potter and Lopez, 2001).
Thus, realism presents a definition of theory and science contrary to that of positivism. 
Positivist theory does not explain or refer to actual entities, as knowledge is based upon 
observables. Realism, in contrast, proposes that theory has a reference in the actual 
world, referring to the hidden mechanisms of nature (for instance, gravity is real, yet 
unobservable). That is, theory refers to unobservable yet real entities, something which 
would be considered meaningless from a positivist perspective (Outhwaite, 1987; 
Boylan and O’Gorman, 1995).
It is the business of science to attempt to discern the nature of things, to identify their 
characteristics and tendencies of interaction. However, such interaction is not invariant. 
Things possess causal power as one of their characteristics, which can only be exercised 
in certain circumstances. “Events are conjointly determined by various, perhaps 
countervailing, influences so that the governing causes, though necessarily ‘appearing’ 
through, or in, events can rarely be read straight off” (Lawson, 1997). Scientific laws, 
therefore, are much better understood as tendencies, as part of the characteristics of 
things themselves (Potter, 2000; Potter and Lopez, 2001). Lawson (1997: 22 -  23) 
describes tendencies as follows:
Because actual events or states of affairs may be co-determined by 
numerous, often countervailing, mechanisms the action of any one 
mechanism, though real and perhaps expressing necessity in nature, may
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not be directly manifest or ‘actualised’. Characteristic ways of acting or 
effects of mechanisms which may not be actualised because of the 
openness of the relevant system are conceptualised [...] as tendencies.
[...] Tendencies, in short, are potentialities which may be exercised or in 
play without being directly realised or manifest in any particular 
outcome.
Thus, from the transcendental realism perspective, science is no longer confined to the 
search for constant event conjunctions, but aims at identifying the structures and 
mechanisms, powers and tendencies that govern the course of events. Explanation 
entails providing an account of those structures, powers and tendencies that have 
contributed to the production of phenomena of interest. The deductive and inductive 
inference of positivism are replaced by scientific realism’s ‘retroductive’ inference: the 
identification of a factor that helped to produce or facilitated an event. Thus, rather than 
being a description of causal laws, knowledge is perceived as statements about 
underlying structures.
However, our knowledge of things is fallible and limited by our time and culture. That 
is, while ‘"things possess just what characteristics and powers they possess”, features 
that are independent of our beliefs, perceptions or knowledge -  they are intransitive -  
our alleged knowledge and beliefs are transitive. The world is composed of objects, 
including causal laws, which are intransitive in the sense of existing, enduring and 
acting independently of the process of their identification and are irreducible to our 
knowledge of them (Lawson, 1997). However, as our knowledge of such objects is not 
merely given in sense experience, and can hardly be created out of nothing, it must 
come about through a transformation of pre-existing knowledge-like materials (Lawson, 
1997). In order words, it is necessary to recognise a transitive dimension to knowledge, 
or epistemology, to complement the intransitive dimension, or ontology. Thus,
transcendental realism employs a version of relativism, as knowledge is thought to 
‘evolve’. Realism presents a picture of science which socially situates itself. As Bhaskar 
(1978: 250) states:
Things exist and act independently of our descriptions, but we can only
know them under particular descriptions [...]. Science [...] is the
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systematic attempts to express in thought the structure and ways of acting 
of things that exist and act independent of thought.
In other words, the transitive objects of science are created by humans in an attempt to 
represent the intransitive objects of science (Outhwaite, 1987). That is, Bhaskar (1979) 
is careful to distinguish between descriptions of reality and the reality which they 
attempt to describe, and to point out that, consequently, all descriptions will be to a 
greater or lesser extent theoretically determined. While objects have causal powers to 
generate observable phenomena that can be monitored in the patterns and regularities 
produced in the laboratory, causal theories must be analysed as tendencies, which may 
be possessed unexercised, exercised unrealised, or realised but unperceived. Therefore, 
there is not a philosophical concept of ‘truth’ which can provide the ultimate seal for a 
particular account. While the basic intuition of correspondence theories is correct -  that 
statements are true if they correspond to the facts of the matter -  attempts to formalise 
the notion of correspondence between statements and states of affairs in a philosophical 
theory are doomed to failure. Thus, realism is more cautious about the limitations of 
what is achieved by science, as it takes into account the “unactualised potential” of 
things.
However, the relativism employed within transcendental realism does not place human 
interest in opposition to objectivity. We can say that one theory is better than another if 
it explains most of what the second theory explains plus some further things (Outhwaite, 
1987). That is, there are rational grounds for the preference of one theory over another, 
rational grounds that go beyond human interest and instead are related to reasons why 
one theory gives a better account of reality than another. Thus, transcendental realism 
puts forward epistemological caution with respect to scientific knowledge, as opposed 
to a self-defeating relativist scepticism
5.6.2 The case fo r  scientific realism.
Following Bhaskar, Lawson (1997) points to two observations which highlight the 
inadequacy of the deductive conception of science and support scientific realism. 
Firstly, most constant conjunctions held to be significant in science, at least those 
outside astronomy, only occur under restricted conditions of experimental control.
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Secondly, the insights produced through controlled experiments are nevertheless 
successfully applied outside of the experimental situation. Lawson (1997: 28) describes 
the contradictions this provides for the deductivist conception of science:
A counter-intuitive implication of this situation [...] is that any event 
regularity that a law of nature supposedly denotes depends upon human 
intervention. [...] At least as significant, the constant conjunction view of 
laws leaves the question of what governs events outside of experimental 
situations not only unanswered but completely unaddressed. In doing so, 
it also leaves the observation that experimentally obtained results are 
successfully applied outside experimental situations without valid 
explanation.
Lawson suggests that, in order to make sense of this situation, it is necessary to abandon 
the view that generalisations of nature consist of event regularities, and to adopt the 
scientific realist conception of science:
Experimental activity and results, and the application of experimentally 
determined knowledge outside of experimental situations, can be 
accommodated only through invoking something like the transcendental 
realist ontology of structures, powers, generative mechanisms and their 
tendencies that lie behind and govern the flux of events in a essentially 
open world. [...] According to this conception, [...] experimental activity 
can be understood as an attempt to intervene in order to insulate a 
particular mechanism of interest by holding off all other potentially 
counteractive forces. [...] Thus, experimental activity is rendered 
intelligible not as the production of a rare situation in which an empirical 
law is put into effect, but as an intervention designed to bring about those 
special circumstances under which a non-empirical law, a mechanism or 
tendency, can be identified empirically. The law itself is always 
operative; if triggering conditions hold, the mechanism is activated and 
in play whatever else is going on (ibid. : 28 -  29)
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5.6.3 Scientific realism and the social sciences.
The transcendental realist critique has a profound influence upon the possibility of a 
naturalistic social science. That is, human beings are a particular sort of thing with 
particular sorts of causal powers. Thus, while the meaning-embedded nature of social 
reality and the significance of language and the constructed nature of knowledge is 
important, it is wrong to reject the potential scientific explanation of social reality. As 
Harre (1993: 237) states:
The difference [between the natural and social sciences] emerge when we 
compare the relation of fact to theory in each kind of science. In the social 
sciences facts, at the level at which we experience them, are wholly the 
creation of theorising, of interpreting. Realists in social science hold, and I 
would share their belief, that there are global patterns of behaviour of men 
in groups.
The predominant issue of concern in applying scientific realism to the social sciences is 
whether there exist intransitive objects: objects that exist independent of our knowledge 
of them. The notion that social situations do not exist independently of the way they are 
interpreted, and that such interpretations are essentially arbitrary is expressed in the 
hermeneutic and interpretative traditions (s. 5.5). “Human action, unlike molecular 
biology, for example, is inherently meaningful. The stars, as Tennyson said, run blindly; 
human beings do not” (Potter, 2000: 19). However, acknowledgement of the role of 
interpretation does not rule out a realist construal of theories. That is, even if the radical 
view that structures of society are nothing but interpretations is accepted, it does not 
follow that there is no criteria forjudging interpretations (Outhwiate, 1987). While the 
subject matter of the social sciences is heavily dependent upon meaning, Bhaskar 
(1988) suggest that it is precisely this feature of social reality that makes a science of it 
possible.
Bhaskar (1988) asks, what must social reality really be like in order for human life to be 
possible? He answers his own question by arguing that there must be structures and 
order. That is, there must be some intransitive aspects of meaning for human life to take 
place. Further, some measure of this intransitive dimension of human activity must be at
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least partially accessible to us. Thus, while the meaning of human life cannot be simply 
determined through mere observation and constant conjunctures of events, and social 
reality is more like a language than a machine, social science is possible because social 
life is possible. That is, meaning is understandable and communicable49. In other words, 
there is an element of necessity in understanding. Social science exists because there 
can be objective answers to questions such as: what does this mean? It is possible to be 
objective about subjectivity. Thus, the methods of the social sciences need not have the 
narrowness of the positivist straitjacket; they need only be appropriate to their object.
As Lawson (1997: 36) argues:
The importance of [the recognition that event regularities rarely occur in 
the social realm] is not that social explanation is thereby impossible.
Rather, it is that we must embrace a very different conception of 
explanation to the deductivist covering-law model. Specifically, social 
explanation, appropriately conceived, is not the attempted deduction of 
events from sets of individual conditions, and constant-conjunction 
‘laws’, but the identification and illumination of structures and/or 
mechanisms responsible for producing, or facilitating, social phenomena.
Acknowledging the possibility of naturalistic social science and objectivity in the study 
of human behaviour, the next chapter turns to the application of scientific realism in the 
context of conceptions of nature: in particular, the identification of necessity in 
conceptions of nature.
49 This argument parallels that expressed in chapter 3: the undermining of the relativist perspective by the 
existence of cultural universals, and the necessity of such universals for intra-cultural understanding.
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6. Direct perception and necessity in the conception of nature.
6.1 Introduction
A review of the anthropological literature concerning the conception of nature reveals a 
debate that parallels that outlined in the last chapter between relativism and the 
necessity in understanding proposed by scientific realism: alternative explanations of 
the “indigenous perspective” -  the notion of relatedness or affiliation between humans 
and the non-human environment -  by mainstream anthropology and those that propose 
the role of ‘direct perception’ in the development of conceptions of nature. It is 
suggested that conventional anthropological attempts to explain the “indigenous 
perspective” (s. 6.2) fail as they are based upon the nature-culture dualism of relativism 
(s. 6.3, 6.4), and that the notion of direct perception allows this failing to be overcome 
and the “oneness” of the “indigenous perspective” to be explained through 
consideration of direct engagement with the environment (s. 6.5.1). Moreover, the 
notion of direct perception in the development of conceptions of nature displays 
significant parallels with scientific realism’s description of the process of knowledge 
development within the natural sciences (s. 6.5.2).
6.2 The indigenous perspective and the cultural construction of nature.
With regards the environment, anthropology is concerned with the ways in which 
natural processes are conceptualised and the natural world classified in different 
cultures, and the ways in which human societies interact with the natural environment 
(Rival, 1998). Just as there is disagreement within anthropology as to what culture 
means, so there is disagreement over whether and how cultures, as symbolic systems, 
derive their meanings from natural elements (Milton, 1996; Rival, 1998).
The perceived relation of culture and environment has tended to mirror the more general 
perception of culture within anthropology (Milton, 1996). Throughout the 1950s, in 
accord with the structuralist/functionalist approach that dominated anthropology at the 
time, environmental determinism reflected the perceived interaction between culture 
and environment (Milton, 1996). That is, culture performs the role of maintaining
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society in the context of its natural environment, and therefore reflects how people make 
sense of and adapt to their environment. However, as the problems with the 
structuralist/functionalist approach began to emerge, and the post-structuralist 
framework came to the fore, so environmental determinism was replaced by cultural 
determinism (Milton, 1996), a position reflected in what has become known as the 
‘indigenous perspective’.
The ‘indigenous perspective’ on the environment is generally conceived as that in which 
knowledge and nature are intimately bound. It is based upon an understanding of the 
relatedness, or affiliation, of the human and non-human worlds (Whitt et a l, 2001). 
Milton (1998) refers to the indigenous perspective as “oneness with nature”, a notion 
captured by Oren Lyons who stated that ‘W e are indigenous people to this land [...] our 
brothers are all the natural world [...] remember that as long as [we] exist, so will you. 
But when we are gone, you too will go” (quoted in Whitt et a l, 2001).
Whitt et a l (2001) summarise the features of the indigenous perspective as a belonging 
and beholdeness to, and reciprocal relations with nature. They argue that such reciprocal 
relations between human and non-human are based upon the notion of respect for, or 
appreciation of the inherent value of nature, which in turn involves knowledge of the 
integral role it plays in sustaining the natural world. This knowledge, it is suggested, is 
learned through listening to stories, which are themselves generated from the land, and 
so are inseparable from it. Hence, to lose the land is to lose knowledge of the land. 
Tribal understanding is “locked together [...] with the entities so that a place and its 
knowledge could not be separated” (Roberts et a l , 1998; quoted in Whitt et a l , 2001: 
16). “One result is that the land itself serves as a repository of knowledge” (Whitt et a l, 
2001: 16), it is part of what relates the human and non-human. Knowledge of the 
environment is, thereby, conceived of as being fully contextual: specific knowledge 
requiring specific places whereby it can be recalled and experienced.
The “oneness” with nature is a widely accepted aspect of the indigenous perspective. 
Within the anthropological literature, there is a strong body of support for the fact that 
indigenous people perceived nature as a continuum, rather than containing intrinsically 
separate things. Tanner’s (1979) and Scott’s (1989) study of the Cree of northern 
America; Bird-Davis’s (1990) comparison of the Nayaka of Southern India, the Mbuti
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of Zaire and the Batek of Malaysia; Apffel-Marglin and Rivera’s (1995) study of the 
peoples of the Andes, and Roberts et a l ’s (1998) study of the Moari all suggest that 
indigenous people do not conceive of ‘nature’ as being distinguishable from people50. It 
is also the “indigenous perspective” that underlies the argument that the Karen should 
be give authority for managing forest resources (s. 1.2).
The report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (the 
‘Brundtland Report’) referred to “the harmony with nature and the environmental 
awareness characteristic of the traditional ways of life” (WCED, 1987: 115). Moreover, 
in his opening address to the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in 1992 (the Rio Earth Summit), Maurice Strong said, “We must reinstate 
in our lives the ethic of love and respect for the Earth which traditional peoples have 
retained as central to their value systems” (quoted in Milton, 1998: 87).
The emphasis on the role of stories and culture in the maintenance of the indigenous 
perspective places it firmly in the relativist framework. That is, humans occupy an 
‘intentional’ world, in which nature does not exist in itself, but only as it is given form 
and meaning within systems of mental representations, the design of which is 
transmitted across generations in what is commonly known as culture (Ingold, 1996). 
This perspective is well illustrated by Muir (1999: 195) in his summary of the humanist 
perspective to landscapes:
I do not doubt that as part of nature we intuit strong links between its
processes and forms and those of our own bodies But such intuitions
are so transformed, overlain and mediated by social, cultural and economic 
as well as personal meanings historically, that to trace the bio- 
physiological bases of environmental response seems futile at best, and at 
worst pandering to the most dangerous ideological interpretation of 
“human nature”.
50 For other examples see also van Beek and Banga (1992); Leach (1992); van den Breemer (1992); and
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6.3 Questioning the difference between industrial and non-industrial conceptions of 
nature.
The indigenous perspective presents us with the conventional anthropological picture of 
the benign interaction with their environment by indigenous, non-industrial people, and 
an appreciation of the interdependence of people and nature that is generally considered 
lacking within industrial societies. This distinction, however, has implications beyond 
how environmentally benign different cultures are, and contributes directly to the 
relativist-naturalist debate, as the indigenous “oneness” with nature is being contrasted 
with the basis of modem, western culture in the Cartesian dualism that is perceived to 
underlie science (Milton, 1996). However, if we turn to the specific reflection of nature 
within industrial and non-industrial cultures, a different story emerges.
Firstly, within Western, modem societies, there is hardly consensus as to the 
exploitability of nature. Though the form of environmentalism within industrial 
societies tends to vary between the espousal of a value system that can be 
accommodated within the existing industrial social structures and one requiring 
fundamental change in these structures (Kruse, 1974; Cotgrove, 1976; O’Riordan, 1981; 
Norton, 1991), there is some indication that people within Western society do not 
strictly conform to the man-nature dualistic perspective, something we are constantly 
reminded of in our daily lives by the protests of environmental groups.
More significantly, the notion that non-industrial people possess a form of “primitive 
ecological wisdom” in accordance with the vision of the “noble savage” has been 
challenged by anthropological studies (Milton, 1996, 1998). It is suggested that this 
“myth” emerged in support of political arguments against industrialism, and in favour of 
the autonomy of indigenous people (Milton, 1996). In many cases of indigenous life 
people may lead their lives in environmentally benign ways, but not as a result of an 
environmentally benign culture. Instead balance with the environment is the result of 
other factors, such as (Ellen, 1986):
Balland and Platteau (1996).
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(i) Small population maintained by factors other than deliberate planning, such 
as disease.
(ii) Relative isolation, thereby avoiding the forms of exchange that requires a 
surplus of wealth, and maintaining a subsistence economy with a built in 
incentive to keep the economy sustainable.
(iii) Restricted technology, limiting the ability to exploit the environment further.
This divergence of indigenous cultural relations with the environment from that 
described in the indigenous perspective is also reflected in the diversity of perceptions 
of the power of nature and human ability to control the environment. The Cartesian 
nature-man dualism that characterises Western philosophy is considered to underlie 
Western, industrial society’s perceived ability to control nature (Norgaard, 1994; 
Milton, 1996). However, such man-nature power relations are not confined to Western 
society alone. A number of indigenous societies have been recorded as perceiving 
nature as being more powerful than man. For instance, the Dogon of Burkina Faso 
respect and treat nature properly due to its power to impact their fives (Milton, 1996), 
and the Wakasigau of Kenya see nature as a force beyond their influence, at whose 
mercy they five their fives (Milton, 1996). However, Milton (1996) also tells us that 
aboriginal Australians consider the environment to be created by ancestor beings that 
travelled through the country. At the same time these ancestor beings also created 
ceremonies to ensure the perpetuation of the environment. All living Aborigines are 
considered reincarnations of these ancestral beings and therefore charged with 
continuing their work through the performance of these ceremonies. A decline in the 
population of a particular species is blamed on the non-performance of the appropriate 
ritual, and, therefore, is the failure of the people themselves. Consequently, the relative 
power of humanity over nature is not something which can automatically be associated 
with Cartesian dualism.
An important distinction made by anthropologists that provides some insight into the 
“mythical” nature of the indigenous-scientific dichotomy briefly described above is that 
between ideology and action, or between culture (consisting of people’s thoughts, 
feelings and knowledge) and social organisation (consisting of individual actions and 
observable patterns of social activity). This distinction is important because, as
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indicated above, the relationship between ideology and action is not simple. Milton 
(1998: 87) tells us that:
People who behave in non-destructive ways that enable them to live 
sustainably do not necessarily respect their environment. Their material 
requirement may be such that they simply do not need to stretch their 
environment’s capacity to support them. Conversely, people may respect 
their environment but still act in ways that damage or destroy it. They may 
regret such damage but see it as beyond their control; they may, for 
instance, regard protection of the environment as the responsibility of a 
centra] government or divine power.
The relationship between ideology and action is particularly problematic in the context 
of modem, capitalist societies. The distance between individuals and the consequences 
of their actions means that the expression of values becomes difficult to support through 
observation of actions51.
While the above discussion is by no means comprehensive, it would tend to indicate 
that there exist potential problems with the indigenous perspective as it is presented by 
mainstream anthropology. To the extent that the “oneness with nature” that is reflected 
within the indigenous perspective is considered to accord with the myth of the noble 
savage and the corresponding perceptions of nature, the indigenous perspective is not 
well supported by the empirical evidence.
6.4 Comparing indigenous and western perspectives on nature.
Within western society, the notion of “oneness” with nature at the heart of the 
indigenous perspective can trace its roots to the Romantic reaction to Cartesian 
dualism’s separation of the person from nature. However, while it is this “oneness” with 
nature that the anthropological description of the indigenous perspective attempts to 
capture, it fails to do so and instead finds itself laboured with the same dualism it is 
trying to reject.
51 For an instance of this difficulty see arguments concerning the causes of deforestation (s. 7.2).
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6.4.1 Western dualism and the Romantic reaction.
Prior to “modernity”, the Scholastic tradition provided an alternative view of perception 
to that of the Cartesian: the theory of forms. Within the Scholastic framework, it is the 
“intellect” that is responsible for perception. Reality was considered material, while the 
intellect was not, so the gap was filled by the concept of the “form”. The “form” is at 
once beyond the material, and the concept that gives organisation to material. It 
therefore represents common ground between the perceived and the intellect, the 
relationship between which is, therefore, not that between things separated, but between 
the intellect and something the intellect has understood (Pratt et al., 2000).
In contrast, in the Cartesian framework that replaced Scholasticism, perception was 
thought of as taking place in virtue of the emission or reflection of a beam of light, 
which impacted upon the perceiver having crossed the spatial gap between perceiver 
and the object perceived (Pratt et al., 2000). Descartes did not dispense with the 
distinction between material and immaterial employed by the Scholastics, but added 
another distinction, the worlds internal and external to the mind. The relationship 
between the human being and the world was re-conceptualised: an objective reality 
existing independent of human perception of it or any meaning and significance that 
human beings might cast over it, a process referred to as objectivisation (Pratt et al., 
2000). Humans were now considered distinct from the world, the subjects responsible 
for the construction of the world. As an observer in the modem world, I am directly in 
touch with the contents of my mind, but beyond my mind is the external world. This 
Cartesian dualism contrasts dramatically with the emphasis on understanding, and the 
concept of “sharing” that underlies Scholasticism (Pratt et a l, 2000).
An alternative rendering of the changing perception of the world emerging with 
modernity was developed by Michel Foucault: the split between language and the 
world. Foucault suggests that, in the pre-modem world, signs are regarded as parts of 
the things themselves, while, with the modem world, signs become “modes of 
representation”. That is, pre-modem accounts of nature presented a unity between “all 
that as visible of things” and also ‘the sign that had been discovered or lodged in them”. 
Words (signs) are intrinsic to nature in the pre-modem world. The introduction of
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modem thought separated these two concepts, and language is now considered an 
independent system of signs which can be used to represent nature. Again the idea of 
separation of “internal” and “external” is present.
The distinction between the “internal” and “external” worlds “forces us to convert from 
a literal to a perceptival understanding” of the world (Rolston, 1983: 137). However, 
this perceptual understanding is not just limited to knowledge, for, if knowledge of the 
world is not literal, but perceptual, then, values are also perceptual. As Rolston (1983: 
135) puts it, the 20th century has been one that we have spent:
Trying to conceive of ourselves as the sole entities bringing value to an 
otherwise sterile environment. The effort has pervaded science and 
technology, humanism and existentialism, ethics and economics, 
metaphysics and analytical philosophy.
And,
By this account we have no organs to taste, touch, see or smell value. [...]
Beauty and utility are things that we must attend to. When our minds turn 
aside to other thoughts, though still perceiving the object, such values 
entirely disappear from consciousness. (Rolston, 1983: 137).
That is, value judgements have to be decided, they are subjective, and have been 
separated from facts.
With the distinction between “internal” and “external” worlds, and the value-fact 
dichotomy established “the scene is set [...] for t4the environment” to be regarded as 
fundamentally alien; and what is alien to us has no hold on us: no appeal to our 
concern” (Pratt et a l , 2000: 11). Many commentators have claimed that we need look 
no further for the origins of modem exploitative attitudes towards nature. Without this 
objectified concept of the world, nature would be “part of us”, and damaging it would 
be akin to damaging ourselves. It is exactly the nature being “part of us” attitude that the 
Romantic movement championed.
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The philosophical basis of the Romantic movement built upon the critique of the 
Enlightenment initiated by Hegel: rejecting the passivity of the mind in favour of 
notions of achievement, development and growth and self-realisation (Pratt et al., 
2000). One of the results of this approach was the identification of the human being 
with nature. Hegel reduced the gap between the subject and the object, so the divide 
between the human and the non-human world was diminished.
Among the various forms of romanticism one finds perhaps the best known of its 
proponents, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) and his view of the goodness of nature. 
In his books Emile and Reveries o f a Solitary Walker Rousseau proclaims the goodness 
of nature over the malady of ill-conceived human interference:
Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the AUTHOR of things; 
everything degenerates in the hands of man. He forces one soil to nourish 
the products of another, one tree to bear the fruit of another. He mixes 
and confuses the climates, the elements, the seasons. He mutilates his 
dog, his horse, his slave. He turns everything upside down; he disfigures 
everything; he loves deformity, monsters. He wants nothing as nature 
made it, not even man; for him, man must be trained like a school horse; 
man must be fashioned in keeping with his fancy like a tree in his 
garden. (1979a: 31; quoted in Taliaferro, 2001: 143).
However, Rousseau never articulated such an ethic as the one hinted at a century before 
by Michel de Montaigne (1533 -  92): ‘There is a kind of respect and a duty in man as a 
genus which links us not merely to the beasts, which have life and feelings, but even to 
the trees and plants” (1991, quoted in Brennan, 2001: 147). Rousseau’s writing, 
nevertheless, can be easily considered to contain the implicit ethic that emphasises the 
continuities between humans and animals, a celebration of nature’s intrinsic value and a 
respect for other forms of life for their own sake.
It was not just in philosophical writings that one finds manifest the expressions of the 
Romantics. Romanticism, more than any philosophical movement, found expression in 
the arts. The English poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772 -  1834) believed in the
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healing power of nature (Brennan, 2001). His most famous ballad, The Rime o f the 
Ancient Mariner, has a powerful conservationist message.
Beyond the shadow of the ship,
I watched the water-snakes:
They moved in tracks of shining white,
And when they reared, the elfish light 
Fell off in hoary flakes.
Within the shadow of the ship 
I watched their rich attire:
Blue, glossy green, and velvet black,
They coiled and swam; and every track 
Was a flash of golden fire.
O happy living things! No tongue 
Their beauty might declare:
A spring of love gushing from my heart,
And I blessed them unaware:
Sure my kind saint took pity on me,
And I blessed them unaware.
The self same moment I could pray;
And from my neck so free 
The Albatross fell off, and sank 
Like lead into the sea.
( The Rime o f the Ancient Mariner, 1798).
The mariner carried a curse for the rest of his life for the killing of the albatross. While 
blessing the sea-snakes led to immediate improvement of his situation, and the 
miraculous awakening of his shipmates, he was fated to wander the world telling his 
cautionary tale to others. Coleridge’s work can be seen as evoking a new environmental
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sensitivity which called for valuing and respecting nature beyond its usefulness to 
human purposes.
There are strong echoes of the Romantic critique in environmentalist thought today 
(Pratt et al., 2000). One of the more radical modem critiques comes from the ‘Deep 
Ecology’ movement of Arne Naess, which was founded upon two of Romanticism’s 
leading notions: the concept of growth as self-expression; and the idea that humans are a 
part of nature52.
6.4.2 The dualist foundations o f the indigenous perspective.
It is the “oneness with nature” at the heart of the Romantic perspective, and its 
distinction from the nature-culture dualism of the Cartesian framework that the 
indigenous perspective within anthropology is trying to capture. However, the 
development of the indigenous perspective saw the true foundations of the reaction 
against the Cartesian framework lost with the adoption of the epistemology of 
conventional anthropology. That is, rather than conforming with Romanticism, in which 
the subject is truly in touch with external reality, the anthropological debate has slipped 
into cultural relativism and adopted the same dualism that lies at the heart of this 
western debate that it is trying to reject.
In support of the notion that the social scientific approaches to the environment are 
founded upon western dualism, Benton (2001) points to three principal reasons for the 
disempowerment of the sociological tradition in the face of contemporary 
environmental problems:
(a) The assumption of a categorical opposition between Nature and Culture, an 
opposition that renders unthinkable the process of interaction and mutual 
constitution which link the two together.
(b) Post-Kuhnian relativist approaches to the sociology of science have removed the 
sociological tradition from the scientific detection that is relied upon to make the 
Green case.
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(c) The prevailing value-commitment of sociology is in accordance with the 
‘Enlightenment’ heritage, and deeply at odds with the ‘Romantic’ inheritance of 
much of the Green movement, especially more radical deep ecology 
manifestation.
Benton (2001) goes on to argue that, while dualism is seen as indispensable to the case 
for an autonomous science of the social/cultural world, only a theoretical breakthrough 
that enables thinking across the Nature/Culture divide could provide sociology with any 
hope of grasping the underlying generative causes of our ecological predicament.
The dualism underlying conventional anthropology results from the particular definition 
of community its adopts. While the Romantic tradition was established upon humans 
being part of a natural community, conventional anthropology has tended to focus upon 
humanity as part of a social community. The resulting divorce of human and non-human 
worlds has provided anthropology with a dualism between society and nature (Ingold, 
1992). According to the conventional anthropological view, we must first know the 
world before we can act in it, and knowing consists of organising the sensations 
impinging upon the passively receptive human subject into higher-order structures or 
representations. However, it is generally assumed that the information encoded in sense 
data is too impoverished to allow specification of the objects and events that subjects 
claim to perceive (Ingold, 1992). Thus whatever patterning or meaning we find in what 
we perceive is contributed by our own socially constructed minds. That is, seeing is 
qualitatively different from knowing, as the community of knowledge creation is that of 
the human social group, rather than nature as a whole.
Ingold’s (1992, 1996) studies of hunter-gatherer groups suggest that, while a “oneness 
with nature” is perhaps the correct description of the indigenous perspective, its 
expression in terms of the conventional anthropological approach is not possible. This, 
he argues, is the result of the fact that this view of the environment is based upon a 
metaphor derived from human society. This is expressed by Milton (1998: 92) when she 
states:
52 See Pratt et al, 2000; and Matthews, 2001 for a more detailed summary of the philosophy of the Deep
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[Anthropologists’] understanding of interpersonal sharing among 
themselves represents to them their relationship with the giving 
environment. [...] As the concept of metaphor depends on a distinction 
between spheres of reality [...], it would not be possible to describe a 
culture in this way without assuming [...] that it contains a fundamental 
division between the two spheres, human and non-human.
Therefore, descriptions of the oneness with nature of indigenous cultures within 
mainstream anthropology are problematic. Instead, it might be more appropriate to state 
that indigenous populations distinguish themselves from their environment and see their 
relationship as harmonious.
The indigenous perspective, therefore, fails in its attempted critique of the Cartesian 
framework. The intended “oneness with nature” description of humanity is sacrificed 
with the emphasis on the role of cultural construction of reality. In the case of the 
hunter-gatherer, material interactions with the forest are said to be modelled on 
interpersonal relations of parenting and sharing. The latter, from the domain of society, 
provide the schema by which the former, the object (the environment) is interpreted and 
understood. “In short, actions that are in the sphere of human relations would be 
regarded as instances of practical involvement with which the world comes to be seen, 
in the sphere of relations with the non-human environment, as instances of its 
metaphorical construction” (Milton, 1996: 125 -  126). As Ingold (1992: 40) expresses 
it: “it is supposed that persons can neither know or act upon their environments directly, 
but only indirectly through the medium of their cultural representation. This supposition 
rests upon a cognitivist account of perception whose roots lie deep in the western 
dualistic worldview”. Ingold (1996: 119) goes on to state:
Many anthropologists are well aware that [...] the dichotomy between 
culture and nature is [...] deeply embedded within the tradition of Western 
thought. In other words, it is recognised that the concept of nature, in so 
far as it denotes an external world of matter and substance waiting to be 
given meaningful shape and content by the minds of man [...], is part of
Ecology movement.
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that very intentional world within which is situated the project of Western 
science as the ‘objective’ study of natural phenomena. And yet the notion 
that there are intentional worlds, and that human realities are culturally 
constructed, rests on precisely the same ontological foundations.
Thus, it is suggested that anthropology is based upon the same idealist ontological 
foundations as the positivism it purports to oppose on exactly these grounds, and that 
for this reason it fails to explain the “oneness with nature” that lies at the heart of the 
indigenous perspective. It is the constraints of the Nature-Culture dualism underlying 
the failure to present an adequate conceptualisation of environmental issues that causes 
Benton (2001) and Ingold (1992, 1996) to advocate a realist approach to understanding 
the environment.
6.5 Reinventing the indigenous perspective within a realist ontology.
65.1 Direct perception and “oneness with nature ”
The indigenous perspective founds itself on a “oneness with nature” emerging from the 
cultural construction of the environment. Ingold suggests that this “oneness with nature” 
within the indigenous perspective is in fact an illusion, and that this results from the 
emphasis on cultural construction within the anthropological approach. However, 
Ingold, then takes his analysis a stage further, suggesting that the “oneness with nature” 
is indeed a feature of hunter-gatherer groups, and that an understanding of this 
conception of nature requires us to go beyond the ontological idealism of conventional 
anthropology.
From his studies of hunter-gatherer relations with the environment, Ingold (1996: 117) 
suggests that “we need to think again about our own ways of comprehending human 
action, perception and cognition, and indeed about our very understanding of the 
environment and our relations and responsibilities towards it”. That is, while 
anthropology would conventionally have us understand our conceptions of nature as 
being metaphorically modelled upon human social relations (s. 6.4.2), instead human- 
human and human-nonhuman relations are of the same kind, constituted in the same
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way through a process of continued active engagement. In this way the division between 
human and nonhuman is removed.
Ingold demonstrates this by taking to task the metaphorised conception of nature as it is 
conventionally manifest within the ‘indigenous perspective’: the notion that reality is 
constructed through social interaction, and that meanings are imposed on an otherwise 
meaningless world, and are learned through participation in society, denies any role for 
the environment itself (Milton, 1996). That is, the social construction model is based 
upon a contradiction. It leaves no raw materials from which to build cultures. For 
instance, metaphors are often treated by anthropologists as the main mechanism through 
which people build their cultural models. However, the concept of metaphor depends on 
the existence of an “unmetaphorised” reality of which people are aware, and in relation 
to which “metaphorised” reality can be understood (Milton 1996). From that perspective 
“culture provides the building plan, nature is the building, but whence comes the raw 
materials?” (Ingold, 1996: 118).
There must, Ingold goes on to suggest, be a physical world ‘out there’, beyond the 
intentional world of culture, otherwise there would be nothing to ‘build’ with nor 
anyone to do the ‘building’. That is, the “indigenous perspective” metaphorisation of 
nature is based upon an illusion, “one that stems from an inability to recognise where 
the reality ends and its schematic representation begins” (1996: 125). In order to provide 
the raw materials and labourers for this building process, Ingold (1992) argues an 
alternative notion of perception is required that allows people direct knowledge of their 
environment in the course of their practical activities. He finds such a notion in the 
pragmatic realism of J. J. Gibson’s (1979, 1982) ‘ecological psychology’ and the 
concept of direct perception, according to which we discover reality through direct 
engagement with the world thereby allowing people to become aware of 
‘unmetaphorised” reality.
Ingold, then, removes perception of the environment from within the realm of culture, 
arguing that it is the conception of both perception and interpretation as socially 
constructed that creates the barrier between the environment and the people perceiving 
it. Consequently, in divorcing perception from cultural construction, Ingold provides us 
with a situation in which culture no longer creates “a barrier between ourselves and the
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‘real’ world, but rather situates us in the world” (Milton, 1996: 63), and support for a 
realist conception of nature.
From the relativist perspective, the environment acquires ‘qualities’ as it enters into 
relationships with subjects. That is, the qualities of objects are not attributes of the 
objects themselves, but produced through the ‘mapping out’ of the internal organisation 
of subjects into the outside world (Ingold, 1992). Direct perception, in contrast, provides 
a different notion of the attributes of the environment. Gibson (1979) suggests that 
environmental objects are perceived in terms of what they afford the perceiver. 
Moreover, the affordances of objects exist as inherent potentials of the objects 
themselves, independent of their realisation by subjects. It is Gibson’s notion of 
affordances that Ingold adopts to describe the human perception of the environment. 
That is, as Ingold (1992: 44) puts it:
Our immediate perception of the environment is in terms of what it affords 
for the pursuit of the action in which we are currently engaged. The man 
throwing the stone did not, we suppose, first ‘construct’ the stone as a 
missile by attaching a meaning or ‘throwing-quality’ to impressions of it 
received through the senses. Nor was the act of throwing merely the bodily 
execution of a command subsequently issued by the mind on the basis of 
this construct. Rather, it was the very involvement of the man in his 
environment, in the practical context of throwing, that led him to attend to 
the throwability of the object, by virtue of which it was perceived as a 
missile. Such direct perception of the environment is a mode of 
engagement with the world, not a mode of construction of it.
Ingold, then, suggests that “life is given in engagement, not in disengagement”, and that 
it is the direct perceptual involvement of subjects in the same environment that precedes 
sociality and the encoding of perceptions in language. That is, the experience gained 
through human-nature interaction provide the raw materials of sensation, which, carried 
over to the domain of social relations, yield a cultural construction of nature, such as 
‘forest as parent’. This epistemology is reflected in the following passage from Ingold:
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Knowledge of the world is gained by moving about in it, exploring it, 
attending to it, ever alert to the signs by which it is revealed. Learning to 
see, then, is a matter not of acquiring schemata for mentally constructing 
the environment but acquiring the skills for direct perceptual engagement 
with its constituents, human and non-human. [...] If the Koyukon hunter 
notices significant features of the landscape of which the Western 
observer remains unaware, it is not because their source lies in the 
Koyukon mind, which imposes its own unique construction on a 
common body of sensory data, but because the perceptual system of the 
hunter is attuned to picking up information, critical to the practical 
conduct of his hunting, to which the unskilled observer simply fails to 
attend. That information is not in the mind, but in the world (Ingold,
1996: 141 -  142)
And,
It will at once be objected that I have taken no account of that vital 
component of knowledge that comes to people through their instruction 
in traditional lore [...] Do not these stories, and the like, amount to a 
kind of modelling of reality, a representation of the world that native 
people might consult as Westerners would consult a map? I think not.
People, once familiar with a country, have no need of maps, and get their 
bearings from attending to the landscape itself, rather than from some 
inner representation of the same. [...] Far from dressing up a plain reality 
with layers of metaphor [...], songs, stories and designs serve to conduct 
the attention of performers into the world (ibid.: 143).
6.5.2 Direct perception and scientific realism.
Contrary to the presentation of the ‘indigenous perspective’ by conventional 
anthropology, Ingold does not undertaken this argument to suggest that hunter-gatherers 
are in any way distinctive in their worldview, or to suggest that they are somehow ‘at 
one’ with their environment in a way that others are not, or to compare the ‘intentional 
worlds’ of the hunter-gatherer and the scientist. Instead, he suggests that the lesson to be
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learned is that the human condition is that of being immersed in nature from the start, 
like other creatures, “in an active, practical and perceptual engagement with constituents 
of the dwelt world” (1996: 120 -  121). Such consistency of worldview corresponds with 
the problems faced in attempting to distinguish the features of environmental values 
from the indigenous and western perspectives.
The process of direct perception which Ingold uses to describe the development of 
conceptions of nature parallels scientific realism’s description of the development of 
knowledge within the natural sciences (s. 5.6.1). Ingold suggests that objects are 
perceived in terms of the effects of their ‘affordances’. Affordances, a concept Ingold 
borrows from Gibson, are the potentialities of the objects themselves, independent of 
their realisation by subjects. The relationship between the notion of affordances and 
conceptions of nature mirrors the ontology and epistemology employed within scientific 
realism:
The world is composed not only of events and states of affairs and our 
experiences, but also of underlying structures, powers, mechanisms and 
tendencies that exist, whether or not detected, and govern or facilitate 
actual events (s. 5.6.1).
Thus, Ingold presents the notion of an instransitive nature, which we come to know 
through our engagement with it. It is through interaction with nature that we become 
aware of the effects of nature’s affordances, and thus develop knowledge of the ‘real’ 
mechanisms and structures -  affordances -  underlying such effects. Ingold seems to be 
describing a process of retroductive inference and knowledge based upon statements of 
structures.
Moreover, Ingold’s description of the development of conceptions of nature also 
accords with scientific realism’s commitment to objectivity and necessity in knowledge 
(s. 5.6.1). That is, the notion of direct perception shares with scientific realism a 
commitment to “global patterns of behaviour of men in groups”, to the existence of 
cultural universals. As Milton (1996: 103) states, the direct perception approach “allows 
for the possibility that individuals from very different social backgrounds might come to
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understand their environments in quite similar ways”. Support for this idea is also 
provided by Ingold (1992: 52), who states:
If perception is a matter of discovering meanings in the environment 
through exploratory action, rather than adding them on through some 
kind of cognitive processing, then the apparently unique cognitive 
capacities of humans [...] will not lead them to perceive their 
environments in radically distinct [ways]. Where humans differ is in their 
ability to describe and render accounts of their actions discursively, to 
themselves and others. Language and symbolic thought are not necessary 
for us to know the world, but are needed to make such knowledge 
explicit. Their role [...] is not to create knowledge [...] but to make 
others aw are to share knowledge.
Furthermore, the fallibility of knowledge recognised within scientific realism via the 
description of unactualised potential and the influence of interests, knowledge and 
experience in focusing attention is paralleled in the process of developing conceptions 
of nature through engaging or dwelling in an environment. From this perspective, 
knowledge does not constitute a pre-specified form, but is achieved. Scott (1989) tells 
us that the term “life” was translated by one Cree man as “continuous birth”, the 
creative unfolding of a total field of relations in which beings emerge and take on 
particular forms. The process of perception is described as a process of action. That is, 
as we move around in our environment we actively seek and pick up information that 
specifies qualities of the objects we encounter (Ingold, 1992). A similar notion occurs 
within the scientific realism perspective, where knowledge is thought to ‘evolve’ (s. 
5.6.1).
The recognition of the fallibility of knowledge within the direct perception approach is 
reflected in a passage quoted earlier where Ingold refers to the potential for different 
interests to cause focus to fall on different aspects of the affordances of the 
environment:
If the Koyukon hunter notices significant features of the landscape of 
which the Western observer remains unaware, it is not because their
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source lies in the Koyukon mind, which imposes its own unique 
construction on a common body of sensory data, but because the 
perceptual system of the hunter is attuned to picking up information, 
critical to the practical conduct of his hunting, to which the unskilled 
observer simply fails to attend. That information is not in the mind, but 
in the world (Ingold, 1996: 142).
The next chapter exploits these parallels as a means of investigating the 
epistemological claims of scientific realism. In particular, we turn to the search 
for the “global patterns of behaviour of men in groups” that is reflected in both 
scientific realism and the direct perception approach.
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7. Searching for necessity in conceptions of the environment in 
northern Thailand.
7.1 Introduction.
In an effort to investigate the veracity of the claims underlying scientific realism and the 
direct perception approach that there exist commonalities in conceptions of nature (s. 
6.5), the role of direct engagement with the environment in developing knowledge of 
the value of resources is highlighted through a review of the apparent causes of 
deforestation (s. 7.2). Moreover, cross-cultural commonalities in tree symbolism tend to 
support the predictions of scientific realism and direct perception (s. 7.3).
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with directly investigating the claims of 
scientific realism and the direct perception approach. It is suggested that if the claims of 
these approaches are valid, commonalities in the conception of nature might be 
expected to be observed. In accordance with the parallels between the epistemological 
processes identified for the natural sciences by scientific realism and the development of 
conceptions of nature identified by the direct perception approach, it is proposed that 
this investigation take the form of a comparison of the conceptions of nature within 
ecological science and Karen spirit beliefs. Underlying each of these epistemologies is a 
commitment to objectivity or necessity in knowledge (s. 6.5.2). Thus, conceptions of the 
functionality of the environment within ecological science and indigenous beliefs shall 
be compared for commonalities (s. 7.4, 7.5, 7.6). The results of the analysis suggest 
little reason to accept the existence of cross-cultural commonalities (s. 7.7). However, it 
is suggested that this is not sufficient evidence to reject the claim of scientific realism 
and direct perception that there is necessity in the meaning of the environment (s. 7.8). 
Instead, further elaboration of the precise role of direct perception in the development of 
concepts is called for if progress in testing its veracity is to be made.
7.2 Environmental engagement and the causes o f environmental degradation.
In the light of the suggestion of the direct perception approach that direct engagement 
with the environment constitutes the process by which conceptions of nature are formed
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(s. 6.5.1), it is interesting to consider the factors pertinent in recently observed increases 
in environmental degradation, in particular deforestation levels. Gadgil (1995) analyses 
the causes of biodiversity decline in the context of people’s relation with the 
environment using Dasmann’s characterisation of people as either ‘biosphere people’ -  
having access to a wide range of distantly located resources -  or ‘ecosystem people’ -  
relying on resources with which they have directly interacted over a long period of time. 
Gadgil then adds another category of people to this list, that of ‘ecological refugees’ -  
‘ecosystem people’ who have been deprived of access to their traditional resource base, 
and who are consequently forced to colonise new resources of which they have had little 
experience, knowledge or connection.
Using these definitions, Gadgil (1995) concludes that, of the groups, ecosystem people 
are most likely to use the resources sustainably. He reaches this conclusion through 
defining the causes of unsustainable resource use as: large catchment areas of resources 
reducing the impact of unsustainable use of any one area, the possibilities of substituting 
resources, and tenuous control over resources. Therefore, it is only when catchments are 
small, the possibilities of substitution are exhausted, and rights to resources are 
protected that people are motivated to use resources sustainably. This describes the 
circumstances of the ecosystem people.
Gadgil’s definition of the causes of sustainable and unsustainable resource use are 
supported by evidence of the causes of deforestation, as outlined by Myers (1995). 
Causes of deforestation that result in the export of value of forested lands out of forested 
areas, such as logging and cattle ranching, are responsible for one-fifth and one-seventh 
of deforestation respectively. To other causes of deforestation that can be related to 
decisions made by those living outside forested areas - road building, dam construction, 
and commercial agriculture - is attributed one-seventh of overall deforestation rates. All 
these causes of deforestation can be attributed to the interaction with the forest of what 
Gadgil refers to as biosphere people.
Another three-fifths of observed deforestation is attributed to shifting cultivation, with 
poverty and lack of property rights being considered contributory causes. Traditionally, 
in the categorisation described above, shifting cultivators were ecosystem people, and 
made sustainable use of tropical forests. However, today, as their traditional, communal
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rights are overlooked by centralised property law, and their land is encroached upon 
through migration, most shifting cultivators represent ecosystem refugees, “shifted” 
cultivators, displaced peasants who have migrated to unoccupied forest lands .
Albeit very crudely, the causes of deforestation tend to point to the relationship between 
degradation and what Ingold refers to as disengagement. That is, the causes of 
deforestation tend to be the responsibility of either those who do not directly interact 
with the resource in question, or, if direct interaction with the resources is possible, this 
is only so in the short run. In each of these cases, those responsible for deforestation 
have not had the opportunity to engage directly with the resources, something that, from 
the perspective of the direct perception model of conceptions of nature, ensures the 
perceived “oneness” with nature of indigenous people. While the actual values attached 
to natural resources by each of the different categories of people is not known, their 
respective relationships with environmental degradation supports the role of direct 
perception in the development of the indigenous people’s perceived “oneness” of 
themselves and nature.
7.3 Environmental engagement and commonalities in tree symbolism.
Further evidence in favour of the role of direct perception in the development of 
conceptions of nature is available in the form of support for its prediction of cross- 
cultural commonalities in conceptions of nature. For instance, it has been suggested that 
tree symbolism reflects something more than the physical manifestation of social effects 
(Bloch, 1998; Rival, 1998). Mary Douglas (1996) realised that the identification 
between the animal kingdom and social life works both ways. Douglas maintains that 
symbolic similarities result from both local theories about life and death, as well as the 
practical and utilitarian knowledge of animals constituted in everyday interaction - a 
notion that supports the idea that conceptions of nature are developed through direct 
engagement with it. Consequently, natural symbols are not just metaphors or projections 
of social life; rather, they reflect appreciation of the attributes of natural kinds
53 For evidence of the changing status of rural people in Thailand from ‘ecosystem people’ to ‘ecosystem 
refugees’ see s. 1.1 and Chalardchai (1989), Hirsch (1987, 1990), Hurst (1990), and Kunstadter (1989a, 
1989b).
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themselves. For instance, trees due to their ambiguous status as living things are ideal to 
reflect the abstract notion of human life.
Ethnographic materials do seem to indicate a correlation between the symbolic 
significance of trees and speculations about life and death across cultures. Symbolic 
representations of trees seem to play with the ambiguity of trees’ relation to life 
(appearing to transcend death as they are not really “alive” in the first place) to reaffirm 
the idea that trees stand for life, vitality and self-regeneration. That is, tree metaphors 
are not simply metaphors or projections of social life, but also reflect the nature of the 
trees themselves. There is “a more fundamental, non-metaphorical connection between 
how humans think of themselves and how they think of animals” (Douglas, 1996: 138).
A number of cultural perspectives have been identified relating tree metaphors with 
human life:
(i) Life cycle rituals
All over the world rituals marking the life cycle make extensive use of trees (Rival, 
1998). Giambelli (1998) records the relationship between the coconut palm and birth, 
marriage and death rituals in Nusa Penida and Bali. Uchiyamade (1998) records similar 
rituals in South India, as does Knight (1998) for the symbolism attached to fruit trees in 
Japan. Bonnemere (1998) shows how tree symbolism is closely related to male 
initiation rites among the Ankava of Highland Papua New Guinea. The Karen ritual of 
tying a newborn’s umbilical cord around young trees (s. 7.5.2) can also be interpreted as 
relating human and tree life cycles.
(ii) The human body.
Another way that tree symbolism is used is through the analogy between the tree and 
the human body (Rival, 1998). Such instances are recorded by Giambelli (1998) and 
Bonnemere (1998). A specific manner in which the tree is interpreted in this vein is 
through its being perceived as being hermaphroditic (Brosse 1998, Graves 1990, Jung 
1968). This sexual uncertainty might explain why the tree is considered such a good
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model for the representation of the reproductive couple (Bloch 1992, de Boeck 1994, 
Howell 1996, Rival 1997).
(iii) Vitality and self-regenerating power.
Various commentators have related the connection between trees, strength, vitality and 
self-regenerating power. Mauze (1998) relates how the American Northwest coast 
Indians traditionally absorbed the inner force of trees simply through touching the bark. 
Giambelli (1998) describes how the Balinese locate the energy of the coconut in its 
seed, while the Bunaq of East Timor locate the potential for life and growth in the root 
of the tree (Friedberg, 1979). Bonnemere (1998) relates how the Ankave locate the 
energy of ritual trees in the fruit juice men prepare.
The heterogeneous nature of the manner in which trees are talked about, used in ritual 
context, or socially included is often interpreted as implying that no unique meaning can 
be attached to symbolism (Mauze, 1998). Fairhead and Leach (1998: 254 -  255) state 
that “local discourse [concerning trees] relates not only to issues of ecology, but also to 
the material results of access to and control over resources”. Interpretation of 
symbolism must, therefore, understand the political context in which different assertions 
are made.
However, both the idea that political context is important in understanding symbolism, 
as well as the observed importance of the physical attributes of trees resulting in 
commonalities in tree symbolism, support the direct perception approach. Not only are 
people being seen to engage directly with their environment in developing conceptions 
of nature, but the fallibility of knowledge development accepted by ‘direct perception’ 
provides the room for context dependent knowledge development
7.4 Biodiversity and non-linear ecological models.
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with directly investigating the claims of 
scientific realism and the direct perception approach. It is suggested that if the claims of 
these approaches are valid, commonalities in the conception of nature might be 
expected to be observed. In accordance with the parallels between the epistemological
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processes identified for the natural sciences by scientific realism and the development of 
conceptions of nature identified by the direct perception approach, it is proposed that 
this investigation take the form of a comparison of the conceptions of nature within 
ecological science and Karen spirit beliefs. Underlying each of these epistemologies is a 
commitment to objectivity or necessity in knowledge (s. 6.5.2). Thus, conceptions of the 
functionality of the environment within ecological science and indigenous beliefs shall 
be compared for commonalities. We begin the comparison in this section with a brief 
review of the main characteristics of non-linear ecological models.
Of concern in this investigation will be the ecological dynamics involved in ensuring 
the reproduction of ecosystems. Consequently, this section briefly summarises current 
thinking within the ecological sciences with regard the resilience of the natural 
environment. In order to keep this discussion brief, attention will be concentrated on 
what has been referred to as a “new ecological synthesis”, and non-linear ecological 
models. In particular, this will take the form of a review of the non-linear ecological 
model as presented in Holling et al (1995). However, it must be remembered that the 
views presented below are not universally accepted (see Schrader-Frechette, 2001).
Succession within ecosystems is considered to be the outcome of four different stages 
within the development of ecosystems: exploitation (colonisation of areas);
conservation (movement to equilibrium of the ecosystem); release/death (the 
disturbance of the ecosystem); and reorganisation/renewal (the minimisation of nutrient 
loss ready once again for exploitation). Cycles of birth, growth, death and renewal 
describe the dynamics of the ecosystem. Within this cycle, it is the process of release 
that is considered most significant for the determination of ecosystem sustainability. 
Once an ecosystem is established, it is the impact of disturbances at this stage that 
determine the extent to which species are displaced, and, consequently, the resilience of 
the ecosystem.
Only a small number of species and physical processes are critical in forming the 
structure of the overall behaviour of terrestrial ecosystems. Although many species 
interact within an ecosystem, these interactions are of differing strengths and directions, 
and only a few of them form the “template” or niche that allow others to “go along for 
the ride”. These species are referred to as “keystone” species. These critical
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processes/species entrain the remaining species, so that the diversity observed in 
ecosystems can be traced to a small set of variables and the niches they provide.
The development of alternative ‘Templates” is determined by the level of diversity 
within the ecosystem. Specifically, the level of diversity determines the ability of the 
ecosystem to maintain a certain equilibrium following a disturbance through the 
provision of species able to fill any niches left open by the destruction of “keystone” 
species during a disturbance. That is, in conditions far away from equilibrium, the 
important measure of the resilience of an ecosystem is the magnitude of disturbance that 
can be absorbed, which in turn is determined by the level of biodiversity in the 
ecosystem. Wilson tells us that:
Field studies show that as biodiversity is reduced, so is the quality of the 
services provided by ecosystems. Records of stressed ecosystems also 
demonstrate that the descent can be unpredictably abrupt. As extinction 
spreads, some of the lost forms prove to be keystone species, whose 
disappearance brings down other species and triggers a ripple effect 
through the demographies of the survivors. The loss of a keystone 
species is like a drill accidentally striking a powerline. It causes lights to 
go out all over (Wilson, 1992: 331 -  332).
While not universally accepted, there would seem to be some support within the field of 
ecology for the notion that biodiversity is a critical factor in the resilience functioning of 
ecosystems. It is this notion that will be taken as the basis of the conception of the 
functionality of nature from the western scientific perspective.
7.5 The cult o f the lord: Karen conceptions o f nature.
7.5.1 The Karen o f northern Thailand.
The Karen are the largest hill tribe in Northern Thailand. Official estimates of the Karen 
population in Thailand put the figure at approximately 271,000 (Chumpol, 1993), but 
others argue that this is very low (Kempe, 1997a places this figure at over 400,000). 
First known through the records of British colonials and American missionaries in the
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early 19th century (Shrock, 1970), the date of the Karen’s arrival in Burma and Thailand 
is a question of conjecture rather than historical fact. It is thought that they have lived in 
Burma since the 13th Century and began to migrate into Thailand in the 18th Century 
(Shrock, 1970; Anderson, 1993). However, many of the Karen have only entered 
Thailand this century, especially after the Second World War.
Anthropologists have had difficulty defining the Karen, arguing that they are so 
culturally diverse that they may not be a distinct ethnic group (Anderson, 1993). The 
Karen are generally divided into four sub-cultural groups according to their dialectical 
differences: the Sgaw, Pwo, Tuangsu, and Kayah (Chumpol, 1993). Within Thailand the 
two main groups of Karen are the Sgaw and the Pwo, both of which are referred to as 
White Karen by virtue of their light complexion, and, in some cases, their white dress 
(Shrock, 1970; Anderson, 1993), approximately 80% being Sgaw (Chumpol, 1993)
While the origin of most of the tribes in N. Thailand is thought to be known with 
reasonable certainty, the ethnic origin of the Karen is unclear. The Karen people are said 
to have sprung from a common ethnic origin, though conflicting theories concerning the 
nature of this origin, and the lack of scientific study of the Karen make this claim 
uncertain (Shrock, 1970). Furthermore:
The heterogeneous anthropological, economic, and religious elements 
found among the widely dispersed Karen tribes, together with their lack of 
social solidarity and their tendency to disintegrate into splinter groups, 
further compound the difficulty of establishing a set of criteria by which to 
determine whether a tribe is Karen (Shrock, 1970: 793).
Such confusion is confounded by the lack of conclusion concerning the origin of the 
Karen groups of languages, which has variously been classified as Sino-Tibetan, Tibeto- 
Burman, Mon-Khmer, and as an independent linguistic group (Shrock, 1970).
It is generally thought that the Karen are of Mongolian stock, originally coming from 
the upper reaches of the Yangtse River -  which they refer to as the 'River of Golden 
Sand' -  near Tibet (Anderson, 1993). The river of “running sand”, as Shrock (1970) 
would have us interpret this phrase, is also taken as a reference to the Gobi Desert,
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which Chinese sources refer to as the “river of sand”, the crossing of which is held as an 
important part of Karen history (Shrock, 1970). It is, therefore, suggested that the Karen 
originated in an area bordering Tibet, later crossing the Gobi Desert into China, before 
making their way into Burma and Thailand (Shrock, 1970). Regardless of whether our 
‘river’ is the Yangtse or the Gobi Desert, we can place the origins of the Karen with the 
Mongols to the north; a theory supported by their facial characteristics (Shrock, 1970). 
However, they have left no record of this history or ancestors in that area, and the fact 
that other racial components can be distinguished among them has given rise to 
conjecture concerning their origin, including:
The idea that the Karen belong either to the Chinese or to the Tibetan racial 
family and that they are of Tibeto-Burman stock. In addition, some of the 
Karen have been identified as being related to the Mon-Khmer peoples, and 
they have also been described as being distantly related to the Lao-Thai 
family. It has also been said that they are aborigines of Burma and, as a 
result of their god traditions, one imaginative author put forth the hypothesis 
that they are one of the lost tribes of Israel (Shrock, 1970: 797).
The common denominator of the Karen economy is rice, which is principally grown 
through the practice of swidden agriculture in the foothills from 400-800 meters 
elevation. While shifting cultivation, the chosen cultivation technique of the Karen, is 
generally regarded as one of the major causes of deforestation and soil erosion in 
Thailand, it is the varieties employed by lowland Thais and some of the other hill tribes 
that are culpable54. The preference for secondary sites and old plots, short cultivation 
and long fallow periods, and maintenance of larger trees within plots that define Karen 
shifting cultivation are considered by anthropologists to represent a benign adaptation to 
the forest environment (Kunstadter, 1983; Chalardchai, 1989; Anderson, 1993; Prasert, 
1997; Bello et al, 1998). Indeed, it is estimated that Karen agricultural plots contain 
over 80 different crop types, while gardens often contain 80 -  90 different varieties 
(Anderson, 1993). Kunstadter (1983: 336) summarises the maintenance of the Karen’s 
environmentally benign agro-forestry practices:
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The ecological stability which has allowed the Karen to maintain a regular 
cycle of cultivation and forest fallow has been achieved as a result of a 
combination of technological and social features. Important socio-cultural 
features include some degree of community control of swidden land, and 
swidden cultivation practices, ritualisation of many aspects of swidden 
cultivation, extensive use of exchange labour [...], and social values which 
encourage investment in productive resources, such as irrigated fields and 
elephants, and de-emphasise accumulation of non-productive material 
possessions.
Traditional Karen technology of agro-forestry has operated at a level which 
can be sustained through self-renewing natural processes. Soil moisture is 
conserved and made available to crop plants through a system of swidden 
cutting. The soil itself is protected against erosion by minimising 
disturbance of the soil surface in weeding and by deliberate erosion control 
[...]. Karens clearly understand the benefits to their domestic economy of 
maintaining the secondary forest which grows on fallow fields, both for the 
products it yields to them and for restoration of soil fertility for further 
farming.
While traditionally forests have been considered outside the direct control of the village, 
the abode of spirits and demons, they did fill an important subsistence role for villagers, 
providing fuelwood, grazing land, building materials, food (snails, tadpoles, clams, 
birds, ground lizards, beetles, red ants, mushrooms and fish), medicine, grasses for mat 
making, and animal skins (Vandergeest, 1996). Rigg (1993) argues that the importance 
of the forest has generally been underplayed due to the low visibility of the collection 
process and the products themselves, something done by women and children in their 
spare time.
54 For a further discussion of the role of different forms of shifting cultivation in deforestation in Thailand
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7.5.2 Karen conceptions o f nature.
The sustainability of Karen forest use practices is said to be supported by a complex 
cultural and social system based upon the ‘local’ knowledge of Karen farming 
communities. Perhaps the best expression of such knowledge systems is the extensive 
array of customs, prohibitions and rituals which regulate the use of the forest: a system 
of regulations derived from a mix of animism, Buddhism and loyalty to the ways of 
their ancestors.
Karen understanding of the environment has been described as the Cult of the Lord, and 
accords with the reciprocal human-environment relations that define the indigenous 
perspective (s. 6.2). These relationships are reflected in statements such as “The Karen 
are the forest” and ‘"the forest depends on the Karen” (P. Jai, personal communication, 
21.3.2000), or “The forest ensures that humans survive, so humans are required to know 
how to live with the forest” (P. Dooy, personal communication, 20.9.2000).
Chumpol (1993) identifies the main concepts within the Karen traditional belief system 
as the Ywa (creator god), and the kau k ’ca (Lord of the Land). Of particular interest here 
is the kau k ’ca (Lord of the Land): the supreme representative of a given cosmological 
structure under which man must subordinate himself if he wants to live in peace and 
prosperity (Yoshimatsu, 1989; Hinton, 1990; Chumpol, 1993), a “volatile entity, one 
who was ready to take offence” (Hinton, 1990: 96).
The kau k ’ca is the spiritual “owner” of the land, responsible for the fertility of the soil 
(Chumpol, 1993). The state of the Karen’s relationship with the kau k ’ca is determined 
by the behaviour of nature. If the kau k ’ca consider themselves sufficiently respected by 
the human settlers of their territory, the crops are abundant, and livestock healthy and 
fertile. If, on the other hand, the kau k ’ca is aroused by human misbehaviour, the result 
will be crop failure, disease or violent storms. Sometimes his anger will cause the Lord 
to manifest himself as a tiger and kill the wrong doer or their animals (Chumpol, 1993).
see s. 1.1.
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The animistic beliefs of the Karen can be seen to underlie their spatial conceptions of 
local forest resources. The spirit ‘regional owners’ vary in power, and their location 
varies with the topographical features of the landscape (Chumpol, 1997; Prasert, 1997). 
Where powerful spirits reside, clearing and even cutting the forest is considered taboo. 
In other areas villagers must inquire with the spirits before clearing the forest. K ’ca, 
translated as “spirit owner” can be divided into several groups according to the place 
that is owned: sky, ground, mountains and rivers (Yoshimatsu, 1989). While the first 
two are singular, as there is only one sky and ground, every mountain and river is 
believed to be inhabited by its own k ’ca. The mountain and river ‘owners’ are all 
governed by the higher ranking ‘regional owners’, the ‘owner’ of a single river source. 
Equally, ‘regional owners’ are all grouped under the ‘supreme regional owner’ (the kau 
k ’ca -  lord of the land), who controls the territory of one basin together with the 
mountains surrounding it, and inhabits the area around the largest river source, which is 
thought to originate in the highest mountain in the territory (Yoshimatsu, 1989).
It is believed that the ‘spirit owners’ are responsible for the safety and well-being of the 
inhabitants of their territory, protecting the inhabitants from danger, including falling 
trees, attack from wild animals, as long as they are worshipped appropriately. The 
‘Supreme regional owner’ governs and influences all the ‘residents’ in its territory, 
including, in addition to human beings, animals and plants, as well as all other natural 
things (e.g. rocks, soil and sand) and natural phenomena (Yoshimatsu, 1989). The 
importance of the ‘regional owners’ is reflected in the fact that:
Before moving out of or into a basin, it is obligatory to inform the Supreme 
‘regional owners’ in the two basins concerned. People are further obligated 
to inform the smaller ‘regional owners’ of their moves [...]. In the case of 
purchasing large domestic animals or marriage, for example, the persons 
concerned must inform the ‘owners’ of the moves of people or animals from 
one territory to another with offerings; otherwise the purchased stock will 
return to their original living quarters or will not be able to find food in their 
new habitat, and the married couple will become infertile or will not be able 
to make a living in their new residence. When the Karen men go hunting 
into another territory, they must ask for permission from the [‘owners’], 
otherwise no game will be given to them (Yoshimatsu, 1989: 36).
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This requirement is also recorded by Hinton (1989: 96) who states that “the Karen still 
recognise the boundaries between territories [...]. Individuals crossing a border will wai 
[an expression of respect] to the spirit”.
There are a number of rituals the Karen perform that reflect this reciprocal basis of 
relations between them and their environment, including the tying of the umbilical cord 
of the newborn around a young tree, which acts to create a bond between the individual 
and the tree (P. Dooy, personal communication, 21.3.2000). The fate of the person and 
their tree are then intertwined. If the tree is damaged, the person will suffer illness. If 
the tree dies, the person will suffer the same fate. The well-being of the tree therefore 
becomes the responsibility of the person. “If the umbilical cord forest is cut, the 
people’s kwan [loosely translated as soul] will fly away” (P. Jai, personal 
communication, 20.9.2000).
The ritual worshipping of the Lord of the Land, called lu kau, takes the form of 
presenting ritual offerings of food, and asking for divine protection (Chumpol, 1993), 
and takes place once every three years (Shrock, 1970: 834):
The Sgaw [one of the two larger Karen tribes] perform this sacrifice in 
January, under the direction of the most influential chief of the area. A 
suitable spot is chosen near a river and an altar of bamboo is erected [...].
Each family brings a white fowl and each of the chiefs brings a bullock or 
goat. The animals are tied to the posts, below which is placed ajar of liquor.
After the chief has uttered a prayer, the animals are slaughtered and the 
gallbladders are inspected to see it they are well-rounded, in which case the 
sacrifice is thought to be acceptable to the gods. Otherwise, it is believed 
that the sins of the people have not been sufficiently atoned and more 
sacrifices are called for.
7.6 Method.
Due to the emphasis of writings within ecology, it was decided that ecological and 
Karen conceptions of the environment would be compared in terms of their perceptions
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of the factors contributing to the maintenance of ecosystem function provision. 
Conceptions of the environment from the perspective of the non-linear ecological model 
revealed the perceived importance of biodiversity levels in the maintenance of 
ecosystem function provision (s. 7.4). Although other ecological characteristics can be 
pointed to as contributing to the maintenance of specific ecosystem functions in specific 
circumstances, for the purposes of this investigation, biodiversity levels are taken as 
instance of ecology’s conception of the functionality of the forest. Having selected 
northern Thailand as the research location, an ecological description of forest resources 
was obtained in the form of a biodiversity survey of the Doi Chiang Dao Wildlife 
Sanctuary (map 4.2) undertaken during 1995 and 1996 by the Departments of Biology 
and Geography, at Chiangmai University55.
Using a combination of forest ground surveys, aerial photograph interpretation, and 
remote sensing techniques, the biodiversity survey classified the forest resources of the 
wildlife sanctuary according to forest type, cover, maturity and degree of disturbance, 
and presented the data in the form of a number of maps of the area. For the present 
purposes, measures of the maturity, extent of cover and degree of disturbance of the 
forest were taken as approximations of biodiversity levels56. The complex ecological 
data for each of these indicators was then simplified from the survey data into 
comprehensible scales for each of these measures, and maps of these features for the 
area local to Mae Paa Sao -  the research location - produced (maps 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6).
Within the Doi Chiang Dao Wildlife Sanctuary reside members of a number of ethnic 
groups, including the Karen, Lisu, Lahu and Northern Thais. From these, the Karen 
were chosen to represent the ‘indigenous perspective’ due to their perceived benign 
interaction with their local forest environment, and the consequent availability of 
ethnographic accounts of their conceptions of nature, not to mention the relatively 
welcoming nature of the Karen compared to the suspicion and paranoia of the other 
tribes generated by their apparent participation in the local drug trade. The Karen village 
Mae Paa Sao (map 7.2) was selected partly due to its accessibility, being located on the
55 Data reproduced with the kind permission of the University of Chiang Mai and the Office of Policy and 
Planning, Ministry of Sciences and Technology, Government of Thailand.
56 The relationship between the aspects of the forest measured (maturity, cover and disturbance) and the 
level of biodiversity can only be considered an approximation, and a much more detailed model of the
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only road through the wildlife sanctuary, but also due to the fact that surveys of the 
villagers’ forest use regulations had already been undertaken by the KGN (pronounced 
Kor Gor Nor: a northern Thai NGO which acts as an intermediary in negotiations 
between villagers and the Thai Government over resources access issues).
Being located at the centre of the Wildlife Sanctuary, Mae Paa Sao is bereft of most of 
the infrastructure normally associated with “modem living” with the exception of 
communal water taps and simple communal toilet facilities. Cooking is done on open 
fires. Houses are constructed on elevated pilings, the ground section generally being 
used for raising pigs. The area of the village is roughly defined as the valley it inhabits. 
The cultivated areas, all located in the bottom of the valley, are predominantly used to 
grow rice, though are interspersed with a variety o f plants. There are also a number of 
gardens allocated to the growing of fruit, vegetables and herbs. The crops are 
predominantly grown for subsistence, though small sales are made to afford the 
purchase of certain ‘luxuries,’ such as fish and household utensils, the average monthly 
income being about 1400 baht (£23).
While the young members of the village migrate to the local Thai town for education 
and then paid labour, the majority of those included in the sample population had 
received no formal education and had lived in the village their whole life, ensuring their 
familiarity with traditional conceptions of the local forest. Equally, although Buddhism 
is now prominent in Mae Paa Sao -  the villagers wake at dawn each morning to present 
alms to monks from the village temple -  their belief systems are still firmly embedded 
within the traditional animism.
The KGN’s survey took the form of walking with village members though forest areas 
considered by the community to be their traditional land, recording the different areas of 
regulation; the output of which was a map of the local forest around Mae Paa Sao 
recording the community’s regulation of forest use. However, the political 
circumstances under which the KGN’s surveys were performed57 required that their
local environment and the impacts upon it would be required if biodiversity levels were to be measured 
accurately. This was judged beyond the scope of the present investigation.
57 The KGN was established to represent forest communities in their negotiations with the Thai 
Government concerning their rights of access to forest land. Specifically, it was considered that 
communities local to protected forests were misunderstood and that they represent the most effective way
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results be verified. Consequently, one member of each of the 13 households within the 
village was selected, and an unstructured interview was performed in which details of 
the areas and under what conditions -  time periods and quantities - the forest products 
used by the villagers (mushrooms, firewood, bamboo, timber, other food products etc) 
could and couldn’t be collected was elicited. While understanding of maps of the local 
area proved difficult for the villagers, they were able to describe the local area in 
sufficient detail relative to local landmarks, such as mountains and the network of 
rivers, for maps to be composed. Accordingly, an impression of community regulation 
areas was drawn up that verified the map compiled by the KGN (map 7.2).
In accordance with the intended comparison of the conception of the factors 
contributing to the functionality of ecosystems, it was assumed that the Karen’s long 
term dependence on forest resources for their livelihood had resulted in the evolution of 
their belief system in order to reflect the functionality of the local forest in the context 
of their everyday requirements. To the extent that this assumption is reasonable, 
comparison of Karen beliefs with ecology’s emphasis on the importance of biodiversity 
levels will provide evidence of the commonalities of conceptions of the functionality of 
the environment. For the performance of such an investigation, Karen spirit beliefs 
require describing in a format comparable with ecological survey data obtained: 
topographically. In order to elicit such a topographical description of the spirit beliefs of 
the inhabitants of Mae Paa Sao, the same sample of villagers was engaged in an 
unstructured interview concerning the existence and form of spirits that resided in the 
local forest. Villagers were asked to discuss the nature of different spirits, including the 
extent of their power in relation to humans and the other spirits and how they might be 
placated, and asked to describe the location of their residence in the local area. Although 
the responses elicited displayed an element of inconsistency as to the location of certain 
spirits, the resulting map (map 7.1) corresponded generally with the views of the 
villages.
of conserving Thailand’s forest resources. The motivation of the KGN is, then, to present the villagers as 
capable of managing local forest resources in order to support their calls for rights to their traditional 
lands within protected forests. Consequently, the possibility that the KGN’s own output might be 
manipulated in favour of the environmentally sound nature of the Karen’s own resource use practices has 
to be entertained.
7.7 Results
In accordance with traditional Karen spirit beliefs (s. 7.5.2), the villagers of Mae Paa 
Sao distinguish between forests under the “control” of the following spirit owners:
- Cemetery spirits: located around the cemetery area, the use of which is 
consequently prohibited, and entry into which frightens the villagers.
- Umbilical cord spirits: location of the ritual tying of the umbilical cords of 
the new bom around young trees, and the use of which is, once again, 
consequently prohibited.
- Big Spirit (lPee Yai ’): located “deep in the forest” in areas from which the 
villagers are unable to remove anything, “even a leaf’.
- Child spirits: located in the area of the “babies cemetery”. The spirits of the 
trees in this area “take care of the children who died as babies” and the 
villagers are thus prohibited from entering.
- Water spirits: located in and around the rivers.
These spirits are also organised into a hierarchy of “power” in which the ‘Big Spirit’ is 
generally recognised as being the most powerful or threatening of the spirits, posing the 
greatest danger to the well-being of the villagers if not placated. Although less 
powerful, all the other spirits represent a strong influence upon the behaviour of the 
Karen, the order of significance of which being cemetery and child spirits, followed by 
umbilical cord and water spirits.
The location of these spirits in the area local to Mae Paa Sao is represented in map 7.1. 
The ‘Big Spirit’ is considered to reside in the higher, steeper areas, and those areas that 
would be referred to as watershed forest. Each of the cemetery spirits, child spirits, and 
umbilical cord spirits are located in the hills, though in areas below the ‘Big Spirit’ on 
the slopes of lesser gradients. One reason for which would be the fact that, though 
infrequently, these areas are the location of activities of the villagers -  burial rites, 
umbilical cord rituals etc. -  and therefore require a greater accessibility. Finally, water 
spirits are located in and around the rivers.
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Map 7.1 Topography o f  Mae Paa Sao spirit beliefs.
• Village
□  ‘Big’ spirit
□  Child spirit




A separate, though related classification of the forests in Mae Paa Sao is that according 
to the community regulations determining its use. The villagers distinguish between 
three areas of differing regulation:
Conservation forest associated with the origin o f the major drainage system and 
water source, “ensuring water all year round”. The forest in this area is
CO
maintained in “climax” state, as use of this forest is prohibited (6125 rai ).
The use-forest/community forest, the use o f which is restricted according to 
various quantity quotas and period restrictions. Use of the community forest is 
generally restricted to various food products, such as mushrooms, as well as the 
gathering of fuel wood, and bamboo and timber for fence and house construction 
(4020 rai).
Shifting cultivation area sub-divided by family-plots (358 rai).
58 1 rai = 0.16 hectares, or 0.395 acres.
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Unsurprisingly, as the spirit belief system represents a very effective means of 
regulating the forest use of the villagers, and it is reasonable to suggest that community 
resource use regulation is simply a manifestation of more traditional spirit beliefs in the 
context of modem rights based discourse, the location of the conservation forest 
corresponds quite well with the location of the residence of the ‘Big,’ cemetery, 
umbilical cord, and child spirits (map 7.2), in the higher, steeper, watershed areas. 
Considering this similarity, the following analysis will, then, concentrate on the 
topography of spirit beliefs.







Turning to the ecological maps o f the same area, comparison can be made between the 
topography of Karen spirit beliefs and the ecological characteristics of the forest. There 
is some relation between canopy cover and spirit location, though a tenuous one (map 
7.3). It could be said that the majority of the lower density canopy cover is found along 
the rivers in areas inhabited by water spirits. However, the areas where the other spirits 
reside display a variety o f canopy cover densities, and similar densities can be found in 
other areas not inhabited by spirits. The area inhabited by the ‘Big Spirit’ to the south of 
the village encompasses a large proportion of the area displaying a dense canopy cover. 
However, the canopy cover in the area to the north of the village, also thought inhabited 
by the ‘Big Spirit,’ is less dense. Equally, there are pockets o f dense canopy cover
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located in areas not considered occupied by spirits. O f interest is the fact that, of the two 
areas populated by the ‘Big Spirit,’ the area closer to and more accessible from the 
village is that with the lower density. That is, it may well be that accessibility, and not 
just spirit beliefs, plays some role in the use of different areas of the forest.
Map 7.3 Forest canopy cover in Mae Paa Sao.










A similar pattern is displayed by bamboo canopy cover, which also seems unrelated to 
the areas inhabited by the ‘Big Spirit,’ and the cemetery, child and umbilical cord spirits 
(map 7.4). The areas inhabited by these spirits cover the whole range of densities of 
bamboo cover in similar proportions to the whole Mae Paa Sao area in general. 
However, from the information available, the denser bamboo cover seems confined to 
the areas of the rivers and, therefore, would correlate with the belief in water spirits.
One caveat to the relationship between canopy density and spirit residence discussed 
above is that it does not take into account variations in tree species, except for 
distinguishing between bamboo and other tree species. However, the possibility that 
different species represent different canopy cover density possibilities tends to
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complicate the use o f canopy cover as an indicator for biodiversity levels. While canopy 
cover might indicate the extent to which the forest is undisturbed, and, for forests of 
uniform species composition, then, reflect the level o f biodiversity, comparisons o f the 
canopy cover o f forests of different species composition do not necessarily represent 
good indicators o f disturbance of biodiversity levels. Distribution of forest species 
throughout the area (maps 7.5, 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8) all indicate that the species composition 
of the different areas varies significantly. For instance, comparing the areas of residence 
of the ‘Big spirit’ to the north and south o f the village, each of the maps indicate that 
these areas vary in their species composition. The area to the north being composed of 
dry dipterocarp, deciduous and bamboo species; the area to the south being composed of 
a mixture o f these, but also fagaceae and evergreen species. Comparison of the canopy 
cover for these two areas is, then, not comparing like with like.
A possible alternative measure of the levels of biodiversity of the forest is the maturity 
of the forest cover (map 7.9). Forest maturity, however, once again shows only little 
relation with the location of spirit residence. While a large proportion of the spirit areas 
is composed of mature forest cover, they also include pockets of immature forest cover,
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Map 7.5 Dry dipterocarp forest tones in Mae Paa Sao,
Dry dipterocarp/deciduous on 
limestone
Dry dipertocarp with deciduous
D. tuberculatus with pine
Dry dipterocarp and 
fagaceae
Dry dipterocarp or 
deciduous/bamboo
Dry dipterocarp and 
deciduous/bamboo
Dry dipterocarp with deciduous 
and bamboo




Dry dipterocarp with some 
deci duous/bamboo
Mixed deciduous/bamboo and 
evergreen
Fagaceae with some 
deci duous/bam boo
Deciduous/bamboo or dry 
dipterocarp (50-75% )
Secondary forest dominated 
by deciduous/bamboo
Deciduous/bamboo with dry 
dipterocarp
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Map 7.7 Fagaceae forest tones in Mae Paa Sao.
Mature fagaceae/evergreen 
with evergreen ground flora
Very open fagaceae (cover <  
30%)
M ixed fagaceae and Ericaceae
Fagaceae with deciduous 
bamboo or dry dipterocarp
High elevation fagaceae (>  
16000m)
M ixed fagaceae and erinaceae 
(scattered, cover < 60%)
Mixed fagaceae and dry 
dipterocarp
Map 7.8 Evergreen forest tones in Mae Paa Sao.







Predominantly evergreen close 
to watercourse (800 -  1400m)
Predominantly evergreen 
close to watercourse (> 
800m)
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and other areas not inhabited by spirits also possess mature forest cover. That is, it can 
be said that the areas of spirit residence are composed of relatively mature forest cover, 
but that the mature forest cover is not entirely related to the presence o f the spirits.
Map 7.9 Forest cover maturity in Mae Paa Sao.
□  Very mature 
g  Mature
□  Immature




  Spirit area
The use o f forest cover maturity as a measure o f the relationship of spirit beliefs and 
biodiversity levels not only faces the same species distribution problem as the canopy 
cover measure, but also the problem that forest cover maturity can be influenced by 
factors other than the beliefs and actions o f the villagers. Other determinants o f forest 
maturity beyond the control of villagers include the soil conditions, the gradient of the 
land, and exposure to sunlight, to name but a few, which will influence the ability of 
species to colonise an area, as well as their growth rate. In order to relate the beliefs and 
biodiversity levels, a measure o f the interaction of the villagers and the forest is 
required. A potential indication of such interaction is provided by the degree of 
disturbance o f the forest cover (map 7.10).
The large part of the area o f residence of the ‘Big Spirit’ to the south of the village 
shows only low disturbance. The remainder of which consists of forest of medium
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disturbance with pockets of highly disturbed forest. It could be the case, then, that the 
belief that spirits reside in this area of the forest relate to the villagers use o f the forest. 
However, the corresponding area o f spirit residence to the north of the village is 
composed predominantly of high disturbance forest. Moreover, there are other pockets 
of little disturbed forest outside of the areas of residence of the spirits. Once again, then, 
there would seem to be an inconsistency in the relationship between the spirit beliefs 
and forest interaction of the villagers.














The analysis attempted provided little cause to think there might be a relationship 
between biodiversity levels and Karen spirit beliefs. Despite the much quoted 
sustainability of the Karen’s interaction with the forest (s. 7.5, also s. 9.4), the belief 
system thought to underlie such interaction displays little correlation with the 
disturbance observed to forest resources. Whether we can conclude from this result that 
the belief systems of the Karen are actually less sustainable than commonly thought 
would depend not only on the reliability o f the investigation performed, but also on the 
relative merits of the Karen and ecological understanding of the environment, exactly
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the issue that concerns us here. In the light of the purpose of this investigation, such a 
result could be interpreted as implying the disparity of indigenous and scientific 
conceptions of the factors contributing to the functionality of ecosystems. However, 
there are a number of methodological issues that require consideration before this 
conclusion can be made.
Firstly, a number of possible alternative explanations of forest cover disturbance require 
eliminating before such a result can be confirmed. For instance, many of the villagers 
complained at the encroachment into and degradation of the forest by neighbouring 
tribes less responsible in the conservation of the forest. However, no figures are 
available as to the extent and location of such encroachment. Moreover, attempts at 
establishing the relationship between spirit beliefs and biodiversity require that such 
beliefs play an active role in the day-to-day lives of the villagers. Although to the best 
knowledge of the author this is the case, the beliefs described (s. 7.5) are traditional 
systems of belief, which are increasingly under pressure to change from the 
encroachment of modernity (s. 9.3.3). However, there remains the problem of the 
distinction between ideology and action referred to in chapter 6. Another possibility that 
would require eliminating is that the disturbance identified was the result of natural 
processes, such as storms. While during extensive discussions with the villagers 
concerning various aspects of their local forest resources no such impacts were 
identified, the collection of such information was not the direct intention of the 
interviews undertaken.
Secondly, it is assumed that the comparisons made reflect such indigenous and 
scientific conceptions of ecosystem functionality when the possibility that this is not 
necessarily the case requires entertaining. For instance, on the one hand, an assumption 
is made as to the relationship between the Karen’s spirit beliefs and their conceptions of 
functionality. On the other hand, there is also some doubt as to the relationship between 
biodiversity levels and the resilience of ecosystems (s. 7.4). Moreover, there is some 
doubt as to the use of forest cover, maturity of forest cover, and disturbance to forest 
cover indicators as measures of biodiversity levels. To the extent that biodiversity can 
be considered a determinant of ecosystem resilience, it measures the ability of 
ecosystems to sustain their functionality in the face of disturbance. However, there is 
more than this to the relationship between disturbance and biodiversity. Disturbance is
202
not merely something the reaction to which is determined by biodiversity, as the extent 
of disturbance is also significant in the determination of the number of remaining 
species and the level of biodiversity. Improvements in the above investigation could, 
then, be made through the incorporation of a more detailed discussion of the 
relationship between biodiversity levels and the surveys of forest resources used.
Thirdly, inaccuracies have to be allowed for in the topographical description of Karen 
spirit beliefs, the elicitation of which took the form of villagers’ descriptions according 
to local landmarks (s. 7.6). Inaccuracies in the interpretation of descriptions such as 
“half way up the mountain, below the residence of the ‘Big Spirit’” may well account 
for discrepancies in any relationship between spirit location and forest resource 
description. Add to these problems of interpretation the inconsistencies in villagers’ 
descriptions of such areas, and inaccuracies will inevitably result.
Barring these possibilities, the notion that there exist commonalities in the conception of 
nature and, hence, that direct perception contributes to the development of these 
conceptions, as well as the scientific realist conception of knowledge development are 
called into question. However, it would be rather hasty to interpret this result as 
implying the outright rejection of the role of direct perception in the development of 
conceptions. The acceptance of the role of direct perception merely “allows” for 
similarities in ‘realities’. That is, it provides the possibility rather than the necessity of 
commonalities in conceptions of nature. Another way of expressing this is that both 
scientific realism and direct perception acknowledge the fallibility of knowledge (s.
6.5.2). Thus, although commonalities are predicted, the divergence of conceptions does 
not entirely contradict scientific realism or direct perception. The possibility of 
unactualised potential and the context dependent nature of knowledge development 
emphasised by the direct perception approach (s. 6.5.2) both support this argument. The 
contexts of interest of the scientist and the indigenous tribesperson could hardly be more 
different, and the environment is very much a complex, open system.
Rather than dismissing the role of direct perception and the existence of necessity in the 
conception of nature outright, in the context of attempting to improve our understanding 
of conceptions of nature, a more appropriate interpretation of this result would be to 
highlight the lack of detail in the relation between direct perception and conception. The
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decision to compare conceptions of ecosystem functionality was made purely on the 
basis of the emphasis placed on this notion by the subject matter of ecology. What is 
required is an elaboration of the process of conceptual development so that more might 
be known about the nature of direct perception and, hence, what conceptual 
commonalities might be expected to emerge from the interaction with the environment. 
As it is, there is currently little guidance as to the commonalities that might be expected 
to be observed.
A number of features of the natural environment should be considered in determining 
the degree to which direct perception might be able to accurately provide the “raw 
materials of sensation” upon which similar realities might emerge, and the extent to 
which characteristics of the environment might be beyond the assimilatory capacity of 
human perception. Firstly, the complexity of the ecological processes involved may 
exceed perceptual capacities. That the contributory factors to ecosystem functionality is 
still an issue of some contention even to scientists who devote their working lives to its 
study demonstrates the limitations of our perceptual capacity (s. 7.4). Secondly, the time 
periods involved in ecological dynamics diverge from those which humans are 
‘programmed’ to think in. That is, natural selection has programmed people mostly to 
thinking in physiological time, our minds focus on issues that matter across time scales 
of hours, days, or at the most, a hundred years, while ecological time spans centuries 
and millennia (Wilson, 1984). The limitations of human cognitive capacity provides 
room for ‘mistakes’ in our perception of the environment that may reduce the possibility 
of commonality.
Further research is therefore required to consider the questions relevant to the 
elaboration of the role of direct perception in the development of our conceptions. To 
what extent does direct perception determine conception and how might it interact with 
alternative sources of conception, such as innate tendencies, or cultural constructs? In 
terms of the language used by Ingold in his exposition of the role of direct perception, 
direct perception is the “raw materials” of sensation, which, carried over to the domain 
of social relations, yield the cultural construction of conceptions of nature. However, we 
are now required to ask: What form do these materials take, and how are they arranged 
in forming conceptions?
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7.9 Summary: The objectivity o f environmental values.
Part II of this thesis has attempted to approach the question of the objective validity of 
environmental citizen values. In summary, it is suggested that, although recent trends 
within the philosophy of science literature would tend to favour the subjectivity or 
relativism of knowledge, there is still room within the debate for the possibility that 
knowledge possesses at least an element of necessity or objectivity. While neither of the 
empirical attempts to identify such necessity within knowledge of the environment or 
the way the environment is valued proves entirely conclusive, there is some reason to at 
least reserve judgement until further evidence is available. Although there is little 
evidence of commonalities between ecological science and Karen spirit beliefs, this 
does not necessarily contradict the scientific realist perspective that supports necessity 
in knowledge development. Moreover, the investigation in Chapter 4 did suggest the 
existence of commonalities in environmental preferences.
Furthermore, the literature reviews of causes of deforestation (s. 7.2), commonalities in 
tree symbolism (s. 7.3), Biophilia (s. 4.2.1), and the classification of biological kinds (s.
4.2.3) all support the notion of commonalities in conceptions of nature. However, 
against this positive evidence needs to be set the literature supporting a relativistic 
explanation of environmental preferences (s. 4.3.2), as well as the fact that some of the 
frameworks developed in the above investigation might be considered novel (the 
adaptation of Piaget’s genetic epistemology in chapter 4) or contentious (direct 
perception’s rejection of mainstream anthropology).
In Part IE we leave the question of the objectivity of environmental norms and turn to 
the other question comprising the subject matter of this thesis: whether norms can be 
incorporated into individual benefit functions.
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PART III
Can moral norms be incorporated into individual benefit functions?
This part of the thesis addresses the question of whether morals can be combined with 
monetary values. That is, can moral norms be represented within individual benefit 
functions? Or can norms be valued monetarily without agents experiencing 
ambivalence? In an attempt to answer this question the next chapter reviews some of the 
literature concerned specifically with attempts to incorporate such moral norms within 
economic valuation. Thus, although this issue encompasses the broad sweep of the 
social sciences, discussion will be restricted to arguments specifically concerned with 
incorporating norms within the neoclassical paradigm.
Identifying criticism of economics in the context of behaviour motivated by morality as 
being targeted against the assumption that agents are self-interested, a brief review of 
the development of rational choice theory is presented to argue that the adoption of the 
assumption of self-interestedness within economics results from confusion of the 
definition of utility espoused by modem economics. It is suggested that the standard 
criticisms of economics are misplaced as they misinterpret the axioms of economics as 
including the requirement that agents be self-interested. Instead it is argued that the 
axioms of economics are concerned not with the content of preferences but with the 
structure of preferences. Specifically, it is assumed that values have a teleological 
structure: that they constitute an ordering. Thus, the question of whether morals can be 
incorporated within economic valuations is reframed as: Is morality characterised as 
having a teleological structure?
Chapter 9 attempts to empirically investigate this question using the Contingent 
Valuation Mechanism (CVM) to elicit willingness to pay for the conservation of forest 
resources in northern Thailand. It is suggested that the commensurability of citizen and 
consumer values in the context of environmental valuation can be investigated through 
consideration of the forms of response to Contingent Valuation (CV) surveys and the 
motivations underlying them. It is argued that if ethical norms are indeed of a 
qualitatively different form to economic preferences -  if they are non-teleological -  then
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respondents will experience ambivalence when asked to value them monetarily within a 
CV survey, and will protest at being asked to do so. On the other hand, if ethical norms 
and economic preferences share a teleological structure, their monetary valuation will 
not elicit such ambivalence or protests. The results obtained suggest that morality has a 
teleological structure and is commensurable with economic preference. However, it is 
argued that in drawing such a conclusion; that is, in analysing the structure of 
belie#preference; assumptions must be made regarding belief and preference, thus 
undermining the validity of the conclusion.
Chapter 10 briefly outlines developments within the field of economic methodology to 
suggest that the problem suffered in testing the claims of economics in chapter 9 is a 
more general criticism laid at the feet of economics. That is, from the application of 
causal theories to the explanation of social behaviour there arise fundamental 
epistemological problems. Thus, in summary, it is suggested that, before the issue of 
whether moral norms can be incorporated within individual benefit functions can be 
resolved, fundamental epistemological issues require further consideration. The debate 
remains open.
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8. Utility, moral norms, and the neoclassical economic framework.
8.1 Introduction
As a way of introduction to the question of whether moral norms can be incorporated 
into economic valuations or valued monetarily without agents experiencing 
ambivalence, this chapter reviews some of the literature concerning the validity of 
incorporating moral values within economic valuation.
It is important at the outset to distinguish the moral norms of concern here from the 
notion of altruism. As discussed in chapter 2, it has been argued that altruism can be 
considered within a utilitarian context and incorporated within individuals’ utility 
functions by simply attaching a more abstract meaning to preferences -  agents are said 
to prefer something in the sense that they would choose it in preference to other things 
(s. 2.6). Morality on the other hand is less easy to incorporate within individual utility 
functions, as it is argued that morality is qualitatively difference to altruism, being more 
than simply a manifestation of people’s preferences.
It is one thing to say what morality is not. However, it is an entirely more demanding 
task to define what it is we mean by morality. It is hoped that this issue will be further 
elaborated throughout the discussion undertaken in this chapter. In the meantime, we 
simply mirror the thoughts of Etzioni (1988: 41 -  42):
An investigation of the relevant literature leads one to the not surprising 
conclusion that philosophers, after being at it for many hundreds of 
years, have yet to produce a fully satisfactory definition of what is moral.
Without attempting here to review the immense literature on the subject, 
the different approaches, and the difficulties that each encounters, we 
suggest that for the purposes at hand it suffices to consider moral acts as 
those that meet four criteria: moral acts reflect an imperative, a 
generalisation, and a symmetry when applied to others, and are 
motivated intrinsically.
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And Elster (1989: 99 -  100):
Rationality is essentially conditional and future-oriented. Social norms 
are either unconditional or, if conditional, are not future-oriented. For 
norms to be social, they must be shared by other people and partly 
sustained by their approval and disapproval. They are also sustained by 
the feelings of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame that a person 
suffers at the prospect of violating them. A person obeying a norm may 
also be propelled by positive emotions, like anger or indignation. 
[Moreover] social norms offer considerable scope for skill, choice, 
interpretation and manipulation. For that reason, rational actors often 
deploy norms to achieve their ends. Yet there are limits to the flexibility 
of norms, otherwise there would be nothing to manipulate.
We start our discussion with a review of the development of utility theory within 
economics (s. 8.2). It is suggested that, although neoclassical economics finds its origins 
in the utilitarian moral philosophy, the inception of modem economics at the end of the
til19 century saw rationed choice theory adopt a definition of utility subtly but 
significantly different from that in utilitarianism. Specifically, economics adopted the 
conception of utility as preference satisfaction, while the classical utilitarian conception 
of utility identified a valuable tendency in an object. It is suggested that the standard 
critique of economics -  the contradiction of the assumption of self-interested agents and 
the existence of morality -  only arises when economists try to reconcile their conception 
of utility with that of their utilitarian antecedents (s. 8.3). That is, in order to uphold this 
position economists are required to present an extreme version of self-interestedness. 
The standard critique of this self-interest assumption in the form of imprudence or limits 
to rationality (s. 8.3.1) and the existence of moral norms (s. 8.3.2) are then briefly 
reviewed.
In response to the standard critique, economists are observed to conceive morality in 
terms consistent with self-interestedness (s. 8.4). Such endeavours generally run into 
problems, and attempts to reconcile economics with actions motivated by morality turn 
outside the utilitarian moral framework: for instance, the dual preference function model 
of Sen and Etzioni, which is founded upon a deontological moral philosophy (s. 8.5).
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However, it is argued that the notion that self-interestedness underlies neoclassical 
economics is a misinterpretation. Instead, it is suggested that economics is concerned 
not with the content of preferences but with the structure of preferences (s. 8.6). That is, 
rational choice theory merely claims that preference must constitute an ordering if 
choices are to be rational.
The question of whether morals can be incorporated within economic valuations is thus 
reffamed as whether morality can be considered to be characterised as having a 
teleological structure (s. 8.6): that is, whether economics is disturbed by morality 
depends whether the structure of morality is consistent with that of economic theory, 
that is teleological. It is only if morality is non-teleological that the claims of Sen and 
Etzioni are correct and radical change at the deepest foundations of economics is 
required. On the other hand, if morality can be considered teleological, the existence of 
moral values is entirely consistent with the behavioural assumptions of neoclassical 
economics.
8.2 Homo Economicus: A brief history o f the economic conception o f human action.
Explanations and predictions in the social sciences turn on the understanding of the 
origins of individual action. It is the form of economists’ presuppositions regarding the 
origins of individual action that distinguish them from other social scientists. 
Economics proceeds by formalising commonsense explanations of action into a theory 
of rational choice. The modem theory of consumer behaviour within economics starts 
from the notion of ‘consumer preference’. By imposing ‘rationality’ conditions on 
these, the theory of choice is obtained:
A utilitarian, rationalist, and individualist paradigm. It sees individuals as 
seeking to maximise their utility, rationally choosing the best means to 
serve their goals. They are decision making units; that is, they render 
their own decisions (Etzioni, 1988: 1).
One of the main developments in the modem conception of rationality in economics is 
thus the notion of rationality as utility maximisation (Cudd, 1993). The idea that 
rationality is utility maximisation is the idea that rational agents represent their desires
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in utility terms, and rank their options in order to find the best way to satisfy most of 
their desires. This requires first that we see rationality as a kind of calculation, in 
particular a maximisation, and second that the maximisation has to do with getting what 
we desire as expressed in utility terms (Cudd, 1993). Additionally, it assumes that 
rationality is a capacity inherent primarily in individuals, not in groups.
The utilitarians pursued the notion that diverse desires might be measured on a single 
scale and thus compared with each other and with the desires of others. Jeremy 
Bentham’s idea was that to determine what ought to be done one could compare 
different courses of action according to the pleasure or pain persons derived from them, 
and he combined the measures of pleasures and pains to form a single sum of happiness, 
the “hedonic calculus”. He argued that ultimately the sum of pleasure and pain is the 
motivation for all actions.
“Utility” in plain English means usefulness. Bentham specialised the meaning to a 
particular sort of usefulness: “the property in any object whereby it tends to produce 
benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness [...] or [...] to prevent the happening of 
mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered” (1823. 2, 
quoted in Broome, 1991: 1). The “principle of utility” is the notion that actions are to be 
judged by their usefulness in this sense: their tendency to produce benefit, advantage, 
pleasure, good or happiness (Broome, 1991). Haslett (1990) refers to this model of 
personal utility as the experience model. According to all versions of the experience 
model, personal utility is defined in terms of having certain experiences -  that is, certain 
mental states or states of consciousness, such as pleasure or happiness.
Before long, however, this version of the utility model was found wanting. Among the 
objections to it are that it restricts what may be said to constitute personal utility too 
narrowly, since pleasure and happiness are not the only experience that may be said to 
be of value (Haslett, 1990). For instance, the experience of doing something worthwhile 
for someone else may not, strictly speaking, be accurately describable as “pleasure” or 
even “happiness”, yet these experiences are nevertheless of value. As John Stuart Mill 
famously said, it may be better to be Socrates dissatisfied than to be a pig satisfied.
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In order to avoid this and other problems with the experience model, many 
philosophers, and most social scientists, have adopted the preference model of utility 
(Haslett, 1990). According to the preference model, utility is preference-satisfaction; the 
greater the number and strength of a person’s preferences that are satisfied, the greater 
that person’s utility. This model seems to avoid most of the major objections to the 
experience model (Haslett, 1990). For instance, many versions of the preference model 
place no restrictions on the preferences, the satisfaction of which supposedly increases a 
person’s welfare, thus overcoming concern that the experience model restricts what is in 
a person’s interest too narrowly.
Hence, later utilitarians abandoned the hedonic hypothesis that pleasure and pain were 
the only ultimate motivation for actions, but still maintained that ends could be 
compared on a single scale by how strongly persons desired them. This severed utility 
theory’s connection to happiness that Bentham had postulated. At this point, utility 
theory was linked to moral and political theory, but not by way of rationality as it is 
now. The greatest happiness principle of the utilitarians holds that the right action in any 
given circumstance is the one that maximises the happiness of all. This is not a matter of 
rationality, but of the Good (Cudd, 1993). It was only within economics that “utility” 
came to be associated with rationality.
The notion of c<utility” entered economics in 1873, with the publication of W. S. 
Jevons’s Theory o f Political Economy (Broome, 1991). However, economists shifted 
the meaning of “utility”. The word came to refer, not to the tendency of an object to 
produce good, but to the good an object produces (Broome, 1991). That is, by a 
person’s utility, economists came to mean not the person’s usefulness in promoting 
good but their own good. Broome (1991) illustrates how initially economists correctly 
adopted the notion of “utility” from philosophy, and how subtle but important 
misinterpretations changed its meaning from usefulness in yielding pleasure to 
identifying such pleasure with utility itself. Hence, the marginal revolution in the 1870s 
-  in Austria with Carl Menger, in Switzerland with Leon Walras, and in England with 
W. S. Jevons -  introduced a new model of microeconomic behaviour in which agents 
are assumed to be rational and to be concerned with subjective desires. By rationality 
they meant agents act to maximise their subjectively given utility subject to their budget 
constraint (Cudd, 1993). Whereas it had traditionally been associated with a valuable
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tendency in an object within utilitarianism, as it was adopted by economics, utility had 
became synonymous with preference.
The final step in making this economic theory into an explicit theory of rational choice 
was to deduce utility functions from a set of axioms describing rationality in preferences 
and actions and to couple this with the principle that rationality is utility maximisation 
(Cudd, 1993). That is, a set of conditions required if a numerical utility function is to 
apply to agents’ preferences must be determined. Moreover, in taking this final step, 
economics reinforced the confusion over the meaning of utility (Broome, 1991). The 
axiomatic theory sets out from a person’s preferences. It proves that, provided these 
preferences conform to some axioms, they can be represented by a “utility function”. 
The sense in which the function represents the preferences is this: of any pair of 
alternatives, the function assigns a greater utility to the one that is preferred. “So 
“utility” acquired the meaning: the value o f a function that represents a person's 
preferences” (Broome, 1991: 3).
It is the axioms from which utility functions are derived that define the faculty of 
rational economic man, homo economicus, and which are available in most 
contemporary microeconomic textbooks. Agents are assumed to have available a set of 
mutually exclusive actions, the choice between which will have consequences defined 
by a set of exogenously given preferences, the satisfaction of which provides utility. 
Specifically, the axioms that define the rational agent in neo-classical theory are a quiet 
attempt to characterise consistency in preferences (O’Neill, 1998. 168).
The rational economic agent is assumed to have preferences that are 
complete, i.e. agents can express preferences over any and all goods; 
reflexive, i.e. every good is as good as itself; and transitive, i.e. such that 
if X is preferred to Y and Y to Z then X is preferred to Z. The rational 
economic agent, thus defined, is assumed to be concerned to maximise 
the satisfaction of a set of preferences, the ‘utility function’ in neo­
classical jargon, under the constraint of a finite budget.
Although the marginalists originally intended their theory to account only for choices in 
the economic sphere, their intellectual descendents, especially Ludwig von Mises and
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the Chicago School, in particular Gary Becker (1976b), expanded it to all contexts of 
human behaviour, for example, crime, education decisions, and the family (Cudd, 
1993).
8.3 Criticisms of homo economicus: ethics and the invisible hand.
Belizeans often say “The higher the monkey climb, the more he exposes 
his ass”. Neo-classical economics has climbed about as high as is 
possible for a social science, and it has therefore attracted a crowd of 
critics (Wilk, 1996: 64).
The criticisms of the economic conception of human action are legion and beyond the 
scope of this one section. Thus, the focus here will be on critiques internal to the 
discipline of economics. However, it should be pointed out that what follows is by no 
means intended to represent a comprehensive review of such internal critiques. 
Moreover, it should be remembered that a broader critique of the conception of man and 
the explanation of behaviour employed within economics is available within other fields 
of the social sciences: in particular, in the sociological tradition emerging from the work 
of Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx, and in the various positions within what Wilk 
(1996) refers to as “moral economics”, including the work of the likes of Max Weber, 
Bronislaw Malinowski, Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, Glifford Geertz, and Marshall 
Sahlins59.
Problems arise with the economic definition of utility as preference when one asks: of a 
pair of alternatives, is the one that a person prefers necessarily the one that is better for 
them? According to the official economic definition of choices, it has greater utility. A 
person’s utility, as it is officially defined within economics, has nothing to do with 
“good”. However, attempting to maintain the spirit of utilitarianism, many economists 
adopt the official economic definition of utility as preference, while at the same time 
using the word to stand for a person’s good (Broome, 1991). Because an alternative 
preferred by a person is defined as having a higher utility, they take it for granted that it 
must be better for them. That is, they suppose that a person is rational and always
214
prefers what is better for them (Broome, 1991). To do so is to suggest that a person is 
“self-interested” in a very strong sense. It rules out not only altruism, but also 
imprudence. It is suggested here that the criticism aimed at neoclassical economics 
tends to reflect this strong notion of “self-interested”.
8.3.1 Human limitations on rationality.
One of the possibilities ruled out by the “strong” conception of a person’s self-interest 
evoked by neoclassical economists in the defence of their position is that people will act 
imprudently. Thorstein Veblen (1898: 73) eloquently satirises this assumption:
[Economics presumes man to be] a lightening calculator of pleasures and 
pains, who oscillates like a homogenous globule of desire and happiness 
under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him 
intact.
Veblen’s statement implies that it is difficult to accept that all social life can be 
adequately explained using the economic model and that one reason for this is the 
limitations of individual rationality.
Formal tests of economic theories of individual choice go back at least as far as L. L. 
Thurstone (1931), who used experimental techniques common in psychology to 
investigate whether the indifference curve representation of preferences could 
coherently organise individuals’ choices [he concluded that it could]. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstem’s (1944) Expected Utility Theory made more pointed predictions which 
allowed more powerful tests. In particular, Allais (1953) identified systematic violations 
of utility theory. There have since been hundreds of experiments designed to further 
explore systematic violations of utility theory, and of the alternative choice theories that 
have been proposed to account for various parts of the experimental data. Camerer 
(1995) gives a comprehensive survey.
59 The difference between these different models of human behaviour is one that is already well 
rehearsed within the literature (see Wilk, 1996).
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Much of the critique of homo economicus originates in Herbet Simon’s notion of 
‘bounded rationality’. Examining the limitations of human reasoning power in complex 
decision making environments, Simon concluded that:
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex 
problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose 
solution is required for objective rational behaviour in the real world -  or 
even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality (Simon,
1957: 198).
Simon (1979) suggests employing the concept of substantive or procedural rationality. 
This can be used to distinguish between the rationality of a decision -  results of a choice 
-  considered independently of the manner in which it is made, and the rationality of a 
decision in terms of the manner in which it is made. Neoclassical economics rests on 
two fundamental assumptions. Firstly, that the economic actor has a particular goal, for 
example, utility maximisation. Secondly, that the economic actor is substantively 
rational. Simon (1979: 81 -  82) pointed to laboratory demonstrations of human failure 
to follow the canons of substantive rationality:
The human mind is programmable: it can acquire an enormous variety of 
different skills, behaviour patterns, problem-solving repertoires, and 
perceptual habits. Which of these it acquires in any particular case is a 
function of what it has been taught and what it has experienced. We can 
expect substantive rationality only in situations that are sufficiently 
simple as to be transparent to this mind. In all other situations, we must 
expect that the mind will use such imperfect information as it has, will 
simplify and represent the situation as it can, and will make such 
calculations as are within its power. We cannot expect to predict what it 
will do in such situations unless we know what information it has, what 
forms of representation it prefers, and what algorithms are available to it.
As an alternative model of behaviour, Simon (1957) proposed the ‘satisficing’ principle: 
individuals try to attain acceptable levels of welfare. The term is an integration of 
‘satisfaction’ and ‘optimising’. Based on the limited human brain capacity, ‘satisficing’
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accepts that the transactions costs of information gathering in economic decision 
making are prohibitively high, and reflects a cost-minimising or cost effective approach 
that takes account of this (van den Bergh et a l, 2000).
Following in Simon’s footsteps, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) showed that the human 
brain is an imperfect decision-making tool, even when faced with relatively simple 
problems of choice, while Elster (1990a) questioned the whole notion of human 
behaviour as decision-making. He pointed out that many actions are taken without a 
clear goal, with no knowledge of the consequences, and because it is easier to conform 
than to choose. That is, people have no objective basis for making decisions, cannot 
rank preferences, and make no decision at all or make the wrong choice. May (1954) 
points to observations of actual behaviour that reject the transitivity of preferences. Van 
den Bergh et al. (2000) identify evidence that suggests individuals are less free-riding 
than predicted on the basis of neoclassical theory. They suggest that this can be 
explained by ‘other-regarding’ and reciprocal fairness.
8.3.2 Ethics and the invisible hand.
The second possibility that the assumption of self-interested rationality rules out is that 
people act according to social norms. That is, microeconomic theory is based on what 
we do as isolated consumers, but it can say little about what we do as political citizens 
with ethical concerns (van den Bergh et al., 2000). In The M oral Dimension, Amitai 
Etzioni (1988) claims, as did Albert Hirschman in Morality and the Social Sciences 
(1980), that people often act from moral motives, that economics needs to recognise 
this, and that it will be significantly changed by doing so. Etzioni (1988) tells us that 
moral acts are a source of value other than pleasure:
Indeed, many are explicitly based on the denial o f pleasure in the 
name o f the principle(s) evoked Doing penance, abstention from 
premarital sex, and Ramadan fasting are not what most people 
consider sources of pleasure (45).
Thus, while acting in line with one’s moral values produces a kind of satisfaction, a 
sense of moral worth, Etzioni (1988) argues that this value differs qualitatively from
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that achieved through, for example, consumption, as adhering to morals provides a 
sense of affirmation, of having done what is required, and re-establishing one’s values. 
Hence, the value achieved through acting in accordance with moral norms differs 
qualitatively from that generally associated with economic valuation: that attained 
through the satisfaction of preferences.
John Elster (1990b: 49) presents a number of example of instances of decision-making 
in which norms are at work rather than self-interest:
Consider a firm that has reached a wage agreement with its workers. If 
wages are paid at the end of the production period, the following game 
arises. At the beginning of the period, workers have the choice between 
working and not working. If they decide to work, the firm has the choice, 
at the end of the period, between paying them the agreed-upon wages and 
not paying them. If this were all there was to the story, it is clear that a 
rational, selfish management would decide not to pay them and that 
rational workers, anticipating non-payment, would decide not to work.
Any promise of payment that the firm might make would lack credibility.
As a consequence, both the firm and the workers would end up worse off 
than if the promise of payment had been credible.
One restraining principle could be the code of honour. If people pursue 
their selfish ends subject to the constraint of not telling lies or breaking 
promises, more cooperation can be achieved than if lies are made and 
promises are broken whenever it seems expedient.
While the actions of both workers and management in this example could well be 
explained in a manner consistent with economic self-interest by simply defining this 
interest in the context of a repeat game, there is no doubt that norms, such as codes of 
honour and trustworthiness, influence our decision making. Indeed, it is often 
recognised that the market economy, the ultimate utilitarian institution, depends for its 
existence on values and commitments that are not tradable, as many writers including 
John Ruskin (1866), Fred Hirsch (1976), and Joseph Schumpeter (1976) have
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repeatedly emphasised. As Kenneth Arrow (1974: 23) remarks on the notion of trust: ‘Tf 
you have to buy it, you already have some doubts about what you’ve bought” .
With the inception of political economy in the eighteenth century, the emphasis was 
placed on the reduction of moral values to a cost calculus -  the reduction of ‘use values’ 
to ‘exchange values’. Hodgson (1997: 53) describes the reaction against this:
Many critics complained of this degradation of worthy values such as 
duty, loyalty, chivalry and trust. Thus, in 1790 Edmund Burke wrote of 
the claims made for rational calculation of human affairs in the era of the 
French Revolution: ‘the age of chivalry is gone -  That of the sophisters, 
oeconomists, and calculators has succeeded’. Subsequently, and with 
similar sentiments, Thomas Carlyle describes political economy as the 
‘dismal science’ which had professed a ‘pig philosophy’. And the great 
romantic critic of utilitarianism William Wordsworth writes in King’s 
College Chapel, Cambridge: ‘high heaven rejects the lore of nicely- 
calculated less or more’.
O’Neill (1998) traces the criticism that neoclassical economics fails to consider actions 
motivated by morals to Aristotle’s distinction between two forms of acquisition, the 
economic and the chrematistic, the former being characteristic of the household, the 
latter of the market. Economic acquisition, that of the household, considers acquisition 
only with respect to the object’s primary use, as an object that satisfies a need. 
Chrematistic acquisition is concerned with the accumulation of the means of exchange, 
of currency. Moreover, while there is a limit to the accumulation of natural goods, 
namely the needs they satisfy, there is no limit to the acquisition of the means of 
exchange. Whereas exchange in the household is entered into only to acquire what is 
useful, the second form of acquisition becomes its own end. In making this distinction, 
Aristotle is drawing a contrast between an objective and proper conception of the good 
life and a misconception (O’Neill, 1998). That is, the household conception of 
economics is based upon the notion that economic life should be judged and organised 
according to a conception of the good.
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O’Neill (1998) goes on to trace Aristotle’s distinction between forms of acquisition to 
socialist critiques of the market; most notably in the work of Marx and Polanyi:
The distinction at the heart of Marxian economics, between the use value 
and the exchange value of commodities, Marx explicitly takes from 
Aristotle. Likewise, Aristotle’s distinction between economic and 
chrematistic acquisition is reintroduced in terms of the distinction basic 
to volume I of Capital between the circuit commodity-money- 
commodity from that of money-commodity-money. The model of 
communism set up in opposition to commodity producing societies is 
that of a household economy, an economy organised around the 
satisfaction of needs (O’Neill, 1998: 29).
And,
In the work of Polanyi the influence of Aristotle’s distinction between 
household and market is even more pronounced. The development of 
modem market society, the great transformation, is a story of the escape 
of the economy from the social and ethical limits [of social relations and 
human needs]. For Polanyi the aim of socialism is to make economic 
existence answerable to ethical goals in modem conditions (ibid.: 29).
However, the exclusion of moral values from the conception of decision making in 
economic models has long been recognised within economics itself. While the 
calculative impetus of economic science is aided by a utilitarian rendering of human 
motivations, classical economists such as Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus always 
find a place for ‘moral sentiments’ and higher human values. Moreover, Smith, Ricardo, 
and Malthus adopt and sustain Aristotle’s distinction between ‘use value’ and ‘exchange 
value’ (Hodgson, 1997). John Stuart Mill, one of the founders of utilitarian moral 
philosophy underlying the neo-classical paradigm, writes of “economic man” that no 
“political economist was ever so absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus 
constituted” (1844: 139; quoted in Hodgson, 1997: 49). Thus, despite the clear 
utilitarian traits in all their works, these classical economists are reluctant to pursue the 
logic of subjectivism to its limit and to establish a single measure of worth based on
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subjective utility. It is only with the marginal revolution in the 1870s that the distinction 
between ‘use value’ and ‘exchange value’ disappears with William Jevons claim to have 
solved the ‘paradox of value’ by formalising a relationship between price and marginal 
utility (Hodgson, 1997).
While the start of modem Western economics as a discipline is usually traced to Adam 
Smith (1723 -  1790), it is wrong to attribute the modem conception of self-interested 
homo economicus to him. In The Wealth o f Nations, Smith builds a powerful argument 
that the individual’s self-interest generates society’s best interest. People participate in 
the market because of their own self-interested desire to get the best return for their 
labour by selling it at the highest price. Each person’s struggle to get the most value 
balances everyone else’s. Wilk (1996: 47) argues that the effect of Smith’s calculus is to 
“move moral issues [...] into the realm of logic, rationality, education, and science”. 
However, the exact role of morality in Smith’s work is not quite so clear cut, rather 
something that is still enthusiastically debated. Indeed, the controversy is so well 
established as to warrant the title Das Adam Smith Problem, and concerns the relation 
between the ‘sympathetic’ ethic contained within the Theory o f Moral Sentiments on the 
one side, and the ‘selfish’ ethic of Wealth o f Nations on the other.
In 1983, Hont and Ignatieff published a collection of essays that provoked much 
discussion within philosophy as well as economics on the issue of the place of morality 
in economics in general, and the work of Smith in particular, and challenge the 
conventional association of Smith with the notion of self-interest. In a paper within that 
collection, Hont and Ignatieff (1983: 24) point to the role of moral values within 
Smith’s conception of the market economy:
Yet if property must be absolute, how then were those excluded from the 
partition of the world to be provided for? Smith’s answer to this question 
made reference to the distinction in natural jurisprudence between 
‘perfect rights’, such as property, which were enforceable at law, and 
‘imperfect rights’, such as charity, which was a moral duty incapable of 
legal enforcement. [...] The law had no business commanding men to be 
benevolent: in any case, benevolence must be freely given or else it was 
not a virtue at all. [...] Yet Smith believed, as did Hume, that even in a
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market society, pity and compassion towards the unfortunate would 
remain natural and unprompted motives of action.
Thus, self-interest was far from the only motivation underlying behaviour in Smith’s 
work. Indeed, rather than being an accepted aspect of human behaviour, the possibility 
of self-interested behaviour was, for Smith, something that required justification:
Far from being able to take ‘economic man’ for granted in their analysis, 
they had to explain his historical possibility as a psychological type.
Only in commercial societies, with the emergence of a town-country 
division of labour, [...] had the purely privatised drive for the 
accumulation of commodities become the ruling principle of every 
individual (ibid.: 9 -1 0 ).
Evensky (1993) argues that, while Adam Smith is usually remembered for his support 
of the notion that self-interest leads to the common good, he qualified this outcome with 
a number of conditions: that there is sufficient competition, and that most people in 
society had internalised a general moral law as a guide for their behaviour, implying 
that the efficient functioning of the economy relies upon ethical behaviour, that self- 
interest in a competitive economy is not sufficient to yield the common good:
In Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, the invisible hand has a much 
broader responsibility [other than the smooth functioning of the market 
system as a coordinator of autonomous individual choices in an 
interdependent world]: if individuals are to enjoy the fruits of a classical 
liberal society, the invisible hand must not only coordinate individual’s 
choices, it must shape the individuals into constructive social beings -  
ethical beings (Evensky, 1993: 197).
That is, “the foundation of a success in creating a constructive classical liberal society 
lies in individuals’ adherence to a common social ethic” (ibid.: 199). For the wheels of 
the “immense machine” that is human society to turn easily, there must be virtue. 
Moreover, as Smith’s experience of commercial society grew, he became increasingly
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sceptical about the ability of the invisible hand to guide society towards the moral ideal 
required to regulate interest for the attainment of the common good (Evensky, 1993).
Winch (1978) argues that the notion of Smith’s espousal of the concept of homo 
economicus, and the consequent stereotype that has grown around the subject, is 
something that has emerged from nineteenth century interpretations of his work. 
However, a different interpretation can be found if one looks at eighteenth century 
debate. Thus, while Smith’s notion that the motivation of self-interest is compatible 
with an optimal allocation of economic resources has been carried forward by economic 
discourse, the rest of the tale has been forgotten. “In Smith’s story ethics is the hero -  
not self-interest or greed -  for it is ethics that defend the social intercourse from the 
Hobbesian chaos” (Evensky, 1993: 204).
In a similar vain, A. K. Sen, in his On Ethics and Economics (1987), asks:
How good an assumption is self-interest maximisation as a characteristic 
of actual behaviour? Does the so-called ‘economic’ man, pursuing his 
own interests, provide the best approximation of the behaviour of human 
beings, at least in economic matters? That is indeed the standard 
assumption in economics.
In his Rational Fools (1977), Sen suggests that “the nature of man in these current 
economic models continues [...] to reflect the particular formulation of certain general 
philosophical questions in the past. The realism of the chosen conception of man is 
simply not a part of this inquiry” (322). Challenging the economic conception of man, 
he states, “I would argue that the nature of modem economics has been substantially 
impoverished by the distance that has grown between economics and ethics” (1987: 7). 
Then, in the context of the above misconception of Smith’s work that seems to have 
become the norm in the economic profession:
Smith’s attitude to ‘self-love’ has something in common with that of 
Edgeworth, who taught that ‘economic calculus’ as opposed to ethical 
evaluation, was particularly relevant to two specific activities, to wit,
‘war and contract’. The reference to contract is of course precisely
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similar to Smith’s reference to trade, because trade takes place on the 
basis of mutually advantageous contracts. But there are many other 
activities inside economics and outside it in which the simple pursuit of 
self-interest is not the great redeemer, and Smith did not assign a 
generally superior role to the pursuit o f self-interest in any of his writings 
(1987: 2 4 -2 5 ).
Sen criticises this misinterpretation of Smith and the promotion of the concept of self- 
interested agents:
[The] reason why the conception of man in economic models tends to be 
that of self-seeking egoist [is that] it is possible to define a person’s 
interests in such a way that no matter what he does he can be seen to be 
furthering his own self-interest in every isolated act of choice. [...]
[T]hen no matter whether you are a single-minded egoist or a raging 
altruist or a class conscious militant, you will appear to be maximising 
your own utility in this enchanted world o f definitions. (Sen, 1977: 322 -  
323; emphasis added)
Sen’s point is echoed by O’Neill (1998: 164):
The assumption [that ‘egoism’ or ‘self-interested’ behaviour is universal] 
is not so much false as empty: the very concepts of ‘egoist’ and the ‘self- 
interested agent’ and those of the ‘altruist’ are contentless in themselves.
Once content is added, it is either uncontentious and uninteresting, or it 
is contentious but false that they are so.
The promotion of the concept of the self-interested maximising individual by 
economics, as has been its misinterpretation of Smith’s message, has been criticised as 
betraying moral values and producing “corrosive self-interest”. Specifically, the 
application of the market mechanism is seen as reinforcing the very motivational 
aspects it assumes as being inherent in human nature. In turn, the promotion of such 
self-interest is seen as corroding the moral context of the community (Hirsh, 1976). If 
all value is derived from the satisfaction of individual wants, then there is nothing left
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with which to restrain such self-interest, damaging the possibility of creating a cohesive 
society in which everyone can participate (Ormerod, 1994). It is this notion that caused 
John Maynard Keynes to write, “I do now regard the [Benthamite] tradition as the worm 
which has been gnawing the insides of civilisation and is responsible for the present 
moral decay” (1933: 445; quoted in Hogdson, 1997: 55). Hont and Ignatieff (1983: 8) 
identify a similar recognition of this corrosive quality of self-interest in the work of 
Smith when they state:
It is notorious, from his contemptuous reference in the Wealth o f Nations 
to the medieval lord’s fascination for the ‘baubles and trinkets’ of trade 
goods, and from his sardonic strictures in the Theory o f Moral 
Sentiments on men’s passions for accumulating objects of ‘frivolous 
utility’, that [Smith] believed material prosperity was purchased, more 
often than not, at the price of a measure of what he himself called 
‘disception’.
And:
In the last edition of the Theory o f M oral Sentiments, [Smith] added a 
chapter which argued that ‘the great and universal cause of the 
corruption of our moral sentiments’ lay in the ‘disposition to admire and 
almost to worship the rich and powerful and to despise or at least to 
neglect persons of poor and mean conditions’. [...] These material 
desires were insatiable because men judged their individual satisfaction 
in comparison to those higher or lower in the ranks system of an unequal 
society (ibid.: 9).
8.4 Reducing norms to self-interested optimising behaviour.
One of the defences employed by economists in the face of criticism of the role of 
behaviour motivated by morality in their models is to maintain the concept of “self­
interestedness” that underlies the utilitarian basis of economics. That is economists have 
tended to argue that moral norms are consistent with the economic concept of self- 
interested preference. One such argument can be found in Robert Axelrod’s (1984) The
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Evolution o f Cooperation. Axelrod suggests that norms of cooperation arise from 
indefinitely repeated plays of a two-person game. In such circumstances, individuals 
can find it to be in their own self-interest to cooperate with others, and such norms are 
sustained as long as people rationally appraise their own self-interest. However, 
Hodgson (1997: 52) argues that:
This is a shallow and devalued concept of a norm, arising simply on the 
basis of an individual’s own utility. There is no recognition that a moral 
norm -  such as honesty, love or duty -  may involve self-sacrifice and 
even transcend self-interest.
Elster (1989) asks the question: Can moral norms be reduced to optimising behaviour? 
In attempting to answer this question, he surveys attempts by economists to argue that 
social norms are nothing but instruments of individual or collective optimisation and 
thus to reduce norm-oriented behaviour to some type of optimising behaviour. He 
organises these attempts under a number of questions:
(i) Are norms rationalisations of self-interest?
Elster recognises that some people argue that norms are merely tools of manipulation, 
used to dress up self-interest in more acceptable garb, and point to investigations in 
social psychology suggesting that people prefer the distributive norms which favour 
them. For instance, low-income groups invoke a norm of equality, while high-income 
groups advocate pay according to productivity. However, Elster counters that, while this 
might seem to be the case for certain norms, it is more difficult to appreciate the self- 
interest underlying other norms: for instance, vengeance, which obviously overrides 
self-interest. Moreover, he goes on to suggest that certain norms are actually self- 
defeating, and the manipulation of norms for self-interested purposes can only occur if 
other people are willing to let norms take precedent over self-interest, otherwise there 
would be nothing to manipulate.
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(ii) Are norms followed out of self-interest?
A second attempt to equate norms and self-interested optimising behaviour identified by 
Elster is the notion that norm-guided behaviour is supported by the threat of social 
sanctions that make it rational to obey the norms60. In response to this, he points out that 
norms do not need external sanctions to be effective. When norms are internalised, they 
are followed even when violations would be unobserved and not exposed to sanctions. 
Shame or anticipation of it acts as a sufficient internal sanction. That is, “if punishment 
was merely a price tag attached to a crime, nobody would feel shame when caught” 
(Elster, 1989: 105).
(iii) Do norms exist to promote self-interest?
Some norms can be individually useful, such as the norm against drinking or overeating. 
Thus, it is argued perhaps social norms are individually useful in that they help to 
economise on decision-making. Elster points to norms which violate this argument by 
distinguishing between the usefulness and the rationality of norms. He takes as an 
example the code of vengeance. While a code of vengeance can have good 
consequences -  they may ensure people avoid offending me -  quarrels between people 
all holding such a code may actually produce worse outcomes than, for instance, 
resolving differences in a court of law. Elster (1989: 106) summarises this argument 
thus: “from a rational point of view, the code is not credible unless it is in the interest of 
the threatener to carry it out when the time comes. The threat to kill oneself, for 
instance, is not rationally credible”.
(iv) Do norms exist to promote common interests?
It is sometimes argued that norms are collectively rational, having collectively good 
consequences for those who live by them. For instance, it is suggested that norms 
compensate for market failure, and the agreement to follow a norm improves the 
efficiency of the economic system. In response to this argument, Elster makes three 
points:
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(a) Not all norms are Pareto improvements, and some make everybody worse off.
In support of this idea Elster presents, among others, the norm of etiquette as an 
example of norms that make everybody worse off due to the required wasteful 
expenditure in pointless behaviours. One argument against Elster5 s example would be to 
suggest that etiquette serves the useful function of confirming one’s identity to a social 
group. However, Elster rejects this notion, as the norms required need not be so 
complicated: “To signal or confirm one’s membership in a group one sign should be 
sufficient, like wearing a badge or a tie” (1989: 108 -  109).
Elster may once again be countered by the suggestion .that it is the complexity of the 
norm that serves to keep outsiders out, thus maintaining people’s standing as members 
of the particular social group. Elster’s response to this argument is to point to the norms 
that govern the life of the working classes whose role cannot be to keep outsiders out. It 
is here that Elster’s argument becomes somewhat strained. Surely he is not suggesting 
that all norms related to the class system are intended to regulate membership of 
different class groups. As he himself has amply demonstrated, norms serve a multitude 
of purposes. The advantages implied of membership to an elite upper class, and the role 
of excessively wasteful consumption in identifying one with such a class, are eloquently 
documented in Thorstein Veblen’s The Theory o f the Leisure Class (1994).
(b) Some norms that would make everybody better off are not observed.
For instance, the norm of using public transport over private cars would result in less 
congestion and less time lost commuting. However, this does not seem to be an 
argument against the notion that norms provide collective benefit. In making this 
argument Elster seems to confuse “norms exist for collective benefit” with “norms that 
provide collective benefit exist”.
60 This point is related to the discussion concerning the sanction system required for collective action (s.
1.2 .2 ).
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(c) Even if a norm does make everybody better off, it does not explain why it exists, 
unless there could be shown to be some feedback mechanism that specifies how 
the good consequences of the norm contribute to its maintenance.
Rejecting the notion that such a feedback mechanism exists, Elster states:
The norms of the strong are not as a rule taken over by the weak, nor do 
the weak always disappear in competition with the strong. Greece was 
conquered by Rome, but Rome assimilated more Greek norms than the 
other way around. When China was conquered by the barbarians, the 
latter ended up assimilating and defending the culture they had 
conquered (1989: 114).
However, in summarising his argument, Elster (ibid.: 114) recognises that:
These arguments do not add up to a strong claim that the social 
usefulness of norms is irrelevant for their explanation. I find it as hard as 
the next man to believe that the existence of norms of reciprocity and 
cooperation has nothing to do with the fact that without them civilisation 
as we know it would not exist. Yet it is at least a useful intellectual 
exercise to take the more austere view, and to entertain the idea that 
civilisation owes its existence to a fortunate coincidence. On this view, 
social norms spring from psychological propensities and dispositions 
that, taken separately, cannot be presumed to be useful, yet happen to 
interact in such a way that useful effects are produced.
Hence, while Elster rejects the notion that norms are individually rational, he at least 
recognises the possibility that their existence and interaction may produce useful effects.
As it is the intention of this section to merely demonstrate economists’ efforts to reduce 
norms to self-interested optimising behaviour, whether they are correct to reconcile 
social norms with rationality in this way will detain us no longer. Instead, we move on 
to consider an alternative means of reconciling economics and morality.
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8.5 The “divided self*: the critiques o f Etzioni and Sen.
Based upon the criticism that morality conflicts with economists’ assumption of self­
interestedness, there have been a number of approaches suggested to deal with 
economists’ neglect of morality. One of the most vibrant alternative approaches to 
modem Western economics is offered by the German, or “institutional” tradition (Wilk, 
1996). Some of the German historicists, such as William Roscher, thought that all 
people had two basic instincts, one self-interested and the other moral and ethical, a 
tradition that has come to represent one of the more common strategies in relating 
citizen and consumer values within critiques of economics.
Amitai Etzioni (1988) distinguishes the deontological moral philosophy from the 
utilitarian basis of the neoclassical paradigm. Acknowledging that deontology has 
different sub-schools and encompasses internal differences, Etzioni goes on to 
emphasise one particular element of deontology: that the basis for deontology is that 
actions are morally right when they conform to a relevant principle or duty (the term 
deontology is derived from the Greek deon meaning binding duty), while utilitarianism 
bases morality on consequences. From the deontological perspective, there is more to 
life than a quest to maximise one’s satisfaction.
Etzioni (1988) then goes on to propose what he refers to as a “moderate deontological” 
position: accepting a role for consequences, but only as a secondary consideration. 
Thus, a moderate deontological position provides the foundations for inclusion of 
neoclassical concepts and findings as a subset. Specifically, Etzioni adopts a dualism 
between a ‘higher self that is moral and altruistic, and a ‘lower self which is selfish, 
subjective, egotistical and driven by needs, defining a new field called 
“socioeconomics” or “humanistic economics”:
Where the neoclassical assumption is that people seek to maximise one 
utility (whether it be pleasure, happiness, consumption, or merely a 
formal notion of a unitary goal), [it is suggested instead] that people 
pursue at least two irreducible “utilities,” and have two sources of 
valuation: pleasure and morality (1988: 4).
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At the core of Etzioni’s position is the reconciliation of the utilitarian homo economicus 
and the deontological homo sociologicus.
The assumption of creative tension and perpetual search for balance 
between two primary forces -  those of the individual, and those of the 
community, of which they are members. If one views the community as 
merely an aggregation of individuals temporarily joined for their 
convenience, one leaves out the need for commitment to serve shared 
needs and for involvement in the community that attends to these needs.
If one sees the community as the source of authority and legitimacy, and 
seeks, in the name of duty, to impose behavioural standards on 
individuals [...] this leaves an insufficient basis for individual freedom 
and other individual rights [...] Individuals and community are both 
completely essential, and hence have the same fundamental standings 
(Etzioni, 1988: 8 - 9).
Thus, people make moral judgements on their urges, judgements rooted in their social 
experience, and these moral commitments are stronger than their biological urges. That 
is, Etzioni contends that the “most important basis for choice”, the “majority of 
choices”, and the “natural” forms of choice are “affective and emotional”, rather than 
rational and self-interested. As in the work of Sagoff and Keat in chapter 2, choices are 
based on social and moral judgements and only secondarily on logical grounds.
In support of the “divided-self’, cognitive psychologist Danial Kahneman teamed up 
with economists Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986) to investigate what kinds of 
economic behaviour people think are fair. They found that the public usually considers 
unfair behaviour that which violates the implicit commitments of an ongoing 
relationship or deliberately exploits the special dependence of a particular person. 
Similarly, studies into the prisoner’s dilemma indicate a substantial refusal on the part 
of a significant fraction (20 -  35%) of participants to undertake rational self-interested 
action, even under circumstances of complete anonymity with no possibility of group 
punishment (Dawes and Thaler, 1988). Those taking the cooperative stance stated their 
motive as to “do the right thing”.
231
Perhaps the most prominent supporter of the dualist distinction between morality and 
consumer preferences is A. K. Sen. Elaborating on the role of ethics in economics, Sen 
identifies and distinguishes between the concepts of sympathy and commitment as the 
key departures from self-interest, a distinction paralleling that between altruism and 
morality discussed above (s. 7.1):
The former corresponds to the case in which the concern for others 
directly affects one’s own welfare [...] It can be argued that behaviour 
based on sympathy is in an important sense egoistic, for one is oneself 
pleased at other’s pleasure and pained at other’s pain [...]. It is action 
based on commitment rather than sympathy which would be non-egoistic 
in this sense (1977: 327).
Based on this distinction, Sen (1977: 329) argues that
[Commitment] drives a wedge between personal choice and personal 
welfare, and much of traditional economic theory relies on the identity of 
the two. This identity is sometimes obscured by the ambiguity of the 
term ‘preference’, since the normal use of the word permits the 
identification of preference with the concept of being better off, and that 
at the same time it is not quite unnatural to define ‘preferred’ as chosen.
That is, while sympathy possesses certain characteristics that allow its incorporation 
into market valuation techniques, commitment is of a qualitatively different nature to 
consumer preferences and requires considering separately. Sen goes on to propose the 
concept of “meta-ranking” of preferences to explain how one might place commitment 
over subjective preferences: “we need to consider ranking o f preference rankings to 
express our moral judgements” (1977: 327). That is, rational individuals have both 
meta-preferences and ordinary preferences. Meta-preferences include moral values, and 
shape the ordering of ordinary preferences.
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8.6 The teleological structure of preference and morality.
Our discussion of the relationship between economics and morality has so far been 
based on the contrast between morality and the assumption of self-interest underlying 
economic models. However, as argued at the start of section 8.3, economists’ 
acceptance of the notion of self-interested agents results from their attempts to maintain 
the utilitarian conception of utility as what is good. On its own, the definition of utility 
employed within economics -  preference satisfaction -  does not require self­
interestedness to be assumed. Indeed, modem axiomatic utility theory makes no such 
assumption (Hanley and Spash, 1995). Agents can conform with the axioms of 
neoclassical economics without being self-interested. Economics is concerned with the 
structure of preferences -  they must constitute an ordering -  rather than the content of 
preferences -  that they are self-interested (Broome, 1992). However, the confusion over 
the definition of utility employed within economics leads many economists to forget 
this important discovery.
It is economic’s concern with the structure of preferences that causes Broome (1992) to 
suggest that Etzioni is not necessarily correct when he argues that recognising that 
people act from moral motives requires that large changes be seen in economics. 
Broome bases this argument on the notion that morals may not conform with Etzioni’s 
deontological description of them. Instead, Broome entertains the possibility that 
morality may be teleological in form, and thus parallel economic axioms concerning the 
form of preference.
Broome (1992) starts by reformulating Etzioni’s philosophical diagnosis of attempts to 
incorporate morals into economic models. Etzioni makes a claim about the sort of 
morality that motivates people and that contradicts the value system underlying the 
market: it is deontological (s. 8.5). However, Broome (1992) suggests that Etzioni’s 
definition of deontological, and thus his diagnosis of the problems with economics, is 
not clear. That is, while Etzioni talks of the utilitarian and the deontological moral 
frameworks, he specifically contrasts the teleological (or ‘consequentialist’) component 
of utilitarianism with deontology. Broome (1992) then goes on to reclassify ‘utilitarian’ 
and ‘deontological’ in Etzioni’s argument as ‘teleological’ and ‘non-teleological’ 
respectively. A teleological theory values an act according to the goodness of its
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consequences. A non-teleological theory, on the other hand, assigns intrinsic value to 
some acts.
Having reclassified Etzioni’s argument, Broome goes on to identify problems with this 
distinction between teleological and non-teleological positions in what he refers to as 
‘the simple teleological view’.
If I perform some act, one consequence of my doing so [...] is that I have 
performed the act. If the act is intrinsically good or bad, then this 
consequence is good or bad too. When evaluating the consequences of 
the act, there is nothing to stop our including the value of this 
consequence along with others. In this way the intrinsic value of the act 
can be taken into account within an evaluation of the consequences 
(Broome, 1992: 270).
As is now well recognised, teleology can therefore take account of the intrinsic value of 
acts; it can simply absorb these values that at first seemed to be non-teleological.
Broome (1992) identifies two arguments within the literature that attempt to undermine 
his ‘simple teleological view’. Firstly, it is suggested that the simple teleological view 
takes up a neutral, impersonal standpoint. Thus, from this perspective, although there 
exists a norm of not breaking a promise, it might be considered better for me to break a 
promise if this ensures that two or more people do not break their promises. It is argued, 
however, that account should be taken of the actor’s particular position in a moral 
problem. Thus, more weight should be attached to my broken promise than other 
people’s promises. If this weight is strong enough it may be better for me to keep my 
promise. Although these positions differ in their understanding of good, both the ‘agent- 
relative view’ and the teleological view imply that the right act is the one that 
maximises good (Broome, 1992).
Secondly, while the teleological view weighs good and bad events against one another, 
it is argued that considerations do not work this way. That is, the wrongness of breaking 
a promise is not a consideration that should be weighed against other goocEbad. Instead, 
it simply determines that I ought not to break a promise. This argument can be found in
234
the work of Robert Nozick (1974). While the first criticism maintains the teleological 
view that the right act is the one that maximises good, the second argument employs the 
distinction between teleological and non-teleological theories in the way moral 
considerations are seen to come together in determining the right thing to do:
According to teleological theories, they combine to determine what is 
best, and what is best is, in turn, what is right. According to non- 
teleological theories, on the other hand, moral considerations sometimes 
work in other ways (Broome, 1992: 273).
Broome (1992) thus identifies teleological theories as possessing a maximising 
“structure”. A teleological theory is one that aims to maximise good. That is, a 
teleological theory implies that, between acts, there is a ccbettemess relations”:
  is at least as good as _____
Moreover, this relation must conform to the transitivity and reflexivity constraints (s.
8.2), and thus is an ordering. Acts, therefore, are ordered by their goodness.
The parallel between this definition/structure of teleological theories and the similar 
preference orderings that underlie the methods of economics causes Broome (1992) to 
argue that:
The traditional methods of economics can cope with moral behaviour, 
provided it is behaviour according to a maximising morality. If 
[maximising morality] includes all moral behaviour, so much the better 
for the methods of economics (Broome, 1992: 275).
That is, the issue of concern in determining whether radical change is required at the 
foundations of economics is whether people act in accordance with a teleological or a 
non-teleological morality. Acting in accordance with teleological morality is consistent 
with utility theory. Acting in accordance with non-teleological morality makes Etzioni’s 
claim that people’s morality is specifically deontological correct, and another look is
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required at the behavioural assumptions underlying economics. As Broome (1992: 281) 
states:
Etzioni says that people have two ‘utilities’, one self-interested and one 
moral. He means that people pursue two goals. But a person may pursue 
both her own good and the good of others and still conform to a 
teleology. She has only to integrate her goals into a coherent structure, 
giving particular weight to each.
Etzioni says that there is conflict between people’s goals. In Broome’s terms, this would 
mean that people fail to integrate their goals into a coherent structure, and thus do not 
conform to a teleology. Broome himself refers to this possibility as an “important source 
of irrationality [requiring] a major change in economics, [as] a very fundamental 
assumption of economics is that, by and large, people behave rationally” (1992: 281). 
That is, the cause of the “major blow to the method of economics” would be 
“irrationality and not deontological morality” (1992: 281).
Broome’s emphasis on the structure of morality rather than on whether agents are self- 
interested in determining the validity of the economic argument is supported by O’Neill 
(1998: 168):
That individuals are ‘self-interested’ in the sense that they are concerned 
to satisfy a consistent set of preferences under budget constraints does 
not imply that agents are egoists in any strong sense of the term. [To 
adopt the ‘self-interested’ assumption] inherits the late eighteenth- 
century shift in the language to describe the unlimited acquisitiveness, in 
which the classical terms pleonexia, greed, avarice and love of lucre 
were replaced by the term ‘interest’, and hence ‘self-interest’ was 
defined in a narrow fashion. However, in taking for granted this concept 
of self-interest, it goes beyond the basic formal axioms of neo-classical 
theory, and implicitly introduces substantive claims about the content of 
agents’ preferences.
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That is, the issue of concern in determining the validity of the claims of economics is 
not the content, but the structure of preferences. It is not whether agents are motivated 
by self-interested or moral values, but the structure of these values that is important. 
Whether we follow Etzioni, and refer to the problem for economics as the deontology of 
morality, or follow Broome, and categorise it as irrationality, the problem remains the 
same: whether goals driven by moral values can be integrated into a coherent structure 
with other value forms, or whether people perceive a conflict between their goals. It is 
exactly this question that was derived from our discussion in chapter 2 and that 
motivates part III of this thesis: whether moral norms can be valued monetarily without 
agents experiencing ambivalence. Having defined in more detail the issue of concern, it 
is to the empirical investigation of whether morality is teleological or non-teleological 
to which we will turn in chapter 9.
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9. Anomalies in Contingent Valuation Survey Responses: An 
empirical investigation into the structure of morality.
9.1 Introduction.
The last chapter framed the question of whether morals can be incorporated within 
economic valuations, or whether moral norms and economic preferences are 
commensurable, as whether morality can be considered to be characterised as having a 
teleological structure. This chapter attempts to empirically investigate this question. 
This is attempted within the framework of the Contingent Valuation Mechanism 
(CVM), as a significant amount of attention has been focused on investigating the 
nature of responses to Contingent Valuation (CV) questionnaires and their relation with 
economic theory: “Contingent valuation has prompted the most serious investigation of 
individual preferences ever undertaken in economics” (Smith, 2000; quoted in Carson et 
al, 2001: 196). In particular, it is suggested that the claim that protest responses to CV 
questionnaires reflect the non-commensurability of ethical and economic values can be 
used as a means of constructing a method for analysing the structure of morality.
The next section briefly introduces the CVM and discussions within the CVM literature 
as to the consistency of questionnaire responses and economic theory. It is suggested 
that the commensurability of citizen and consumer values in the context of 
environmental valuation can be investigated through consideration of the forms of 
response to CV surveys and the motivations underlying them. It is argued that if ethical 
norms are indeed of a qualitatively different form to economic preferences -  if they are 
non-teleological -  then respondents will experience ambivalence when asked to value 
them monetarily within a CV survey, and will protest at being asked to do so. On the 
other hand, if ethical norms and economic preferences share a teleological structure, 
their monetary valuation will not elicit such ambivalence or protests. That is, the 
motivations underlying CV survey responses will be analysed to determine whether:
(a) Protest responses are motivated by the existence of social norms, and
(b) The existence of social norms manifests itself in protest responses.
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Section 9.3 provides a brief survey of the socio-cultural context in which the CV 
questionnaire is implemented, demonstrating the existence of cultural norms regarding 
forest use, before section 9.4 describes the questionnaire employed. The results obtained 
suggest that morality has a teleological structure and is commensurable with economic 
preference (s. 9.6). However, it is argued that in making such a conclusion we fail to 
overcome the ‘fallacy of motivational precision’. That is, in analysing the structure of 
belieffpreference, assumptions must be made regarding belief and preference.
9.2 Using the Contingent Valuation Mechanism to determine the structure of moral 
values.
9.2.1 Ethical values and protest responses to the Contingent Valuation Mechanism.
Sagoff (1998) and others61 suggest that the error involved in transforming citizen values 
into consumer values through their economic valuation is manifest in the difficulties 
faced by practitioners of the Contingent Valuation Mechanism (CVM) when attempting 
to measure citizen values monetarily. Individuals report that they base their willingness 
to pay (WTP) for environmental public goods on their concerns as citizens more than on 
their wants as consumers, being affected less by their own well-being than by ethical 
concerns: decision making processes inconsistent with the neo-classical paradigm 
(Edwards, 1986, Diamond et al, 1993, Sagoff, 1998). Specifically, it is suggested that 
the non-commensurability of citizen and consumer values is manifest in anomalies 
observed in the responses to Contingent Valuation surveys; more specifically, the 
existence of protest responses62.
61 For instance, see the work of Vatn and Bromley (1995), who relate anomalies in CV surveys 
specifically to the non-commensurability of citizen and consumer values in the valuation of 
environmental resources.
62 A number of other varieties of anomaly have been recorded in responses to CV surveys; for instance, 
embedding, scope and order effects. Arguments concerning the nature of these effects and their 
relationship with the neo-classical paradigm are already well established within the literature (see Imber 
et al, 1991; Mitchell, 1991; Kahnemann andKnetsch, 1992; Carson et al, 1992; Diamond et al, 1993; 
Devouges et al, 1992; Loomis and Larson, 1992; Smith, 1992; Hanemann, 1994; and Carson and Flores, 
1996), and arguments have been presented for the reconciliation of these effects with consumer theory. 
Discussion of these anomalies will, then, not concern us here.
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The CVM is one of the non-market valuation techniques applied by economists in the 
absence of markets for welfare enhancing/deteriorating effects . Carson (1998: 15) 
describes it as:
A survey-based technique for eliciting preferences for non-market goods, 
in a form which allows one to estimate how survey respondents trade-off 
private consumption for a non-marketed good in monetary terms. It is the 
most commonly used approach to placing a monetary value on non­
marketed environmental resources.
That is, the CVM represents a technique used for the monetary valuation of 
externalities. Specifically, a CV survey takes the form of a constructed hypothetical 
market for the good or service requiring valuation: a hypothetical valuation problem 
that usually takes as its departure a change in the status or characteristic of the good of 
services that respondents are then asked to state their willingness to pay (WTP) to 
avoid, or their willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for (for further details see 
Mitchell and Carson, 1989). Participants’ WTP and WTA responses can then be used to 
construct utility functions and thus the economic value of the good or service. Firmly 
grounded within the neo-classical framework, the CVM is now widely accepted by 
resource economists following a great deal of empirical and theoretical refinements 
during the 1970s and 1980s (Hanley and Spash, 1995)64
One of the attractions of the CVM is that it facilitates the construction of a market in 
which the researcher can devise an economic decision related to the commodity of 
interest. If it is the case that environmental values are of a fundamentally different form 
to those found in the market, it is suggested that this will likely be manifest in 
ambivalent reactions to the construction of such a market for the resource. As already 
discussed in chapters 2 and 8, the existence of the social norms that define citizen 
values is thought to result in feelings of ambivalence or conflict when the monetary 
valuation of such norms is attempted. That is, strongly opposing feelings are
63 Other non-market valuation techniques include the hedonic pricing method, the travel cost method, as 
well as production function approaches. A review of these methods can be found in Hanley and Spash 
(1995).
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experienced in attempting to apply monetary valuations to such norms, the resolution of 
which violates the assumptions underlying the neo-classical paradigm (Opaluch et al, 
1989, Stevens et al, 1991). Specifically, the non-comparability of options means that the 
individual faces non-scalar preferences based upon different objective functions, and the 
balancing of costs and benefits involved in neo-classical calculations is not the basis for 
choice. In such cases individuals are thought to rely on alternative forms of decision 
making, such as rules of thumb or lexicographic orderings (Opaluch et al, 1989). 
Moreover, when choices are made with the aid of rules of thumb, the observed 
behaviour cannot be considered to reveal individuals’ underlying preferences, as such 
alternatives are designed specifically to avoid the need to balance costs and benefits.
Opaluch et al (1989) modelled such ambivalence as spanning a continuous range of 
congruity. At one extreme attempts to value goods monetarily are congruous, trade-offs 
are possible and neo-classical theory applies, and agents are able to respond to CV 
questionnaires without experiencing ambivalence. At the other extreme attempts to 
value goods monetarily are incongruous, no comparison between goods is possible, and 
people experience ambivalence when attempting such valuations and respond by 
protesting. In between these extremes a scale of ability to resolve ambivalence is 
considered to exist, reflected in the divergence of WTP and WTA in CV surveys.
In response to the range of congruity, economists have tended to focus on discrepancies 
in the level of WTP and WTA65. In particular, they tend to invoke one of various tests to 
argue for the consistency of responses with economic theory, including order and 
embedding effects, scope effects, endowment effects, and income and substitution 
effects, or to claim that such anomalies are the result of survey context (Carson et al, 
2001). For instance, Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) argued that order and embedding 
effects in CV survey responses reflect the willingness to pay for “moral satisfaction” or 
‘‘warm glow” rather than the economic value of goods and services. While critics of the 
CVM suggest that “moral satisfaction” is not an economic value, economists counter
64 For discussion of the relationship between the CVM and the neo-classical paradigm, as well as the 
relative merits of the CVM see Cummings et al (1986), Mitchell and Carson (1989), and Hanley and 
Spash (1995).
65 See Willig (1976), Thaler (1980), Kahneman et al (1990), Haneman (1991), Mueser and Dow (1997), 
and Carson et al (2001).
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that it is utility whatever its source that matters for total value (Carson et al, 2001). 
Motivations are essentially irrelevant from the perspectives of economic theory.
Sagoff (1998) suggest that, in explaining anomalies in WTP responses in this manner, 
economists are exploiting what he refers to as “ambiguity of the term ‘satisfaction”’, 
extending it to encompass “psychological satisfaction”, or a mental state of pleasure or 
contentment, correlating preferences with the “warm glow” individuals obtain from 
supporting a worthy cause, rather than the conventional sense of fulfilling the terms of a 
preference66. In response to this approach economists developed many concepts -  
including ‘existence’, ‘vicarious benefit’, ‘bequest’, and ‘stewardship values’ -  to 
capture in welfare terms the amounts people were willing to pay for policies of which 
they strongly approve because they believe them to be intrinsically right. However, this 
strategy presupposed what had to be proved, namely, that WTP really sought to buy 
psychic satisfaction (Sagoff, 1998).
Sagoff (1998) goes on to argue that anomalies in WTP reflect the existence of citizen 
values qualitatively different to those prevalent in the market. In support of this 
position, a recent paper by Spash (1997) has pointed to the difficulties inherent within 
the CVM for those who hold rights based beliefs with regard to the environment. It is 
Opaluch et al’s (1989) extreme of incongruity that it is argued most incontrovertibly 
reflects the existence of such non-commensurable value forms. The protest responses 
associated with such ambivalence or incongruity are thought to reflect attitudes toward 
the valuation process, in particular an ethical objection to the idea of placing 
environmental objects in a market context (Jorgensen and Syme, 2000). Thus, it is on 
such incongruity and protest response which we will concentrate.
Economists’ reaction to the existence of protest responses in CV surveys is to either 
claim the consistency of these responses with economic valuation, or to remove them 
from final valuation calculations -  the approach generally employed towards outliers 
within CVM studies (Mitchell and Carson, 1989) -  both of which have caused 
controversy within the CVM literature (Jorgensen et al, 1999). Lindsey (1994), the first 
author to really address the issue of the meaning of protests, interpreted them as being
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indicative of the undue influence of contextual elements of the CV (payment vehicle, 
information constraints, judgements of procedural fairness) and should therefore be 
censored, as they do not reflect “true” values. Jorgensen et al (1999), however, argue 
that before such censoring or calculation of economic values can be justified, what CV 
surveys are really measuring should be determined, and that until such a discussion is 
undertaken one must be suspicious of such a methodology.
The existence of a number of alternative attitudes capable of explaining protest 
responses -  ethical objections to monetary valuation of resources, attitudes towards 
contextual elements within the elicitation model -  would tend to suggest that 
determination of the attitudes underlying a particular response is an empirical problem. 
Jorgensen et al (1999), having performed a CV survey to determine the exact influence 
of these contextual elements of the CV format (payment vehicle, procedural fairness, 
institutional form use) on the frequency of protest responses, suggest that the incidence 
of protest responses could not be explained by these methodological issues alone, but 
rather arise from the act of paying itself, indicating the importance of non-economic 
forms of valuation within decision making with regard to environmental resources.
9.2.2 Investigating the attitudes underlying protest responses.
It is suggested that the commensurability of citizen and consumer values in the context 
of environmental valuation can be investigated through consideration of the forms of 
response to CV surveys and the motivations underlying them. It is argued that if ethical 
norms are indeed of a qualitatively different form to economic preferences -  if they are 
non-teleological -  then respondents will experience ambivalence when asked to value 
them monetarily within a CV survey, and will protest at being asked to do so. On the 
other hand, if ethical norms and economic preferences share a teleological structure, 
their monetary valuation will not elicit such ambivalence or protests. That is, the 
motivations underlying CV survey responses will be analysed to determined whether:
(a) Protest responses are motivated by the existence of social norms, and
(b) The existence of social norms manifests itself in protest responses.
66 It is the ‘ambiguity of the term ‘preference’ that economists use to argue in chapter 2 that citizen values
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Conventional approaches to performing CV surveys do not lend themselves to making 
known the motivations underlying responses. Identifying this situation, Boyle et al 
(1994) concluded that:
[Identifying the ultimate explanation of our results is not easy because 
our study, like most contingent-valuation studies, does not contain 
sufficient information to identify how respondents formulate their 
valuation responses. Unfortunately the economic construct provides 
hypotheses regarding the outcome of valuation experiments, but is fairly 
anemic in insights about the processes respondents employ when 
formulating valuation responses (pg. 78 -  79; quoted in Clark et al, 2000:
46).
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) report assessing the 
reliability of the CVM recommended, amongst other things, that respondents attitudes 
towards the goods being valued be used to help interpret survey results (Arrow et al, 
1993), the rationale being that such respondent characteristics might provide an internal 
test of the plausibility of responses. However, attention to respondent attitudes is one of 
the panel’s recommendations to receive least attention (Kotchen and Reiling, 2000). 
Moreover, in the context of analysing the relationship between economic preferences 
and moral norms, it is suggested that the attitude surveys that are recommended are 
unable to accurately distinguish between preferences and norms, as respondents are 
unlikely to be aware of what motivates their value judgements (Kotchen and Reiling, 
2000). That is, despite Spash’s (1997) identification of a correlation between 
environmental attitudes and ethical beliefs, such research suffers from what Mitchell 
and Carson (1989) refer to as the ‘fallacy of motivational precision’. While 
environmental attitudes surveys may demonstrate the strength of people’s values with 
regard the environment, they do not tell us anything about the structure or nature of 
those values.
are consistent with the self-interested model of rationality (s. 2.6).
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It is argued that, if we want to determine the form of ethical values, respondents’ 
attitudes to valuing goods monetarily would provide a better indicator than their 
attitudes to the goods themselves. Thus, following Clark et al (2000), it is suggested that 
investigating the CVM from the perspective of the members of the public who take part 
in CV surveys can contribute to understanding the motivations underlying protest 
responses and determine whether they are consistent with the utilitarian preference 
structure assumed by neoclassical economists. That is, rather than relating 
environmental attitudes and CV responses, the focus will be placed on respondents’ 
attitudes to the CV survey itself. To use Clark et al’s phrase, it is intended that ‘"the 
‘black box’ that is CV be opened up”. Having already identified respondents attitudes in 
the shape of relevant environmental norms within the sample population (s. 9.4), a 
further step is taken and the existence of these norms is related to respondents reactions 
to the CV format itself. It is hoped in this way that the ‘fallacy of motivational 
precision’ can be overcome and we can determine whether the environmental norms are 
utilitarian or deontological in form.
9.3 Environmental norms in northern Thailand.
An investigation of the motivations underlying CV survey responses in the presence of 
social norms requires that a valuation scenario be identified in which such norms are 
relevant. The resources chosen for valuation are the forest resources of northern 
Thailand; and the participants whose valuations are elicited are from a number of 
locations of varying socio-cultural characteristics within the northern Thai region. 
Before the method for valuation elicitation is considered, the social norms pertaining to 
the valuation of forest resources relevant to each research population will be examined.
The sample population was selected from among the inhabitants of the northern Thai 
region, and included Thai participants from Chiang M ai, the second largest city in 
Thailand; Chiang Dao, a large town set in the rural region 75 km north of Chiang Mai, 
and located on the edge of the Doi Chiang Dao Wildlife Sanctuary, a protected forest 
area; and Baan Tham, a village also located on the edge of the Doi Chiang Dao Wildlife 
Sanctuary. The final element of the sample was chosen from the Karen village of Mae 
Paa Sao, located within the Doi Chiang Dao Wildlife Sanctuary (maps 4.1, 4.2).
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9.3.1 Traditional Karen spirit beliefs6 .
The Karen’s traditional understanding of the relationship between humans and nature 
can be summarised by the expression: ‘Live with the water, care for the river ... Live 
with the trees, care for the forest’ (Prasert, 1997). Various aspects of Karen cultivation 
techniques are pointed to as evidence of their benign relationship with the forest. The 
preference for secondary sites and old plots, short cultivation and long fallow periods, 
and maintenance of larger trees within plots that define Karen shifting cultivation are 
considered by anthropologists to represent a benign adaptation to the forest environment 
(Kunstadter, 1983; Chalardchai, 1989; Anderson, 1993; Prasert, 1997; Bello et al, 
1998).
The sustainability of Karen forest use practices is said to be supported by a complex 
cultural and social system based upon the ‘local’ knowledge of Karen farming 
communities. Perhaps the best expression of such knowledge systems is the extensive 
array of customs, prohibitions and rituals which regulate the use of the forest: a system 
of regulations derived from a mix of animism, Buddhism and loyalty to the ways of 
their ancestors. The Karen believe that everything in the world, including forest 
resources, has a spirit ‘owner’, an unseen supernatural power that inhabits a different 
dimension, and can harm humans if made angry (Shrock, 1970; Yoshimatsu, 1989; 
Hinton, 1990; Chumpol, 1997; Prasert, 1997). Harmony between themselves and the 
spirit realm is constantly strived for, requiring the performance of many rituals 
throughout the year.
Community forest areas contain the larger trees in the local village area, and the belief 
that they should be conserved is held so strongly that the Karen rarely contradict it 
(Prasert, 1997). The trees in this area are closely connected with Karen spirituality and 
identity. The community forest abounds with spirits, the power of which varies with the 
topographical features of the landscape68. Where powerful spirits reside, clearing and 
even cutting the forest is considered taboo. In other areas villagers must inquire with the 
spirits before clearing the forest. (For details of the distribution of spirits within the
67 For further discussion of the spirit beliefs of the Karen, see s. 7.5.
68 For a further description of the topographical relationship between spirits and resources see s. 7.5.
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forest, and the rituals performed for their appeasement, see Shrock, 1970; Prasert, 1997, 
and Chumpol 1997).
9.3.2 Traditional Thai relations with the forest.
Traditional Thai cultural relations with the environment mirror those of the Karen. 
Kunstadter states that:
Archaeological, historical and ethnographical evidence suggests that the 
people of Thailand, over many thousands of years, developed cultural 
adaptations to a varied environment, involving different combinations of 
hunting, fishing, gathering, complex farming systems and eventually 
manufacturing and trade (1989b: 543).
Once again these cultural adaptations are regulated through social beliefs regarding the 
relationship between people and the spirit world (Suvanna, 1989). Two important 
spirits are Phra Sai, spirit of the banyan tree, and Phra Pho, spirit of the pipal tree, both 
of which are found in the forest. These spirits are both male. Female spirits include 
Nang Tani, spirit of the banana tree, and Nang Takien, spirit of the hopea tree. If these 
trees are to be cleared, a sacrifice must be offered to the spirit of the tree to in order to 
gain permission, or the spirit will cause harm to those who chop down the tree 
(Suvanna, 1989).
Prior to being introduced to the spirits regulating use of environmental resources, Thai 
children learn to respect, appreciate, as well as fear nature through nursery rhymes and 
lullabies (Suvanna, 1989). Rhymes are used to highlight feelings of benevolence 
towards the animals and plants the child meets in its everyday life. They are taught to 
think of animals as if they are human beings with sense and feelings. That is, they are 
gradually “introduced to the teachings of Buddhism regarding merit and sin, and 
perhaps to the law of Karma” (Suvanna, 1989).
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9.3.3 Social forces in contemporary environmental perceptions in Northern Thailand.
There is a vast literature concerning the impact of recent changes in the social structure 
in Thailand on the efficacy of traditional social norms in the regulation of 
environmental resource use. Recent improvements in transportation and 
communication, the extension of state institutions into the village, and increased rates of 
consumption driven by the cultural force of development advertising have combined to 
reduce the relevance of the above traditional norms in the everyday lives of the people 
of northern Thailand (Kunstadter, 1989b). The prevalence of these effects varies 
between the four research locations. However, considering the limited scope of this 
survey, rather than discussing the incidence of these dynamics in each research location, 
we will restrict ourselves to the observation that, while such factors have tended to 
erode traditional norms, they also institute the means for the development and diffusion 
of alternative norms. Moreover, as more contemporary social norms also emphasise the 
importance of forest conservation, the extent to which traditional norms have been 
replaced is not of great concern here. Irrespective of the degree of social change, norms 
still exist promoting the conservation of forest resources. Once again, there is a vast 
literature on the effects of such alternative worldviews, and we will restrict ourselves 
here to a few points illustrating the influence of two factors, education and the media, 
upon forest use norms.
It is argued that while education provides a way for tribal people to better themselves 
within Thai society, it also represents a severe challenge to the perpetuation of tribal 
cultures and their environmental values (Anderson, 1993). Superficial, though still 
significant evidence of such influence is the fact that school children are not allowed to 
wear tribal dress -  instead they have to wear school uniforms -  and that students are 
instructed in the Thai language (Anderson, 1993). However, this is not such a great 
issue in Mae Paa Sao. While the younger members of the village do attend school in the 
nearest large Thai town, the majority of the sample population, selected from older 
members of the village, had received little or no formal education.
For those Karen who had received formal education, as well as the majority of the Thai 
part of the sample population, the manner in which the environment is presented within 
the Thai education system represents an important factor in the development of social
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norms. While a complete examination of the role that formal education plays in the 
development of environmental preferences in Thailand is beyond the scope of this 
discussion, the official aim of education policy with regard the environment is clear in 
the following statement from the Thai Government:
Since Thailand’s children will have to cope with air, noise, land, and 
water pollution, it is necessary to inculcate them with environmental 
values to make responsible decisions from an early age. They must feel 
they are a part of nature and that they have a stake in its preservation.
They must acquire confidence and a sense of responsibility for 
improving it (Royal Thai Government, 1992: 22).
The presentation of the environment within the media forms a large influence upon the 
environmental perceptions of particularly the Thai part of the sample population, but to 
some extent also the members of the Karen villages. While the ability to read of the 
more isolated Karen population is limited, about % of Karen households reported having 
radios, which were on a number of occasions during the interviews mentioned as a 
source of information regarding forestry issues.
The media constantly highlights the value derived from, and promotes the preservation 
of, the forest. For instance, the population of Thailand is “constantly hearing in the 
media, and advertising uses as a selling point, that the forest is a source of water” 
(Chusak Wittayapak, Krungthep thurakit, 12 January 2000, pg. 5). For instance, the 
Chiang Mai News comments that:
Years ago the Li River [in Lamphun province, Northern Thailand] was 
very fertile, able to provide water for drinking and use in agriculture 
[...], and could be used for floating teak trees throughout the day and 
night. However, this picture is changing due to the extent of 
deforestation. Now the water level drops every year, and the river is dead 
(Chiang Mai News, pg. 3, 21 January, 1999).
Similarly, in a quote that holds extra significance when one appreciates the level of 
respect with which the King is held in Thailand, the newspaper ThaiRat remarked that:
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The King of Thailand was very happy when he saw, in front of him, 
what in the past had been scrub, had now become green and lively. The 
King has inspired many people to participate in tree planting projects 
that are now yielding large, healthy trees that will provide value for their 
whole life (ThaiRat, 24 July, 1997, pg. 14: “Trees numbered in 100 
millions: the harmony between man and forest”).
9.3.4 Social norms in northern Thailand.
While the summary of this section in no way represents a comprehensive review of the 
literature concerning the influences upon environmental norms in the northern Thailand 
region, it is sufficient to indicate an underlying theme of environmental norms: the 
value of the forest. In each location the prominence of each of the various influences on 
environment values varies, yet the focus remains the value of forest resources. That is, 
while traditional beliefs could be possibly argued to more strongly express the norm of 
conservation, more contemporary social norms maintained through education and the 
media would tend to also highlight the importance of forest conservation.
9.4 Method
Based upon the notion that protest responses to CV surveys are a manifestation of the 
non-commensurability of citizen and consumer values (s. 9.2), a CV survey was 
performed for the conservation of forest resources in northern Thailand with 
participants possessing the social norm favouring the conservation of such resources (s.
9.3), in order to examine the form of CV survey responses and their motivation. Face- 
to-face interviews were conducted with 148 householders across the 4 research 
locations: Mae Paa Sao (41), Baan Tham (66), Chiang Dao (21), Chiang Mai (20).
As noted in section 9.2, the performance of CV surveys is conventionally intended to 
enable the estimation of the demand for a non-market resource and takes the form of a 
straightforward elicitation of participants WTP/WTA, ignoring the motivations 
underlying participants’ responses, which are assumed to correspond with consumer 
theory. However, determination of the correspondence of social norms with consumer
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theory and their impact on CV responses requires that responses be taken a step further, 
and motivations also discussed. Accordingly, a CV context and elicitation questions 
were designed in accordance with conventional thinking (Cummings et al, 1986; 
Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Arrow et al, 1993; Hanley and Spash, 1995), but protest 
responses were followed by discussion aimed at discovering the motivations behind the 
participants’ responses.
A hypothetical market scenario was established based on participant WTP to enable 
improvements in Royal Forest Department (RFD) facilities and staff levels in order that 
they could ensure the better implementation of forest use restrictions and thus the 
preservation of existing areas of the Doi Chiang Dao Wildlife Sanctuary. To ensure that 
all participants possessed at least a minimum amount of information regarding the 
services provided by the forest, the possible consequences of losing forest in terms of 
water quality and quantity were provided in the interview.
The willingness to pay section of the survey included a scenario that was read to the 
respondents by the interviewer describing the possible improvements in the quality of 
the forest resources in the Doi Chiang Doa Wildlife Sanctuary. This information was 
presented along with photographs showing the ways that forest quality can be improved, 
and maps demonstrating the areas affected. The instructions were:
There are a number of ways that quality of forest could be improved. For 
example, increased RFD staffing, improved incentives for RFD staff, or 
projects implements in cooperation with local communities. However, such 
policies would be costly. The next few questions concern the possibility of 
your willingness to pay for programmes to control forest quality.
Some people have, for different reasons, criticised RFD efforts to control 
forest quality. However, for now, I would like you to suppose that any 
money that you might be willing to pay would be honestly spent and only 
for the purpose of improving forest quality. It is important to know how 
much improving forest resource quality is worth to you.
When you answer these questions, I would like you to think about:
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- Your current household income and expenses.
- Other possible uses for your household income.
This scenario, in combination with information about forest services presented 
earlier in the interview, served to define the nature of the public good, and 
possible remedial action.
Alternative sources of value other than that concerning the forest resources posed a 
serious problem in designing a realistic hypothetical market scenario for the 
preservation of forest resources in northern Thailand. The only organisation with the 
wherewithal and legal backing to undertake such a task in the eyes of the population is 
the RFD. Unfortunately, the RFD is also considered rather inefficient and corrupt by 
many people in Thailand, impacting perceptions as to the likelihood of the preservation 
project suggested being successful. Indeed, many of the responses collected displayed 
people’s pessimism with regard the realism of the scenario presented because of the 
involvement of the RFD (s. 9.5).
A particularly important issue in the design of the CVM scenario was the form of 
payment vehicle employed. While the Thai elements of the sample interacted 
monetarily with state institutions through the payment of local charges, which were 
easily adapted for the purpose of CV survey design, the Karen pay no charges of any 
form to the Thai State. Hence, a payment mechanism had to be devised and introduced 
to participants as part of the scenario itself. While this is perhaps not ideal for 
conventional uses of the CVM, it is hoped that the elicitation of motivations within the 
survey enabled the influence of this issue to be identified.
The choice of mechanism for obtaining bids used within the survey was perhaps a little 
problematic from the perspective of conventional thinking on the subject. The flexibility 
and speed of response elicitation offered by an open-ended question format was 
considered necessary for the purposes of the investigation. The open-ended question 
format avoided the starting point bias associated with alternative methods (Hanley and 
Spash, 1995), and allowed participants to protest against the scenario presented where
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they considered it appropriate. However, the advantages provided by such flexibility 
have to be offset against the fact that the open-ended question format is considered 
problematic when applied where participants have little experience of trading. This is of 
particular concern in the case of the Karen, who have the least interaction with the 
market. However, a study by Whittington et al (1990) suggests that “it is possible to do 
a contingent valuation survey amongst a very poor, illiterate population and obtain 
reasonable, consistent answers” (1990: 307).
The open-ended question was framed so as to reflect an annual government charge for 
improved forest conservation:
What is the most your household would be willing to pay each year in the 
form of a local, state charge in order to fund improvements in RFD facilities 
and staff levels, hence enabling improved protection of the forest currently 
designated as belonging to the Doi Chiang Dao wildlife sanctuary?
In the case of ‘protest’ responses, value elicitation was then followed by a simple 
inquiry into the motivation behind the respondent’s answer:
Why did you say you wouldn’t pay?
9.5 Results
CV survey response forms were distinguished according to categories defined as: 
reactions to the CVM scenario itself (RFD incompetence and other objections to the 
scenaro); WTP; unwillingness to pay due to lack of income; unwillingness to pay due to 
the lack of perceived economic benefit; and protest responses motivated by the 
contradiction of social norms concerned with the conservation of the environment. A 
frequency table describing the distribution of responses across these categories is 
sufficient to demonstrate the force of the results obtained (table 9.1).
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Mae Paa Sao 41 20 (49%) 6 (15%) 6 (15%) 0 5 (12%) 4 (10%)
Baan Tham 66 15 (23%) 15 (23%) 10(15%) 3 (5%) 5 (8%) 18 (27%)
Chiang Dao 21 13 (62%) 0 2 (10%) 0 1 (4%) 5 (24%)
Chiang Mai 20 7 (35%) 1 (5%) 2 (10%) 0 3 (15%) 7 (35%)
All 148 55 (37%) 22 (15%) 20 (14%) 3 (2%) 14 (9%) 34 (23%)
Overall, 37% of participants responded to the survey questions with WTP answers. A 
further 15% failed to provide WTP estimates due to their lack of income. In the context 
of the CVM, the form of these responses is reasonably clear cut, so we shall turn instead 
to focus upon the various protest responses.
Responses protesting against the CVM context itself were divided into those citing RFD 
incompetence as the motivation for an unwillingness to pay (9%), and other objections 
to the scenario presented (23%). The dissatisfaction of people with the RFD’s handling 
of protected areas has already been documented (s. 9.4) and its motivation behind 
responses to the questions posed comes as no surprise. Other objections to the CVM 
survey form are generally thought to result from dissatisfaction with the payment 
vehicle, procedural fairness, or some other aspect of the institutional form used. In this 
case, motivations took the form:
- “It is the duty of the RFD to preserve the forest, I don’t believe I should have to 
pay”.
- “The RFD already has sufficient budget and staff’.
- “What is being proposed contradicts ancient property rights, therefore the RFD 
has no right to the land”.
- “I’m not sure the payment will ensure the conservation of the forest”.
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- “I don’t know enough about the forest resources to say how much I would pay”.
The remaining protest responses elicited were divided into those considered to reflect 
the existence of social norms with regard the use of forest resources (2%), and those 
motivated by the perceived lack of benefit accruing from the proposed change in forest 
resource use (14%). The responses allocated to the social norm category stated their 
motivation as simply ‘"People shouldn’t cut the forest”, or “I do not want to condone the 
cutting of the forest”. Attempts to get the respondent to elaborate further upon the 
reasoning behind their responses failed.
Responses categorised as being motivated by perceived individual benefit of the 
proposed changes included the responses:
- “If the RFD built an office here it would cause water pollution and the gradual 
reduction in the quality of the forest”.
- “A RFD presence in the area would restrict people’s use of the forest”.
- “The output of the forest is limited, so I get no benefit from the forest”.
- “The forest is located in the wildlife sanctuary, so I am unable to use it”.
- “I don’t believe there is scientific proof of the benefits of forest resources” .
The above analysis has concentrated solely upon the aggregate figures. While the 
distribution of response forms across the categories within the 4 research sites varied 
slightly, considering the small sample sizes involved this is not surprising. Equally, the 
pattern of the distribution of response forms across the comparison of interest -  
economic verses non-economic values -  is reasonably constant. Extending the analysis 
to the level of individual research locations could be justified and would be of interest if 
greater detail with regard the variation in the strength and form of cultural norms across 
the locations was available and could be measured independently. However, the limited 
nature of the description of cultural norms concerning forest resources (s. 9.3) restricts 
the possibility of a meaningful discussion of inter-location results. Hence, it is thought 
that extending the analysis to the level of the individual research locations raises more 
questions than it provides answers, and it makes more sense to focus upon the 
aggregated results.
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9.6 Discussion and conclusion.
9.6.I Interpretation: the commensurability o f citizen and consumer values?
Applying these results to the non-commensurability discussion (s.9.2) requires, firstly, 
that responses are distinguished according to those pertaining to the valuation of forest 
resources, and those not. It is only the former that interests us here, so the motivation 
categories ‘RFD incompetence’ and ‘other objections to the scenario’ can be ignored at 
this stage.
A second relevant distinction is to separate resource values into those thought to reflect 
economic, teleological values, and those reflecting non-economic, non-teleological 
values. In accordance with accepted CVM practice, the ‘WTP’ and ‘can’t afford’ 
responses can be categorised as representative of economic values. This is not in 
contention. The first question of concern is the motivations underlying CV survey 
protest responses, in particular, whether protest responses are motivated by the 
existence of social norms (s. 9.2.2). Of the remaining protest responses, the ‘no 
perceived benefit’ motivation reflects a neo-classical preference form, while the ‘social 
norm’ category is thought to reflect non-economic values. That is, of the 23 protest 
responses relevant to the investigation, 87% (20) correspond with economic values, and 
only 13% (3) reflect non-economic values.
Interpreting this result, it is suggested that value forms consistent with the neo-classical 
paradigm would tend to explain protest responses to CV surveys. That is, the majority 
of those who gave “protest responses” cited reasons worthy of homo economicus. zero 
WTP responses are not protests against monetary valuation, and the existence of social 
norms with regard the use of the resources did not significantly enter into people’s 
motivations in valuation. However, to arrive at this result, the sample size has to be 
reduced to only 23, hardly significant. A second way to analyse the results, then, would 
be to start with the extent to which responses could be thought informed by social 
norms, and ask whether the existence of social norms is manifest in protest responses. 
This would allow investigation of the notion that social norms reflect non-economic 
values and are responsible for protest responses observed in CV surveys.
256
All participants within the sample are thought to possess the social norm of 
conservation with regard forest resources (s. 9.3). If we were to accept the notion that 
social norms are non-commensurable with monetary valuation, and the source of 
protests to the CVM (s. 9.2), it would be expected that all participants would protest 
based upon the existence of these norms. This, however, is plainly not the case. Of those 
responses thought to be concerned with forest resource values, 97% (‘WTP’, ‘can’t 
afford’ and ‘perceived benefit’) are motivated by neo-classical economic values, while 
only 3% (‘social norms’) are protest responses based upon norms of forest resources. 
The existence of social norms does not stop responses being influenced by economic 
factors. Moreover, while still small, the sample upon which this result is based (100) is 
significantly larger than that applied above.
That respondents don’t seem to suffer the ambivalence predicted when faced with a 
monetary valuation of social norms could be interpreted as implying that morality is 
characterised as having a teleological structure. That is, a lack of such ambivalence 
would suggest that social norms concerning the valuation of forest resources are 
consistent with the teleological structure of economic preferences. Social norms and 
economic preferences, or citizen and consumer values are commensurable.
9.6.2 Previous studies
Interestingly, this result contradicts some of the findings of previous attempts to elicit 
respondents perceptions of the CVM:
Schkade and Payne (1994), exploring the thought processes of respondents while 
they completed a CV questionnaire, in contrast to evidence of ‘economic thinking’ 
found in the case of CV studies of familiar market commodities, reported few 
examples of individuals thinking about the economic trade-off between money- 
forgone and environmental benefits.
- Vadnjal and O’Connor (1994) found a significant proportion of respondents to a 
CV questionnaire expressed their motivation in responding as they did as not 
being consistent with economic thinking.
- Clark et al (2000), after discussions with respondents to a CV survey designed to 
appraise nature conservation policy in the UK, suggest that nature conservation
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may not be susceptible to contingent valuation. They found that the CVM was 
rejected as an acceptable means of representing respondents values, and that 
valuing nature in monetary terms was incommensurable with deeply held cultural 
values.
However, other studies tend to support the result obtained:
- Brouwer et afs (1999) analysis of a CV survey of agents’ monetary valuation of 
the recreational and amenity benefits of the Norfolk Broads revealed that 67% of 
respondents thought the results of the survey would be useful in decision-making, 
and 75% felt comfortable using monetary terms to express the importance they 
attached to an environmental public good.
- Kotchen and Reiling (2000) identify a relationship between pro-environmental 
attitudes and ethical values, and suggest that those with stronger pro- 
environmental attitudes are more likely to participate in the CVM valuation 
procedure.
Clark et al (2000) suggest that the difference in the results obtained can be explained by 
the different resources respondents are asked to value and the types of value attached to 
them. For instance, Brouwer et al’s (1999) valuation of flood alleviation in the Norfolk 
Broads does not evoke the cultural or ethical values thought to be non-commensurable 
with monetary valuation. In order to further explore the possible reasons for these 
different results, we now identify caveats to the above analysis.
9.6.3 Caveats: the commensurability o f citizen and consumer values?
It hardly needs stating that a considerable amount of further research in this area is 
required before any hard and fast conclusions can be drawn. The investigation 
attempted above is the first instance known to the author in which the CVM has been 
applied in the manner described. A thorough investigation of the influence of social 
norms on the valuation of natural resources of the form attempted above would require a 
detailed anthropological mapping of social norms to specific resources areas, a more 
extensive application of the CVM to the valuation of these specific resources, and the 
determination of the extent to which social norms influenced responses. This study has
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attempted a very simplified version of such an investigation. However, we shall focus 
here on a number of specific issues that have been raised in connection with the method 
employed.
Firstly, there are a number of concerns with the context in which the CVM has been 
employed and the particular hypothetical scenario employed:
(a) The CVM literature, especially that relating to the open-ended question format 
employed, emphasises the importance of the experience participants have in trading 
the resources in question (Hanley and Spash, 1995). While its is reasonable to say 
that none of the sample has experience of the monetary valuation of forest resources, 
those in Mae Paa Sao have little experience of market transactions at all, calling into 
question the validity of the responses elicited.
(b) It has been suggested that alternative conservation methods would be preferred by 
the participants than the improvement of RFD facilities. Specifically, the Karen 
would prefer to conserve forest resources through their own communal resource use 
regulations. And indeed this is the case. However, responses to the hypothetical 
scenario motivated by such concerns would be expected to be picked up within the 
survey and categorised appropriately. In this case, such motivations would be 
classified as reactions against the scenario and would not enter into any 
interpretation of the forms of forest values.
(c) It has also been commented that, while social norms may be non-commensurable 
with monetary valuation, the proposed increasing of the effectiveness of the RFD in 
conserving the environment could well be interpreted as corresponding with such 
norms. Hence, willingness to contribute towards such a proposal might not be that 
unexpected in such circumstances. However, it is exactly the ability to translate 
norms into monetary valuation, and their consistency with economic valuation that 
is at issue. Whether or not the social norm and the project valued monetarily work 
towards the same end is no consequence for the debate being considered: whether 
citizen values reflect concerns of individual well-being. It is the form, rather than 
the direction of values that is being investigated.
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Turning to the ability of the investigation to contribute to the research question, the crux 
of the argument that ‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’ values are commensurable depends on the 
tolerability of the conjecture that morality has a teleological structure. An important 
criticism that has been raised in reaction to the above investigation is that the CVM, 
with its foundations in the neo-classical paradigm, presupposes the existence of values 
with such a teleological structure. Thus, it is argued, as a method for identifying the 
interaction of consumer and citizen values it is fundamentally flawed. In response to 
this criticism it must be pointed out that it is exactly such criticism upon which the 
methodology is based. That is, the methodology is not concerned with the monetary 
valuations elicited by the CVM but with protests against the presuppositions employed 
with the CVM. Hence, it is suggested that the method has already incorporated this 
criticism and thus does not suffer from any such presupposition. The possible existence 
of citizen values is acknowledged in designing the CV survey.
A related concern, is that, while social norms have been identified for the participant 
population, the strength and specific nature of the norms has been given no attention. 
The accuracy of the interpretation presented above requires that the activation of the 
relevant social norms be assured. While the sample is strongly biased towards responses 
from Mae Paa Sao (28%) and Baan Tham (45%), and it might be expected that, of the 
sites researched, traditional norms could be expected to have been maintained better in 
these two sites due to their relative isolation, the same point stands. The general 
overview of the presence of social forest use norms in northern Thailand tells us nothing 
of the exact incidence of norms in the locations surveyed, or the activation of these 
norms within the investigation. The presentation of social norms has been 
oversimplified. While the survey design was inspired by a literature identifying protest 
responses as manifestations of ambivalence towards the monetary valuation of moral 
norms (s. 9.2), suggesting that the CVM in general is able to activate relevant social 
norms, the caveat that remains is that the specific CV survey employed may have failed 
to activate moral norms. It is a similar point that Clark et al (2000) use to explain the 
different results obtained in examining agents’ responses to attempts to monetarily 
value environmental resources -  the non-existence of moral norms (s. 9.6.2).
Having said that, the only way such an investigation can be thought to contribute to the 
question of whether the structure of morality is teleological or not is either if a monetary
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valuation is motivated by the holding of a moral norm, or if a protest response is 
motivated by the holding of a moral norm. It is only in these cases that the relationship 
between moral norms and economic preferences can be observed explicitly. All other 
responses require assumptions to be made regarding how moral norms relate to the 
motivations underlying responses. Thus, for instance, in the above analysis, identifying 
the existence of moral norms concerned with the use of forest resources and protest 
responses motivated by economic benefits as evidence of the teleology of moral and 
economic values requires that we assume moral norms have been activated and 
considered in the valuation process.
Unfortunately, in the investigation undertaken, it was only protest responses that were 
followed by discussions of motivations, so we cannot say whether non-protest responses 
were motivated by moral values. Moreover, the small number of protest responses 
motivated by moral norms is inconclusive. Thus, it would seem that the investigation 
undertaken still suffers from Mitchell and Carson’s (1989) ‘fallacy of motivational 
precision’. In concluding with regard to the structure of morality, assumptions have to 
be made regarding the existence and activation of moral norms. The next chapter 
examines this failing of the investigation in more detail.
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10. The unfalsifiability of economic Maws’: methodological issues in 
the predictive success of economics.
10.1 Introduction
In chapter 9 we saw our attempt to determine the structure of morality and its 
relationship with economic preferences fall short due to the requirement of making 
assumptions with regard beliefs. That is, we failed to overcome the ‘fallacy of 
motivation precision’. Ever since its eighteenth-century inception, the science of 
economics has been methodologically controversial (Hausman, 1994). This chapter 
reviews methodological discussions of economics to suggest that this problem 
encountered in testing the structure of environmental values is a more general criticism 
of economics and social sciences. That is, the problem with most conceptions of 
rationality within the social sciences, including that of neo-classical economics, is that 
they remain untestable as causal theories. Neither economists nor their critics can create 
a definition of “rationality” that avoids circularity. The approach employed attempts to 
work back from behaviours to beliefs/desires and, in doing so, requires further 
assumptions about the nature of the mind, as there are an infinite number of different 
combinations of beliefs and desires that can lead to an action.
The next section reviews the suggestion that economics has experienced a lack of 
predictive success. It is suggested that this failure is the result of economists’ 
maintenance of a deductivist methodology. In particular, the unfalsifiability of the folk 
psychology employed within the social sciences results in the naturalistic project’s 
failure to satisfy the criteria for a scientific, causal theory (s. 10.3). However, it is 
exactly the deductivist epistemology espousing the notion of causal theory that 
economists have so long employed as their goal (s. 10.4). Attempts to defend this 
deductivist perspective within economics (s. 10.5) tend to founder on the recognised 
lack of predictive success of economics (s. 10.6). Finally, the rejection of the deductivist 
project is manifest within the adoption by economists of rival philosophies, including 
hermeneuticism (s. 10.7) and realism (s. 10.8).
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10.2 The lack o f predictive success in economics.
Neo-classical economics is not only challenged at the conceptual level but also by 
doubts about the predictive success of the theory for aggregate phenomena. Rosenberg 
(1986: 127) tells us that neo-classical microeconomics is characterised by a “want of 
empirical improvement over the course of a century or two, [and a] relative indifference 
to this fact of neo-classical economists”. That is, the failure of economics is not 
methodological, or conceptual, but empirical: its failure to explain the causes and 
consequences of economic choice with anything like accuracy and precision 
(Rosenberg, 1994).
Leontief (1985) denies that economics has ever improved its predictive success, 
suggesting that this is the result of the indifference of economists to testing the 
assumptions of most mathematical models, and “it is precisely the empirical validity of 
these assumptions on which the usefulness of the entire exercise depends” (1985: 63). 
He expresses his disgust at the unreality of most academic articles in economics:
Nothing reveals the aversion of the great majority of present-day 
economists for systematic empirical inquiry than the methodological 
devices they employ to avoid or cut short the use of concrete factual 
information. [...] Page after page of professional economic journals are 
filled with mathematical formulas leading the reader from sets of more or 
less plausible but arbitrary assumptions to precisely stated but irrelevant 
theoretical conclusions (Leontief, 1982: 104).
While Rosenberg (1986) acknowledges the existence of successful prediction within 
economics, he goes on to point out that it is accompanied by a vast amount of 
unsuccessful predictions. Moreover, “the successful and unsuccessful predictions follow 
from exactly the same parts of the theory combined with exactly the same measuring 
devices. So that the piling up of positive instances is little reason to project the 
predictates in questions” (Rosenberg, 1986: 130).
The empirical failure of economic theory can be illustrated by its reaction to the crisis it 
faced in the form of the great depression, losing faith in the notion that Walrasian
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general equilibrium was the state towards which markets must, in the long run, move. 
The main reaction to this was Keynesianism. However, come the simultaneous 
unemployment and inflation of the 1970s, Keynesianism was rejected in favour of a
return to the neo-classical tradition. Rosenberg (1994) interprets this move as a
manifestation of the fact that economics is insulated from empirical influences. While 
economists have not forgotten the great depression, their interest in it seems limited to 
showing that the Walrasian approach is consistent with it. Rosenberg is supported in 
this argument by Blaug (1976: 363) who states that:
Much empirical work in economics is like playing tennis with the net 
down: instead of attempting to refute testable predictions, economists 
spend much of their time showing that the real world bears our their 
predictions, thus replacing falsification, which is difficult, with 
confirmation, which is easy
Lawson (1997: 4) identifies the increased recognition of the problems facing economics 
among its own ranks:
[Contemporary economics, including its traditional exemplar general 
equilibrium theory, recently seems also to have been recognised as a
project in dire straights. The upshot here is a bout of articles with such
titles as ‘The Intrinsic Limits of Modem Economic Theory: The Emperor 
has no clothes’ (Kirman, 1989), or books with such titles as Economics 
in Disarray (Wiles and Routh, 1984), The Crisis in Economic Theory 
(Bell and Kristol, 1981) or ‘The Death of Economics’ (Ormerod, 1994).
Lawson goes on to identifying the manifestation of this critique of economics within 
popular culture.
On the outside, for example, the (UK) Observer Magazine [...] 
concludes that ‘there’s no such thing as economics. It’s all voodoo, bluff 
and pseudo-science’. New Scientist [...] even carried sketches of 
economists forecasting economic variables by reading lines on the palms
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of their hands and of econometricians pushing numbers around while 
blindfolded (1997: 3).
However, despite these strong views by some eminent economists, there is still 
substantial support within the profession for the claims made by economics. As 
Rosenberg (1992: 98) tells us:
It is easy to pile up Nobel laureates on either side of the question of 
whether economics has met the test of empirical progress. One side will 
include Leontief and Herbert Simon, holding that traditional economic 
theory leaves much wanting; [the other] side will include Samuelson, 
Friedman, Debreu, and others. [...] However, the parties to this debate 
do not share a common criterion of predictive power or empirical 
confirmation, because there is none.
10.3 Folk psychology and the failure o f scientific economics.
It is argued that the lack of predictive success of economics results from the problems 
suffered by the naturalistic project within the social sciences, of which mainstream 
economics is a part. In particular, the unfalsifiability of folk psychology is thought to 
result in the naturalistic project’s failure to satisfy the criteria for a scientific, causal 
theory69.
Rosenberg (1986, 1992, 1994, 1995) identifies folk psychology and its attendant 
problems as underlying critiques of microeconomic theory. He suggests that the failure 
of economics is not methodological, or conceptual, but empirical. Specifically, it rests 
upon the search for laws that will express the relations between the categories of 
preferences, expectations, and actions. However, attempts to find such laws have failed 
due to the impossibility of improving the predictive power of a theory based upon such 
folk psychological characteristics.
69 See s. 5.3 for a more detailed discussion of the unfalsifiability of folk psychology.
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The approach employed attempts to work back from behaviours to beliefs/desires and, 
in doing so, requires further assumptions about the nature of the mind, as there are an 
infinite number of different combinations of beliefs and desires that can lead to an 
action. That is, the only way to measure beliefs and desires is to make assumptions 
about the mind, such as the rational theory of choice. It was a similar problem that the 
empirical investigation in chapter 9 suffered from70. Hence, the theory cannot be tested 
though measurement of its “initial conditions”, as such measurement relies on the 
theory itself, which therefore cannot be improved. Thus:
The failure of economics to uncover laws of human behaviour is due to 
its wrongly assuming that these laws will trade in desires, beliefs, or 
other cognates. And the system of propositions about markets and 
economies that economists have constructed on the basis of its 
assumptions about human behaviour is deprived of improving 
explanatory and predictive power because its assumptions can’t be 
improved in a way that transmits improved precision to their 
consequences (Rosenberg, 1994: 383).
The predictive power of economic theory requires that the instruments employed to 
predictively apply it to initial conditions be independent of the theory being applied. 
That is, the reliability of the instrument we use to measure the strength of preferences 
and the degree of belief must not hinge on the truth of the theory of rational choice. 
However,
This is just what we cannot get for the theory of rational choice, because 
of the nature of desires, beliefs, and actions. There is no way to tell what 
a person believes unless we already know what he wants and how he 
acts; no way to tell what a person wants unless we know what he 
believes and how he acts; no way to tell what a person will do unless we 
know what he wants and believes. The only way two of these three 
factors can lead us to a prediction about the third is via the theory of 
rational choice (Rosenberg, 1992: 126).
70 See s. 11.2 for a further discussion of this comparison.
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Thus, it is suggested that rarely will confirming and discontinuing test results be 
unambiguously interpretable in economics. Caldwell (1994a) backs up this argument 
with five observations of economic analysis:
(i) Initial conditions are numerous.
(ii) Some initial conditions cannot be independently checked.
(iii) The absence of falsifiable general laws.
(iv) Test of models are not tests of theories.
(v) Empirical data may not accurately represent theoretical constructs.
The upshot of the folk psychological character of the explanatory variables employed 
within economic theory is that we cannot expect the theory’s predictions and 
explanations of the choices of individuals to exceed the precision and accuracy of the 
common-sense explanations and predictions with which we have all been familiar since 
prehistory (Rosenberg, 1992). This notion is supported by Sen when he states that:
The rationale for this approach seems to be based on the idea that the 
only way of understanding a person’s real preference is to examine his 
actual choices, and there is no choice-independent way of understanding 
someone’s attitude towards alternatives [...]. Behaviour, it appears, is to
be explained in terms of preferences, which are in turn defined only in
terms of behaviour. Not surprisingly, excursions into circularity have 
been frequent (Sen, 1977: 323- 324).
Thus, the employment of folk psychology within economics is thought to result in its 
failure to satisfy the criteria for a scientific, causal theory. However, it is exactly the
search for causal theories underlying the deductivist epistemology that economists have
so long employed as their goal.
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10.4 The deductivist method in economics.
Methodology in economics has been particularly influenced by empiricism and logical 
positivism (van den Bergh et al, 2000). As Lawson (1997) states in his attack on the 
epistemological basis of economics:
I do not think that it is contentious to observe that deductivism, [...] and 
in particular the conception of laws which underpins it [...], characterises 
contemporary mainstream economics. [...] The positing of strict constant 
event conjunctions, interpreted as ‘axioms’ or ‘assumptions’, is a 
condition of modem ‘economic theorising’. [...] It is implicitly taken for 
granted that the deductivist model of explanation is universally valid 
(Lawson, 1997: 18).
And:
Although deductivist explanation does not usually figure explicitly in 
characterisations of the [economic] project provided by its proponents, 
its centrality cannot be doubted. While the deducibility requirement, that 
the explanandum be deducible from the explanans, is more or less always 
transparent, the covering-law aspect, namely that at least one universal 
law (of the form ‘whenever event x then event y) be specified, is usually 
met by the axioms (ibid.: 91).
And:
In short, if a reliance upon the deductivist mode of explanation is not 
always explicit in orthodox economics, it is not denied. Rather a 
presumption of its centrality and indeed universality in science is 
essentially taken for granted; so much so that any attempted defence or 
justification of it is considered unnecessary. Those critics who venture to 
suggest otherwise tend merely to be summarily dismissed (ibid.: 92).
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For many, Robbins’ (1932) Essay on the nature and significance o f economic science 
still provides the most acceptable definition of what economics is about. He concludes:
In the light of all that has been said the nature of economic analysis 
should now be plain. It consists of deductions from a series of postulates, 
the chief of which are almost universal facts of experience present 
whenever human activity has an economic aspect, the rest being 
assumptions of a more limited nature based upon the general features of 
particular situations or types of situations which the theory is to be used 
to explain (1932: 99 -  100).
10.5 The defence o f the deductivist epistemology within economics71.
Perhaps the first person to undertake the task of defending the poor empirical record of 
the deductivist tradition in economics was John Stuart Mill. In his On the Definition o f 
Political Economy and the M ethod o f Investigation Proper to it (1836) -  one of the first 
discussions of methodology in economics -  Mill proposed the “deductive method” for 
making inferences from observation to scientific theories. This involves three steps: 
induction, inference to causes and laws from observations; logical and mathematical 
computations to determine the consequences of the causal claims; and verification by 
observation (Achinstein, 2000).
Despite Mill’s emphasis on the empirical, he still showed respect for the untested and 
sometimes disconfirmed conclusions of economics. Mill reconciled these positions by 
turning to the peculiar nature of the “moral science”. For Mill the basic premises of 
economics are either psychological claims, which are firmly established in 
introspection, or technical claims, such as the laws of diminishing returns, which are 
established directly by experimentation. However, within this “deductive method”, Mill 
places emphasis on the a priori in the derivation of knowledge about the “moral 
sciences”, while the a posteriori is relegated to its verification:
71 Epistemological positions employed by economists but overlooked in this discussion include 
rationalism (Hollis and Nell, 1975; and Mises, 1949, 1979), as well as Imre Lakatos’s “methodology of 
scientific research programmes” (Latsis, 1976; Blaug, 1980; and Weintraub, 1985).
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Having now shown that the method a priori in Political Economy, and in 
all the other branches of moral science, is the only certain or scientific 
mode of investigation, and that the a posteriori method, or that of specific 
experience, as a means of arriving at truth, is inapplicable to these subjects, 
we shall be able to show that the latter method is notwithstanding of great 
value in the moral sciences; namely, not as a means of discovering truth, 
but of verifying it, and reducing to the lowest point that uncertainty before 
alluded to as arising from the complexity of every particular case, and from 
the difficulty (not to say impossibility) of our being assured a priori that 
we have taken into account all the material circumstances (1836: 61).
The latter role of empirical investigation, the reduction of uncertainty in circumstances 
of complexity, points to Mill’s suggested reason for economics’ poor predictive success: 
the complexity of the economy means that economics is “hypothetical”. That is, the 
complexity of the number of causal factors involved in economic prediction means that 
the deductive method cannot be directly applied. Instead, he suggests, economics is a 
science of “tendencies”, which may be overwhelmed by factors left out of the theory:
The discrepancies between our anticipations and the actual facts is often 
the only circumstance which would have drawn our attention to some 
important disturbing cause which we have overlooked (ibid.: 62).
And,
The error, when there is error, does not arise from generalising too 
extensively; that is, from including too wide a range of particular cases in 
a single proposition. Doubtless, a man often asserts of an entire class 
what is only true of a part of it; but his error generally consists not in 
making too wide an assertion, but in making the wrong kind of assertion: 
he predicated an actual result, when he should only have predicated a 
tendency to the result -  a power acting within certain intensity in the 
direction (ibid.: 67).
270
Mill, then, established economic premises as specifying how causal factors operated, 
but not providing universal laws. Instead, such premises represented tendencies, which 
are subject to “disturbances” or “interfering cause”, which cannot be specified in 
advance. Hence, ceteris paribus clauses play a crucial role in the formulation of 
tendency “laws”, allowing the justification of economic premises even in the face of 
empirical failure (Boylan and O’Gorman, 1995).
Economic methodology was dominated by Mill’s deductivism and the notion that 
premises were not impugned by their empirical failure until the 1930s, most notably in 
John Neville Keynes’ (1917) The Scope and M ethod o f Political Economy, and Lionel 
Robbins’ An Essay on the Nature and Significance o f Economic Science (1932). 
However, with the intrusion of logical positivism into economic methodology came the 
first important changes in the profession’s view on the justification of economic theory.
In 1938, Terence Hutchinson’s The Significance and Basic Postulates o f Economic 
Theory challenged the deductivist methodology which had so far dominated economics, 
and introduced economists to the influence of the logical positivists72. Hutchinson’s 
central criticism of theoretical economics is that it does not have testable implications. 
That is, the propositions of pure theory are pure tautologies or are so circumscribed by 
ceteris paribus clauses that their interpretation and testing are impossible:
If the finished propositions of a science, as against the accessory purely 
logical or mathematical propositions used in many sciences, including 
Economics, are to have any empirical content, as the finished propositions 
of all sciences except the Logic and Mathematics obviously must have, 
then these propositions must conceivably be capable of empirical testing or 
be reducible to such propositions by logical or mathematical deduction.
They need not, that is, actually be tested or even practically capable of 
testing under present or future technical conditions or conditions of 
statistical investigation, nor is there any sense in talking of some kind of 
“absolute” test which will “finally” decide whether a proposition is 
“absolutely” true or false. But it must be possible to indicate
72 For a more detailed treatment of logical positivism, see s. 3.3.
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intersubjectively what is the case if they are true or false; their truth or 
falsity, that is, must take some conceivable empirically noticeable 
difference, or some difference must be directly deducible therefrom (1960:
9).
Consequently, he suggested, the statements of pure theory in economics are empty 
definitional and logical truths. Contrary to the previous deductivist methodology, 
Hutchinson argued that economics, like the empirical sciences, must formulate and test 
empirical generalisations, that theorising should be based upon empirical investigation, 
a line of argument supported by the Operationalism73 of the likes of Paul Samuelson 
(1938, 1948).
In response to the work of Hutchinson and Samuelson, economists undertook empirical 
research that tested and questioned the acceptability of the fundamental propositions of 
neo-classical economics (Hall and Hitch, 1939; Lester, 1946, 1947)74. In turn, 
paralleling the arguments for a more instrumentalist logical positivism in the philosophy 
of science, economists argued that this critique propounded an erroneous 
methodological thesis which insisted on testing directly the assumptions of economics, 
rather than focusing on their empirical consequences, the empirical implications of the 
use of assumptions (Machlup, 1946, 1947). As Machlup states:
I had pointed out that fundamental postulates, such as the maximisation 
principle, are “not subject to requirement of independent verification”; 
they are considered as verified, together with the whole theory of which 
they are a part, when the deduced consequences of their conjunction with 
an evident and substantive change and with assumed conditions relevant 
to the case are shown to correspond to observed events (1956: 169).
Perhaps the dominant work in methodological thinking in economics in the post-war 
period, and one which continued this instrumental logical positivist approach, was
73 The aim of which was to derive “operationally meaningful theorems”, based upon “a hypothesis about 
empirical data which could be refuted under ideal conditions”.
74 For a review of attempts to empirically investigate the propositions of neo-classical economics, see 
chapter 8.
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Milton Friedman’s The Methodology o f Positive Economics (1953). Today economists 
do not deny that their assumptions about human nature are unrealistic, but instead claim, 
following Friedman, that the absence of realism does not diminish the value of the 
theory, as it works to produce valid predictions. Instead of viewing the fundamental 
claims of microeconomic theory as a body of statements capable of being true or false, 
followers of Friedman treat them as a set of heuristic tools, useful instruments for 
organising economic observations.
Friedman based his approach on the validity of theory as predictive capacity rather than 
explanatory power75. He declared this his aim for positive economics, and used it to 
defend economics against the criticism of its unrealistic general axioms, arguing that the 
idea behind economics was to provide a system of generalisations that can be used to 
make accurate predictions. Criticism of economics based upon the empirical assessment 
of its assumptions was mistaken, as this assessed economics on the basis of its role as 
language (analytic statements) rather than as substantive prediction. From this 
perspective, theories are simply linguistic/conceptual instruments for making 
translations from one set of facts to another. The only question of interest, suggests 
Friedman, is which model results in the more successful predictions:
A theory cannot be tested by comparing its “assumptions” directly with 
“reality.” Indeed, there is no meaningful way in which this can be done. 
Complete “realism” is clearly unattainable, and the question whether a 
theory is “realistic” enough can be settled only by seeing whether it 
yields predictions that are good enough for the purpose in hand or that 
are better than predictions from alternative theories. Yet the belief that a 
theory can be tested by the realism of its assumptions independently of 
the accuracy of its predictions is widespread and the source of much of 
the perennial criticism of economic theory as unrealistic. Such criticism 
is largely irrelevant, and, in consequence, most attempts to reform 
economic theory that it has stimulated have been unsuccessful (1953:
206).
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In support of this position, Boland (1979: 508) states that “Since no one has yet solved 
the problem of induction, one is always required to assume the truth of his premises or 
assumptions”. In other words, every theory requires untestable axioms, axioms that 
whose validity in the future cannot be known. Therefore, instrumentalism may guide 
science, which means that the theory that is best in terms of conditional or future 
prediction is most desirable.
10.6 Rejecting the deductivist project in economics.
Friedman’s defence of economics against the unreality of its assumptions based upon its 
predictive success is undermined by the argument that economics suffers from a lack of 
successful prediction (s. 10.2). Simon (1963) turns the lack of predictive success of 
economics against Friedman’s instrumental logical positivism, suggesting that the lack 
of evidence concerning the predictions of economic theories, such as the notion that the 
market produces profit maximising prices, means that the testing of theories requires 
that evidence concerning their assumptions be considered. This argument is supported 
by Rosenberg (1992: 61 -  62) when he says:
A cursory examination of the history of neoclassical theory shows that 
the intended domain of economic explanation certainly included the very 
phenomena described in the assumptions of neoclassical theory [...] 
Economists may confidently announce, along with Hicks, that 
“economics is not in the end very much interested in the behaviour of 
single individuals”. But this interest will not prevent false assumptions 
about individuals from bedevilling predictions about the economic 
aggregates made up of them.
Simon (1963) then takes his criticism of Friedman further, arguing that science is not 
based upon unreal assumptions. He suggests that the role of the assumptions of science 
is not described according to their unreality, but that they sufficiently approximate the 
real world to make their postulation interesting. Thus, instead of the principle of 
unreality, economics should be based upon the “principle of continuity of
A philosophical position borrowed from the logical positivist A. J. Ayer (1936). See section 3.3 for a
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approximation”: if conditions in the real world approximate sufficiently well the 
assumptions of an ideal type, the derivations from these assumptions will be 
approximately correct.
Lawson (1997: 111) lends his support to this critique of the unreality of the assumptions 
of economics:
Formally, if X implies Y, and we know that X is [mainly] false as a set 
of claims about actual or possible states of social reality, we can infer 
nothing about the real possibility of Y. Despite pretensions to the 
contrary, orthodox ‘theory’ cannot shed light on the real possibility of 
situations occurring in society which might be characterised as types of 
economic equilibrium. [...] There is little to be gained by employing 
assumptions which specify situations which are already known to be 
non-actual and non-achievable.
In support of Simon’s criticism of Friedman, most important philosophers of science 
have almost universally rejected Friedman’s position (see Boland, 1979). It is widely 
agreed that the purpose of theory is to explain. Otherwise, when predictions prove to be 
valid, we do not know why, and hence are unable to foretell under what conditions they 
will continue to hold or fail, or may need to be adapted.
An alternative approach, then, to the lack of predictive success in economics is to reject 
the deductivist project in economics. This position is neatly summarised in the work of 
Lawson:
Because the project rests upon an implicit commitment to identifying or 
formulating regularities of the form ‘whenever event x then event y’,
[. . .] its legitimate application is restricted to those very special situations 
in which scientifically significant event regularities are [...] forthcoming 
-  which, in the economic sphere, may be hardly any situation at all 
(1997: 93).
more detailed treatment of this position.
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And,
My central thesis is briefly stated. The essence of contemporary 
mainstream economics does not lie at the level of substantive theory as 
most of its critics suggest, but at the level of methodology. Specifically, 
the most fundamental feature is a generalised insistence on the 
deductivist mode of explanation, including an unsustainable commitment 
to the ‘whenever this then that’ structure of Taws’. And it is in this very 
essence that the perpetual disarray of the subject is rooted (ibid.: 282).
The limitations of the deductivist methodology in the social sciences have long been 
recognised76. Rival philosophies of science have thus been developed that to different 
extents reject the positivist tradition. Two such philosophies discussed in previous 
chapters are the interpretative or hermeneutic position (s. 5.5) and the scientific realist 
perspective (s. 5.6). In the remainder of this chapter we briefly review attempts to apply 
each of these traditions to economics.
10.7 Hayek’s Subjectivism
The Duhem-Quine underdetermination hypothesis (s. 3.4) tells us that a single 
hypothesis cannot be falsified, as it is invariably conjunctions of hypotheses that are 
being tested. That is, it is difficult to falsify theories according to the Popperian criteria, 
as we can never be sure that the main hypothesis has been put out to falsification on its 
own, and that other auxiliary hypotheses are not involved. Accordingly, we should not 
expect to find any evidence for the maximisation hypothesis, but at best refutations 
stating that decisions were inconsistent with maximisation (van den Bergh et al, 2000). 
For instance, the maximisation hypothesis may be refuted because the auxiliary 
hypothesis of fixed preferences is incorrect. One cannot test consistency of behaviour 
over time unless one has precise information about the changes in preferences. In turn, 
Boland (1981) argues that neoclassical theory cannot be tested since preferences are 
non-observable, and empirical surveys, introspection and direct observation are
76 See chapters 3 and 5 for a summary of these positions.
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unreliable. Thus, the maximisation hypothesis in reality is just a metaphysical 
assumption which is not to be subjected to any empirical test: it is the paradigm (see 
Kuhn s. 3 .5) of neoclassical economics (van den Bergh et al, 2000).
The problems faced in attempting to test the claims of economics as causal theories has 
led opponents of the naturalisation project to suggest that the social sciences are 
justified on alternative non-naturalistic foundations, and that attempts to treat beliefs 
and desires as the causes of action are the result of conceptual confusion. Causal 
explanation is rejected as the aim of the social sciences. Instead, the social sciences are 
thought to explain behaviour by rendering it intelligible or meaningful, or showing it to
77be reasonable in the light of beliefs and desires .
The most significant figures associated with this interpretive position in economics are 
Hayek and Shackle78. The hermeneutic nature of Shackle’s work is reflected in Antony 
Giddens’ reference to him as “The Sartre of Economics”. His position is perhaps best 
expounded in his Epistemics and Economics (1972). However, for present purposes we 
shall focus on the work of Hayek. He criticised the reliance of mainstream economists 
upon positivist methods and procedures borrowed, as he saw it, from the natural 
sciences, methods which he assessed as contributing scarcely anything to our 
understanding of social phenomena (Lawson, 1997). In accordance with the 
hermeneutic tradition, he argued that the explanatory strategy of the social sciences is 
no longer revealing causes and effects but making action intelligible or meaningful, or 
showing them to be reasonable in the light of beliefs and desires
Hayek’s first step in elaborating a non-positivist perspective on social theorising is 
found in his Scientism and the Study o f Society (1942 -  44). However, the motivation 
for his ‘scientism essay’ is found in his Economics and Knowledge (1937). Here Hayek 
considers the problem of economics to be the requirements for the attainment of 
equilibrium. He defines the solution to this problem as the requirement that agents’ 
actions are co-ordinated:
77 For a more detailed review of this argument see s. 5.5.
78 Another prominent supporter of the anti-naturalist tradition within economics is McCloskey (1985). 
McCloskey, however, goes further and argues for an anti-methodology, classifying economics as mere 
rhetoric, a process of persuasion. He goes on to substitute for philosophy the abolition of economics as an
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Actions of a person can be said to be in equilibrium in so far as they can 
be understood as part of one plan. Only if this is the case, only if all 
these actions have been decided upon at one and the same moment, and 
in consideration of the same set of circumstances, have our statements 
about their interconnections, which we deduce from our assumptions 
about the knowledge and the preferences of the person, any application 
(1937: 36).
Starting with this requirement for the achievement of equilibrium, Hayek then goes on 
to consider the possibility of attaining this requirement. He identifies two cases in which 
the subjective data of individuals, and the plans that are derived from them, will 
necessarily agree:
Plans are mutually compatible and [...] there is consequently a 
conceivable set of external events that will allow all people to carry out 
their plans and not cause any disappointments, [and] that individual 
subjective sets of data correspond to the objective data (ibid.: 39 -  40).
Hayek favours the first of these:
For a society then we can speak of a state of equilibrium at a point of 
time -  but it means only that compatibility exists between the different 
plans which the individuals composing it have made for action in time.
And equilibrium will continue, once it exists, so long as the external data 
corresponds to the common expectations of all members of society. The 
continuance of a state of equilibrium in this sense is then not dependent 
on the objective data being constant in an absolute sense (ibid.: 41).
And again, the tendency towards equilibrium “can hardly mean anything but that under 
certain conditions the knowledge and intentions of the different members of society are 
supposed to come more and more into agreement” (ibid.: 44).
organised body of knowledge, as there is no hope for improvement in economic knowledge. For a further
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Turning to the conditions under which this tendency is supposed to exist, Hayek points 
out that economics generally makes it appear as if the question of how equilibrium 
comes about were solved, but that this demonstration amounts to no more than the 
apparent proof of what is already assumed. That is, the device usually adopted for this 
purpose is the assumption of the perfect market where every event becomes known 
instantaneously to every member. However, Hayek argues,
The statement that, if people know everything, they are in equilibrium is 
true simply because that is how we define equilibrium. [And] it is clear 
that if we want to make the assertion that under certain conditions people 
will approach that state we must explain by what process they will 
acquire the necessary knowledge (ibid.: 45).
Hayek does not venture an explicit explanation of the source of such knowledge. 
However, an indication of his opinion can be attained from the following passage:
The conclusion [. . .] which we must draw is that the relevant knowledge 
which we must possess in order that equilibrium may prevail is the 
knowledge which he is bound to acquire in view of the position in which 
he originally is, and the plans which he then makes. [...] To show that 
[...] the spontaneous actions of individuals will [...] bring about a 
distribution of resources which can be understood as if it were made 
according to a single plan [...] seems to me indeed an answer to the 
problem which has sometimes been metaphorically described as that of 
the “social mind” (ibid.: 51 -  52).
In arriving at this conclusion, Hayek is arguing that economic theory avoids 
demonstrating how a state of equilibrium is brought about by assuming that all agents 
have the same objectively correct perceptions (Caldwell, 1998). However, he suggests, 
agents’ perceptions are not objective but subjective, and equilibrium is brought about
discussion of postmodernism within economics see Burczak (1994).
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through the compatibility of these subjective perceptions through the process of 
construction of the “social mind”.
Building on his rejection of universal correct knowledge Hayek turned, in his ‘scientism 
essay’, to enquire how it is that despite limitations in human knowledge, some kind of 
order in society comes about. As in his Economics and Knowledge, in response to this 
question, Hayek turns to subjectivism, the most significant implication of which is that 
for the social sciences, including economics, the beliefs, desires and actions of 
individuals are not matters to be explained, but merely items to be grasped:
It is important to observe that in all this the various types of individual 
beliefs or attitudes are not themselves the object of our explanation, but 
merely the elements from which we build up the structure of possible 
relationships between individuals. Insofar as we analyse individual 
thought in the social sciences the purpose is not to explain that thought 
but merely to distinguish the possible types of elements with which we 
shall have to reckon in the construction of different patterns of social 
relationships. It is a mistake, to which careless expressions by social 
scientists often give countenance, to believe that their aim is to explain 
conscious action (1942-4: 68).
It is such statements that cause people to interpret Hayek’s subjectivism as hermeneutic: 
social life is concept-dependent. However, Hayek’s exact philosophical position is not 
entirely certain and much more complex than can be done justice to here. This can be 
illustrated by an exchange between Theodore Burczak and Bruce Caldwell in volume 10 
of Economics and Philosophy. Both authors struggle relating the ambiguities of Hayek’s 
subjectivism to scientific or hermeneutic positions. Burczak states
It is not, of course, uncontroversial to associate Hayek with post­
modernism. Hayek, to my knowledge, was never a direct participant in 
the debates surrounding post-modernism, and his brief remarks on such 
figures as Michel Foucault [...] are negative. Moreover, [...] at crucial 
junctures Hayek’s economics depends upon teleological and determinist 
arguments. Nevertheless, I believe it is possible to discern the outlines of
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a nonessentialist, postmodern economics in Hayek’s work (Burczak,
1994a: 32).
Favouring a scientific subjectivist interpretation of Hayek, rather than Burczak’s 
hermeneutic subjectivism, Caldwell states:
Hayek’s resistance to hermeneutics is harder to document because [...] 
he wrote so little about it. It is probably better to characterise Hayek as a 
non-hermeneut rather than as an anti-hermeneut, to indicate that it is a 
path that he chose not to follow rather than one that he vigorously 
opposed (Caldwell, 1994b: 308).
Burczak responds:
Hayek’s work opens many doors. My paper [. . .] aims to show how his 
subjectivism opens the particular door to what might be called 
postmodern, hermeneutical economics. To be sure, I do not believe that 
Hayek himself stepped through this door. I agree with Bruce Caldwell’s 
assertion that Hayek was committed to a “scientific” subjectivism rather 
than a “hermeneutic” subjectivism (1994b, 315).
However, Burczak goes on to outline certain elements of Hayek’s writing that are:
quite consistent with [his] subjectivism, but [...] far more compatible 
with a postmodern hermeneutic subjectivism than with a scientific 
subjectivism, [pointing to] the possibility that our knowledge of society 
is theory- and rhetoric-laden “all the way down” (1994b: 316).
Thus, the two agree that Hayek’s post-modernism is an unintended consequence of his 
writings, because in the few places where Hayek wrote about post-modernism he was 
negative about it; that Hayek’s work coheres with the hermeneutic but not the anti­
humanist variant of post-modernism; and that certain aspects of Hayek’s thought are 
inconsistent even with the hermeneutic version (Caldwell, 1994b). That is, Hayek 
argued with modernism, and in doing so often made post-modern sounds, but in the end
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he resisted taking the “interpretive turn” toward a more thorough-going hermeneutics. 
However, Hayek’s writings “opened the door” to hermeneutic thought in economics.
10.8 Lawson’s Realism 79
In accordance with the scientific realist alternative to positivism presented in s. 5.6, 
Lawson (1989a, 1989b, 1994, 1997, 1999) proposes a realist economics, thus 
maintaining the naturalist project, but rejecting deductivism:
How are the problems and failings of modem economics to be explained 
and resolved? [...] These problems: (1) result ultimately from a 
widespread, rather uncritical, reliance by economists upon a questionable 
conception of science and explanation; and (2) can be resolved through 
replacing this conception with a more adequate one, derived by way of 
adopting an explicit realist orientation (Lawson, 1997: 15).
And,
Success at economic forecasting is unlikely. [...] The one clear 
implication is that without attention to context-specific structures and 
mechanisms, there is little basis for supposing that x will follow from y 
on this occasion merely because it happened before. [...] If event 
prediction is usually infeasible it is in any case not required for a 
successful science of economics. For it can now be accepted that the 
primary aim of science is not the illumination or prediction of events at 
all but the identification and comprehension of the structures, powers, 
mechanisms and tendencies which produce and facilitate them (ibid,: 287 
-  288).
Lawson (1997) suggests that the deductivist epistemology requiring constant 
conjunctures of events does not ‘fit’ the open social system that is the subject of 
economics. In response to this, he suggest that a scientific realist ontology overcomes
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the problems of deductivism while maintaining the naturalistic enterprise. Lawson’s 
(1997) starting point is to identify two problems of contemporary economics: firstly, its 
inability to identify event regularities discussed above; secondly, the inability to 
reconcile real human choice with economic modelling. That is, modelling choices 
would suggest that they are deterministic, negating the possibility of real choice: 
“[Choice requires that] if under conditions x an agent in fact chose to do y, it is the case 
that this same agent could really instead have not done y” (Lawson, 1997: 30).
Focusing on the notion of choice, Lawson applies a scientific realist perspective to 
search for the intransitive mechanisms underlying human choice in order to reformulate 
economic methodology. He suggests that real choice requires humans to be intentional. 
In turn, intentionality is bound up with knowledgeability, as humans must have some 
knowledge at least of the conditions that render their intended acts feasible. In turn 
again, knowledge presupposes a degree of endurability in the objects of knowledge 
sufficient to facilitate their coming to be known. Now, Lawson argues, if, as widely 
reported, scientifically significant event regularities do not often occur in the social 
realm, the enduring objects of knowledge that condition actual human practices must lie 
at a different level, at that of the structures which govern, but are irreducible to events, 
including human activities.
The fact of human intentionality and choice indicates that there are real material causes 
or structures which facilitate intentional action. The question, then, is whether such 
social structures exist. If they do, and if, like many features of the natural realism they 
cannot be perceived directly, the possibility of their detection will turn on the perception 
of their effects. In this way the reality of hypothesised entities can be assessed quite 
empirically, albeit indirectly:
Once we accept the property of depending upon human agency as 
criterial for the social, and acknowledge the causal criterion for ascribing 
reality, it is easy enough to see that identifiable social structures do exist.
Items such as (societal) rules, relations and positions clearly depend on 
human agency as well as condition our every day [...] activities. The
79 The following discussion is based upon Lawson (1997). However, other relevant discussions can be
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human (intentional) activities of speaking, writing, driving on public 
roadways, cashing cheques, playing games, giving lectures, and so forth, 
would be impossible without such social material conditions as rules of 
grammar, the highway code, banking systems, rules of play, teacher- 
student relations, etc. All are structures which pre-exist and make a 
difference to (facilitate as well as constrain) related human activities 
(Lawson, 1997: 31).
Thus, natural and social realms are similar in that both are characterised by structures 
underlying the course of events. However, they are dissimilar in that social structures 
depend for their existence on human agency. “Thus, although a language system is like 
gravity in that it facilitates human action it is unlike gravity in depending in turn on 
human action” (Lawson, 1997: 32). Human agency and social structure presuppose each 
other. Neither can be reduced to, identified with, or explained completely in terms of the 
other, for each requires the other.
The significant point is that because social structure is human-agent dependent it is only 
ever manifest in human activity. Thus, given the open nature of human action -  that 
each person could always have acted otherwise -  it follows that social structure can only 
ever be present in an open system. In consequence, any economic laws must be 
interpreted as tendencies that are manifest as strict event regularities only very rarely, 
and the deductivist project in economics is misguided (Lawson, 1997). By accepting a 
scientific realist perspective and acknowledging a realm of structures and mechanisms 
which are irreducible to actual phenomena including human activities, but which 
govern, facilitate, produce and/or condition them, the determinism of positivism is 
avoided, and space for real choice is retained. For instance, while the structures of 
languages facilitate speech, they do not determine what is said.
Lawson is not suggesting that people never act in an economically rational way. The 
point is that, from a scientific realist perspective, notions such as economic rationality 
must be conceived in terms of potentials; as potentials that may or may not be 
expressed, and if expressed may or may not be actualised because of countervailing
found in Lawson (1989a, 1989b, 1994, 1999).
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tendencies. Thus, contrary to mainstream neo-classical economics, it is suggested that 
the subject matter of economics cannot be reduced to principles governing the 
behaviour of individuals. Instead, economics should acknowledge the centrality of 
human beings to all social life, and the reality of social structures that cannot be reduced 
to people.
Both the deductivist and scientific realist philosophies maintain the naturalistic project 
in the social sciences through a notion of causal hypotheses. However, their conception 
of such causal hypotheses differs in significant ways. While deductivism employs a 
deductive or inductive mode of inference to cover a phenomena under a generalisation, 
scientific realism employs a ‘retroductive7 or ‘abductive7 or ‘as i f  mode of inference to 
identify a factor responsible for, that helped produce, or at least facilitated the 
phenomena. That is, rather than looking for an empirical law, scientific realism moves 
from an observation to a theory of a deeper causal mechanism, structure or tendency. In 
this case, laws are neither empirical statements (statements about experience) nor 
statements about events or their regularities, but statements about structures and their 
characteristic modes of activity.
The scientific realist perspective also accepts that the choice of phenomena to be 
explained, and the set of causal factors pursued in its explanation reflect the 
investigator’s knowledge, understanding, values and interests. Thus, while identifying 
causal intransitive mechanisms, knowledge is also fallible. This is particularly important 
as the scientific realist ontology accepts the existence of countervailing tendencies and 
unactualised potentials80.
Lawson (1997) illustrates the difference between the deductivist and the scientific 
realist conceptions of economics through a comparison of the notion of rationality 
employed within each. The deductivist goal of the economic orthodoxy is achieved by 
imputing to any economic agent some unitary objective, a set of beliefs/knowledge, and 
an ordering of some kind over the perceived potential satisfiers of the imputed 
objective, thus producing a model explaining behaviour of the form ‘if x then y7 (see 
chapter 8).
80 For a more detailed review of the scientific realism position, see s. 5.6.
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Scientific realism replaces this image of the perpetually-calculating, optimising agent 
with one of individuals continually negotiating their daily affairs through 
acknowledgement of the existence of choice and intentionality that enable individuals to 
formulate plans in line with their desires and beliefs, and to act upon them. Lawson 
(1997) refers to this as the theory of situation rationality. Choices are conditioned by the 
situated options perceived, and individuals have themselves been moulded by the 
context of their birth and development. Individuals are faced with a range of positions 
with associated, and perhaps contradictory, interests, needs and motives, and a range of 
rules to draw upon and obligations to fulfil. Action is thus a “continuous stream”. While 
individuals act rationally, it is a far cry from the ever calculating, ranking optimiser of 
standard economic theory.
The aim of economics as it emerges from the scientific realist perspective is to describe 
the structural conditions for some manifest social phenomena to be possible:
Economics analysis as conceived here, then, will usually be a 
complicated and messy affair. Unlike the simplistic positivistic 
conception of science as elaborating event regularities, the process of 
uncovering and explaining significant causal structures and mechanisms, 
including geo-historically rooted and dynamic totalities, will usually be a 
painstaking, laborious, and time-consuming, transformative activity, one 
that gives rise to results that will always be partial and contingent. [...]
The explanatory process will inevitably involve looking at certain 
features of some structure or mechanism or system to the neglect of 
others, understanding some structure etc., from a particular angle, 
leaving certain questions at any stage unanswered [...] and warranting of 
further attention (Lawson, 1997: 270 -  271).
10.9 Testing causal theories in economics.
It is not the intention of this chapter to side with any particular epistemological 
approach to economics, nor to provide a comprehensive review of economic
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methodology. Instead, identifying the problems with the dominant deductivist approach, 
and acknowledging the existence of alternatives is meant to highlight the problems with 
testing the claims of economics and the fact that these issues are recognised within the 
economics profession itself.
Thus, just as we experienced problems testing the claims of economics in chapter 9, so 
economics generally suffers in its claim to present testable causal theories. That is, the 
problem with most conceptions of rationality within the social sciences, including that 
of neo-classical economics, is that they remain untestable as causal theories. Neither 
economists nor their critics can create a definition of “rationality” that avoids 
circularity. The approach employed attempts to work back from behaviours to 
beliefs/desires and, in doing so, requires further assumptions about the nature of the 
mind, as there are an infinite number of different combinations of beliefs and desires 
that can lead to an action. Indeed, it is the failure of this epistemological approach to 
illuminate the social realm that causes some economists to opt instead for the rival 
philosophies of hermeneuticism and realism.
10.10 Summary: Can moral norms be incorporated within individual benefit- 
functions?
Part III of this thesis has attempted to address the question of whether moral norms can 
be incorporated within individual benefit-functions. Having identified some of the 
literature concerned with this issue in chapter 8, it was suggested that neo-classical 
economics is not based on the notion of self-interest, but rather makes assumptions 
regarding the structure of preference: that they are teleological. Thus, it is argued that 
whether moral norms can be incorporated within individual benefit functions depends 
on the structure of morality. In particular, whether morality shares a teleological 
structure with economic preferences.
Chapter 9 attempted to determine empirically whether morality possesses such a 
teleological structure through the examination of participants’ motivations in 
responding to a Contingent Valuation survey. It was suggested that moral norms and 
economic values are commensurable and thus do share a teleological structure. 
However, in testing the structure of beliefs, our analysis required that certain
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assumptions be made regarding the nature of beliefs, something that chapter 10 
identifies as a fundamental epistemological flaw arising from the application of causal 
laws to the explanation of social behaviour.
Thus, in summary, it is suggested that, before our result in favour of the neo-classical 
paradigm and the notion that moral values possess a teleological structure can be 
accepted there are fundamental epistemological issues that require resolving within 




11. Investigating the commensurability of environmental values: 
Implications for the epistemology of the social sciences.
11.1 The commensurability of environmental citizen and consumer values.
To briefly review the rationale for undertaking the above investigation, it was suggested 
in Part I that both the efficacy of incorporating moral values within economic valuations 
of the environment and the likely impact of the expansion of market forces on traditional 
communal norms are questions that can be answered through the determination of die 
commensurability of citizen and consumer values. That is, if citizen and consumer values 
are commensurable and moral values can be incorporated into individual benefit 
functions without agent’s experiencing ambivalence, and doing so involves no loss of 
knowledge, then moral norms motivate actions through the same psychological 
mechanism as market incentives. In this case, moral norms can be incorporated within 
economic valuation of environmental resources, and market incentives have the potential 
to undermine traditional communal practices.
In Part I of this thesis two questions were outlined, the answer to which would contribute 
to determining the commensurability of citizen and consumer values. The first of these 
questions was whether environmental moral norms possessed objective validity. Part II 
considered this question, concluding that although the potential for objectivity was still 
maintained within the work of Lakatos and the scientific realist philosophy, recent trends 
tended to favour the relativism of knowledge. However, while attempts to empirically 
identify necessity in knowledge of the environment in corroboration of the objectivity 
thesis proved inconclusive, the investigation in chapter 4 did suggest the possibility of 
necessity in the development of environmental preferences. Furthermore, surveys of the 
literature revealed support for commonalities in tree symbolism (s. 7.3), Biophilia (s. 
4.2.1), and universalities in the classification of biological kinds (s. 4.2.3).
In favour of the relativism of knowledge, chapter 4 also identified a literature supporting 
the local, culturally determined nature of environmental preferences. What’s more, the
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frameworks developed in an attempt to investigate the existence of necessity in 
knowledge of the environment might be considered novel (the adaptation of Piaget’s 
genetic epistemology in chapter 4) or contentious (direct perception’s rejection of 
mainstream anthropology in chapter 6).
The second question asked in Part I was whether citizen and consumer values can be 
combined, or can citizen values be incorporated within individual benefit functions? Part 
III considered this question, though once again our discussion proved inconclusive. It was 
argued that this question could be rephrased as whether morality can be thought of as 
possessing a teleological structure (chapter 9). However, although an empirical 
investigation into people’s motivations in responding to a Contingent Valuation survey 
suggested that citizen and consumer values are commensurable (chapter 9), the validity 
of this result is called into question by rejection of the naturalistic project within the 
social sciences (chapter 10).
The thesis therefore fails to convincingly determine the commensurability of citizen and 
consumer values, as the empirical investigations undertaken are unable to settle all the 
philosophical questions posed. This is perhaps not so surprising considering the 
complexity of the issues concerned. As Foster tells us:
“Value” is a word with all the complexity of life itself. [It] eludes our 
definitional grasp with a subtle duplicity characteristic of the really 
important concepts in human experience (Foster, 1997: 2 -  3).
As such, it is difficult to relate decisively back to the policy problems that motivated our 
investigation in Part I. It is hoped that the questions of pertinence to the resolution of 
these problems have been spelt out clearly, and the reasoning in following this line of 
questioning is justified. However, given the inability to conclude with regard the answers 
to the questions posed, policy recommendations await further research.
291
11.2 Lessons for the methodology of the social sciences.
Rather than concluding about the commensurability of citizen and consumer values, what 
emerges most forcefully from this thesis is the minefield presented by epistemological 
issues in the social sciences. Social scientists have defended competing and irreconcilable 
approaches to their own discipline by appeal to philosophical theories. Indeed, perhaps 
the one constant within the philosophy of social science has been the dispute between the 
naturalist and the anti-naturalist81. For instance, while economists have tended to favour a 
deductive, naturalist epistemology, researchers in the fields of anthropology and 
sociology have tended to favour the anti-naturalist, interpretive epistemological approach. 
Briefly stated, the naturalist maintains that the social sciences should approach the study 
of social phenomena in the same way that the natural sciences have approached the study 
of natural phenomena -  that the social sciences should have as their goals prediction and 
nomological explanation. Anti-naturalists deny the possibility of a naturalistic social 
science due to basic differences in the subject matter of the social and natural sciences. 
Advocates of this view hold that there are no laws in the social sciences, and that instead
we should seek to understand social phenomena from the point of view of the social
a82agent .
Such disputes over whether the goal of social science should be predictive improvement 
or increasing intelligibility is fundamentally a disagreement about the nature, extent, and 
justification of claims to knowledge. Of course, we’d rather not have to choose between 
seeking improvement in prediction and making human action more intelligible. Yet 
insofar as what we seek in social science is knowledge, the choice is forced upon us 
(Rosenberg, 1995). That is what makes epistemology unavoidable for those who hold that 
the aim of the social sciences is to provide knowledge.
81 Other epistemological approaches to the social sciences include pluralism -  the notion that naturalist and 
anti-naturalist positions are compatible or even complementary -  and critical social science -  the idea that 
deep unconscious prejudices we hold about class, race, and gender influence our research and that the 
social sciences should raise them to consciousness so that we can escape their influence and become 
‘liberated’.
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Throughout part II various epistemic frameworks were presented at one stage or another. 
Chapter 3 reviewed the distinction within the philosophy of science between the positive 
notion of objective knowledge through causal laws and the relativist espousal of 
subjective, culturally constructed knowledge, as well as reviewing Lakatos’s 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Chapter 4 investigated the potential 
role of Piaget’s genetic epistemology in helping to explain landscape preference. Chapter 
5 related the positivist and relativist perspectives to the social sciences in the shape of the 
conventional naturalist-non-naturalist dichotomy, as well as summarising the scientific 
realist defence of objective knowledge. Finally, chapter 6 briefly discussed the distinction 
between the Cartesian and Romantic frameworks before turning to Gibson’s direct 
perception approach to knowledge.
This thesis is concerned with investigating the claims of economics. As it is the deductive 
epistemology that underlies much of economic thinking, we shall focus on this 
epistemological debate by commenting upon the appropriateness of this deductive 
approach for the social sciences.
Throughout the thesis, concerns have been documented over the possibility of a social 
science based upon constant behavioural conjunctions. In chapter 5, we described how 
the “deductive-nomological” or “covering law” theory of scientific explanation, deducing 
occurrences from a set of one or more laws and a description of initial conditions, cannot 
be applied to the behavioural sciences due to the folk psychology they employ (s. 5.3). In 
particular, is was suggested that this form of explanation fails as there are two problems 
measuring the initial conditions of behaviour. Firstly, mental states are thought to be 
holistic. That is, by itself an action never identifies a single belief or desire, as the 
identification of one belief or desire requires that all other beliefs and desires be known.
Secondly, while this problem might be overcome through the measurement of beliefs and 
desires, the only instrument available to undertake such measurement is social theory
82 For a further discussion of the details of the naturalist and anti-naturalist positions within the social 
sciences see chapters 3, 5 and 10.
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itself. That is, the approach employed attempts to work back from behaviours to 
beliefs/desires and, in doing so, requires further assumptions about the nature of the 
mind, as there are an infinite number of different combinations of beliefs and desires that 
can lead to an action. The only way to measure beliefs and desires is to make 
assumptions about the mind, such as the rational theory of choice.
Two of the empirical investigations undertaken within this thesis adopted the positivist 
“covering-law” epistemological position, and the result of each demonstrated the 
fundamental epistemological difficulties in applying such “laws” to social action. That is, 
the inability of the social sciences to describe constant behavioural conjunctures. Firstly, 
chapter 4 attempted to analyse the source and form of environmental landscape 
preferences. The hypothesis presented for investigation was of a format represented by 
the “covering-law” approach:
Initial conditions: Picture 1 scores higher on characteristic X.
Hypothesis: Developmental necessity favours the preference for X.
Therefore;
Observation: Picture 1 is chosen.
A caveat to concluding in favour of this hypothesis was that learned preferences may 
favour the preference for X. (s. 4.8.2). This reflects the first problems outlined above. To 
identify one belief requires that all beliefs and desires be known: to know preferences 
derived from necessity in development is to know preferences learned. As noted, this 
problem can be overcome through the measurement of beliefs. However, there is no way 
of measuring whether it is the case that learned preferences favour the preference for X 
except through the employment of a “covering-law” of sort being tested, as the only 
approach available is to work back from behaviour to beliefs and desires, something 
which requires assumptions about the mind such as are reflected in theory. This is the 
second problem outlined above.
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Thus, to determine whether learned preferences favour X would require employing the 
observation that people prefer picture 1, or more of characteristic X, and working back 
from such behaviour to preferences. However, the only link between behaviour and belief 
are “covering-laws” relating the two. For example, if the law that ‘Developmental 
necessity favours the preference for X’ is employed, then we would conclude that learned 
preferences do not favour X. Thus, a circularity opens up when “covering-laws” are used 
to relate behaviour and beliefs or desires.
Similarly, chapter 9 attempts to investigate the structure of morality. In doing so, the 
hypothesis presented for empirical analysis can be written:
Initial conditions: 1. Resources are valued using moral norms.
2. Economic preferences can be valued monetarily.
Hypothesis: Moral norms and economic preferences are both teleological.
Therefore;
Observation: Resources can be valued monetarily.
A caveat to concluding in favour of this hypothesis was that the investigation undertaken 
may not have activated the norms used to value the resources (s. 9.6.3). That is, are the 
initial conditions described above accurate? Again the first problem of holistic mental 
states is raised: in order to know a person’s belief regarding the teleology of morality one 
must know, for instance, their desire to apply norms in the valuation process. And again 
this problem cannot be overcome through measurement of the initial conditions, as the 
only way to do so is to employ laws to work from behaviour to belief: as resources can be 
valued monetarily, norms and economic preferences are both teleological, and economic 
preference can be valued monetarily, then it can be concluded that norms were activated.
Thus, the empirical investigations undertaken demonstrate the problems deploying laws 
to describe behaviour: the holistic nature of mental states, and the inability to measure
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beliefs and desires without making assumptions about the mind in the form of theories. 
The methodological insights emerging from this thesis contribute generally to the debate 
concerning the epistemic status of the social sciences. Do the social sciences require any 
special treatment or are the epistemological insights of the natural sciences sufficient in 
investigating society? Is a naturalist social science possible? The above observations 
would suggest that such a naturalist project is not possible, and that the social sciences 
should adopt an alternative epistemological framework, such as the hermeneutic or the 
scientific realist perspectives outlined in chapter 5.
11.3 Hermeneutics and the commensurability of values.
The importance in the generation of knowledge of different epistemological positions 
when applied to the social sciences can be illustrated through consideration of intuitive 
responses to the question raised in chapter 9: does morality possesses a teleological 
structure? Before the concerns with regards the epistemological position adopted were 
highlighted, the conclusion of the empirical work undertaken in chapter 9 was that citizen 
and consumer values, or moral norms and economic preferences, are commensurable. 
That is, moral norms can be incorporated within individual benefit functions and valued 
monetarily. This is the conclusion produced through the application of a naturalist 
perspective to the development of knowledge within the social sciences. It is also a 
conclusion not without its critics.
Interestingly, an analysis of the criticism levied against the notion of the 
commensurability of moral norms and economic preferences can be thought of as the 
application of an anti-naturalist, interpretive epistemology. That is, such an approach 
accords much more with the notion of understanding social phenomena from the point of 
view of social agents themselves. Within this perspective can be included many of the 
intuitive objections to the economic valuation of natural resources reviewed within the 
course of this thesis. For instance, Keat lists a number of the analogies presented by Mark 
Sagoff in criticism of the neo-classical economic position:
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To arrive at environmental decisions [by determining people’s WTP] 
would be the equivalent of trying to decide whether a person on trial is 
guilty by discovering, before any evidence has been heard, what the 
preferences of the jury were in this regard, and then calculating the net 
benefits of the two possible verdicts; or deciding whether creationist 
science, instead of Darwinian theory, should be taught in certain schools 
by finding out whether there were enough pupils or parents whose 
preferences for this were sufficiently strong, as indicated by their WTP to 
meet the costs of doing so; or determining the justifiability of the Vietnam 
war by finding out whether this policy produced more preference 
satisfaction than its alternatives, with people’s moral judgements about the 
war being included alongside other kinds o f‘preference’ (Keat, 1997: 33 -  
34).
In other words, the conclusion presented in chapter 9 was that ethical judgements are 
made in accordance with their makers’ own, subjectively determined well-being. It is not 
controversial to suggest that people will justifiably have problems with this. That is, 
people will feel that interests can be made distinct from those exhibited in a particular 
institutional context, such as the market. Another way of putting this is that people hold 
strong convictions about the kinds of things that can be bought and sold. Or, there are 
commitments that are central to the well-being of agents that are partially constituted by a 
refusal to put a price on goods. The notion of non-commensurability holds strong 
intuitive claims. For instance, O’Neill (1998: 171) suggests that “The person who could 
put a price on friendship, simply could not have friends.”
Anderson (1990) characterises these strong intuitive claims by contrasting impersonal 
monetary valuation and market exchange with the gift exchange and reciprocity of 
personal relationships:
Prostitution is a classic example of the debasement of a gift value through 
its commodification. But what is base about buying and selling sexual 
“services” on the market? One cannot understand what makes this practice
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base without understanding the specifically human good achieved when 
sexual acts are exchanged as gifts. This good is founded on mutual 
recognition of the partners as sexually attracted to each other and as 
affirming an intimate relationship in their mutual offering of themselves to 
each other. This is a shared good: one and the same good is realised for 
both partners in their action, and part of its goodness lies in the mutual 
understanding that it is shared. [...] When sexual “services” are sold on 
the market, the kind of reciprocity required to realise human sexuality as a 
shared good is broken. [...] The problems entailed by explicitly 
exchanging sexual acts for money arise in part because sexual acts [... ] are 
valuable as expressions of underlying non-commercial motives and 
understandings (Anderson, 1990: 187 - 188).
Moreover, one way of making intelligible the intuitive reaction against the suggestion 
that moral norms and economic preferences are commensurable would be to suggest that 
morality does not possess a teleological structure. That is, nobody would find it 
unreasonable to suggest the morality possess a non-teleological structure and is non- 
commensurable with economic preference - a conclusion that contradicts that emerging 
from the positivist analysis of chapter 9.
This analysis of people’s understanding of the question presented in chapter 9 
corresponds with the epistemological approach espoused by hermeneutics. Rather than 
developing and empirically examining the predictions of a “covering-law”, as was 
attempted in chapter 9, the approach adopted here is concerned with understanding, or 
making intelligible the meanings and interpretations attached by people to the world -  in 
this case the problem of incorporating moral norms into economic valuation. 
Furthermore, the conclusions of the positivist and hermeneutic approaches to the problem 
of the structure of morality, at least in this instance, reveal opposing conclusions. Put 
another way, the different epistemologies produced different knowledge.
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Another way of expressing the contradictory knowledge emerging from the two 
approaches adopted is to suggest either that the conclusion of the investigation 
undertaken in chapter 9 is wrong, or that people’s intuition is wrong. However, to pick 
between these two positions one first has to choose between competing epistemologies.
11.4 Implications for investigating the claims of economics.
This thesis set out with the intention of investigating a number of the claims made by 
economics. Specifically, in order to determine the commensurability of moral norms and 
economic preferences, economists’ claims that moral values are subjective, and that 
norms can be incorporated into individual benefit functions were put to the test. The 
epistemological implications of the results obtained, however, hold important lessons for 
any such attempt. As was described in sections 10.4 and 10.5, economists have 
traditionally maintained the deductive epistemological approach reflected in the 
covering-law model of explanation. As Caldwell argues:
I submit that one operative assumption of our time is the almost 
unquestioned authority of science. Its particular manifestation within 
[economics] had its origins many years ago, when the notion first blossomed 
that economics could be, and should try to be, a scientific discipline. In the 
twentieth century the dream seemed realised with the emergence of 
positivism. [However] positivism in its many variations has been in decline 
within the philosophy of science for the last twenty years or so, and that 
knowledge is now filtering down to the special sciences, especially as the 
works of the ‘growth of knowledge’ philosophers (Thomas Kuhn, Imre 
Lakatos, J. A. Agassi, and others) have gained prominence. Few economists 
keep up with developments in the philosophy of science, and as such it is 
understandable that many still labor under the illusion that economics is, or 
can be, a positivist discipline (1994a: 4. Emphasis added).
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Thus, if economics is to convincingly come to terms with its critics, it must address some 
of its philosophical presuppositions -  in this case the teleological structure of morality. 
However, to do so requires, in turn, that further philosophical questions be asked, this 
time in the area of epistemology. If questions concerning the moral philosophical 
framework upon which economics is based are to be answered satisfactorily, economics 
has to first embrace concerns over its epistemological status.
As the brief review of the work of Mill, Robbins, Hutchinson, Machlup and Friedman (s. 
10.5) suggested, philosophy and methodology were issues that once sat at the heart of 
economic debate. However, Lawson (1997) describes a recent reluctance on the part of 
economists to reflect on epistemological questions:
Perhaps the most immediate form [of this reluctance] is the perpetual 
repetition of such quips as ‘don’t think about it, just do it’; or ‘methodologists 
are crazy’. An effective restraint on methodology, moreover, is the clear 
reluctance of mainstream economic journals to publish much of it. Also 
significant is the apparent refusal of many central research funding authorities 
to promote it. In the UK, for example, the training currently provided and 
recommended for economics students tends to be more or less devoid of any 
explicit methodological content. A quick run through a recent Economic and 
Social Research Council Guidelines fo r  Post Graduate Training reveals that 
economics is one of only two out of the twenty subject guidelines provided 
(the other being ‘town planning’) that do not include an explicit section 
detailing the need for some form of formal training in the ‘philosophy of the 
social sciences’ (Lawson, 1997: 11- 12).
As an example of this notion that methodological reflection is irrelevant to economics, 
Lawson quotes Frank Hahn’s response to the claim that he himself practices 
methodology:
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Methodology like original sin won’t go away, and Backhouse is right in 
saying that I myself have sinned. Perhaps it would have been better if I had 
not. [... ] What I really wanted to advise the young to do was avoid spending 
much time and thought on it. As for them learning philosophy, whatever 
next? (Hahn, 1992; quoted in Lawson, 1997: 12).
Further, Lawson quotes a similar observation of Caldwell’s
At the 1989 History of Economics Society meeting [...] there was a session 
entitled, ‘Should Methodology Matter to the Economist or to the Historian 
of Economics?’ Some of the participants answered in the negative. As an 
observer I was disappointed in the session, not because the study of 
methodology was attacked, but because the attack was such an anaemic one.
The major worry seemed to be that many economists think that 
methodological study is a waste of time. One panellist even suggested that it 
would be right to keep doing methodological investigations as long as we 
called them by another name so as not to offend our fellow economists 
(Caldwell, 1990; quoted in Lawson, 1997: 13).
Perhaps this position is not all that unreasonable. The differences between the deductive 
and interpretive views of the social sciences rest on fundamental issues of philosophy, 
claims about epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. Since these issues were first raised 
by Plato almost 2400 years ago, philosophers have not been able to settle them 
(Rosenberg, 1995). Thus, why should the rest of us bother about these issue if they 
cannot be settled? As Caldwell states:
The study of methodology is an agonising task; writing a book on the 
subject requires the skills of an individual who is at once presumptuous 
and masochistic. By the very nature of methodological work, solutions to 
important problems seldom seem to exist (1994a: 1).
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And,
An apt, if cynical, characterisation of methodological study is that it is the 
systematic categorisation of unanswerable questions (ibid.: 6).
However, while these issues may be insoluble, they are certainly not irrelevant. Even the 
claim that philosophical reflection is irrelevant to advancing knowledge is itself a 
philosophical claim (Rosenberg, 1995). Social scientists indifferent to philosophy can 
embrace this view. But unless they argue for it, their view must appear to others to be 
sheer prejudice. An argument for the irrelevance of philosophy is itself philosophy. As 
argued in the last section, what makes epistemology unavoidable for those who hold that 
the aim of the social sciences is to provide knowledge: “Methodology systematises man’s 
curiosity; each methodological view directs the scientist to seek knowledge differently” 
(Caldwell, 1994a: 2).
Hausman (1994) identifies a resurgence of interest in the philosophy and methodology of 
economics during the last generation. Martin and McIntyre (1994) identify a similar 
resurgence of interest in philosophy in the social sciences in general since the early 
1980s. Hausman goes on to identify a number of reasons for this increased interest:
(a) The recent poor performance of economies, and the widespread doubt that anyone 
knows how to restore prosperity or to alleviate the continuing misery 
characteristic of most of the so-called “developing” countries. Not only do lay 
people doubt economists, but economists doubt themselves.
(b) The provocative claim by economists that economics is the model that all social 
scientists should follow makes methodological questions concerning economics 
more directly significant to practitioners of the social sciences.
(c) The calling into question of the fundamental claims of mainstream economics 
following stringent testing by cognitive psychologists.
(d) The increased scepticism within the philosophy of science regarding how science 
ought to be done (see chapters 3 and 5).
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Thus, Hausman argues:
In such an atmosphere it is not surprising that economists should turn to 
methodological reflection in the hope of finding some flaw in previous 
economic study or [... ] some new methodological direction that will better 
guide their work in future (Hausman, 1994: 2).
Perhaps the relationship between the problems experienced within economics and the 
renewed interested in philosophy is more than coincidence. As Thomas Kuhn noted, it 
has only been at periods of crisis in the development of physics or chemistry that natural 
scientists have turned to philosophy and taken seriously questions about the foundations 
of their discipline.
Whatever the motivation behind this increased interested in methodology in economics, it 
is a trend that is supported by this thesis. That is, the conclusion of this thesis is a call for 
further attention to the philosophical issues underlying economic arguments, in particular 
epistemology. It is beyond this thesis to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
philosophical issues relevant to economics, let alone ruling on the epistemological 
framework most appropriate for economics. However, it is hoped that it at least provides 
an introduction to some of the issues of importance, and thus a starting point for future 
study.
11.5 Is the conunensurability o f values worth investigating?
One response to the questions posed in this thesis was that they seemed too obvious. That 
is, it is generally acknowledged that no value system possesses any greater validity than 
another -  that values are subjective -  and that the capitalist ideology has the power to 
undermine other value systems -  that traditional norms will be eroded in the face of 
market forces. In the light of the investigation undertaken, that this claim was made can
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be taken as indicative of the conclusion presented above -  that the social sciences need to 
pay greater attention to the philosophical issues underlying their discipline.
One level of response to this claim would be to point to various arguments identified as 
contributing to the answers to these questions and the different, often contradictory 
positions adopted with regard these questions. For instance, while relativism has been 
influential within the social sciences, especially within the anthropology literature, the 
same literature contains claims regarding the ‘truth’ to be learned from indigenous 
cultures. Moreover, the power of the capitalist ideology to erode traditional norms is 
accepted by those arguing in favour of the non-commensurability of moral norms and 
economic preferences. That these two positions require contradictory moral philosophical 
presuppositions seems to have escaped many involved in such debates.
Following on from these observations, a second more fundamental response would be to 
suggest that the answers to such questions only seem obvious from the perspective of a 
social science steeped in presupposition. That is, once we examine these presuppositions, 
as attempted within this thesis, they become much less obvious. Firstly, as argued above, 
we see that the presuppositions employed are far from consistent and often contradict. 
Secondly, we start to appreciate the importance of the epistemological position adopted 
in arriving at, and supporting these presuppositions (s. 11.3).
Thus, by way of reiteration, the concerns raised against this thesis serve to reinforce its 
conclusion: if social scientists are to resolve their different perspectives on the 
fundamental questions that divide them, they must address the philosophical basis of their 
knowledge.
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Appendix 3: Landscape scale sensitivity analysis.







Coherence Complexity Mystery Legibility Water Lushness Forest
5 to -5 Picture 1 0.9851** 0.9744* -0.9689* -0.8446 0.9558* -0.9655* 0.9177*
20 to -20 Picture 2 0.9851* 0.9744* -0.9689* -0.8446 0.9558* -0.9655* 0.9177*
50 to -50 Picture 3 0.9852* 0.9762* -0.9710* -0.6973 0.9573* -0.9658* 0.9050*
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